05000280/FIN-2017004-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Instructions for Corrective Maintenance on Unit 1 C RC Hot Leg Sample Valve |
| Description | A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.A.7 was identified for the failure to have detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions in design change packages (DCPs)78-001, 80-007, and 84-369 when replacing 1-SS-HCV-101C, the Unit 1 C reactor coolant (RC) hot leg sample valve. This resulted in 1-SS-HCV-101C developing a through-wall leak on the tube to valve socket weld. Additionally, due to the reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary leakage, Unit 1 required an unplanned shutdown per TS 3.1.C.3 on August 9, 2017. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 1075404. During the shutdown, the licensee made an American Society of Mechanical Engineering (ASME) code repair by cutting and capping the tubing to stop the leak. 1-SS-HCV-101C will be restored to normal system configuration during the next refueling outage in April 2018.The inspectors determined that the failure of the licensee to have the instructions necessary to properly install the C RCS loop hot leg sample valve and tubing as required by Surry procedure SUI-0001 was a performance deficiency (PD). Specifically, DCPs78-001,80-007, and 84-369 did not have instructions necessary to ensure the 1-SS-HCV-101C and the associated tubing was properly mounted to absorb the stresses applied to the valve and tubing during normal operation of the valve. As a consequence of the insufficient supports, 1-SS-HCV-101C experienced a through-wall leak on a socket weld on August 9, 2017, which subsequently required an unplanned shutdown of Unit 1. Using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, the inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 2, dated October 7, 2016; the finding was determined to adversely affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. The inspectors screened the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power dated June 19, 2012, and determined that it screened as Green because the deficiency did not cause a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant to a stable shutdown condition. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because it is not considered current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Surry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000280/2017004 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2017 (2017Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Mckenna C Jones C Read P Capehart R Kellner W Loo G Macdonald |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Surry - IR 05000280/2017004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Surry) @ 2017Q4
Self-Identified List (Surry)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||