05000280/FIN-2017002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Have Work Instructions Impacting MER 5 Flood Barrier |
| Description | An NRC-identified, NCV of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.A.7 was identified because the mechanical equipment room (MER) 5 flood dike was not installed in accordance with the manufacturers installation procedures after it was removed for maintenance. Specifically, work order (WO) 38103734871, procedure GMP-013, Removal and Installation of Flood Protection Dikes and Secondary Flood Shields and Placing MER 3 in Extended Access, Revision 22, and drawing 11548-FC-6L, Flood Protection Dike Details MER 5 Turbine Building Unit 2, Revision 0, did not provide instructions, procedures, or drawing specifics that took into account the manufacturer instructions of using epoxy to ensure a water tight seal; and failed to use the materials as listed in drawing 11548-FC-6L during the reinstallation of MER 5 flood dike. The issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as condition reports (CR) 1068357, 1068357, and 1068528.The inspectors determined that not having and following work instructions and drawings appropriate to the reinstallation of MER 5 flood dike is a performance deficiency (PD). This PD is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, on May 2, 2017, the licensee failed to ensure WO 38103734871, procedure GMP-013, and drawing 11548-FC-6L had detailed manufacturer instructions to use epoxy to ensure a water tight seal and failed to use the materials as listed in drawing 11548-FC-6L. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), in this case the main control room (MCR) chillers in MER 5, in which the SSC in question maintained its operability. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with teamwork, in that, individuals and work groups failed to communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, while preparing for and performing MER 5 flood dike reinstallation using WO 38103734871, procedure GMP-013, and drawing 11548-FC-6L, the licensee utilized a new foam material, but the differentdepartments in the organization (specifically Supply, Engineering, and Maintenance) failed to work together to evaluate the supplied manufacturer material and any specific requirements needed for installation (H.4) |
| Site: | Surry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000280/2017002 Section 1R06 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Mckenna N Day C Jones A Butcavage R Carrion C Dykes W Loo A Masters |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Surry - IR 05000280/2017002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Surry) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Surry)
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