05000266/FIN-2010003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedures Needed to Maintain Equipment Operability with Hazard Barriers Out-Of-Service |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to follow procedural/instructional guidance contained in a temporary procedure for the maintenance of high energy line break (HELB) barriers. Specifically, on June 25, 2010, the licensee placed a wedge under the control room door, a HELB barrier, contrary to the guidance contained in Operations Notebook procedure/instruction, HELB Barrier/Vent Path Temporary Guidance. The licensee entered this item into its corrective action program. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of equipment needed to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Specifically, the failure to maintain the control room door available as a supporting structure, system, or component (SSC) for control room equipment availability/operability during a HELB impacted the reliability and the operability of affected control room SSCs. The finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because of its short exposure, approximately 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensees staff was familiar with and had been briefed on , HELB Barrier/Vent Path Temporary Guidance in the Operations Notebook yet had failed to implement human error prevention techniques such as pre-job briefing or peer checking, which, if performed, could have ensured that maintenance on the control room door was performed as required by the operations notebook procedure (H.4(a)). |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
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| Report | IR 05000266/2010003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Barclay M Kunowski M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adomo P Cardona Morales R Ruiz S Burtond Jonesk Carrington M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adomo P Cardona Morales S Burton T Bilik |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2010003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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