05000266/FIN-2009005-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Momentary Loss of Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Indication in the Control Room |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, \"Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,\" was identified for performing an Instrumentation and Control (I&C) procedure that was inappropriate to the circumstances, and resulted in the momentary loss of all available channels of reactor vessel level indication in the control room. As part of the immediate corrective actions, the licensee suspended the performance of the procedure and sent an operator into containment to verify reactor vessel level via the local standpipe level indicator and to ensure level indication was reestablished. Additionally, the licensee applied a work planning logic-tie to this activity to ensure the reactor was de-fueled prior to performing this calibration and was currently evaluating the need for revisions to the procedure. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, \"Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process,\" and determined that this issue required a Phase 2 analysis since the finding increased the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors and a senior reactor analyst determined through the analysis that this issue is best characterized as a finding of very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control component, in that the licensee did not appropriately coordinate work activities for the existing plant conditions to ensure the operational impact on reactor vessel level indication while at a water level above reduced inventory was fully understood (H.3(b)). (Section 1R20.1 |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2009005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Jones D Mcneil E Sanchez Santiago J Cassidy J Gilliam J Jandovitz M Kunowski M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adorno R Edwards R Jickling R Ruiz S Burton |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2009005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2009Q4
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