05000266/FIN-2009005-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Update Safe Load Path Manual to Include Safety-Related Cable Locations |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to update the Safe Load Path Manual for the Unit 2 turbine building (SLP-3) as part of the mid-1990\'s modification that added the G-03 and G-04 emergency diesel generators. Specifically, it was identified that SLP-3 allowed unrestricted load lifts over the Unit 2 turbine building truck bay area based upon a 1980\'s evaluation, and was not updated to reflect a modification that added safety-related cables for emergency diesel generators under the Unit 2 truck bay. Due to the close proximity of the A train cables to the B train cables, a loss of both trains of emergency alternating current (AC) power could result if the underground cables were disabled by a dropped load of sufficient magnitude. The licensee addressed the immediate concern by installing temporary steel plates over the affected area of the truck bay to provide adequate protection for upcoming heavy load lifts. Additionally, the licensee revised SLP-3 to require additional risk mitigation measures be taken prior to heavy load lifts in that area. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated January 10, 2008. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue did not result in the actual loss of a safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program component, because the staff did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, in 2008, when questions were raised by licensee staff regarding the adequacy of SLP-3, the SLP was not revised (P.1(d)). (Section 1R18.1 |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2009005 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Jones D Mcneil E Sanchez Santiago J Cassidy J Gilliam J Jandovitz M Kunowski M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adorno R Edwards R Jickling R Ruiz S Burton |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2009005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2009Q4
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