05000259/FIN-2009003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Assess and Manage Shutdown Risk Associated with Outage maintenance Activities |
| Description | A Green self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50.65 (a)(4), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, was identified for failure to adequately assess and manage shutdown risk associated with maintenance activities. Specifically, on May 2, 2009, the licensee performed a scheduled activity to install the 2A Recirculation Line nozzle plug in the reactor vessel. Installation of this plug isolated the common residual heat removal (RHR) system shutdown cooling (SDC) suction path while SDC availability was assumed in the shutdown risk assessment and had been designated as protected equipment as part of the specified risk management actions. Shortly after the nozzle plug was installed, the licensee recognized that SDC was no longer immediately available and promptly removed the plug to restore SDC availability. This event was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as problem evaluation report 170184. This finding affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and was determined to be greater than minor because the licensee failed to effectively manage the prescribed significant compensatory measures (i.e., protection of Loop I RHR). The significance of this finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC 0609), Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Table 1, Losses of Control, and Checklist 7 of Attachment 1, BWR Refueling Operation with RCS Level > 23 , the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the event did not result a loss of control per Table 1 of Appendix G, or an actual loss of decay heat removal, and the SDC alignment was restored well within the time to boil. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross cutting aspect of work activity coordination in the area of Human Performance, because the licensee failed to adequately evaluate the impact of the work and to communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with each other during activities in which interdepartmental coordination is necessary to assure plant performance (H.3.b) |
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000259/2009003 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Hamilton W Loo H Gepford E Guthrie K Korth R Williams |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2009003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)
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