LER-1980-021, Forwards Corrected App C, Calculations of Radiological Effects as Results of Hypothetical Accident W/CV-3030 Open, to 800820 LER 80-021,Revision 1.Corrected Apps E & F Also Encl |
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s consumers Power company General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Mlchl911n 49201 * (517) 788-0650 November 24, 1980 Mr James G Keppler Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region III U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-021 -
CORRECTIONS TO AUGUST 20, 1980, LETTER By letter dated August 20, 1980, Consumers Power Company transmitted Licensee Event Report 80-021, Revision 1 along with several Appendices.
Appendix C, page 7 did not copy.
Appendix E, page 1 had an error as did Appendix F, pages 1 and 2.
Corrections are indicated by a vertical line in the right hand ~argin. All three (3) Appendices are attached to this letter in their entirety.
David P Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Plant NOV 2 61980
APPENDIX C CALCULATIONS OF RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS AS RESULT OF HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT WITH CV-3030'0PEN
Introduction
Calculations have been performed in accordance with data derived from the analysis given in Appendix D; 490 gallons of containment sump water is delivered over the period between 20 seconds and 150 seconds following a LOCA.
During this period, the recirculation line contains 100% sump water as opposed to 52% as i~ the Appendix C analysis where both ECCS trains were functional.
A second variation from the Appendix*. C calculations 1
arises during the first 150 second~ when the SIRW tank receives a net inflow of fluid because ECCS train A is not functioning to remove water.
The net inflow allows airborne radioiodine release during this period as well as during the two hours after the tank empties to its shut-off level of two feet.
Results Site boundary thyroid dose for the DEA is calculated to be 0.57 mrem due to release of 2.03 mCi dose equivalent I-131.
Site boundary thyroid dose for an MHA is 38.8rem, and results from release of 137.4 Ci of dose equivalent I-131.
Both the DBA and MHA doses are a factor of 1.09 times.the result of the earlier two train analysis. The increase of 9% is due to the release of activity over the 130 second fill period at a release rate pf 1% per two hours (0.000139% per second), given an average concentration of 0.25 curies/gallon over that period.
Dose at the control room console is calculated to be o.44rem.
This increase over the two-train dose of 0.23rem arises from the increase in recirculation pipe consentrations from 52% to 100% of sump concentration in the single train event.
Conclusion Doses continue to represent small fractions of 10CFR50 and 10CFRlOO limits.
A large degree of conservatism remains in the methods by which.these doses are calculated. For fUrther disscusion see the conclusion section of Append.ix C.
2 Results -
MHA Offsite thyroid dose of 35.6 rem at the site boundary is calculated with 25% of core iodine inventory diluted by l.2x105 gallons of fluid available to the sump within the first few seconds of the DBA.
The quantity of iodine released is 126 Curies.
All assumptions are similar to those described for the DEA case.
Dose at the control room console is calculated to be 0.23 rem due to liquids from the sump present in the recircuJ.ation line outside the control room.
Expcsure from the SIRW itself is negligible since d.ilution in SIRW vater is laTge, only 10% of the activity remains after 20 minutes. and the control room is shielded by a minimum of 4 feet of concrete in that di-rection.
Conclusion r;e;i ther control room ha bi tabili ty nor offsi te doses are seriously affected by opening of CV-3030, since in all cases represent small fractions of 10CFR50 and 10CFRlOO limits.
It must be emphasized thc,t doses have been calculated in a conservative manner.
In particular, the MlIA fission product inventory based on TID 14844 greatly excee~s the inventory actually expected in the first few minutes of an accident.
}<'or exaw.ple, WASH-14CO wo:cst-case accident descr:'.. ptions indicate that final gap activity begins to escape the core only after one minute, and core melt occurs only after 16 minutes.*
l)!j 1.J::*
TABLE I (RADIOLOGICAL)
FLUID VOLUMES DILUTING FISSION PRODUCT INVENTORY PRIMARY COOLANT VOLUME 7,800 FT3 1/2 CLEAN HASTE RECEIVER TANK 4,065 FT3 SAFETY INJECTION BOTTLES (li) 4,000 FT3 PRE-EXISTING SUMP VOLUME 304 FT3 TOTAL DILUTION 16,169 FT3 MHA IODINE - 131 CONCENTRATION CORE INVENTORY AT 2650 MwT = 6.65 x 107 CI 5.835 X 104 GAL 3', 041 X 104 GAL 2.992 X 104 GAL 2.275 X 103 GAL 1.210 x ios GAL r
25% CoRE INTO CooLANT Ar T = 0 ~ 1.66 x 107 C1 1-131 -:t> 137 Cr/GAL DosE EQUIVALENT 1-131 ~ 258 CI/GAL I
(
3 e
FIRST 20 SECONDS - DosE EQUIVALENT I-131 EVALUATION (A
:---:* ------u"'. q
~--
\\
- - ________ _.,;_ ____ ~ __ _:__~~----------------,,
~ I l
~l!l:- 22' 'NATER LEVEL Fi.u;:;;.~cTIVITY Our = AssuMED ZERO
- -un. D i NV EN TORY = (' 0.1 CI
--*a>
RELEASE TO ATMOSPHERE*- NEGLIGIBLE
<AIR FLOWING INTO TANK)
(
2 I
I 20 SECONDS TO 150 SECONDS DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 EVALUATION
' l I I
0 0
.t' 0
0
...r:'."'
~ 2 2i.
Qi
~,__
'- --r..
J r
."?*~... ' * *. : *. *.. * * : *.. * * -
- ,. ~***~-~sefsi@<:f ~-- 2o' vv ATER LEVEL FLUID.~cnvm IN = l.26xl05 Ci ~ 0.50 Ci/GAL 11 ~-~=
~~u1n AcrrvITY bur = AssuMED ZERO
~---*
1**2r 1 5 5
""'~
--~--
h.UID InvENTORY =
,' o;~ 0 CI--> 0, 0 C1/GAL RELEASE TO ATMOSPHERE ~ NEG~IGIBLE (AIR FLOWING INTO TANK)
f\\CTIVITY 150 SECONDS To 20 MINUTES*~ DosE EQUIVALENT l-i3J. EvAu.iArr*oN
~,-----------------
0 I
e *
.ii * *
~20'
'I
'I>
'I,
\\
\\
,, 0 1
~
~.
3
~
~... '.** * ** ::--*.. :-...... --:--~
.. ~
i
--i- _. -
-.. ~-
- .' ~'<-2' WATER LE.'1'=,
.:*.~-:-
...;n. -,,-......
flO
"_.,-----~
- u
\\! t._~
IN ~ ZERO
.~CTIVITY Our = l.13xJ05 C1
= l.26xl04 CI
@ 0.5 CI/GAL
@ 0.5 CI/GAL lS--
INVENTORY RELEASE UiIR TO ATMOSPHERE = ZERO FLOWING INTO TANK)
r.: LU ID 4
20 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS PLUS 20 MINUTES DosE EQUIVALENT I-131 EVALUATION
~
6...
t I J-\\CTIVITY AcTIVITY Our = ZERO INVENTORY = l.25xlo4 CI
.,, *. ~
I I *
n I
lb 0
\\
'1 f~
e
\\..,
\\
- I I 0 VI/ ATER LEVEL RELEASE JO ATMOSPHERE = 126 CI D,Eo I-131
I I
I I
I I ;
5 DOSE TO THYROID AT SITE BOUNDARY - MHA DosE = {Q) CX/Q) CB) Crl CDCF)
WHERE:
DosE = REM Q
= CI/SEC RELEASE RATE (126 Cz/7200 SEC) = 0.0175 CI/SEC DOSE EQUIVALENT !-131 X/Q
= SEC/M3 DIFFUSION (5,5xlo-4 SEC/M3 PER R.G.1.4 AND AMENDMENT 31)
B
= M3/HR BREATHING ~ATE (l,25 M3/HR PER RsG.1,4)
T
~ HHS OF BREATHING TIME (2 HRS)
DCF
= DosE CONVERSION FACTOR (1.48xl06 RAD/C! INHALED, PER R.G.1.4)
RESULT:
35.6 REM e*
DEA RESULT - PRIMARY COOLANT AT 110JJCI/ML DosE EQUIVALENT I-131: 0.52 MILLIREM
CmnRoL RocM HABITJ\\BJ"LITY G 6" RECIRCULATION LINE EXPOSURE DETERMlNED TO BE ONLY.SIGNIFICANT CONCERN
© 2' CONCHETi: WALL BETWEEN LINE AND CONTROL ROOM 6
- INTERVENING EQUIPMENT AND DISPLAY PANELS NOT INCLUDED AS. SHIEL.PIN~
e 8 15' TO 20 1 DISTANCE BETWEEN SOURCE AND OPERATOR AT MAIN CONSOLE
~ LINE FILLED WITH
- 1)
MIXTURE 52% SUMP FLUID; 48% SIRW TANK WATER
- 2)
IODINE CONCENTRATION AS USED WITH.OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATIONS
_3)
PARTICULATE CONCENTRATION BASED ON 1% OF CORE INVENTORY TO SUMP e EXPOSURE DURATION 130 SECONDS RESULT:
0.225 REM DBA RESULT -
<0.01 MREM e*
CONCLUSIONS OF RADIOLOGICAL EVALUATION
- MAXIMUM HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT:
- 1)
SITE BOUNDARY TOTAL BODY DOSE NEGLIGIBLE DUE TO DEPRESSURIZATION OF PRIMARY SYSTEM PRIOR TO REM9VAL FROM SUMP
- 2)
SITE BOUNDARY THYROID DOSE 36 REM
- 3)
CONTROL ROOM DOSE 0,23 REM
- EFFECTS ARE CONSIDERED TO REPRESENT SMALL FRACTIONS OF 10CFR50 AND 10CFR100 CRITERIA a DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT:
- 1)
SITE BOUNDARY TOTAL BODY DOSE NEGLIGIBLE
- 2)
SITE BOUNDARY THYROID DOSE 0.5 MILLIREM
- 3)
CONTROL ROOM DOSE < 0.01 MILLIREM 7
I I
APPENDIX E OFFSITE DOSE AND CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ASSUMING LOSS OF TRAIN A SAFEGUARDS PUMPS
~-*
1
Introduction
Since the opening of CV-3030 would not in itself prohibit ECCS operation, it is assumed that only primary coolant activity at the Technical Specification limit of 1 microcurie per gram dose-equivalent I-131 is involved in recir-culation to the SIRW following a postulated DBA.
Two aspects of this event are considered: 1) Release of iodines to the environment via the SIRW tank vent following addition of 490 gallons of sump water to the.tank via the recirculation line; and 2) Dose to control room personnel from the 611 recir-culation line during the 130-second period it is filled with a mixture of 48% SIRW and 52% containment sump water.
For the sake of completeness, doses from MHA fluids circulation also has been determined.
MHA dose parameters are readily available for control room dose calculations, so the MRA calculations were utilized in determination of DBA doses by appropriate scaling of the nuclide inven~ory. Offsite doses were calculated independently by use of iodine inventories for each case. Total body doses from noble gas were not calculated because coolant from the sump vould be lacking in noble gasses due to degassing upon release from the primary system.
Results - DBA
~.aximum offsite dose of.52 millirem to thyroid is calculated from release of 1.86 mCi dose equivalent I-131. This release resulted from a transfer of 490 gallons of undiluted primary coolant to "the SIRW, 100% of which mixes with SIRW vater. The tank empties to a 2-foot level in a maximum of 20 minutes.
No iodine escapes during pump down, since airflow through the SIRW vent is inward at that time.
One percent of the available iodine inventory escapes to the atmosphere within the next two hours (similar to a fuel pool accident described in Regula-tory Guide 1.25). Dose was calculated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.25.
Dose at the control room console is calculated to be less than 0.01 millirem integrated over the two-minute period during which primary coolant is flowing through the 6" recirculation pipe outside the control room.
The dose is low primarily because tvo :feet of concrete is present between the piping and control room interior. Dose from the SIRW tank is-negligible because concentration is very low once diluted in the SIRW volume.
Also, a minimum of 4 feet of concrete separates the tank f'rom the control room.
APPENDIX F EFFECT ON MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK AT 1400 MWD/MTU
Appendix F 1
I.
REFERENCES
- 1.
XN-NF-79-94(p) "Palisades Cycle 4 Startup Predictions and Nuclear Data for Operation".
- 2.
"Palisades Cycle 4 Startup Data, Supplementary Information",
R.G. Grummer to B.D. Webb, November 30, 1979.
II.
DATA
- 1.
Net worth (N-1) at 6o°F Reference 2, Table 2 BOC4 = 3.63% ~p,
EOC4 = 4.09% ~p
- 2.
Power defect at TOO ppmb
- - Reference 1, Figure 6.5
= 1-.2% ~p
- 3.
Net rod worth (N-1) at 532°F
- - Reference 1, Table 6.1
- 4.
BOC4 = 4.90% ~p EOC4 = 5.49% ~p Shutdown boron concentration, keff Reference 1, Table 6.2 BOC4 EOC4 532°F 1000 150
=.98, No xenon -
N-1 Configuration 60°F 1050 500
- 5.
Core conditions 1400 Mwd./MT Cycle burnup 700 ppm boron
- 6.
Reciprocal boron worth Reference 1, Figure 6.6 III.
ANALYSIS 1000 ppm, 6o°F, BOC = 77.0 ppm/% ~P 150 ppm, 6o°F, EOC = 70.5 ppm/% ~P
- 1.
Worth of control rods 6o°F including uncertainty.
BOC
= 3.63 x.90
=
3.27% ~P EOC = 4.09 x.90 = 3.68% ~p Interp~lating to cycle burnup oL1400Mwd/MT worth (N;._l) =
3.27 +
1400 (3.68 - 3.27) = 3.32% ~p 10,400
- 2.
Reactivity added by cooldown.
This is derived by extracting the change in net rod worth due to cooldown from the change in shutdown boron concentration from hot to cold conditions.
Appendix F 2
a.
At 1000 ppm (1.050 - 1000 - (4.90 - 3.63) x 7fl/77* = -0.62% ~p b.
At 150 ppm (500 - 150 - (5.49
- 4. 09) x 70. ~ /70. 5
=
- 3. 56%" ~p c.
Interpolating to 700 ppm
~P700 = - 62 + lOOO - 7oo (3.56 +.62) = 0.86% ~p 1000 - 150
- 3.
Shutdown Margin - Equals rod worth minus power defect minus reactivity from cooldown.
3.32 - 1.20 - 0.86 = 1.26% ~p CONCLUSION The Palisades reactor could have cooled all the way to 6o°F without boron inejction and remained subcritical until xenon decay.
There is adequate margin in the analysis to account for large uncertainty factors.
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| 05000255/LER-1980-001, Forwards LER 80-001/01T-0 | Forwards LER 80-001/01T-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-001-01, /01T-0:on 800109,pipe & Pipe Support Stress Analyses Per IE Bulletin 79-14 Identified Lines Not Meeting FSAR Criteria for SSE or Obe.Apparently Caused by Differences in Design Documents & as-built Conditions | /01T-0:on 800109,pipe & Pipe Support Stress Analyses Per IE Bulletin 79-14 Identified Lines Not Meeting FSAR Criteria for SSE or Obe.Apparently Caused by Differences in Design Documents & as-built Conditions | | | 05000255/LER-1980-002-03, /03L-0:on 791023,during Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers,Snubber S-6,located on Main Steam Line, Failed to Meet Test Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Loose Accumulator Oil Fill Fitting.Snubber Replaced | /03L-0:on 791023,during Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers,Snubber S-6,located on Main Steam Line, Failed to Meet Test Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Loose Accumulator Oil Fill Fitting.Snubber Replaced | | | 05000255/LER-1980-002, Notifies That Current Main Steam Line Break Analysis Requested in NRC Cannot Be Completed Until Containment Spray Problem Identified in LER 80-002,is Resolved | Notifies That Current Main Steam Line Break Analysis Requested in NRC Cannot Be Completed Until Containment Spray Problem Identified in LER 80-002,is Resolved | | | 05000255/LER-1980-003-01, During Evaluation of SEP Topic VI-3,incorrect Assumptions for Initiation of Containment Spray Were Determined to Have Resulted in Lower Predicted Peak Pressures.Reanalysis Corrected Calculations | During Evaluation of SEP Topic VI-3,incorrect Assumptions for Initiation of Containment Spray Were Determined to Have Resulted in Lower Predicted Peak Pressures.Reanalysis Corrected Calculations | | | 05000255/LER-1980-003, Forwards Revised Page 3-36 to Basis of Tech Spec Section 3.4 Re Containment Cooling,Submitted in 861020 Change Request.Error in Original Submittal Resulted from LER 80-003 Re Description of Main Steam Line Break Results | Forwards Revised Page 3-36 to Basis of Tech Spec Section 3.4 Re Containment Cooling,Submitted in 861020 Change Request.Error in Original Submittal Resulted from LER 80-003 Re Description of Main Steam Line Break Results | | | 05000255/LER-1980-004, Forwards LER 80-004/01T-0 | Forwards LER 80-004/01T-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-004-01, /01T-0:on 800327,during Review of Tech Spec Surveillance Procedures,Discovered Procedure MO-19 Requiring Isolation of Both Containment Spray Headers During Test Violated.Cause Not Stated.Procedure Rewritten | /01T-0:on 800327,during Review of Tech Spec Surveillance Procedures,Discovered Procedure MO-19 Requiring Isolation of Both Containment Spray Headers During Test Violated.Cause Not Stated.Procedure Rewritten | | | 05000255/LER-1980-005-01, /01T-0:on 800327,during Review of Tech Spec Surveillance Procedures,Discovered That Procedures QO-2 & MO-23 Require Stroking Sirw Tank Outlet Valves.Amend to OL or Clarification of Tech Spec Requirements Will Be Sought | /01T-0:on 800327,during Review of Tech Spec Surveillance Procedures,Discovered That Procedures QO-2 & MO-23 Require Stroking Sirw Tank Outlet Valves.Amend to OL or Clarification of Tech Spec Requirements Will Be Sought | | | 05000255/LER-1980-005, Forwards LER 80-005/01T-0 | Forwards LER 80-005/01T-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-006, Forwards LER 80-006/03L-0 | Forwards LER 80-006/03L-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-006-03, Discovered That T-ring Air Supplies for 12-inch & 48-inch Purge Valves Had Leakage in Excess of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Poor Fittings & Packings | Discovered That T-ring Air Supplies for 12-inch & 48-inch Purge Valves Had Leakage in Excess of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Poor Fittings & Packings | | | 05000255/LER-1980-007-01, /01T-0:on 800407,during Maint on Control Room Ventilation Sys,Discovered Leakage Defects Through Shaft of Fan V-36.Fresh Air Damper D-1 Would Not Close.Caused by Inadequate pre-operational Testing of Ventilation Sys | /01T-0:on 800407,during Maint on Control Room Ventilation Sys,Discovered Leakage Defects Through Shaft of Fan V-36.Fresh Air Damper D-1 Would Not Close.Caused by Inadequate pre-operational Testing of Ventilation Sys | | | 05000255/LER-1980-007, Forwards LER 80-007/01T-0 | Forwards LER 80-007/01T-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-008, Forwards Updated LER 80-008/01X-1 | Forwards Updated LER 80-008/01X-1 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-008-01, Test Results of Type C Containment Leak Tests Indicated Local Leakage in Excess of Tech Specs.Caused by Deterioration of Valve Internals | Test Results of Type C Containment Leak Tests Indicated Local Leakage in Excess of Tech Specs.Caused by Deterioration of Valve Internals | | | 05000255/LER-1980-009-01, /01T-0:on 800424,during Walkdowns of safety- Related Sys Conducted to Verify P&ID Accuracy,Ventilation Supply Damper CV-1812 to West Safeguards Equipment Room Could Not Be Located.Cause Unknown | /01T-0:on 800424,during Walkdowns of safety- Related Sys Conducted to Verify P&ID Accuracy,Ventilation Supply Damper CV-1812 to West Safeguards Equipment Room Could Not Be Located.Cause Unknown | | | 05000255/LER-1980-010-01, /01T-0:on 800326,during Calibr of Sirw Tank Low Level Switches,Reactor Analysis & Safety Setpoint Were Determined to Have Exceeded Tech Specs Limit.Caused by Error in Acceptance Criteria.Reportability Determined 800428 | /01T-0:on 800326,during Calibr of Sirw Tank Low Level Switches,Reactor Analysis & Safety Setpoint Were Determined to Have Exceeded Tech Specs Limit.Caused by Error in Acceptance Criteria.Reportability Determined 800428 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-011-03, /03L-0:on 800416,following Mods to Power Operated Relief Valve Supplies,Valves Were Declared Operable Before Administrative Reviews Were Completed.Caused by Misunderstanding of Review Requirements | /03L-0:on 800416,following Mods to Power Operated Relief Valve Supplies,Valves Were Declared Operable Before Administrative Reviews Were Completed.Caused by Misunderstanding of Review Requirements | | | 05000255/LER-1980-011, Forwards LER 80-011/03L-0 | Forwards LER 80-011/03L-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-012, Licensee Event Report 80-012 Regarding Bottom Half of the Barrier for Fire Penetration HO-12 Was Missing During Inspection of Fire Barriers | Licensee Event Report 80-012 Regarding Bottom Half of the Barrier for Fire Penetration HO-12 Was Missing During Inspection of Fire Barriers | | | 05000255/LER-1980-012-03, /03L-0:on 800417,during Insp of Fire Barriers, Discovered That Bottom Half of Barrier for Fire Penetration Was Missing.Cause Undetermined.Barrier Restored to Operable Status | /03L-0:on 800417,during Insp of Fire Barriers, Discovered That Bottom Half of Barrier for Fire Penetration Was Missing.Cause Undetermined.Barrier Restored to Operable Status | | | 05000255/LER-1980-013-01, /01T-0:on 800521,HPSI Flow Indication for Loop 2A Was Inoperable.Caused by Ruptured Bellows.Transmitter Was Replaced to Restore Operability | /01T-0:on 800521,HPSI Flow Indication for Loop 2A Was Inoperable.Caused by Ruptured Bellows.Transmitter Was Replaced to Restore Operability | | | 05000255/LER-1980-013, Forwards LER 80-013/01T-0 | Forwards LER 80-013/01T-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-014, Licensee Event Reports 80-014, 80-015, and 80-016 Regarding Oil Level in Snubbers No. 5, 9, and 7 Were Found to Be Less than Zero During Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers | Licensee Event Reports 80-014, 80-015, and 80-016 Regarding Oil Level in Snubbers No. 5, 9, and 7 Were Found to Be Less than Zero During Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers | | | 05000255/LER-1980-014-03, /03L-0:on 800512,during Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers,Oil Level in Snubber 5 Found to Be Less than Zero.Caused by Rust Combined W/Vibrator,Accelerating Seal Failure.Rust Found Inside Accumalator | /03L-0:on 800512,during Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers,Oil Level in Snubber 5 Found to Be Less than Zero.Caused by Rust Combined W/Vibrator,Accelerating Seal Failure.Rust Found Inside Accumalator | | | 05000255/LER-1980-015-03, /03L-0:on 800512,during Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubber,Oil Level in Snubber 9 Found to Be Less than Zero.Cause of Seal Damage Unknown;Normal Wear Suspected.Accumulator Plunger Seal Found to Be Damaged | /03L-0:on 800512,during Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubber,Oil Level in Snubber 9 Found to Be Less than Zero.Cause of Seal Damage Unknown;Normal Wear Suspected.Accumulator Plunger Seal Found to Be Damaged | | | 05000255/LER-1980-016-03, /03L-0:on 800515,during Testing of Hydraulic Snubber,Oil Level in Snubber 7 Found to Be Less than Zero. Caused by Seal Degradation.Snubber Will Be Disassembled to Confirm Cause | /03L-0:on 800515,during Testing of Hydraulic Snubber,Oil Level in Snubber 7 Found to Be Less than Zero. Caused by Seal Degradation.Snubber Will Be Disassembled to Confirm Cause | | | 05000255/LER-1980-017-03, Ps Testing Procedures Review Revealed Setpoint of PS-1801 Through 1804 to Be Lower than Permitted by Tech Specs.Caused by Faulty Procedure. Procedures Revised to Conform W/Tech Specs | Ps Testing Procedures Review Revealed Setpoint of PS-1801 Through 1804 to Be Lower than Permitted by Tech Specs.Caused by Faulty Procedure. Procedures Revised to Conform W/Tech Specs | | | 05000255/LER-1980-017, Forwards Updated LER 80-017/03X-1 | Forwards Updated LER 80-017/03X-1 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-018-03, /03L-0:on 800522,during Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers,Oil Level in Snubber 2 Was Found to Be Less than Zero & Was Declared Inoperable.Apparently Caused by Seal Degradation | /03L-0:on 800522,during Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers,Oil Level in Snubber 2 Was Found to Be Less than Zero & Was Declared Inoperable.Apparently Caused by Seal Degradation | | | 05000255/LER-1980-018, Licensee Event Report 80-018 Regarding Oil Level in Snubber No. 2 Found to Be Less than Zero During Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers | Licensee Event Report 80-018 Regarding Oil Level in Snubber No. 2 Found to Be Less than Zero During Routine Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers | | | 05000255/LER-1980-019-01, /01T-0:on 800609,during Tech Spec Review,Tech Spec 3.3 Determined to Provide Too Little Borated Water for Safety Injection.Caused by Imprecise Wording of Tech Spec. Low Level Alarm Setpoint Changed,Tech Spec Under Evaluation | /01T-0:on 800609,during Tech Spec Review,Tech Spec 3.3 Determined to Provide Too Little Borated Water for Safety Injection.Caused by Imprecise Wording of Tech Spec. Low Level Alarm Setpoint Changed,Tech Spec Under Evaluation | | | 05000255/LER-1980-019, Forwards LER 80-019/01T-0 | Forwards LER 80-019/01T-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-020-01, /01T-0:on 800711,control Rod Drive Mechanism Failed to Operate Properly,Resulting in Rod Being Misaligned for Approx Five Minutes.Caused by Dirty Control Relay Armatures & Contractor Interlock Which Resulted in Sticking | /01T-0:on 800711,control Rod Drive Mechanism Failed to Operate Properly,Resulting in Rod Being Misaligned for Approx Five Minutes.Caused by Dirty Control Relay Armatures & Contractor Interlock Which Resulted in Sticking | | | 05000255/LER-1980-020, Forwards LER 80-020/01T-0 | Forwards LER 80-020/01T-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-021-01, /01X-1:on 800725,during Valve Inservice Insp, Operator Opened Containment Sump Valve CV-3030.Valve Stayed Open 36-h.Caused by Operator Error.Valve Closed,Operator Counseled & Shift Turnover Checklist Revised | /01X-1:on 800725,during Valve Inservice Insp, Operator Opened Containment Sump Valve CV-3030.Valve Stayed Open 36-h.Caused by Operator Error.Valve Closed,Operator Counseled & Shift Turnover Checklist Revised | | | 05000255/LER-1980-021, Forwards Corrected App C, Calculations of Radiological Effects as Results of Hypothetical Accident W/CV-3030 Open, to 800820 LER 80-021,Revision 1.Corrected Apps E & F Also Encl | Forwards Corrected App C, Calculations of Radiological Effects as Results of Hypothetical Accident W/CV-3030 Open, to 800820 LER 80-021,Revision 1.Corrected Apps E & F Also Encl | | | 05000255/LER-1980-022, Forwards LER 80-022/03L-0 | Forwards LER 80-022/03L-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-022-03, /03L-0:on 800710,2-h After Reactor Criticality, Channel NI-03 Not Declared Operable Prior to Reactor Startup.Caused by Failure of Shift Supervisor to Check Control Mechanism | /03L-0:on 800710,2-h After Reactor Criticality, Channel NI-03 Not Declared Operable Prior to Reactor Startup.Caused by Failure of Shift Supervisor to Check Control Mechanism | | | 05000255/LER-1980-023-03, Containment High Radiation Detectors Re 1805 & 1807 Determined Inoperable.No Apparent Cause for Failure.Detectors Disassembled,Cleaned & Recoated & Are Now Functional | Containment High Radiation Detectors Re 1805 & 1807 Determined Inoperable.No Apparent Cause for Failure.Detectors Disassembled,Cleaned & Recoated & Are Now Functional | | | 05000255/LER-1980-023, Forwards Updated LER 80-023/03X-1 | Forwards Updated LER 80-023/03X-1 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-024, Forwards LER 80-024/01T-0 | Forwards LER 80-024/01T-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-024-01, /01T-0:on 800731,w/diesel Generator & Charging Pump P-55A Inoperable,Backup Pump P-55B Failed.Diesel Generator Restored in One Hour.Caused by Pump Packing Failure on P-55B.Pump Repacked & Restored to Svc | /01T-0:on 800731,w/diesel Generator & Charging Pump P-55A Inoperable,Backup Pump P-55B Failed.Diesel Generator Restored in One Hour.Caused by Pump Packing Failure on P-55B.Pump Repacked & Restored to Svc | | | 05000255/LER-1980-025, Forwards LER 80-025/01T-0 | Forwards LER 80-025/01T-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-025-01, /01T-0:on 800801,during Vol Control Tank Venting, Unplanned Gaseous Release Occurred W/O 15-day Min Holdup. Caused by Either Dirt Trapped in Head Plate & Diaphragm or Uneven Tightening of Compressor Head Bolts | /01T-0:on 800801,during Vol Control Tank Venting, Unplanned Gaseous Release Occurred W/O 15-day Min Holdup. Caused by Either Dirt Trapped in Head Plate & Diaphragm or Uneven Tightening of Compressor Head Bolts | | | 05000255/LER-1980-026, Forwards LER 80-026/03L-0 | Forwards LER 80-026/03L-0 | | | 05000255/LER-1980-026-03, /03L-0:on 800719,during Refilling of Safety Injection tanks,FT-0313 Found Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Close Instrument Equalizing Valve During Recent Calibr | /03L-0:on 800719,during Refilling of Safety Injection tanks,FT-0313 Found Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Close Instrument Equalizing Valve During Recent Calibr | | | 05000255/LER-1980-027-01, During Venting of Quench Tank to Waste Gas Surge Tank,Gaseous Release Occurred W/O 15 Day Min Holdup.Caused by Leaking Isolation Valve & Valve Pin Disassembly.Pin Replaced | During Venting of Quench Tank to Waste Gas Surge Tank,Gaseous Release Occurred W/O 15 Day Min Holdup.Caused by Leaking Isolation Valve & Valve Pin Disassembly.Pin Replaced | | | 05000255/LER-1980-027, Forwards Updated LER 80-027/01X-1 | Forwards Updated LER 80-027/01X-1 | |
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