05000250/FIN-2013004-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Power Operated Relief Valve Inoperable for Greater Than Allowed Outage Time Due to Lifted Leads |
| Description | A self-revealing non-cited violation of the limiting condition for operation specified by Unit 4 Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.9.3, Overpressure Mitigating System, was identified due to the inoperability of a reactor coolant system (RCS) power-operated relief valve (PORV) for longer than the TS allowed outage time (AOT) of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Specifically, the licensee failed to control the wiring configuration of the pressure comparator circuit for PORV PCV-4-456 and, as a result, the PORV would not have automatically responded to an overpressure event. The licensee corrected the wiring configuration error upon discovery and entered this issue into the corrective action program as action request 1868533. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to control the wiring configuration of PCV-4-456 resulted in the PORV being unable to automatically respond to an RCS overpressure event. The inspectors assessed the finding in the mitigating systems cornerstone and evaluated the significance using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk assessment because it was associated with a non-compliance with low temperature overpressure (LTOP) Technical Specifications. A Senior Reactor Analyst in NRC headquarters determined that the risk significance of the issue was very low (i.e., Green). The dominant accident sequence was an over-pressurization event caused by the pressurizer heaters, where the remaining PORV fails resulting in a through wall crack of the reactor coolant system. This finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the work practices component of the human performance area because the licensee had not effectively communicated expectations regarding procedural compliance, and as a result, personnel did not implement procedural requirements to maintain plant configuration using wiring lift and land sheets; causing leads that affected the operability of PORV PCV-4-456 to not be re-landed H.4(b). |
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000250/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Klett G Kolcum J Rivera M Endress M Riches R Reyes R Taylor T Hoeg W Pursley |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Turkey Point - IR 05000250/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Turkey Point) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Turkey Point)
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