05000247/FIN-2009007-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to ensure that the CCW pump hydraulic performance test procedures had acceptance criteria that incorporated the limits from applicable design documents. |
| Description | The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that Entergy did not to ensure that the component cooling water pump hydraulic performance test procedures had acceptance criteria which incorporated applicable design limits sufficient to ensure continued pump operability. Specifically, if the pump flow rate had degraded to the lower limit of the acceptance band, as listed in the test acceptance criteria, the pump would not have been able to meet the design basis flow requirements at the minimum acceptable differential pressure listed in the test procedure. In addition, the test acceptance criteria for design basis flow rate and differential pressure had no allowance for measurement uncertainty of the test instruments. In response to this deficiency, Entergys short-term corrective actions included initiation of a corrective action condition report and completion of an operability determination for the affected equipment. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the test acceptance criteria did not ensure that the No. 23 component cooling water pump remained capable of performing its safety function under design basis conditions. The finding had very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program Component, because Entergys initial operability review, issue prioritization, and subsequent evaluation did not adequately assess actual pump performance. P.1(c) |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000247/2009007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Bonney J Rady J Richmond J Schoppy L Doerflein L Scholl M Balazik S Ibarrola S Kobylarz W Sherbin |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000247/2009007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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