:on 960322,CST Unusable Vol Not Accounted for in Plant Procedures.Caused by Personnel Error.Design Calculations Will Be Revised to Correctly Identify Usable Vol of Csr| ML20132C937 |
| Person / Time |
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| Site: |
Millstone  |
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| Issue date: |
12/16/1996 |
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| From: |
Robert Walpole NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
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| To: |
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| Shared Package |
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| ML20132C896 |
List: |
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| References |
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| LER-96-020-01, LER-96-20-1, NUDOCS 9612190071 |
| Download: ML20132C937 (5) |
|
text
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J NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 14 95)
EXPIRES 04/30/98 o
T Co LE TtON RO S 50 RS E
TED N
L'4""90'Ll",fT!! "*nLl".'a YoJ=s".T!!=~5 ^=
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
IST'u'f 'Oc52R""#ft&"4#Ls^J,P'#E3en"&
!?naWb ^~Toa!#A%fi"T2#JM3"os."8 tea"*
(See reverse for required number of digits / characters for each blocki FACLITV NAME {11 DOCKET NUMBER W PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000245 1 of 5 TITLE 14)
Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Unusable Volume Not Accounted For in Plant Procedures i
EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR F ACluTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER 03 22 96 96 020 01 12 16 96 CPERATING THIS REPORT is SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE m N
20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
X so 73(a)(2)ii) 50.73(ali2)(viiii LEVEL (10) 000 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
X so.73(aii2>(ii) 50.73(a)(2><K)
POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203ta)(3Hii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) specify m Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT TOR THIS LER l12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER linclude Area Codel Robert W. Walpole, MP1 Nuclear Licensing Manager (860)440-2191 l
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE To NPRDS To NPRDS I
s SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMisSloN
[ YES NO 03 15 97 (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten hnes) (16)
I i
On March 22,1996 at 1645 hours0.019 days <br />0.457 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.259225e-4 months <br />, with the plant shutdown and reactor in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition, it was determined that Millstone Unit No.1 Technical Specification 3.5.C.3 has not been met in the past, and that l
Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f) was not met during three past refueling outages. Technical Specification 3.5.C.3 l
requires a minimum of 250,000 gallons of usable water in the condensate storage tank (CST) to ensure operability of the feedwater coolant injection (FWCl) system. Engineering evaluations, which now include pump vortexing in ths calculation of unusable volume, have concluded that the administrative requirement to maintain 300,000 gallons in the CST for normal operations was insufficient to ensure Technical Specification compliance. This event is reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) as a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. This evsnt is also reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) as an unanalyzed condition which significantly compromised plant safety, and was promptly reported, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), on March 22,1996.
Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f) requires a minimum of 414,000 gallons of usable water in the CST for reactor vsssel makeup capability during refueling outages when the torus is drained, which cannot be met at based on the 4
current calculated unusable volume. This event is reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i), as a condition i
prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
l l
i l
l Thsre were no safety consequences as a result of this event.
l l
9612190071 961216 l
PDR ADOCK 05000245 1
S PDR
i NRC FORNl 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMZSION (4 95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER. (2)
LER NUMBER 16)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVislON Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000245 NUMBER NUMBER 2 of 5 96 020 01 l
TEXT Uf more space is required, use addnional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 1.
Description of Event
On March 22,1996, at 1645 hours0.019 days <br />0.457 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.259225e-4 months <br />, with the plant shutdown and reactor in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition, it was determined that Millstone Unit No.1 Technical Specification 3.5.C.3 has not been met in the past, and that Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f) was not met during three past refueling outages.
Technical Specification 3.5.C.3 requires a minimum of 250,000 gallons of usable water in the condensate storage tank (CST) to ensure operability of the feedwater coolant injection (FWCl) system. Plant procedures 1
require CST level to be greater than 300,000 gallons during normal operation. Engineering evaluations have concluded that approximately 68,000 gallons constitutes unusable volume due to instrument uncertainty, pump vortexing (utilizing the emergency condensate transfer (ECT) pump), and the elevation of the suction nozzle in the CST. Therefore, to meet this Technical Specification, plant procedures should have required CST 'evel to be greater than 318,000 gallons at all times FWCl is required to be operable. This event is reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) as a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
J l
This event is also reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) as an unanalyzed condition which significantly compromised plant safety, and was promptly reported, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), on March 22,1996.
Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f) requires a minimum of 414,000 gallons of usable water in the CST for reactor vessel makeup capability during refueling outages when the torus is drained. Accounting for a total unusable volume of approximately 75,000 gallons (if one low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump is aligned to the CST suction line and flow is not throttled), the CST volume of 4G9,000 gallons required to i
meet this Technical Specification exceeds the 460,000 gallon design capacity of the tank. This event is j
reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) as a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
Historically, plant records show the torus has been drained only three times in the past, during the 1980, 1982, and 1987 refueling outages. Currently, with the plant in COLD SHUTDOWN, the torus is not drained, and as such, Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f) is not applicable. Administrative plant procedures are being updated to ensure at least 318,000 gallons are available in the CST at all times FWCl is required. in addition, Technical Specification, procedure and plant modifications are being evaluated to reduce the l
contribution of pump vortexing to unusable volume. There were no safety consequences as a result of this i
event.
II.
Cause of Event
l l
The root cause of this event was personnel error. The design calculations for the usable volume of the CST l
were incomplete, in that they failed to properly consider all contributions to unusable volumes in the CST.
i l
111. Analysis of Event Technical Specification 3.5.C.3 requires 250,000 usable gallons of water inventory in the CST to ensure FWCl operability during power operation. Additionally, Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f) requires 414,000 usable gallons of CST water inventory during refueling operation when the torus is drained. Based on a recent reevaluation of the calculation methodologies of CST unusable volume, Technical Specification 3.5.C.3 has not been met in the past. This event is reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) es a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. This event is also reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) as an unanalyzed condition which significantly compromised plant safety, and was
__m
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NRC FORW) 366A a U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IG951 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
I TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000245 NUMBER NUMBER 3 of 5 020 01 l
96 TEXT litmore space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (11l l-promptly reported, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), on March 22, 1996.
In addition, Technical -
l Specification 3.5.F.7(f) was not met during the 1980,1982, and 1987 refueling outages. This event is reportable, pursuant to 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B), as a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
t l
The original calculation of unusable CST volume did not account for the amount of water unavailable due to l
pump vortexing at the suction nozzle inside the tank. Adding this to the amount of unusable volume due to instrument uncertainties and the location of the pump suction line nozzle in the tank, the total unusable CST l
volume is estimated to be between 63,400 and 67,750 gallons for FWCl operational modes (with ECT pump flow), and at least 75,000 gallons (if one LPCI pump is aligned to the CST suction line and flow is not l
throttled) for refueling operations with the torus drained. in the latter case, suction is taken from the CST with one LPCI pump, which has a higher vortexing limit than the ECT Pump.
Analysis of Technical Specification 3.5.C.3 Compliance:
To meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5,C.3 when FWCl is required to be operable, total l
CST volume should have been maintained at all times at or above 318,000 gallons. Current administrative procedural controls only require the volume to be greater than 300,000 gallons for normal operation (RCS Temp >/= 330 degrees F).
Two specific accident scenarios were evaluated that credit use of the CST i
volume, the limiting Appendix 'R' scenario and the non-limiting FWCl / loss of normal power (LNP) scenario.
Limitina Appendix 'R' Scenario:
In 1987, during a review of the particular Appendix 'R' scenario for the worst case reactor building fire, a CST volume of at least 232,000 usable gallons was necessary to ensure. achieving cold shutdown following this scenario it is assumed that the ECT pump is unavailable, and makeup to the hotwell is via normal condensate transfer. As a result of this larger volume requirement for the CST, a Technical Specification enange was processed and approved by the NRC to raise the minimum CST inventory requirement from 225,000 gallons to 250,000 gallons. This quantity of CST water is sufficient to account for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of decay heat removal via FWCl /
safety / relief valve (SRV) operation, anri to compensate for primary coolant leakage and shrinkage during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The 10-hour time frame allows for equipment repairs to restore isolation condenser operability for the worst case reactor building fire.
The calculations supporting this conclusion were reviewed, taking into account unusable volumes in l
the hotweil and CST, as well as instrument uncertainties. It was conservatively determined that a l
total of 265,000 gallons of usable water inventory is required to mitigate this scenario, in order to meet this requirement using the CST, in conjunction with an assumed condenser hotwell volume of 35,000 usable gallons, a level of 300,000 gallons, which is the low end of the range of normal CST j
level, is sufficient to mitigate this scenario. Having additional water in the condenser hotwell i
provides additional margin for mitigation of this accident scenario.
l Evaluation of Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and non-LOCA Scenarios:
j The FWCl system was originally credited for accident mitigation in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) C,hapter 15 accident analysis. However, the current accident analysis no l
longer credits the FWCl system for any accident mitigation functions, even though the system has NaC FORM 366A (4-95)
i j
NRC FORY 366A '
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON I4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION l
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION I
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000245 NUMBER NUMBER 4 of 5 96 020 01 l
TEXT (if more space is required. Use additional copies of NRC Form 366Al (17) maintained its capability to mitigate small break LOCA scenarios. Small Break LOCAs are mitigated by the LPCI, core spray, isolation condenser and automatic pressure relief (APR) systems. For non-LOCA transients, such as an LNP scenario, the FWCl system could be used to recover reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level initially, and then to provide adequate make-up to account for subsequent reactor coolant system (RCS) boil-off and leakage. Water inventory in the condenser hotwellis sufficient to recover level initially. The CST inventory of 300,000 gallons, in conjunction t
with the ECT Pump is more than adequate to provide make-up for long term boil-off.
Analysis of Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f) Compliance:
To meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f), a minimum of 489,000 gallons should have been maintained in the CST during refueling operations with the torus drained, if only one LPCI Pump is aligned to the CST to provide reactor cavity makeup. This is in excess of the tank's capacity of 460,000
+
gallons. Plant records indicate that the torus was drained during the 1980,1982, and 1987 refueling outages. Therefore, it is concluded that, when accounting for pump vortexing as unusable volume, Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f) was not able to be met during these three outages. However, in the event of a leakage path that would have resulted in significant loss of reactor cavity water inventory, the available CST volume would have been used to provide make-up water to the refueling cavity. Significant reactor i
{
cavity leakage would then drain to the torus and would be available for vessel make-up via the LPCI or Core Spray systems, once net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements are met and the systems are realigned.
l Therefore, the safety significance of this event is very low.
There were no safety consequences as a result of this event.
l l
IV. Corrective Action
l Design calculations will be revised to correctly identify the usable volume of the CST. In addition, a review of the calculations of unusable volume of all safety-related tanks is ongoing and will be completed prior to l
startup for operating cycle 16.
j To ensure future compliance with Technical Specification 3.5.C.3, administrative procedures will be revised l
l to ensure 318,000 gallons is available in the CST at all times FWCl is required to be operable. These procedure revisions will be completed prior to startup for operating cycle 16. Due to the ina' iiity to meet o
Technical Specification 3.5.F 7(f) during refueling operations with the torus drained, administrative controls j
have been put in place as short-term corrective action to ensure that neither fuel movement nor CRD work,
?
as specified in Technical Specification 3.5.F.7(f), occurs when the torus is drained. Long-term corrective actions that were evaluated are the design and installation of anti-vortexing baffles at the CST suction l
nozzle, potential revision of the applicable Technical Specification, and possible procedural changes to provide guidance on flow throttling of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) when lined up to the CST as a back-up method of providing make-up water to the reactor vessel cavity during refueling when the torus is drained.
I Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) has evaluated long-term corrective actions to resolve the Tech.
i Spec. 3.5.F.7(f) compliance issue. It has been determined that the CST usable volume requirement of 414,000 gallons can be met through throttling of the LPCI pump, if this pump is used to provide vessel 1
make-up capability from the CST. Since vortexing is proportional to pump flow rate, the use of a Core Spray pump to provide make-up water from the CST to the vessel cavity causes less vortexing than a LPCI pump, i
GWRC FORM 366A (4-95)
NitC FORyl 366A
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000245 NUMBER NUMBER 5 of 5 96 020 01 l
TEXT Uf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (11) and therefore would not require throttling to meet this CST usable volume requirement. However, since the ECCS pump alignment configuration as required in Tech. Spec. 3.5.F.7(f) provides far more flow capacity than would be needed to mitigate the worst case reactor cavity leak, throttling or cycling of any one of these ECCS pumps would be necessary anyway to control vessel cavity level and prevent a cavity overfill condition. Therefore, NNECO has determined that adding procedural guidance on the throttling of the ECCS pumps in the event of a reactor cavity leak is the most appropriate corrective action to resolving this issue.
The procedural guidance will be completed prior to shutdown for refueling outage 16.
V.
Additional Information
Similar Events A similar event was recently reported as LER 96-010-00,
Emergency Gas Turbine Generator and Emergency Diesel Generator inoperable Simultaneously Due to Lack of Available On-Site Fuel Oil Because of Pump Submergence Calculations."
Manufacturer Data q
None g
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95RC FORM 366A (4-95)
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| 05000336/LER-1996-001, :on 960625,discovered Reactor Coolant Sys Heatup Rate Exceeded Tech Spec.Caused by Design & Procedural Weaknesses Re Plant Heatup Controls.Revised Plant Operating Procedures & Heatup/Cooldown Computer Program |
- on 960625,discovered Reactor Coolant Sys Heatup Rate Exceeded Tech Spec.Caused by Design & Procedural Weaknesses Re Plant Heatup Controls.Revised Plant Operating Procedures & Heatup/Cooldown Computer Program
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-001-02, :on 960120,supplementary Leak Collection & Release Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Equipment Failure of Door Latch.Door Repaired & Plant Returned to 100% Power |
- on 960120,supplementary Leak Collection & Release Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Equipment Failure of Door Latch.Door Repaired & Plant Returned to 100% Power
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-002, :on 960108,determined That Ice Plug in Common Line Resulted in Inability to Backwash Svc Water Strainers. Caused by Mod to Backwash Line Piping.Ice Plug Removed, Restoring Ability to Backwash |
- on 960108,determined That Ice Plug in Common Line Resulted in Inability to Backwash Svc Water Strainers. Caused by Mod to Backwash Line Piping.Ice Plug Removed, Restoring Ability to Backwash
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000423/LER-1996-002-02, :on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Identified. Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedures Revised |
- on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Identified. Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000423/LER-1996-002, :on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Occurred Due to Procedure Inadequacy.Changes Will Be Made to Technical Requirements Manual |
- on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Occurred Due to Procedure Inadequacy.Changes Will Be Made to Technical Requirements Manual
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1996-003, :on 960111,discovered Existing Anchorage of EDG Day Tank Not Seismically Adequate.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Anchorage of EDG Tank Will Be Graded to Meet Design Basis of Seismic Load Requirements |
- on 960111,discovered Existing Anchorage of EDG Day Tank Not Seismically Adequate.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Anchorage of EDG Tank Will Be Graded to Meet Design Basis of Seismic Load Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1996-003-01, :on 960205,failed to Recognize Requirement to Enter TS LCO 3.0.3 Following Discovery of Ice Blockage. Caused by Inadequate Problem Identification Methods.Design Basis Summary Documents Have Been Prepared Re TS Safety Sys |
- on 960205,failed to Recognize Requirement to Enter TS LCO 3.0.3 Following Discovery of Ice Blockage. Caused by Inadequate Problem Identification Methods.Design Basis Summary Documents Have Been Prepared Re TS Safety Sys
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1996-003-02, Forwards LER 96-003-02 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 960111,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made in Ltr,Submitted | Forwards LER 96-003-02 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 960111,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made in Ltr,Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-003-01, :on 960312,temporary I-Beams Located Overhead of Recirculation Spray Sys HXs Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Work Control Procedures Revised |
- on 960312,temporary I-Beams Located Overhead of Recirculation Spray Sys HXs Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Work Control Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-004-01, :on 960319,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Were in Noncompliance W/Ts.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Revised Operating Procedure to Preclude cross-connected Sys Alignment |
- on 960319,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Were in Noncompliance W/Ts.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Revised Operating Procedure to Preclude cross-connected Sys Alignment
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-004, :on 960131,svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys Susceptibility to Freezing Following Loss of Intake Structure non-vital Heating Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design.Design Change Implemented |
- on 960131,svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys Susceptibility to Freezing Following Loss of Intake Structure non-vital Heating Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design.Design Change Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-004-02, :on 960316,auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Noncompliance W/Ts Occurred.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Event Reviewed W/Station Personnel to Caution Others on TS Surveillance Requirements |
- on 960316,auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Noncompliance W/Ts Occurred.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Event Reviewed W/Station Personnel to Caution Others on TS Surveillance Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1996-005-01, :on 960212,discovered PEO Improperly Utilized to Replace Automatic Backwash Function of Svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys.Caused by Failure to Enter TS Action Statement. Revise Procedures for IST SWS Pump Operability |
- on 960212,discovered PEO Improperly Utilized to Replace Automatic Backwash Function of Svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys.Caused by Failure to Enter TS Action Statement. Revise Procedures for IST SWS Pump Operability
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-005-02, :on 960321,service Water Booster Pump Auto Start Discovered Disable.Caused by Inadequate Review.C/A: Bypass Jumper Removed & Mod Initiated |
- on 960321,service Water Booster Pump Auto Start Discovered Disable.Caused by Inadequate Review.C/A: Bypass Jumper Removed & Mod Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-005-03, :on 960321,design Noncompliance Noted for High Temp Automatic Start Feature of SWS Booster Pumps.Caused by Weakness in Design Control Process.Operating Procedures Revised |
- on 960321,design Noncompliance Noted for High Temp Automatic Start Feature of SWS Booster Pumps.Caused by Weakness in Design Control Process.Operating Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-006-01, :on 960207,service Water Pump Motor Flood Protection Not Provided.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Administrative Controls Established |
- on 960207,service Water Pump Motor Flood Protection Not Provided.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Administrative Controls Established
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-006-02, :on 960330,plant Shutdown Required by TS for AFW Containment Isolation Valves Declared Inoperable.Caused by Opened Valves Outside Containment.Unit Was Shutdown in Orderly Manner |
- on 960330,plant Shutdown Required by TS for AFW Containment Isolation Valves Declared Inoperable.Caused by Opened Valves Outside Containment.Unit Was Shutdown in Orderly Manner
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000423/LER-1996-007, :on 960403,containment Recirculation Spray, Quench Spray & Safety Injection Sys Were Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Design Reviews of Rss,Qss,Si & Other Sys Will Be Performed |
- on 960403,containment Recirculation Spray, Quench Spray & Safety Injection Sys Were Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Design Reviews of Rss,Qss,Si & Other Sys Will Be Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1996-007, :on 960220,discovered RCS C/D Rate Exceeded TS Limit.Caused by Use of Wrong Temp Sensor.Plant Operating Procedures,Heatup/C/D Monitoring Computer Program & Operator Training Involving These Events Revised |
- on 960220,discovered RCS C/D Rate Exceeded TS Limit.Caused by Use of Wrong Temp Sensor.Plant Operating Procedures,Heatup/C/D Monitoring Computer Program & Operator Training Involving These Events Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-007-01, :on 960403,CRS & Qs Sys Found Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Restored Sys to Appropriate Design Basis Requirements Prior to Declaring Sys Inoperable |
- on 960403,CRS & Qs Sys Found Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Restored Sys to Appropriate Design Basis Requirements Prior to Declaring Sys Inoperable
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000423/LER-1996-007-02, Forwards LER 96-007-02 Which Supplements Rept Submitted on 960502,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B&D), 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B&D).Commitments in Response to Event, Encl | Forwards LER 96-007-02 Which Supplements Rept Submitted on 960502,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B&D), 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B&D).Commitments in Response to Event, Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-008, :on 960222,concluded That Condition of Wire Mesh Screen Encl Over Two Containment Recirculation Suction Pipes Outside Design Basis.Caused by Const/Installation Error.Screen Encl Being Replaced |
- on 960222,concluded That Condition of Wire Mesh Screen Encl Over Two Containment Recirculation Suction Pipes Outside Design Basis.Caused by Const/Installation Error.Screen Encl Being Replaced
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-008-01, :on 960412,reactor Protection Sys Lead/Lag Time Constants Found non-conservative.Caused by Failure of Vendor to Identify Conservative Calibr Requirements.Tss Changed to Correctly Identify Direction of Conservatism |
- on 960412,reactor Protection Sys Lead/Lag Time Constants Found non-conservative.Caused by Failure of Vendor to Identify Conservative Calibr Requirements.Tss Changed to Correctly Identify Direction of Conservatism
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1996-009, :on 960423,inoperable Shutdown Margin Monitors from Low Count Rate Occurred Due to Inadequate Design Control.Reduced SMM Setpoint |
- on 960423,inoperable Shutdown Margin Monitors from Low Count Rate Occurred Due to Inadequate Design Control.Reduced SMM Setpoint
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1996-009-01, :on 960109,isolation Condenser Makeup Water Temperature Below Design Basis Limit,Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design Specification.Preliminary Assessment of non-ductile Failure of Isolation Condenser Sys Performed |
- on 960109,isolation Condenser Makeup Water Temperature Below Design Basis Limit,Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design Specification.Preliminary Assessment of non-ductile Failure of Isolation Condenser Sys Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-009-01, :on 960216,post LOCA Contianment Pressure Prevented Timely Extraction of PASS Air Sample & H Sample. Caused by Inadequate Assessment of Revised Post LOCA Response Analysis.Implemented Design Change |
- on 960216,post LOCA Contianment Pressure Prevented Timely Extraction of PASS Air Sample & H Sample. Caused by Inadequate Assessment of Revised Post LOCA Response Analysis.Implemented Design Change
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-009-02, Submits Table of Commitments Re LER 96-009-02 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) | Submits Table of Commitments Re LER 96-009-02 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1996-010, :on 960222,identified That Containment Hydrogen Monitor Flow Could Not Be Established W/Containment at Atmospheric Pressure Due to Improper Setting of Sys Pressure Regulators.Sys Calib Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 960222,identified That Containment Hydrogen Monitor Flow Could Not Be Established W/Containment at Atmospheric Pressure Due to Improper Setting of Sys Pressure Regulators.Sys Calib Procedure Will Be Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-010-02, :on 960425,determined That Potential Failure Mode of Rod Control Sys Acopian Power Supplies Could Create Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Design Review. Reset Feature Will Be Deleted |
- on 960425,determined That Potential Failure Mode of Rod Control Sys Acopian Power Supplies Could Create Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Design Review. Reset Feature Will Be Deleted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000336/LER-1996-011-01, :on 960222,required Time to Enter Mode 5 Exceeded.Caused by Effective Action Not Being Initiated to Revise SDC & Cooldown Rate Monitoring Procedures.Operating & Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 960222,required Time to Enter Mode 5 Exceeded.Caused by Effective Action Not Being Initiated to Revise SDC & Cooldown Rate Monitoring Procedures.Operating & Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-011-02, :on 960512,determined That Both Trains of CR Envelope Pressurization Sys Inoperable Due to Imbalance in air-conditioning Sys.Cr air-conditioning Sys Rebalanced.W/ |
- on 960512,determined That Both Trains of CR Envelope Pressurization Sys Inoperable Due to Imbalance in air-conditioning Sys.Cr air-conditioning Sys Rebalanced.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-012, :on 960515,containment Leakage in Excess of TS Limits Noted,Due to Valve Leakage.Containment Spray Line Penetration 100 Flushed to Remove Any Boron Deposits.W/ |
- on 960515,containment Leakage in Excess of TS Limits Noted,Due to Valve Leakage.Containment Spray Line Penetration 100 Flushed to Remove Any Boron Deposits.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1996-012-01, :on 960228,SIS Drain Stop Valves Failed to Meet Functional Requirements of Ts.Caused by Personnel Error & Inadequate Retest Requirements.C/A:Valve 2-SI-618 Modified & Safety Related Solenoid Valves Inspected |
- on 960228,SIS Drain Stop Valves Failed to Meet Functional Requirements of Ts.Caused by Personnel Error & Inadequate Retest Requirements.C/A:Valve 2-SI-618 Modified & Safety Related Solenoid Valves Inspected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-012-02, :on 960515,containment Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Boric Acid Residue.Performed Flush of Line to Remove Boron Deposits |
- on 960515,containment Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Boric Acid Residue.Performed Flush of Line to Remove Boron Deposits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000423/LER-1996-013, :on 960612,design Deficiency in Rhrs.Caused by Inconsideration That Failure Mode of RHS Flow Control Valves Could Create High RHS Heat Exchanger CCP Discharge Temps. Actuators for Heat Exchanger Valves,Modified |
- on 960612,design Deficiency in Rhrs.Caused by Inconsideration That Failure Mode of RHS Flow Control Valves Could Create High RHS Heat Exchanger CCP Discharge Temps. Actuators for Heat Exchanger Valves,Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1996-013-01, :on 960314,assessed Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitors Nuclear Instrumentation Channels A,B,C & D as Inoperable Due to Potential Susceptability to Common Mode Failure.Replaced Failed Power Supply |
- on 960314,assessed Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitors Nuclear Instrumentation Channels A,B,C & D as Inoperable Due to Potential Susceptability to Common Mode Failure.Replaced Failed Power Supply
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-013-02, :on 960515,determined Design Deficiency in Residual Heat Removal System (Rhs).Caused by Original Plant Design.Corrective Actions Will Be Described in Supplement |
- on 960515,determined Design Deficiency in Residual Heat Removal System (Rhs).Caused by Original Plant Design.Corrective Actions Will Be Described in Supplement
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000336/LER-1996-014-01, :on 960311,weekly TS Surveillances Missed. Caused by Personnel Error W/Respect to Scheduling.C/A: Implemented Requirements of Surveillance Procedure Sp 2614A-3 |
- on 960311,weekly TS Surveillances Missed. Caused by Personnel Error W/Respect to Scheduling.C/A: Implemented Requirements of Surveillance Procedure Sp 2614A-3
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1996-014-02, :on 960516,surveillances for Emergency Diesel Generator Performed During Operation,Versus Shutdown.Caused by Misinterpretation of Shutdown Stipulation.Surveillances Performed During Shutdown |
- on 960516,surveillances for Emergency Diesel Generator Performed During Operation,Versus Shutdown.Caused by Misinterpretation of Shutdown Stipulation.Surveillances Performed During Shutdown
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-015-05, Forwards LER 96-015-05,documenting Event That Occurred at Plant,Unit 3 on 960610,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted | Forwards LER 96-015-05,documenting Event That Occurred at Plant,Unit 3 on 960610,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-015-04, Forwards LER 96-015-04,documenting Condition Determined at Unit 3 on 960610.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | Forwards LER 96-015-04,documenting Condition Determined at Unit 3 on 960610.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000336/LER-1996-015-01, :on 960312,failed to Perform Action Requirement for TS LCO 3.3.1.1.Caused by Failure to Recognize Applicability of TS During Abnormal Equipment Configuration. Revised Procedures |
- on 960312,failed to Perform Action Requirement for TS LCO 3.3.1.1.Caused by Failure to Recognize Applicability of TS During Abnormal Equipment Configuration. Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-015-02, Forwards LER 96-015-02 Re Inadequate Electrical Separation Between Redundant Protection Trains Associated W/Reactor Trip Switches & Reactor Trip Breaker Indicating Lights | Forwards LER 96-015-02 Re Inadequate Electrical Separation Between Redundant Protection Trains Associated W/Reactor Trip Switches & Reactor Trip Breaker Indicating Lights | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000423/LER-1996-016-02, :on 960619,switchgear Cabinet in Noncompliance W/Seismic Design Basis & Subsequently Inadvertent Esfa Signal Occurred.Personnel Did Not Latch Known Seismic Latches as Required.Engaged Latches |
- on 960619,switchgear Cabinet in Noncompliance W/Seismic Design Basis & Subsequently Inadvertent Esfa Signal Occurred.Personnel Did Not Latch Known Seismic Latches as Required.Engaged Latches
| | | 05000336/LER-1996-016-01, :on 960312,common Power Supply Cable to 4 Condenser Pit Level Switches Found Improperly Connected. Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Cable Properly Connected & Trip Circuits Tested |
- on 960312,common Power Supply Cable to 4 Condenser Pit Level Switches Found Improperly Connected. Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Cable Properly Connected & Trip Circuits Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-017, :on 960320,discovered That Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Does Not Meet Single Failure Criterion by Reg Guide 1.97.Caused by Failure to Adequately Consider Sys Design Basis Requirements.Design Change Modified |
- on 960320,discovered That Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Does Not Meet Single Failure Criterion by Reg Guide 1.97.Caused by Failure to Adequately Consider Sys Design Basis Requirements.Design Change Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-017-02, :on 960621,determined Design Deficiency Existed in Tornado Protection Ventilation Dampers,Could Have Affected EDGs Following Tornado.Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Const Design.Procedure Revised |
- on 960621,determined Design Deficiency Existed in Tornado Protection Ventilation Dampers,Could Have Affected EDGs Following Tornado.Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Const Design.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000336/LER-1996-018-01, Forwards LER 96-018-01,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Unit 2 on 960319.LER Suppl Provides Update on Analyses & Investigation of Condition.Attachment 1 Is Clarification of Original Commitment Associated W/Ler | Forwards LER 96-018-01,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Unit 2 on 960319.LER Suppl Provides Update on Analyses & Investigation of Condition.Attachment 1 Is Clarification of Original Commitment Associated W/Ler | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000336/LER-1996-018, :on 960316,gaps Discovered in Encls Door Seals for Motor Control Ctrs B51 & B61.Caused by Weakness in Existing Program to Inspect & Verify Integrity of Environ Protective Barriers.Doors for MCC B51 & MCC B61 Replaced |
- on 960316,gaps Discovered in Encls Door Seals for Motor Control Ctrs B51 & B61.Caused by Weakness in Existing Program to Inspect & Verify Integrity of Environ Protective Barriers.Doors for MCC B51 & MCC B61 Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-019-02, :on 960627,RCS PORV Block Valves Were Determined to Be Unable to Perform Intended Safety Functions.Caused by Structural Design Deficiency.C/A Will Be Provided in Supplement to Rept |
- on 960627,RCS PORV Block Valves Were Determined to Be Unable to Perform Intended Safety Functions.Caused by Structural Design Deficiency.C/A Will Be Provided in Supplement to Rept
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
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