05000219/LER-1982-046, Forwards LER 82-046/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-046/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20027B910
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	09/16/1982
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20027B911	List: 05000219/LER-1982-046, Forwards LER 82-046/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000219/LER-1982-046-03, /03L-0:on 820815,controls Keeping Main Line Drain Valves Deactivated in Isolation Position Were Defeated Prior to Temp Dropping Below 212 F.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Reinstructed
References
NUDOCS 8209300303
Download: ML20027B910 (3)

LER-1982-046, Forwards LER 82-046/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2191982046R00 - NRC Website

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P.O. t30x 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

September 16, 1982 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 1

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Cenerating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-46/03L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-46/03L in compliance with paragraph 6 9 2.b 3 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, 1 1 M

Peter B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:Ise Enclosure s cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C,ommiss, ion Wishington, D.C.

20555 Direc tor (3)

Of fice of. Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 9209300303 820916

{DRADOCK 05000219 PDR GPU Nuclear is a part of the Generel Public Uti' ties System MO

e OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licenree Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-46/03L Report Date September 16, 1982 Occurrence Date August 15, 1982 Identification of Occurrence It was discovered that primary containment integrity was not maintained when the administrative controls keeping-main steam line drain valves V-1-106, V-1-110, and V-1-lll deactivated and secured in the isolation position were defeated prior to the reactor coolant temperature going below 2120F. This exceeds a limiting condition for operation as outlined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3 5. A.3.a.l.b.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6 9 2.b.3 Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was proceeding to a cold shutdown condition.

Major Plant Parameters Reactor Power:

Suberitical Generator Output:

0 MWe Mode Switch Position:

REFUEL Reactor Coolant Temperature: 3900F Description of Occurrence On May 27,1982, the breakers for valves V-1-106, V-1-110, and V-1-lll were placed in the "0FF" position, tagged, and the control switches for each valve were also tagged in the " NORMAL" (closed) position. This was due to valve V-1-106 being declared inoperable (Reference: Reportable Occurrence 50-219/82-18/03L). These actions are required by the Technical Specificationa, paragraph 3 5. A.3.a.l.b.

e,..

Licensee Event Report Page 2 Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-46/03L During the plant shutdown on August '15,1982, valves V-1-106, V-1-110 and V-1-111 were not maintained as " deactivated and secured" in the isolation position until the reactor coolant temperature was below 2120F. At approximately 11:00 AM in preparation for shutdown maintenance, the tags on the breakers were removed and the breakers returned to the "0N" position.

Also, the tags on the valves' control switches were removed, and the Control Room operators were instructed not to operate the valves until reactor coolant temperature was less than 2120F. It was not until 4:40 that afternoon that reactor coolant temperture was brought below 2120F, leaving a period of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and 40 minutes during which the valves were not " deactivated and secured".

It is important to note that during this time the valves remained in the isolated (closed) position.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence The cause was attributed to personnel error. While the valves were maintained in a closed position, the deactivation requirement of the Technical Specifications was overlooked.

Analysis of Occurrence The Technical Specifications require that a primary containment penetration, with an inoperable isolation valve, be isolated by using at least one deactivated cutomatic valve secured in the isolation position. This was done by deactivating valves V-1-110 and V-1-111 on May 27.

On August 15, the administrative controls keeping these valves deactivated were defeated although the valves remained in the closed position. However, since the breakers had been returned to the "0N" position, the capability to inadvertantly open the valvas existed.

Corrective Action

No immediate corrective action was taken because the limiting condition for operation, which was exceeded, was not identified until after reactor coolant temperature was below 2120F. This licensee event report will be required reading for Operations personnel to help prevent this type of event from occurring in the future.