ML103140510

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Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolida
ML103140510
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/29/2010
From: Ajluni M J
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-10-0271, TSTF-425-A, Rev 3
Download: ML103140510 (982)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:Mark J. Ajiluni, P.E. Southern Nuclear Nuclear Licensing Director Operating Company, Inc.40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Tel 205.992.7673 Fax 205.992.7885 October 29, 2010 SOUTHIERN 4 COMPANY Docket Nos.: 50-321 NL-10-0271 50-366 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Ladies and Gentlemen: In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP).In accordance with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 425-A, Revision 3, the proposed amendment would modify the HNP TS by relocating specific surveillance frequencies to a licensee-controlled program with the implementation of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-10, Rev.1 "Risk-Informed Technical Specification Initiative 5b, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies." The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal Register on July 6, 2009 (74 FR 31996) as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP).The following Enclosures are attached to this amendment request: " Enclosure 1 provides the basis for the proposed change to the HNP TS, the requested confirmation of applicability and plant specific verifications." Enclosure 2 provides documentation of PRA technical adequacy." Enclosures 3 and 4 provide the existing HNP TS pages marked up to show the proposed changes for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively." Enclosures 5 and 6 provide the clean typed HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS pages." Enclosures 7 and 8 provide the proposed TS Bases changes for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2." Enclosure 9 provides a cross-reference between the TSTF 425-A marked up TS pages and the HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS pages.AoDD U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-10-0271 Page 2 SNC requests approval of the proposed license amendment by April 29, 2011 with the amendment being implemented within 120 days of receipt of the amendment. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for Public Comment; State Consultation," a copy of this application, with enclosures, is being provided to the appropriate designated Georgia Officials. This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact N. J. Stringfellow at (205) 992-7037.Mr. M. J. Ajluni states he is Nuclear Licensing Director of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.Respectfully submitted, M. J. Ajluni Nuclear Licensing Director Sworn to and subscribed before me this 2, day of 0 c.16 A eA. , 2010.Notary Public My commission expires: !4/ 7 X MJA/SYA/

Enclosures:

1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.Basis of Proposed Change Documentation of PRA Technical Accuracy Markup for HNP Unit 1 Proposed TS Changes Markup for HNP Unit 2 Proposed TS Changes Clean Typed Pages for HNP Unit 1 Proposed TS Changes Clean Typed Pages for HNP Unit 2 Proposed TS Changes TS Bases changes for HNP Unit 1 TS Bases changes for HNP Unit 2 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 TSTF 425 Mark ups U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-10-0271 Page 3 cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President (W/O Enclosure) Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President -Hatch (W/O Enclosure) Ms. P. M. Marino, Vice President -Engineering (W/O Enclosure) RType: CHA02.004 U. S. Nuclear Requlatory Commission Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Project Manager -Hatch Mr. E. D. Morris, Senior Resident Inspector -Hatch Mr. P.G. Boyle, NRR Project Manager State of Georgia Mr. C. Clark, Commissioner -Department of Natural Resources Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 1 Basis for Proposed Change Enclosure 1 Basis for Proposed Change Table of Contents 1.0 Description

2.0 Assessment

2.1 Applicability

of Published Safety Evaluation

2.2 Optional

Changes and Variations

3.0 Regulatory

Analysis 3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

4.0 Environmental

Evaluation Enclosure 1 Basis for Proposed Change 1.0 Description The proposed change would modify the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP)Technical Specifications (TS) by relocating specific surveillance frequencies to a licensee-controlled program with the adoption of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-425, Revision 3, "Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program (Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force (RITSTF) Initiative 5)." Additionally, the change would add a new program, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, to the HNP TS Section 5, Administrative Controls. The changes are consistent with NRC approved Industry/TSTF STS change TSTF-425, Revision 3, (ADAMS Accession No. ML080280275). The Federal Register notice published on July 6, 2009 announced the availability of this TS improvement.

2.0 Assessment

2.1 Applicability

of Published Safety Evaluation Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) has reviewed the safety evaluation dated July 6, 2009 as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). This review included a review of the NRC staff's evaluation, TSTF-425, Revision 3, and the requirements specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-10, Rev. 1, (ADAMS Accession No.ML071360456). SNC has concluded that the justifications presented in the TSTF and the Safety Evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to Units 1 and 2 of HNP and justify this amendment for the incorporation of changes to the TS for Units 1 and 2 of HNP.Enclosure 2 includes SNC documentation with regard to PRA technical adequacy consistent with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.200 Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070240001), Section 4.2, and describes any PRA models without NRC-endorsed standards, including documentation of the quality characteristics of those models in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.200.NRC Amendments 234 and 176 for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively, revised the HNP TS to support extension of certain Surveillance Requirements from "92 days" to "92 days on an alternate test basis." An alternate test basis consists of the testing of systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components during the interval specified by the Surveillance Frequency, so that all systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components are tested during two consecutive Surveillance Frequency intervals according to the partial testing formula that follows, where n is the total number of systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components in the associated function. If the total number of systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components is even, then n/2 are tested during each interval specified by E1-2 Enclosure 1 Basis for Proposed Change the Surveillance Frequency. If the total number of systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components is odd, then either (n+1)12 or (n-1)12 are tested during the first test interval at the specified Surveillance Frequency. The systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components not tested during the first interval are tested during the next interval.The exclusion criteria listed in TSTF-425 do not apply to the Surveillance Requirements that are on an alternate test basis; therefore, these surveillance frequencies and the definition of alternate test basis will be relocated from the HNP TS to a licensee controlled document. NEI 04-10 Guidance will be applied if HNP desires to remove, modify or add an alternate test basis requirement.

2.2 Optional

Changes and Variations The proposed amendment is consistent with the Standard TS changes described in TSTF-425, Revision 3; however, SNC proposes the following variations or deviations from TSTF-425: NRC letter dated April 14, 2010 provides a change to an optional insert (INSERT #2) to the existing TS Bases to facilitate adoption of the Traveler while retaining the existing NUREG TS surveillance frequency (SF) Bases considerations for licensees not choosing to adopt TSTF-425. The TSTF-425 TS Bases insert states as follows: The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.Recently several licensees submitting license amendment requests (LARs) for adoption of TSTF-425 have identified a need to deviate from this statement because it only applies to frequencies that have been changed in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP) and does not apply to frequencies that are relocated but not changed.The NRC staff agreed that the TSTF-425 TS Bases insert applies to SFs that are relocated and subsequently evaluated and changed, in accordance with the SFCP in NRC letter dated April 14, 2010. The TSTF-425 TS Bases does not apply to SFs relocated to the SFCP but not changed. Therefore, for SFs relocated to the SFCP but not changed, the existing TS Bases description remains a valid description of the TS SF Bases for the unchanged SF.E1-3 Enclosure 1 Basis for Proposed Change To resolve this issue with existing LARs and to avoid future problems, the NRC staff supported the following recommended changes to clarify the applicability of the TS SF Bases, maintain consistency with TSTF-425 TS SFCP requirements, and allow retention of existing TS SF Bases for licensees who choose not to adopt TSTF-425 (April 28, 2010 discussion between the TSTF and the NRC): 1. The existing Bases information describing the basis for the Surveillance Frequency will be relocated to the licensee-controlled Surveillance Frequency Control Program.2. The TSTF-425 TS Bases, INSERT #2, should be added to the end of the existing TS Bases and changed to read as follows: The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SNC has incorporated these recommended changes into this License Amendment Request.Enclosure 9 provides a cross-reference between the NUREG-1433 Surveillance Requirements (SRs) included in TSTF-425 versus the HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS. This Enclosure includes a summary description of the referenced TSTF-425/HNP TS SRs which is being provided for information purposes only and is not intended to be a verbatim description of the TS SRs. This cross-reference highlights the following:

1. SRs included in TSTF-425 and corresponding HNP SRs with identical SR numbers;2. SRs included in TSTF-425 and corresponding HNP SRs with differing SR numbers;3. SRs included in TSTF-425 that are not contained in the HNP TS; and 4. HNP plant-specific SRs that are not contained in the TSTF-425 mark-ups.Concerning the above, HNP SRs that have SR numbers identical to the corresponding TSTF-425 SRs are not deviations from TSTF-425.

HNP SRs with SR numbers that differ from the corresponding TSTF-425 SRs are administrative deviations from TSTF-425 with no impact on the NRC's model safety evaluation dated July 6, 2009 (74 FR 31996).E1-4 Enclosure 1 Basis for Proposed Change For TSTF-425 SRs that are not contained in the HNP TS, the corresponding mark-ups included in TSTF-425 for these SRs are not applicable to HNP. This is an administrative deviation from TSTF-425 with no impact on the NRC's model safety evaluation dated July 6, 2009 (74 FR 31996).For HNP plant-specific SRs that are not contained in the mark-ups provided in TSTF-425, SNC has determined that the relocation of the frequencies for these HNP plant-specific SRs is consistent with the intent of TSTF-425, Revision 3, and with the NRC's model safety evaluation dated July 6, 2009 (74 FR 31996), including the scope exclusions identified in Section 1.0, "Introduction," of the model safety evaluation, because the subject plant-specific SRs involve fixed periodic frequencies. In accordance with TSTF-425, changes to the frequencies for these SRs would be controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency Control Program provides the necessary administrative controls to require that SRs related to testing, calibration and inspection are conducted at a frequency to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met. Changes to frequencies in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program would be evaluated using the NRC approved methodology and probabilistic risk guidelines contained in NEI 04-10, Revision 1.3.0 Regulatory Analysis 3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration SNC has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register dated July 6, 2009 (74 FR 31996) as part of the CLIIP. SNC has concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to Units 1 and 2 of HNP and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a) for this application.

4.0 Environmental

Evaluation SNC has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in the model safety evaluation dated July 6, 2009 as part of the CLIIP. SNC has concluded that the staff's findings presented in the published evaluation are applicable to Units 1 and 2 of HNP and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference for this application. E11-5 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction

2.0 Technical

Adequacy of HNP PRA Model 2.1 PRA Model for As-Built As-Operated HNP 2.1.1 PRA Maintenance and Update 2.1.2 Plant Changes Not Yet Incorporated into the PRA Model 2.2 Consistency with Applicable ASME PRA Standards 2.2.1 Previous Peer Review and Self Assessments for HNP PRA Model 2.2.2 RG 1.200 PRA Peer Review for HNP PRA against ASME PRA Standard Requirements

2.2.3 Resolutions

of Findings from RG 1.200 PRA Peer Review 2.3 Identification of Key Assumptions 3,0 External Event Considerations

4.0 General

Conclusion Regarding PRA Capability

5.0 References

E2-1 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy 1.0 Introduction SNC employs a multi-faceted approach to establishing and maintaining the technical adequacy and plant fidelity of the PRA models for all operating SNC nuclear generation sites. This approach includes both a proceduralized PRA maintenance and an update process, and the use of self-assessments and independent peer reviews. The following information describes this approach as it applies to the HNP PRA.2.0 Technical Adequacy of Hatch PRA Model 2.1 PRA Model for As-Built As-Operated Hatch Nuclear Plant 2.1.1 PRA Maintenance and Update The SNC risk management process ensures that the applicable PRA model remains an accurate reflection of the as-built and as-operated units. The SNC risk management process also delineates the responsibilities and guidelines for updating the full power internal events PRA models at all operating SNC nuclear generation sites. The overall SNC risk management program defines the process for implementing regularly scheduled and interim PRA model updates, for tracking issues identified as potentially affecting the PRA models (e.g., due to changes in the plant, errors or limitations identified in the model, industry operational experience), and for controlling the model and associated computer files. To ensure that the current PRA model remains an accurate reflection of the as-built, as-operated plant, the HNP PRA model has been updated according to the requirements defined in the SNC risk management process: Pertinent modifications to the physical plant (i.e. those potentially affecting the Base Line PRA (BL-PRA) models, calculated core damage frequencies (CDFs), or large early release frequencies (LERFs) to a significant degree) shall be reviewed to determine the scope and necessity of a revision to the baseline model within six Months following the Unit 2 refueling outage or a specific major plant modification occurring outside a refueling outage. The BL-PRAs should be updated as necessary in accordance with a schedule approved by the PRA Manager following the scoping review. Upon completion of the lead Unit's BL-PRA, the other Unit's BL-PRA will be regenerated by modification of the updated BL-PRAs to account for Unit differences which significantly impact the results." Pertinent modifications to plant procedures and Technical Specifications shall be reviewed annually for changes which are of statistical significance to the results of the BL-PRA and those changes documented. Reliability data, failure data, initiating events frequency data, human reliability data, and other such PRA inputs shall be reviewed approximately every three years for statistical significance to the results of the BL-PRAs. Following the tri-annual review, the BL-PRAs shall be E2-2 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy updated to account for the statistically significant changes to these two categories of PRA inputs in accordance with an approved schedule.* BL-PRAs shall be updated to reflect germane changes in methodology, phenomenology, and regulation as judged to be prudent by the PRA custodian or as required by regulation. In addition to these activities, SNC risk management procedures provide the guidance for particular risk management and PRA quality and maintenance activities. This guidance includes: " Documentation of the PRA model, PRA products, and bases documents." The approach for controlling electronic storage of Risk Management (RM)products including PRA update information, PRA models, and PRA applications." Guidelines for updating the full power, internal events PRA models for SNC nuclear generation sites." Guidance for use of quantitative and qualitative risk models in support of the On-Line Work Control Process Program for risk evaluations for maintenance tasks (corrective maintenance, preventive maintenance, minor maintenance, surveillance tests and modifications) on systems, structures, and components (SSCs) within the scope of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)).In accordance with this guidance, regularly scheduled PRA model updates nominally occur on an approximate three year cycle; however, longer intervals may be justified if it can be shown that the PRA continues to adequately represent the as-built, as-operated plant. Table 1 shows the brief history of the major HNP PRA model updates.2.1.2 Plant Changes Not Yet Incorporated into the PRA Model As part of the PRA evaluation for each Surveillance Test Interval (STI), based on a Surveillance Frequency change request, an evaluation will be performed by the PRA Department, to assess the impact, if any, of any plant's changes which are not incorporated into the HNP PRA model which is used for providing risk information/insights prior to presenting the results of the risk analysis to the Independent Decision-making Panel (IDP). If non-trivial impact is expected, then this may include the performance of additional sensitivity studies or PRA model changes to confirm the impact on the risk analysis.E2-3 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table 1: History of the Major Hatch PRA Model Updates Model Document No. Scope Updated Items CDF and LERF (/yr)'IPE Generic Letter 88- At-power, internal The original CDF: 2.1 E-5 20 Response, and external, CDF LERF: 4.7E-06 Individual Plant and Level 2 PRA Examination Submittal Plant HNP Units 1 and 2 December 11, 1992 Rev. 0 SNC-H1-98-002-At-power, internal, Conversion from RISKMAN Event CDF: 1.22E-5 005 Notebooks CDF and LERF Tree model to a CAFTA Fault Tree LERF: 2.2E-6 prepared by PLG model.The CDF reduction was due to updating initiating event frequencies, splitting Loss of Feedwater into two events (one based on loss of condensate system-one not). The LERF reduction was due to the use of a more simplified LERF model.Rev. 1 PSA-H-00-024 At-power, internal, Cafta model changes from Rev 0 CDF: 1.24E-5 Rev. la May CDF and LERF LERF: 2.20E-6 2001 The change in CDF was due to a correction in the Mutually Exclusive file that had incorrectly removed a valid cutset E2-4 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table 1: History of the Major Hatch PRA Model Updates Model Document No. Scope Updated Items CDF and LERF (Iyr)Rev. 2 PRA-BC-H At-power, internal, The first HNP PRA Peer Review CDF: 8.3E-6 003 Jan. 2006 CDF and LERF was performed on Revision 1 of LERF:6.08E-7 CDF only the HNP model in April 2001. The Revision 2 model has the findings The most significant change that reduced PRA-BC-H from that Peer Review CDF and contributed to LERF reduction was 002 April 2006 incorporated in it. This model had the inclusion of five hours of battery power for LERF/LEVELII a complete updated HRA, Data, RCIC operation during a station blackout. In only and Common Cause input. In addition, the data update provided more addition, the LERF model was industry correct power recovery factors.completely redone to address all of LERF was affected primarily by using the Peer Review findings regarding declaration times to general emergency it. comparison to emergency planning evacuation data for the plant surrounding area.Rev. 3 PRA-BC-H At-power, internal, Selected depressurization events CDF = 6.76E-6 002 Jan. 2009 CDF and LERF were recalculated to a lower LERF = 5.8E-7 CDF only probability of failure. Loss of station service battery A no longer The modification to the model with regards to caused a turbine trip. These items the Loss of A station service battery in were modified in the model and conjunction with lower depress probabilities provided the bulk of the change in provided the lower overall values.CDF. These changes caused a slight decrease in LERF frequency. E2-5 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table 1: History of the Major Hatch PRA Model Updates Model Document No. Scope Updated Items CDF and LERF (/yr)Rev. 4 PRA-BC-H At-power, internal, This model has been peer CDF = 7.78E-6 008 June 2010 CDF and LERF reviewed to R.G. 1.200 Revision 2 LERF = 1.16E-6 clarifications, the ASME/ANS PRA Standard and NEI 05-04. Peer The CDF model addressed many comments review comments have been from the peer review. There were several incorporated and the model meets new special initiating event trees added for Cat II of the ASME standard. electrical systems. The data and HRA was completely redone. The upgrade of the line break outside containment event values provided most of the change in core damage frequency between Revision 3 and Revision 4. The remainder of the change was distributed among the extra initiators being considered. LERF was affected most by the new values for the breaks outside containment. These were initially estimated, however, for Revision 4, line lengths were calculated and a more rigorous methodology was used.E2-6 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy 2.2 Consistency with Applicable ASME PRA Standard Requirements

2.2.1 Previous

Peer Review and Self Assessment for Hatch PRA Model In addition to independent internal review during each HNP PRA model development and update, the HNP PRA model has been peer reviewed twice.The first peer review was conducted by the BWR Owners Group in April 2001. The review team used Revision A-3 NEI draft "Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Peer Review Process Guidance dated June 2, 2000 as the basis for review. This review was observed by a team from the NRC.* In 2006, a gap analysis was performed against the available versions of the ASME PRA Standard (Reference

1) and Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 0 (2003 trial version).2.2.2. RG 1.200 PRA Peer Review for Hatch PRA Model against ASME PRA Standard Requirements The decision was made to perform a complete peer review for all elements of the internal events model including Internal Flooding against R.G. 1.200 Revision 2 clarifications (Reference 2), the ASME/ANS PRA Standard, and NEI 05-04. This was completed in November 2009.A summary of the review is described in the following information.
1. The ASME/ANS PRA Standard (Reference
3) contains a total of 326 numbered supporting requirements (SRs) in nine technical elements and one configuration control element. There were five not applicable requirements for the HNP review: AS-B4, IFEV-A8, LE-D5, LE-D6, and MU-D1.2. Among 321 applicable SRs, 95% of SRs met Capability Category II or higher as follows: Capability Category Met No. of SRs % of total applicable SRs CC-I/Il/Ill (or SR Met) 225 70%CCI 5 1%CC II 27 8%CC III 18 6%CC 1/11 10 3%CC Il/111 26 8%SR Not Met 10 3%SR Not Applicable 5 1%Total 326 100%3. 10 SRs were judged to be not met. IE-A6 was not met because the additional initiating events identified from the FME analysis were not included in the model under review. IE-B2 was not met because the IE E2-7 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy notebook did not discuss the system for grouping initiating events. IE-B3 was not met because IE-B2 was not met. AS-83 was not met because the Accident Sequence notebook did not provide a discussion of the phenomenological conditions for each accident sequence.

SC-B5 was not met because a comparison of the thermal hydraulic calculations with those of other plants was not performed. SC-Cl was not met because, although the success criteria were very detailed, it was difficult to compare criteria to a specific initiating event. IFSN-AlO was not met because credit was not given to operator isolation of a certain flood scenario. This could cause a potential for flooding in other areas. IFQU-A5 is not met because IFSN-A10 is not met. IFQU-A6 cites an over conservatism by failing operator actions outside the main control room in flooding areas. MU-Al is not met because the SNC process used does not provide a more organized method of documentation. In addition to the not met SRs, there were five SRs that were met as Cat 1. IE-A9 was met as Cat 1 because plant specific experience for initiating event precursors was not provided. LE-C3 was met as Cat 1 only because there was no address as to the possibility of equipment repair.HNP did not credit repair during LERF conditions. LE-ClO was met as Cat 1 because there was no documentation regarding continued equipment operations or personnel actions in a LERF environment. HNP did not credit such actions. LE-Cl 2 was met as Cat 1 because there is no documentation showing that the PRA can credit post containment failure operation of equipment or personnel actions. HNP does not credit such items. LE-C13 was met as Cat 1 because there was not an engineering basis for the decontamination factor used for scrubbing.

2.2.3 Resolution

of Findings from RG 1.200 PRA Peer Review Table 2 shows details of the 10 "SR Not Met" findings and resolutions after the peer review. In addition, the five Cat 1 SRs are also addressed. E2-8 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table 2 Resolution of the Hatch PRA Peer Review F&Os Associated 10 "SR not Met" SRs F&O # Review Level' Resolution The Status of Resolution by the SNC Element IE-A6-1-2 IE-A6 Finding Include the additional lEs in the analysis. It would The lEs identified in the notebook have been (SR not met appear panel failures would be very unlikely added to the model as well as the common CC-Il) except for specific types of events, especially cause failure considerations. Two of the spatially related events, buses were not modeled as lEs because they serve only to feed two that were added as lEs. The two buses not modeled as IEs are modeled as support for systems; one of the supported systems is in itself modeled as a special initiator. The special initiator modeling for the HNP PRA not only considers what causes a transient/scram but also what would require a shutdown per Technical Specifications. IE-B2-1-7 IE-B2 Finding Describe the process for systematically grouping The IE notebook has been revised to include (SR CC-I/Il/Ill the IEs to ensure: a full discussion of IE grouping. This Not met) (a) Events can be considered similar in terms of comment has been addressed. plant response, success criteria, timing, and the effect on the operability and performance of operators and relevant mitigating systems: or (b)events can be subsumed into a group and bounded by the worst case impacts within the new group.E2-9 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table 2 Resolution of the Hatch PRA Peer Review F&Os Associated 10 "SR not Met" SRs F&O # Review Level' Resolution The Status of Resolution by the SNC Element IE-B3-1-7 IE-B3 Finding Describe the process for systematically grouping This comment has been added to the IE (SR Not met IEs to ensure: notebook. There are no subsumed events in CC II) (a) Events can be considered similar in terms of the HNP PRA model.plant response, success criteria, timing, and the effect on the operability and performance of operators and relevant mitigating systems; or (b)Events can be subsumed into a group and bounded by the worst case impacts within the new group.AS-B3-1-9 AS-B3 (SR Finding Include additional detail for each accident The detail required by this finding has been Not met sequence. Particularly, there was no mention of added to the accident sequence notebook.CCI/II/III) the generation of harsh environments affecting The sequence descriptions have a temperature, pressure, debris, water levels or discussion of Environmental Conditions. The humidity that could impact the success of the HNP PRA does not typically rely on system equipment or operator actions in an area where a severe environment is encountered. SC-B5-3-1 SC-B5 (SR Finding Check the reasonableness and acceptability of the A comparison table for the HNP PRA was Not met results of the thermal/hydraulic and any other developed for Success Criteria based on CCI/II/lil) analysis used to support the success criteria, input from other BWR facilities (i.e. Pilgrim, Document in the SC Notebook how this Cooper, LaSalle, and Nine Mile Point).reasonableness was performed. E2-10 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table 2 Resolution of the Hatch PRA Peer Review F&Os Associated 10 "SR not Met" SRs F&O # Review Level' Resolution The Status of Resolution by the SNC Element SC-Cl-5-4 SC-C3 (SR Finding The success criteria should be captured in tabular A success criteria summary table has been Not met from in the SC document. Having this information added to the SC notebook. This table in CCI/II/III) in one place will alleviate confusion when addition to the extreme detail already performing PRA applications and upgrades. provided makes the Success Criteria Additionally, it will facilitate peer reviews. Provide notebook extremely informative. a summary of success criteria for available mitigating systems and human actions for each initiating group.IFSN-A10-IFSN-A10 (SR Finding Operator actions should be developed and added The PRA model used in the peer review 4-5 Not met to the scenario development and the PRA model contained over 100 flood initiators. No CCI/II/II) to reflect how the plant would be operated in the screening was done based on operator event of this scenario. It may be beneficial to action input. This finding was addressed by consider use of mitigation event trees to assure screening the initiators to 24 and applying that all mitigation issues are considered. HRA for these scenarios to mitigate the results.IFQU-A5- IFQU-A5 (SR Finding Operator actions should be developed and added The PRA model used in the peer review 4-5 Not met to the scenario development and the PRA model contained over 100 flood initiators. No CCI/II/Ill) to reflect how the plant would be operated in the screening was done based on operator event of this scenario. It may be beneficial to action input. This finding was addressed by consider use of mitigation event trees to assure screening the initiators to 24 and applying that all mitigation issues are considered. HRA for these scenarios to mitigate the results.IFQU-A6- IFQU-A6 (SR Finding Consider more realistic operator actions for floods This item has been addressed for IFQU-A5-2-7 Not met when action has to be taken outside the main 4-5.CCI/II/II) control room.E2-1 1 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table 2 Resolution of the Hatch PRA Peer Review F&Os Associted 10 "SR not Met" F&O # Review Level' Resolution The Status of Resolution by the SNC Element MU-Cl-5-8 MU-C1 (SR Finding Recommend developing a database for use by This comment refers to the model update Not met Cat PRA. Such a database should have prioritization process. These procedures are under I/1l/ll) clearly delineated. This would allow a dynamic revision. Presently, model change assessment of the cumulative impact of pending requirements tend to be governed by the use changes. Additionally, this will allow the more of the corrective action program.significant changes to be incorporated before less significant ones Table 2 Resolution of the Hatch PRA Peer Review F&Os Associated with the 5 Cat I met only SRs F&O # Review Level Resolution The Status of the Resolution by SNC Element LE-C3-7-2 LE-C3 (SR Finding Review significant progression sequences to Statements have been added to L2 NB Cat I met) support evaluations required in applicable SR Section 7 of notebooks, as well as Appendix Capability Category. K to note that significant accident sequences resulting in LERF were reviewed and credit for continued operation or repair (beyond LOOP recovery) was not judged to be credible. Cat 1/11/111 is considered met for this SR.E2-12 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table 2 Resolution of the Hatch PRA Peer Review F&Os Associated with the 5 Cat I met only SRs F&O # Review Level Resolution The Status of the Resolution by SNC Element LE-CIO LE-CIO (SR Finding Review significant progression sequences to Statements have been added to L2 NB 2 Cat I met) support evaluations required in applicable SR Section 7 of notebooks as well as Appendix Capability Category K to note that significant accident sequences resulting in LERF were reviewed and credit for continued operation or repair (beyond LOOP recovery) was not judged to be credible. Cat II is considered met for this SR.LE-C12 LE-C12 (SR Finding Review significant progression sequences to Statements have been added to L2 NB 2 Cat I met) support evaluations required in applicable SR Section 7 of notebooks as well as Appendix Capability Category K to note that significant accident sequences resulting in LERF were reviewed and credit for continued operation or repair (beyond LOOP recovery) was not judged to be credible. Cat II is considered met for this SR.LE-C13 LE-C13 (SR Finding Perform a containment bypass analysis as Text enhanced in Appendix D of notebooks 4 Cat I met) described in SR LE-C13 (Footnote 6 added to Table HA5) and similarly in Section 7.7. The analysis regarding scrubbing is approached with engineering judgment. Only scrubbing for low pressure sequences is considered and then the value is low. This basis is acceptable and the use of scrubbing is considered in the uncertainty analysis. Cat Il/111 is considered met for this SR.E2-13 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy Table 2 Resolution of the Hatch PRA Peer Review F&Os Associated with the 5 Cat I met only SRs F&O # Review Level Resolution The Status of the Resolution by SNC Element IE-A9-1-4 IE-A9 (SR Cat Finding Include other sources of OE in the search for IE Several sources are available to determine I met) precursors. plant specific initiating events. When preparing the IE notebook, SNC reviewed the following sources. For each source, appropriate section has also been identified.

1. Plant Specific Events: [Table 3-4;Appendix C (LERs)]2. Plant Systems: [Appendix B -FMEA]3. LOCA inside Containment

[3.2.3]4. LOCA outside Containment [3.2.3]5. Multiple Failures [3.1.6]6. Interview [3.1.9; Appendix E]As a result of these reviews, additional special initiating events were identified and have been modeled.E2-14 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy 2.3 Identification of Key Assumptions The overall initiative 5B process is a risk-informed process with the PRA model results providing one of the inputs to the IDP to determine if a Surveillance Test Interval (STI)change is warranted. The methodology recognizes that a key area of uncertainty for this application is the standby failure rate utilized in the determination of the STI extension impact.The HNP PRA model does not use the standby failure rate approach, but the demand failure approach. In the demand failure approach, demand failure probabilities were evaluated by Bayesian update using plant specific failure data (total number of demands and total number of failures) and generic data. Therefore, there is no specific assumption utilized in the HNP PRA model for standby failure rate.For evaluating the impact of a STI change for 5B application, the following assumption will be used: Qd = 1/2 AT Where Qd: Demand failure probability, A: Standby failure rate, and T: a STI Therefore, if a STI increased from TO to T1 by a surveillance frequency change, the demand failure probability will be assumed to increase from Qd to Qd*(T1/TO). It is also noted that key assumptions may differ based on the system being considered for a STI change. Therefore, for each application of the PRA model, assumptions will be reviewed, key assumptions for a particular application will be identified, and impact of these key assumptions on the risk insights will be assessed.3.0 External Event Considerations The NEI-04-10 methodology allows for STI change evaluations to be performed in the absence of quantifiable PRA models for all external hazards. For those cases where the STI cannot be modeled in the plant PRA (or where a particular PRA model does not exist for a given hazard group), a qualitative or bounding analysis is performed to provide justification for the acceptability of the proposed test interval change.External hazards were evaluated in the HNP Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submitted in response to the NRC IPEEE program (Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement

4) (Reference 4). The IPEEE program was a one-time review of external hazard risk and was limited in its purpose to the identification of potential plant vulnerabilities and the understanding of associated severe accident risks. The results of the HNP IPEEE study 'are documented in the HNP IPEEE main report. The primary areas of external event evaluation at HNP were internal fire and seismic.The internal fire events were addressed by a scenario-based PRA approach that meets the requirements of NUREG-1407 (Reference
5) to systematically and successively E2-15 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy evaluate fire and smoke hazards and their associated risk impact to HNP. The IPEEE Fire PRA study provided estimates of CDF and LERF. However, the original IPEEE Fire PRA has not been updated. Currently, a state-of-the-art HNP Fire PRA model, which will meet all Capability Category 11 (CC-II) requirements in the ASME PRA standard, is being developed.

When, and if, the IPEEE Fire PRA model is used, consistent with NEI-04-1 0, the fire risk insights will be complemented by conservative qualitative potential impact of the fire hazard.In the HNP IPEEE, the seismic risk evaluation was performed in accordance with EPRI Seismic Margins Analysis (SMA) methodology. Since the SMA approach was used, there are no comprehensive CDF and LERF values available from the seismic analysis in the HNP IPEEE to support the STI risk evaluations. A conclusion from the SMA was that HNP has a high-confidence-low-probability-of-failure (HCLPF) capacity of at least 0.3 pga.In addition to internal fires and seismic events, the HNP IPEEE analysis of high winds, floods, and other external hazards was accomplished by using a progressive screening approach described in NUREG-1407. The HNP IPEEE concluded that in all reviewed areas no potential vulnerabilities were identified. As stated earlier, the NEI 04-10 methodology allows for STI change evaluations to be performed in the absence of quantifiable PRA models for all external hazards. Therefore, for fire risk assessment, until a new HNP fire PRA model which meets all CC-Il requirements in the ASME PRA standard is built, the impacts on fire risk of an STI change will be assessed using a qualitative or a bounding approach supplemented with insights from IPEEE fire PRA and from the HNP internal events PRA model. In performing the assessment for the other external events, a qualitative or a bounding approach will also be utilized in most cases.4.0 General Conclusion Regarding PRA Capability The HNP PRA maintenance and update processes and technical capability evaluations described above provide a robust basis for concluding that the PRA is suitable for use in risk-informed licensing actions. As specific risk-informed PRA applications are performed, remaining gaps to specific requirements in the PRA standard will be reviewed to determine application specific additional analysis, i.e., sensitivity studies, which may be required on an as needed basis.E2-16 Enclosure 2 Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy 5.0 References

1. "Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, ASME RA-S-2002, April 2002 and Addenda to Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications,"ASME RA-Sa-2003, American Society of Mechanical Engineers 2003.2. "An Approach for Determining Technical Adequacy of PRA Results for Risk-Informed Activities," Regulatory Guide 1.200 Revision 2, USNRC, January 2007.3. "Addenda to ASME RA-S-2002 Standard for PRA for Nuclear power Plant Applications, "RA-SB-2005, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, December 2005.4. "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities

-10 CFR 50.54(f), Supplement 4," NRC Generic Letter 88-20, June 1991 5. "Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," NUREG-1407, US NRC, June 1991.E2-17 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 3 Markup for HNP Unit 1 Proposed TS Changes Insert 1 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program 4 Insert 2 The Surveillance Frequenqy is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Insert 3 5.5.13 Surveillance Frequency Control Program This program provides controls for the Surveillance Frequencies. The program shall ensure that Surveillance Requirements specified in the Technical Specifications are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation are met.a. The Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall contain a list of Frequencies of those Surveillance Requirements for which the Frequency is controlled by the program.b. Changes to the Frequencies listed in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall be made in accordance with the NEI 04-10, "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies," Revision 1.c. The provisions of Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are applicable to the Frequencies established in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Definitions 1.1 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION

1.1 Definitions

N, Irv -l-r--------------------------------------------------------- IJLJI r -------------------------------------------------------------- The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and Bases.Term Definition ACTIONS ACTIONS shall be that part of a Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times.AVERAGE PLANAR TheAPLHGR shall Tbe applicable to a sPecific Plhanar heightand is LINEAR HEAT equal to the sum of. the LHGRs for all the fuel rods in the specified GENERATION bundle at the specified height divided by the nUmber Rf fuel rods in RATE (APLHGR) the fuel bundle at the height.CHANNEL A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as 'necessary, CALIBRATION of the channel output such that it reqsponds Within the* necessary range andaccuracy to known values of the 'parameter that the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CAL'IBRATIoN Shall encompass the entire'channel, including the required sensor, alar~m, display/, and triP fLinctions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Calibratio'n of instrument Channeilswith resistan~ce temper'ature ... detector (RTD) or thermocouple sensors may conist of an inplace qualitative assessment 'of sensor behavior and normal calibration o0f-the. remaining adjustable. devices in thechannel. The CHANNELmCA"IBRATION maybe Performed by means of any ser'ies of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is calibrated .(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 1.1-1 Amendment No. Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)sDM shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical assuming that: a. The reactor is xenon free;b. The moderator temperature is 68'F; and c. All control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. With control rods not capable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of these control rods must be accounted for in the determination of-SDM.Is~: , flI2I.-.LJL~I I I o ..r I STAGGERED A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall' GGR66t E)f the teStREI Of GRe E)ACIC the sy6tems,, swbsVstiqFns;-E;haRRbIG, 9F eth& desmqRated GeFnj39AeRtrA dUFORq the 0ýteFyal r:-08G*fi8d bY the 8WFV8011aRG8 PF +k-+ -11 syrstem6, 6606y6t&R6ý, 0haRA916i 9F Gth8F des"qRnfod nomminne Ka teigtbd dU0wRq n' q6jFVew11;aocQ F=roaugi wheFen th-RUMbeO Of 646teMS, GUh6Y6t8M6;'GhaRn9l9ý'bF OtI419F de6wqRatýfURGt THERMAL POWER TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.The TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME consists of two component&:

a. The time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until 80% of the turbine bypass capacity is established; and b. The time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until initial movement of the turbine bypass valve.The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured..HATCH UNIT 1 4 1.1 -5 Amendment No. E Control Rod OPERABILITY

3.1.3 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, or D not met.OR Nine or more control rods inoperable. E.1 Be in MODE 3.12 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS !!SURVEILLANCE S R 3.1.3.1 Determine the position of. each control rod FREQUENCY SR 3.1.3.2----------------- NOTE ------------ Not required tobe performed until 7 days after I control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWE]is greater than the LPSP of the RWM.--------------------------- m ------------------ w -------------------- Insert each fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch. \SR 3.1.3.3 ---------------------- NOTE------


Not required to be performed until 31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM.* Insert each partially withdrawn control rod at least one notch.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-7 Amendment No. [ , Control Rod Scram Times 3.1.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-.-NOTE--------------------------- During single control rod scram time Surveillances, the control rod drive (CRD) pumps shall be isolated from the associated scram accumulator. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.4.1 Verify each control rod scram time is within the Prior to exceeding limits.of Table 3.1.4-1 with reactor steam dome 40% RTP after fuel pressure > 800 psig. movement within the reactor pressure vessel I nsert 1-Prior to exceeding 40% RTP after each reactor shutdown a 120.days SR 3.1.4.2 Verify, for a representative sample, each tested control rod scram time is within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 With reactor steam dome pressure> 800 psig.SR 3.1.4.3 Verify each affected control rod scram time is Prior to declaring within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with any rea6tor control rod steam dome pressure. OPERABLE after wr[k ogn control rod orCRD System thatcould affect scram time SR 3.1.4.4 Verify each affected control rod scram time is Prior to exceeding within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with reactor 40% RTP after steam dome pressure > 800 psig. work on 6ontrol rod or CRD System that could affect scram time*HATCH UNIT1 3.1-10 Amendment No. Control Rod.Scram Accumulators

3.1.5 SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS __, SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.5.1 Verify each control rod scram accumulator pressure is > 940 psig.Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-14 Amendment No. Pjq Rod Pattern Control 3.1.6 ACTIONS._...._ _, CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2 Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the shutdown position.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.6.1 Verify all OPERABLE control rods comply with BPWS.Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-16 Amendment . SLc System.3.1.7 FREQUENCY SR 3.1.7.1 Verify available volume of *solution is within the Region Figure 3.1.7-1.SR 3.1.7.2 Verify temperature of sodium pentabo te s tion is within the Region A limits of Figure 3. \7-2.SR 3.1.7.3 Verify temperature of pump suction piping isw inn the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2.SR 3.1.7.4 Verify continuity of exp!osive charge.SR 3.1.7.5 Verify the concentration of sodium pentaborate in solution is within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-1.. AND Once within 24, hours after water or sodium pentaborate is Ilnsert 1 added to solution AND Once within 24 hours after solution temperature is restored within the SRegion A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2 SR 3.1.7.6 Verify each SLC subsystem manual and power operated Valve in the flow path that is riot locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position, or can be aligned to the correct position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-18 Amendment No. F Insert REQUIEMENT (cniud.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SLC System 3.1.7 SURVEILLANCE)UENCY SR 3.1.7.7 Verify each pump develops a flow ra at a discharge pressure > 1232 psig.In accordance with the Inservice Testing .Program SR 3.1.7.8 Verify flow through one SLC subsystem from into reactor *pressure vessel.SR 3.1.7.9 Verify all heat traced piping between storage tank and pump suction is unblocked. ý5A ---fkq AND Once within 24 hours after pump suction piping temperature is restored within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2 SR 3.1.7.10 Verify sodium pentaborate enrichment is Prior to addition to> 60.0 atom percent B-10. SLC tank HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-19 Amendment No., Insert 1 SDV Vent and Drain Valves 3.1.8 OUI'V EILLMI'IEr" .rEWUIr-lVll IM 1 " SURVEILLANC FREQUENCY SR 3.1.8.1 E---------------------N E-- ------------- Not required to be met on ven nd am Ives closedduring performance of S .1.SR 3..8.2Cycle each SDV vent and drain valve to the fy SR3183Verify each SDV vent a~nd drain valve:iopn

a. Closes in < 45 seconds after receipt of an-,actual or simulated scram signal; and b. Opens when the actual or simulated scram signal is reset.HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-23 HAmendment No.

APLHGR 3.2.1 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION.RATE (APLHGR)LCO 3.2.1 APPLICABILITY: All APLHGRs shall be less than or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any APLHGR not within A.1 Restore APLHGR(s) to 2 hours limits. within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY S R 3.2. 1.1 Verify all APLHGRs'are less than or equal to the Once 'with 'in limits specified in the COLR. 12 hours after 24% RTP HATCH UNIT 1 3.2-1 Amendment No. M MCPR 3.2.2 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)LCO 3.2.2 All MCPRs shall be greater than~or equal to the MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR.'APPLICABILITY: -THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any MCPR not within l Aimits. A.1 Restore MCPR(s) to 2 hours within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS_ _., SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.2.1 Verify all MCPRs are. greater than or equal to the Once within limits specified in the COLR. 12 hours after I 24o/a RTP I(seont inue..(continued) HATCH UNITI1 3.2-2 Amendment No. LHGR-3.2.3 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)*LCO 3.2.3 APPLICABILITY: All LHGRs shall be less than or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.THERMAL POWER >- 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any LHGR not within limits. A.1 Restore LHGR(s) to 2 hours within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated. Completion POWER to <24% RTP.Tinme-not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY32,13.1 Verify all LHGRs are less than or equal to the Qnce within limits specified in the COLR. 12 hour`#s4 after , 24% RTP ,,,, ... .. .... : A N. D :*f A---e.-. +*This Specification is effective starting from Hatch 1/Cycle 22.HATCH UNIT 1 3.2-4 Amendment No. M RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (coniinued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION'TIME

1. As required by Required .1.1 Initiate alternate method 12 hours Action D.1 and referenced to detect and suppress in Table 3.3.1.1-1. .thdrmal-hydraulic instability oscillations.

AND 1.2 Restore required 120 days channels to OPERABLE.J. Required Action and J.1 Be in MODE 2. 4 hours.associated Completion Time of Condition I not met.' [inser I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES --1. Referto Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for e h RPS Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable'status solely for p ormance of required Surveillances.: entry into associated Conditions and Required tions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the'associated Function maintains trip capability. SU RVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.1.1.2


-----------

NOTE -------------- Not required to, be performed until 12 hours after THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.Verify the absolute difference between the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated powerý is 5'2% RTP while operating at> 24% RTP.(continued) HATCH'UNIT 1 3.3-3 Amendment No. L S--NOTE--- Only required to be met during from MODEl.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-4 Amendment No. E RPS ins'strumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS' SURVEI SR 3.3.1.1;11 Verify Turbine StopN Turbine Control Val)Pressure -Low Funi when THERMAL PC Closure d Closure, Tn Oil'p not bypasse'st27.6% RTP.SR 3.3.1.1.13


NOTES.1. Neutron detectors are 2. For Function 1, not requir performed when entering MODE 1 until 12 hours af MODE. 2.SR 3.3.1.1.14 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.16


.


........ NOTE-Neutron detectors are excluded.------------------------------------------------


Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-5 Amendment No. M RPS Instrumentation

  • .3J3.1.1 SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS (continued)

,_, _, SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.17 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Poweris > 25% and recirculation drive-flow is <'60% of rated recirculation drive flow.Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1, ':.3.3-7'6 Amendment No. . SRM Instrumentation .3.3.1.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One or more required E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately SRMs inoperable in ALTERATIONS except MODE 5. for control rod insertion. AND E.2 Initiate'action to fully Immediately insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 7- -- -N--- OTES--1. Refer to Table.3.3.1.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for e ch applicable MODE or other specified conditions.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for pe ormance of required Surveillances,.entry into associated Conditions and Requir'ed A tions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required channel(s) i PE ABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-11 Amendment No. P] SRM InstrLimentati6h 32 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN tot ed SURV/IL NCE" FREQUENCY S R 3.3.1.2.2



OTES -------------------

1. Only reqou ed obe met dur CORE'ALTERATI N 2. One SRM m be sed to satisfy m than one of th folio i.ng.Verify an OPERABLE S M det ctor is located in: a. The fueled region;b. The core quadrant w re , CO 'E, ALTERATIONS are be ng perfomed, when the associated SRM is i cluded i ithe fueledregdio,;

and c. A core quadrant adjacent t where C RE ALT.ERATIO'NS are being prformed, hen the associated SRM is inclu d in the fueled region..SR 3.3.1.2.3 Perform"CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.1.24 ---------------------- NOTES-----

1. Not requireda tobe~met with lessthan e eqlual to four fuel assemblIes adjacent o the SRM and no other fuel assemblies

'the associated core quadrant.2. Not requirbd to be met during spiral .. .,*., -----.. ... -"---'. ..",-,- '". ....-....--- --...-".. ... 'Veiify count rate is > 3.0 cps with a signal to noise ratio > 2:1.(continued) HATCH.UNIT 1 3.3-112: Amendment.N6. f SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.2.6


NO1ýNot r'equired to be perforn after IRMs on Range 2 or SR 3.3.1.2.7 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONA& TEST determination of signal to noise 7 ------------O T E S --------X 1. Neutron detectors are excluded.2. Not required to be performed until 12 hours after IRMs on Range 2 or below.----------- Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-13 Amendment No. Control Rod. Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRMENT


N TES ---------------


1. Refer to Table 3.3.2.1-1 to det mi e wh h SRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.2. When an RBM channel is placed i n i perab status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into as ocia. d Con i ions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided th ass iated F ction maintains control rod block capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTION LTES SR 3.3.2.1.2 ---NOTE --------.---- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after a contHol rodMis withdrawn at < 10% RTP MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.ScR 3.3.2.1.3 -o )- -NOTEu Not required to be performe'd 'until 1 hour after THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP in MODE 1.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.S(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3:3-17 Amendment No. E Insert 1 J.Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Cl ID\IIb l I AMNI-C SURVEI, , CE FREQUENCY S R 3.3.2.1.4


-NOTE ---------------------

Neutron detectors e luded.Verify the RBM: a. Low Power Ran e Ups le Function is not bypassed wh n HER AL POWER is>29% and < 64% T b. Intermediate Power an e -Up cale Function is not bypas ed hen T ERMAL POWER is 64% and 8 0 RTP.c. High Power Range -Up ale unction is not bypassed when THE MAL POWE s84% RTP.SR 3.3.2.1.5 Verify the RWM is not bypassed whe TH MAL POWER is < 10% RTP.SR 3.3.2.1.6


NOTE ------------------- ---Not required to be performed until 1 hour 'er reactor mode switch is in the shutdown posion.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.S R 3.3.2.1.7 --- --- --- ----N O TE ------------------- .....--- ----Neutron detectors are excluded.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.2.1.8 Verify control rod sequences input to the RWM are Prior to declaring in conformance with BPWS. RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-18 Amendment No. Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation 3.3.2.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS S-----------------NOTE


When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be'delayed for up to 6 hours provided feedwater and main turbine high water level trip capability is maintained. HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-21 Amendment No. M PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. As required by Required F.1 Initiate action in Immediately Action D.1 and referenced accordance with in Table 3.3.3.1-1. Specification 5.6.6.Ilnsert 1h SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


-NOTES ------------------------------

1. These SRs apply to each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1.
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for pe\o mance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required A ti ns may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required channel(s) in the a s ciated Function is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE

\FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SIR 3.3.3.1.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-23 Amendment No. M Remote Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE------------------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions. may be delayed for up to 6 hours.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-26 Amendment No. M EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more Functions with B.1 Restore EOC-RPT trip 2 hours EOC-RPT trip capability not capability. maintained. OR AND B.2 Apply the MCPR limit 2 hours MCPR limit for inoperable for inoperable EOC-RPT not made EOC-RPT as specified applicable, in the COLR.C. Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated 4 hours associated Completion recirculation pump from Time not met. service.OR C.2 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours POWER to < 27.6%RTP.Insert 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS S------------------NOTE ........ -------------------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performan of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions y be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip caý ility.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.4.1.2 Verify TSV -Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 27.6% RTP.(continued) I.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-28 Amendment No. I EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 SR 3.3.4.1.3 Perform CHANNELOLIE Allowable Values sh 11'e TSV -Closure: < 10% o, TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oi Pressure -Low: > 600 psi, SR 3.3.4.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNG'TION including breaker actuation.


NOTE --------------- Breaker interruption time may be assL the most recent performance of SR 3.SR 3.3.4.1.5 Verify the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE is within limits.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-29 Amendment No. ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Both Functions with C.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip 1 hour ATWS-RPT trip capability capability for one not maintained. Function.D. Required Action and D.1 Remove the associated 6 hours associated Completion recirculation pump from Time not met. service.OR D.2 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours Insert 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS



-- NOTE --When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for perform ce of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required ay be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip SURVEILLANCE FREUENCY.SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. -R-R (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-31 Amendment No. 0 ATWS-RPf Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be: a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -ATWS-RPT Level: > -73 inches; and b. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High: < 1175 psig.SR 3.3.4.2.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FT including breaker actuation. F~nsert 1 'HATCH UNIT. 1 3.3-32 Amendment No. M ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS S ----------------- NOTES-----------------


1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, e.ntry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Functions 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains initiation capability.

..............----.......................... .. * -....................................... .............................---........... HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-37 Amendment No. M RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Function 2; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1, 3, and 4 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability.

HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-45 Amendment No. Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1. As required by Required 1.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately Action C.1 and referenced channel to OPERABLE in Table 3.3.6.1-1. status.OR 1.2 Initiate action to isolate Immediately the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Shutdown Cooling System.r'nsert SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS S-----------------NOTES


-------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.171 to determine which SRs apply for.e Primary Containment Isolation Function.2. Whena channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for p rmance of required Surveillances, entry..into associated Conditions and Required t ns maybe delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains i I ion capability.

SURVEILLANCE .FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 2dye SR 3.3.6.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-49 Amendment No. M Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY S R 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. S R 3.3.6.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.24mnh SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL ES ,Mnctth-I nsert .HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-50 Amendment No. M Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1 Place the associated 1 hour standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) in operation. OR C.2.2 Declare associated 1 hour SGT subsystem(s) inoperable. Insert 1 Ik rir C' l -- -SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.2-1 to determine which SRs apply fo ch Secondary Containment Isolation Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely fo ormance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditio'ns and Requir tions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintain ation capability.

SURVEILLANCE ' FREQUENCY 8SR 3.3.6.2. 1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 1 SR 3.3.6.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.6.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.6.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.6.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.HATCH UNIT 1' 3.3-56 Amendment No. R LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 ACTIO NS (continued) .... .. ....CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Declare the associated Immediately associated Completion LLS Valve(s)Time of Condition A, B, inoperable. or C not met.OR Two or more LLS valves with initiation capability not maintained. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 7---- .- .--N O T E S ---'-..1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.3-1 to determine which SRs apply for ea Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for pee rmance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required c ions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided LLS initiation capability is maintainec SURVEILLANCE FREQENCY SR 3.3.6.3.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.6.3.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for portion of the channel outside primary containment.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-59 Amendment No. I LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.3


NOTE --------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 during each scheduled outage > 72 hours when entry is made into primary containment. Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for -R portions of the channel inside primary containment. .....S R 3.3.6.3.4 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.S R 3.3.6.3.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATIO SR 3.3.6.3.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM F CT NALT T.InIserti HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-60 Amendment No. E MCREC System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS S-----------------NOTE-----------------


When a Control Room Air Inlet Radiation -High channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other channel is OPERABLE.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-63 Amendment No. M LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


L------------------NOTES


1. Refer to Table 3.3.8.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each LOP Function.2. When a 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains initiation capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3).HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-65 Amendment No. P RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE-------------------------

NOTE ----------------------------- When an RPS electric power monitoring assembly is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Required.Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other RPS electric power monitoring assembly for the associated power supply maintains trip capability.



SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY+SR 3.3.8.2.1-NOTE ---------------------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, when in MODE 4 for> 24 hours.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.8.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be: a. Overvoltage < 132 V, with time del< 4 seconds.b. Undervoltage>_ 108V, with tim E to < 4 seconds.c. Underfrequency > 57 Hz, wh e set to < 4 seconds.SR 3.3.8.2.3 Perform a s, Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-69 Amendment No. M Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A. 1 Satisfy the 24 hours LCO not met. requirements of the LCO.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.OR No recirculation loops in operation. Insert 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1 ---------------------- NOTE- ------------ Not required to be performed until 24 hours after both recirculation loops are in operation. Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch with both recirculation loops in operation is: a. < 10% of rated core flow when operating at< 70% of rated core flow; and b. < 5% of rated core flow when operating at> 70% of rated core flow.SR 3.4.1.2 (Not used.)I HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-2 Amendment No. M Jet Pumps 3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.2.1 -------------------- NOTES--------------

1. Not required to be performed until 4 hours after associated recirculation loop is in operation.
2. Not required to be performed until 24 hours after > 25% RTP.Verify at least one of the following criteria (a, b, or c) is satisfied for each operating recirculation loop: a. Recirculation pump flow to speed ratio differs by -5% from established patt ns, and jet pump loop flow to recirculat' n pump speed ratio differs by < 5% om established patterns.b. Each jet pump diffuser to lo r plenum differential pressure differ y < 20% from established patterns.c. Each jet pump flow d' ers by < 10% from established pattern nsert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-5 Amendment No. P RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.4.1 Verify RCS Unidentified and total LEAKAGE and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.Insert 1 HATCH*UNIT 1 3.4-9 Amendment No. PA RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

3.4.5 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours D. All required leakage D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately detection systems inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-NOTE-When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required leakage detection instrumentation is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of required primary containment atmospheric monitoring system.SlR 3.4.5.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL nstrut required leakage detection instru S R 3.4.5.3 Perform a. CHANNEL XcALI Ted0 of required*leakage detection instu n-tf insr 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-11 Amendment No. M RCS Specific Activity 3.4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.6.1 --------------------- NOTE--------------- Only required to be performed in MODE 1.Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 specific activity is _ 0.2 [tCi/gm.IInsert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-13 Amendment No. P RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Hot Shutdown 3.4.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.7.1 ---------------------- NOTE-------------- Not required to be met until 2 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR low pressure permissive pressure.Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is operating. Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-16 Amendment No. P RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Cold Shutdown 3.4.8 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. No RHR shutdown cooling B.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND AND No recirculation pump in operation. Once per 12 hours thereafter AND B.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-18 Amendment No. Insert 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE RCS PIT Limits 3.4.9 FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.1 Verify: a. RCS pressure and RCS temperature are within the limits specified in Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2 during RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and during RCS non-nuclear heatup and cooldown operations; and b. RCS heatup and cooldown rates are< 100°F in any 1 hour period during RCS heatup and cooldown operations, and RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.+SR 3.4.9.2---------


NOTE ---------------

Only required to be met when the reactor is critical and immediately prior to control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality. Verify RCS pressure and RCS temperature are within the criticality limits specified in Figure 3.4.9-3.Once within 15 minutes prior to initial control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality


NOE------- SR 3.4.9.3 .NOTE Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 during startup of a recirculation pump.Verify the difference between the bottom head Once within coolant temperature and the reactor pressure .15 minutes prior to vessel (RPV) coolant temperature is < 145 0 F. starting an idle recirculation pump (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-20 HAmendment No. RM RCS P/T Limits 3.4.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.4 ---------------------- NOTE --------------- Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 during startup of a recirculation pump.Verify the difference between the reactor coolant Once within temperature in the recirculation loop to be started 15 minutes prior to and the RPV coolant temperature is < 50 0 F. starting an idle recirculation pump SR 3.4.9.5 ----------------------- NOTE--------------- Only required to be met when tensioning/ detensioning the reactor vessel head bolting studs.Verify reactor vessel flange and head flange Once within temperatures are > 76 0 F. 30 minutes prior to tensioning/ detensioning the reactor vessel head bolting studs and SR 3.4.9.6 ---------------------- NOTE ------ ---------Only required to be met when the react vessel head is tensioned. iVerify reactor vessel flange add head flange " Once within temperatures are- 76 0 F. 12 hours after RCS temperature is 5.106 0 F in MODE 4, Inrsert* " , AAND" Once Within 30 minutes after RCS temperature isin MODE 4, andlIn, -,,. HATCH UNIT 1-3.4-21 Amendment No. U Reactor Steam Dome Pressure 3.4.10 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure LCO 3.4.10 APPLICABILITY: The reactor steam dome pressure shall be < 1058 psig.MODES 1 and 2.I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Reactor steam dome A. 1 Restore reactor steam 15 minutes pressure not within limit. dome pressure to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.10.1 Verify reactor steam dome pressure is< 1058 psig.Insert " I HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-25 Amendment No. P !ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.1 Verify, for each the piping is filled with discharge valve to the SR 3.5.1.2---------------- NO ---'Low pressure coolant injec ioir may be considered OPERA I and operation for decay hea steam dome pressure less th Removal (RHR) low pressure in MODE 3, if capable of bein(and not otherwise inoperable.


K Verify each ECCS injection/spray ubsys m manual, power operated, and auto atic v ye the flow path, that is not locked, set e d, or otherwise secured in position, is in t e corre position.SR 3.5.1.3 Verify ADS air supply header pressure 90 psig.SR 3.5.1.4 Verify the RHR System cross tie valve is cI sed and power is removed from the valve oper\ar.SR 3.5.1.5 (Not used.)SR 3.5.1.6 NOTE---------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, when in MODE 4> 48 hours.Verify each recirculation pump discharge valve cycles through one complete cycle of full travel or is de-energized in the closed position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-3 Amendment No. M Insert 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT ntinued)EGGS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVE\'\CE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.7 Verify the followin C pumps develop the specified flow rate ins a system head corresponding to th eci d reactor pressure.YSTEM HEAD RRESPONDING

0. F T REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE UM PR SURE OF CS > 4250 gpm 113 ig LPCI > 17,000 gpm 2 0 PS In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.5.1.8---------------------

NQTE ---------------- Not required to be performed ntil hours a r reactor steam pressure and fl ae 'dequate perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure < 10 psig nd> 920 psig, the HPCI pump can de elop a low rate > 4250 gpm against a system ad corresponding to reactor pressure.SR 3.5.1.9------------------ NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 12 ho rs after reactor steam pressure and flow are ade uate to perform the test. \Verify, with reactor pressure 5 165 psig, the PCI pump can develop a flow rate > 4250 gpm ag inst a system head corresponding to reactor syste, pressure.I SR 3..1.10 Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.I (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-4 Amendment No. ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.11----------------- NOTE ---------------- Valve actuation may be excluded.Verify the ADS actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. /SR 3.5.1.12 Verify each ADS valve relief mode actuato strokes when manually actuated./ Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-5 Amendment No.= ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2 Initiate action to restore Immediately required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND Insert 1 .3 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required containment flow path SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify, for each required low pressure coolan injection (LPCI) sibsystem, the suppression p I water level is > 146 inches.SR 3.5.2.2 Verify, for each required core spray (CS)subsystem, the: a. Suppression pool water level is> 146 inches; or b. ---------------- NOTE'------------ Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during OPDRVs.Condensate storage tank water level is>13 ft.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-7 Amendment No. V9 ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.3 Verify, for each required ECCS injection/ spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.SR 3.5.2.4 ------------------ NOTE --------------- One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manu ly realigned and not otherwise inoperable. Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and is I°lCkehe, automatic valve in the flow path, that is ot sealed, or otherwise secured in positi is in the correct position.SR 3.5.2.5 Verify each required ECCS pump evlops e In accordance with specified flow rate against a syste head the Inservice corresponding to the specified re ctor pr 'sure. Testing Program.SYS EM HEAD C RESPONDING NO. F T A REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE Pu RESSURE OF CS >4250 gpm 1 >113 psig LPCI >7700 gpm 1 -20 psig SR 3.5.2.6 ------N ------------------ Vessel injection/spra m be excluded.Verify each requir d, ;CCS injection/spray subsystem actua on an actual or simulated automatic initiati signal.[I Inert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-8 Amendment No. M RCIC System.3.5.3 SL FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 Verify the RCIC 4 from the pump di!valve.SR 3.5.3.2 Verify each RCIC Sys manuS power operated, and autoat e in t path, that is not locked, seale , otherwi e secured in position, is in the correct os tion.N SR 3.5.3.3-NOTE--Not required to be performe(reactor steam pressure and perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure :5 10> 920 psig, the RCIC pump can de rate > 400 gpm against a System h corresponding to reactor pressure.I-SR 3.5.3.4----NOTE ----Not required to be performed until 12 h1o reactor steam pressure and flow are ade(perform the test.--------------------------------------------------------- I C-24 -M-h-Rthel Verify, with'reactor pressure < 165 psig, the R pump can develop a flow. rate > 400 gpm agai system head cerrespondihg to reactor pressu SR 3.5.3.5--NOTE ------------------- Vessel injection may be excluded.Verify the RC(IC System actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-10 Amendment No. Primary Containment 3.6.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY+SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of 1 psid.AND--------- NOTE --------Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass 9 months Insert .1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-2 Amendment No. W Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.2.1


NOTES --------------

1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1.

Perform required primary containment air lock In accordance with leakage rate testing in accordance with the the Primary Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Containment Program. Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.2.2



NOTE ---------------

Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted. Verify only one door in the primary containment air lock can be opened at a time.I ... e-r HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-6 Amendment No. E PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and F.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion suspend operations Time of Condition A, B, C, with a potential for or D not met for PCIV(s) draining the reactor required to be OPERABLE vessel.during MODE 4 or 5.OR F.2 --------NOTE ----------- Only applicable for inoperable RH.R shutdown cooling valves.Initiate action to restore Immediately valve(s) to OPERABLE status.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE. FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1


NOTE--------------- Not required to be met when the 18 inch primary containment purge valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.----. ....--------- .....- ....---------


------- -------Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge valve is closed.Insert' 1 (continued)

.HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-10 Amendment No. F PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6..1.3.2


NOTES --------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be clos during accident conditions is closed.SR 3.6.1.3.3--------------------------

NOTES --------------

1. Valves and blind flanges' high radiation areas may be verified use of administrative mea 2. Not required t e metfor PCIVs that are,..open under dministrative controls.oVerify eacimary containment manual isolation valve a blind flange that is located inside I n ert1 'uig ciel F primary c-ainment and is required to'be closed during acciden nditions is closed.Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge.SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power operated In accordance with and each automatic P CIV, except for MSIVs, is the Inservice within limits. Testing Program (continued)

HATCH'UNIT 1 3.6&111 Amendment No. g PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATICH UNIT 1 3.6-12 Amendment No. P Drywell Pressure 3.6.1.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.4 Drywell Pressure LCO 3.6.1.4 APPLICABILITY: Drywell pressure shall be < 1.75 psig.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Drywell pressure not within A.1 Restore drywell 1 hour limit. pressure to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1' Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE 'FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.4.1 Verify drywell pressure is within limit.Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-13 Amendment No. W Drywell Air Temperature 3.6.1.5 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature LCO 3.6.1.5 APPLICABILITY: Drywell average air temperature shall be < 150 0 F.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Drywell average air A.1 Restore drywell 8 hours temperature not within limit, average air temperature to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.5.1 Verify drywell average air temperature is within limit.Insert i HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-14 Amendment No. P LLS Valves.3.6.1.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE " ]FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.6.1 Verify each LLS valve relief mode actuator strokes 124 ffn9R h when manually actuated. /SR 3.6.1.6.2


NOTE -------------------- Valve actuation may be excluded.Verify the LLS System actuates o n actual or simulated automatic initiation si al.IFsert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-16 Amendment No. Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vabuum Breakers 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.7.1 --NOTES --------------

1. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances.
2. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers open when performing their intended function.Verify each I vacuum breaker is closed. SR 3.6.1.7.2 Perform a functional test of each vacuum br ker. In acco'rdance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.7.3 Verify the opening setpoint eachvacuum 2 nth.breaker is < 0.5 psid.insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-18 Amendment No. M Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

....SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.8.1--- -------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances. Verify each Vacuum breaker is closed./SR 3.6.1.8.2 Perform a functional test of each requir breaker.AND Within 12 hours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the S/RVs SR 3.6.1.8.3 Verify the opening vacuum breaker is HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-20 Amendment No. M Suppression Pool Average Temperature 3.6.2.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Suppression pool average E.1 Depressurize the 12 hours temperature > 120'F. reactor vessel to< 200 psig.AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1.1 Verify suppression pool average temperature is 5, r within the applicable limits.AND 5 minutes when performing testing that adds heat to the suppression pool Insert i HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-23 Amendment No. f Suppression Pool Water Level 3.6.2.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level LCO 3.6.2.2 APPLICABILITY: Suppression pooi water level shall be > 146 inches and < 150 inches.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Suppression pool water A,1 Restore suppression 2 hours level not within limits. pool water level to within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.2.1 Verify suppression pool water level is within limits.Iinsert 1 " 1Y HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-24 Amendment No. Insert 1 Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling LCO 3.6.2.3 Two RHR suppression pool cooling s bsystems shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTIO_ COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression pool A.1 Restore RHR 7 days cooling subsystem suppression pool inoperable, cooling subsystem OPERABLE status.B. Two RHR suppression pool B.1 Restore one RHR 8 hours cooling subsystems suppression pool inoperable. cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Comýletion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FRQUENCY SR 3.6.2.3.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-25 Amendment No. P Insert 1. RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Poo Spray LCO 3.6.2.4 Two RHR suppression pool spray su systems shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION-REQUIRED ACTIO COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression pool A.1 Restore RHR spray subsystem suppression pool Il inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.7 days B. Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable. B.1 Restore one RHR suppression pool sr subsystem to OPERABLE status.8 hours C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.C.1 Be in MODE 3.12 hours AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ,,SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.4.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-27 Amendment No. M RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.4.2 Verify each suppression pool spray nozzle is unobstructed. Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-28 Amendment No. F CAD System 3.6.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY S R 3.6.3. 1.1 Verify >: 2000 gal of liquid nitrogen are contained in each N2 storage tank. , SR 3.6.3.1.2 Verify each CAD subsystem manual, po r operated, and automatic valve in the f path th is not locked, sealed, or otherwise cured position is in the correct positio r can aligned to the correct position.Insert I HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-30 Amendment No. M Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration 3.6.3.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.2 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration LCO 3.6.3.2 APPLICABILITY: The primary containment oxygen concentration shall be < 4.0 volume percent.MODE 1 during the time period: a. From 24 hours after THERMAL POWER is > 15% RTP following startup, to b. 24 hours prior to reducing THERMAL POWER to < 15% RTP prior to the next scheduled reactor shutdown.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Primary containment A.1 Restore oxygen 24 hours oxygen concentration not concentration to within within limit. limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL °8 hours associated Completion POWER to < 15% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.2.1 Verify primary containment oxygen concen~tration is within limits.I.nsert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-31 Amendment No. W Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND C.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all'secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.SIR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one secondary containment access doorin* .~each access opening is closed. / .SR .3.6.4.1.3 ---..........----- --- ---7 .-- --NOTE ---------


---- -------_ _The number of standby gas treatmert (S T)'subsystem(s) required for this Surveilla ce i dependent on' the secondary contain nt configuration, and sha!l be one' less a an- e number required to meet LCO 3.6. ".tandby, Gas Treatment (SGT) System," fo th .giyen configuration.'

Verify required SGT sub'syst s) will draw months on a.down the secondary contai nt to > 0.20 in of vacuum water.gauge in 20 second Insert I.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-33 Amendment No. M Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.4-------------- NOTE --------------- The number of SGT subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3,"Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. Verify required SGT subsystem(s) can maintain> 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment for 1 hour at a flow e< 4000 cfm for each subsystem. Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-34 Amendment No. M SCIVs ,3.6.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.2.1----------------- NOTES--------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for SCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each secondary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed./i SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verify the isolation time of each power and each automatic SCIV is within I.imýJ SR. 3.6.4.2.3 Verify each automatic SCIV isolation position on an actu;actuation signal. /Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-37 Amendment No. M SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two or more required SGT F.-1 -------NOTE------ subsystems inoperable LCO 3.0.3 is not during movement of applicable. irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE Suspend movement of Immediately ALTERATIONS, or during irradiated fuel OPDRVs. assemblies in secondary containment. AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND F.3 initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each required SGT subsystem for 15 continuous minutes.SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in a ordance In accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Pr ram (VFTP). the VFTP SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each required SGT bsystem an actual or sim tiation'signai HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-40 Amendment No. P PHRSW System 3.7.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION. REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Both RHRSW subsystems NOTE--------- inoperable for reasons Enter applicable Conditions and other than Condition B. Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7 for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.D.1 Restore one RHRSW 8 hours subsystem to OPERABLE status.E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _ _ _SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify each RHRSW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not !ock sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is; e S correct position.oi" can be aligned to th ri'rect position.Insert 1 "" HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-2 Amendment No. Ig PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Verify the water level in each PSW pump well of the intake structure is > 60.7 ft mean sea level (MSL). AND 12 hours when water level is< 61.7 ft MSL SR 3.7.2.2 ---------


NOTE----------------

Isolation of flow to individual compone s or systems does not render PSW Syste inoperable. Verify each PSW subsystem ma al, power operated, and automatic valve i the flow paths servicing safety related syste s or components that is not locked, sealed, or/6therwise secur/ in position, is in the correctp sition. .SIR 3.7.2.3 Verify each PSW acte on an actual or simulated iiitosga.I I nssignal.-1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-5 Amendment No. M DG 1B SSW System 3..7.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify each DG 1B SSW System manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured position, is in the correct position.SR 3.7.3.2 Verify the DG 1B SSW System pump arts automatically when DG 1B starts an energizes the respective bus.Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-7 Amendment No. M MCREC System 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two MCREC subsystems


NOTE ---------inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. m ovem ent of irradiated fuel -------------------------------------------- assemblies in the secondary containment, F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately during CORE irradiated fuel ALTERATIONS, or during assemblies in the OPDRVs. secondary containment. AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND F.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY S R 3.7.4.1 Operate each MCREC subsystem 15 minutes.SR 3.7.4.2 Perform required MCREC filter testing in In accordance with accordance with tie Ventilation Filter s Testi the VFTP Program (VFTPý.SIR 3.7.4.3 Verify each MCREC subsystem " 'tuates on an 3 actual or simulated initiation.. nal. tu Insert I (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-10 Amendment No. M SR 3.7 MCREC System 3.7.4 LLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY.4.4 Verify each MCREC subsystem can maintain a positive pressure of : 0.1 .inches water gauge relative to the turbine building during the pressurization mode of operation at a subs tem flow rate of < 2750 cfm and an outside flow rate< 400 cfm.Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-11 Amendment No. M Control Room AC System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each control room AC subsystem has the , capability to remove the assumed heat load.Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-15 Amendment No. M Main Condenser Offgas 3.7.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 --------------------- NOTE-- ------------- Not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line not isolated and SJAE in operation. Verify the gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases is < 240 mCi/second. AND Once within 4 hours after a> 50%' increase in the nominal steady state fission gas release after factoring out increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER level Insert I HA TCH UNIT I 3.7-17 Amendment No. f

3.7. PLANT

SYSTEMS 3.7.7 -Main Turbine Bypass System insert 1 Main Turbine Bypass System 3.7.7 LCO 3.7.7 The Main Turbine Bypass System shall be pERABLE.OR LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System, a made applicable. TIO (MCPR)," limits for an)ecified in the COLR, are APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.AU; I _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. Requirements of the LCO A.1 Satisfy the requirement not met. of the LCO.B. Required'Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.MPLETION TIME 2 hours iours REQ UENCY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 Verify one complete cycle of each main turbine bypass valve.SR 3.7.7.2 Perform a system functional test.SR 3.7:7.3 Verify the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is within limits.I HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-18 Amendment No. Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level* 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 37.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level LCO 3.7.8 APPLICABILITY: The spent fuel storage pool water level shall be > 21 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks.During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Spent fuel storage pool A.1 -----NOTE-- ------- .water level not within limit. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 Verifythe spent fuel storage pool water level'is,> 21 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblie seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks lnsr1 I " HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-19 Amendment No. P AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -- --------------- NOTE SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18 are applicable only to the Unit 1 AC sources. SR 3.8.1.19 is applicable only to the Unit 2 AC sources.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY S R 3.8. 1.1 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability for each required offsite circuit.SR 3.8.1.2 -------------------- NOTES -------------

1. Performance of SR 3.8.1.5 satisfies this S 2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed b a warmup period prior to loading.3. A modified DG start involving idlin and gdadual acceleration to synchron' us.,speed may be used for this SR as rec mended by the manufacturer.

When m dified start procedures are not used, the limne, 'voltage, and frequency tolerances of R 3.8.1.5.a mu;st be met.'4. FOr the swing DG, a sing: test will satisfy this SurYeillance for bot units, using the s .tarting .ircuitry of Uni I an.d synchronized to 4160 V bus 1,1F for ne periodic test, and th.ltarting cirCUitry f Unit2 and s ynchronized to 41 V bus 2F during the next periodic test..5. DG. loadings ma include gradual loading as recommend d by the, manufacturedr.'(continued). Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-7 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.2 (continued)


NOTES ---------------

6. Starting transients above the upper voltage limit do not invalidate this test.7. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.8. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.Verify each DG: a. Starts from standby conditions andn /achieves steady state voltage ? 3740 V and < 4243 V and frequency 58.8Hz nd_< 61.2 Hz; and b. Operates for > 60 minutes at a Ioa> 1710 kW and :5_ 2000 kW.S R 3.8.1.3 Verify~each day tank contains 50 gallons of fuel oil. *. ..S R 3.8.1..4 Check for and removeacc ulted w-each,,day tank.., .ý z.Ihsbrt.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-8 Amendment No. W AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.5 --------------------- NOTES ---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.
3. Momentary load transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.4. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.5. For the swing DG, a single test will satisfy this Surveillance for both units, using the starting circuitry of Unit 1 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 1F for one periodic test and the starting circuitry of Unit 2 .and synchronized'to 4160 V bus 2F during the next periodic test.--------------.

"! ------------------------ "7 -------------------------- " Verify each DG: a. Starts from standby conditions andn achieves; in .< 12 seconds, voltagee_ 3740 V and frecquency > 58,8 Hz a after steady state conditions ,are re hed, maintains voltage > 3740 V and 4243 V and frequency >t58.8 Hz and :5 1.2 Hz;and u b. Operates for 60 minut at a load 2250kW and 240 W for DGs 1Aand 1C, a _n 2360 kW and:52425 kW for D B.(continued) Insert 1.HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-9 Amendment No. M AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.6 --------------------- NOTE--------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify automatic and manual transfer of unit power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit.SR 3.8.1.7 NOTES---------------

1. This Surveillance shall not be performe in MODE 1 or 2, except for the swing DG For the swing DG; this Surveillance s all not be performed in MODE 1 or 2 us' g the.Unit 1 controls.

Credit-may be take for unplanned events that satisfy this R.2. For the swing DG, a single test the specified Frequency will satisfy his Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG rejects a load gre erthan or equal to its associated single lar stpost-accident load, and: a. Following load rejecti the frequen is< 65.5 Hz; and b. Within 3 seconds fIlowing o rejection; the voltage is 374(0 Van 4580 V.I I Ins ert 1 tconunuea) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-1.0 Amendment No. Pý AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.8--- ---NOTES----1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or. 2, except for the swing DG.For the swing DG, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE -1 or 2 using the Unit 1 controls. Credit may be taken'for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.2. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition,,the power factor shall be maintained, as close to the limit as practicable.

3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG operating at a power factor _5 0.88 does not tril and voltage is maintained

< 4800 V during and following a load rejection of > 277,54zW;Insert 1 (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-11 Amendment No. M AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.9---------------- NOTES---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify power a.b.C.on an actual or simulated loss of offsite signal: De-energization of emergency buses;Load shedding from emergency buses;and DG auto-starts from standby conditio and: 1. Energizes permanently co ected loads in < 12 seconds, 2. Energizes auto-connec d shutdown loads throu automatic load sequence timin evices, 3. Maintains steady s ate voltage> 3740Vand54 43V, 4. Maintains stea state frequency> 58.8 Hz ann 61.2 Hz, and 5. Supplies p manently connected anid auto-!onnected shutdown loads for 5 minutes:.Inse'rt 1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-12 Amendment No. M AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.10 ------------------- NOTES ---------------

1. All DG starts maybe preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify on an actual or simulated Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation signal each DG auto-starts from standby condition and:, a. In < 12 seconds after auto-start achiev voltage > 3740 V, and after steady st e conditions are reached, maintains v Itage>3740 Vand <4243 V;b. In < 12 seconds after auto-st achieves frequency

> 58.8 Hz, and a r steady state conditions are reached, intains frequency >t.58.8 Hz an < 61.2 Hz; and c. Operates for _ 5 mi tes.(cnntin~ued')- Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.(continued). 8-13 Amendment No. M AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.11------------


NOTE ------------------------

This Surveillance shall not be performed in MOD.E 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify each DG's automatic trips are bypassed on actual or simulated loss of voltage signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal except: a. Engine overspeed;

b. Generator differential current; a//c. Low lube oil pressure./Insert I (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-14 Amendment No. I AC Sources -Operating I 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.12 NOTES ----------------

1. Momentary transients outside the load and power factor ranges do not invalidate this test.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, unless the other two DGs are OPERABLE.

If either of the other two DGs becomes inoperable, this surveillance shall be suspended. Credit may be taken for unplanned events .that satisfy this SR.3. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this conditionithe power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

4. Foir the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG operating at a power factor < 0.88 operates for 2: 24 hours: a. For > 2 hours loaded > 3000 kW; a b. For the remaining hours of theest loaded 22775 kW and < 2825 kW.VV.Ihsehl (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-15 Amendment Noe. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13 -------------------- NOTES -----------------------------

1. This Surveillance shall be performed within 5 minutes of shutting down the DG after the DG has operated > 2 hours loaded> 2565 kWV. Momentary transients outside of load range do not invalidate this test.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.-------------------.
" ..---- --- ---- --- ---- --- --. " ....."--------

-----Verify each DG starts and achieves, in 12 seconds, voltage.>

3740 V and frequency> 58.8 Hz; and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage _ 3740 V and < 42 and frequency >58.8 Hz ýand < 61.2 ,Hz.SR 3.8.1.14 -------------------- NOTE ------- ---------This Surveillance shall not be performed" MODE 1, 2, or 3. However; credit may. etaken for unplanned events that satisfy this Verify each DG:.,a. Synchronizes with off si-e power source while loaded with em rgency loads on a.simulated. restoratio of offsite po r;b. Transfers loads offsite per source;and c. Returns to r ady-t oad operation..(rtnnfin",oi),d Insert I\vvl ,,. HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-16 Amendment No.rm AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE.REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.15 ----------------- ---NOTE ---------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify with a DG operating in test mode and connected to its bus, an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal overrides the test mode by: a. Returning DG to ready-to-load operatio and b. Automatically energizing the emer ncy load from offsite power.SR 3.8.1.16 -- ---------- --NOTE ----------- This Surveillance shall not be perf rmed in MODE 1,2, or:3. However, cre, rhay be taken for unplanned events that satis this SR.Verify interval between E blockis within +/- 10% of, load sequence timing (continued) Iýs'ert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 .3.8-17 Amendment No. I AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE 'FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.17 ----------------- NOTES --------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify, on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal in conjunction with an actual -or simulated ECCS initiation signal: a. De-energization of emergency buses;b. Load shedding from emergency buse and c. DG auto-starts from standby condio and: 1 .Energizes permanently c nnected loads in < 12 seconds,'.
2. Energizes auto-conn ted emergency loads th, ugh automatic load seq ence timing devices, 3. Achieves stead state voltage> 3740 V, and 4243 V, 4. Achieves st _dy' state'frequency

-- 58.8 Hz a d .8,61.2 Hz, and 5: Supplies ermanently 'connected and aut -connected emergency loads r 5 minutes.__.. .(continued) HATCHUNIT 1 -3.8-18 Amendment No.FM AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.18 ----------------- NOTE --------------- All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.Verify, when started simultaneously from standby condition, the Unit 1 DGs andthe swing DG achieve, in < 12 seconds, voltage > 3740 V a frequency > 58.8 Hz.SR 3.8.1.19 For required Unit 2 AC Sources, t SRs of In accordance with Unit 2 Technical Specification re applicable, applicable SRs except SR 3.8.1.6, SR 3.8. 0, SR 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8:1.17.Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8ý1 9 Amendment No. Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE , FREQUENCY 4-SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil storage tank contains > 33,320 gallons of fuel.I m SR 3.8.3.2 Verify each required DG lube oil inventor>- 400 gallons.SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil total particulate concentration f Unit 1 and swing DG stored fuel oil are tes d accordance with, and maintained within t e Iir its of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.I In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each required D.G air start recl is > 225 psig. /I SR 3.8.3.5 Verify each Unit 1 and swing D f .I oil trans r subsystem operates to automa ic Ily transf fuel oil from the storage tank to~th y tank.I SR 3.8.3.6 Check for and remove, ac u ulatedate rom each Unit 1.and swing D. /uel oil ora etank.SR 3.8.3.7 Verify each.Unit 1 subsystem operatE the associated fuel of each required I?HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-25 Amendment No. M DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS S------------------NOTE



SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8 are applicable only to the Unit 1 DC sources. SR 3.8.4.9 is applicable only to the Unit 2 DC sources.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.1 Verify battery terminal voltage is >125 V on float charge.SR 3.8.4.2 Verify no visible corrosion at battery terminals a connectors. OR //a Verify battery connection resistance is wit n lmits./S R 38.4.3Verify battery cells, cell plates, and /ra /kshow no SR "visual indi3dti.mn of phyiical damage r bnorymal deteriorati~on. 3; &8.4.4. Remove visible/corrosidn, and /ef batter ' 1't HATCH UNIT -1 3.8-28 Amendment No. M DC Sources- Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.7 --------------------- NOTES --------------

1. The modified performance discharge test in SR 3.8.4.8 may be performed in lieu of the service test in SR 3.8.4.7.2. This Surveillance shall got be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except for the swing DG battery. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify battery capacity is adequate to supply, and maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle n subjected to a battery servicetest..

Ifiswt 1 (continued). HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-29 Amendment No. I DC Sources -Operating*3.8.4 (I IIX/1ZII I AKI(': P~r)" It=KA1INIT-( h.AntminH.Zicu SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.8 --------------------- NOTE--------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3,except for the swing DG battery.However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify battery capacity is > 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test or a modified AND performance discharge test.12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85% of expected life with capacity < 100% of manufacturer's rating Insert 1 'AND 24 months when battery has reached 85% ofo expected life with capacity > ,100% of manufacturer's rating SR .3.8.4.9 Forequired Unit 2 DC sources, the SRs of Unit 2- In acco'rdance with Specificatioi 3.8.4 are applicable, applicable SRs HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-30 Amendment No. I Battery Cell Parameters

3.8.6 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion battery inoperable. Time of Condition A not met.OR One or more batteries with average electrolyte temperature of the representative cells not within limits.OR One or more batteries with one or more battery cell Insert 1 parameters not within Category C limits.SURVEILLANCE REQUIRE MENTS"' SURVEILLANCE FiREQUENCY SR 3.8.6.1 Verifybattery cell parameters meet Table 3.8 6-Category A limits.SR 3.8.6.2 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.8.6 1 Category B limits.* AND Once within 24 hours after battery overcharge SR 3.8.6.3 Verify average electrolyte temperature of representative cells is,> 65°F for each station service battery, and 40'F for each DG battery.HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-34 Amendment No. Distribution. Systems -Operating 3.8.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY S R3.87.1Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to .required AC and DC electrical power distributi~r subsystems. Insert1 HATCH UNIT I 3.8-38 Amendment No. M Distribution Systems -Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS _CONDITIO'N REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.AND A.2.4 Initiate actions to Immediately restore required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND, A.2.5 Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify.correct breaker alignments and voltage to required AC and DC electrical .power distributio subsystems. Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-40 Amendment No. Refueling Equipment Interlocks

3.9.1 SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS "_" SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each of the following required refueling equipment interlock inputs: a. All-rods-in, b. Refuel platform position, c. Refuel platform fuel grapple, fu loaded, d. Refuel platform fuel grapple ull-up position, e. Refuel platform frame- unted hoist, fuel loaded, f. Refuel platform tro ey-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, and g. Service plam-hoist, fuel loaded.SInsert 1" HATCH UNIT 1 -3.9-2 Amendment No. M I Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Inierlock 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.2 Refuel

Position One-Rod-Out Interlock LcO 3.9.2 APPLICABILITY: The refuel position one-rod-out interlock shall be OPERABLE.MODE 5 with the. reactor mode switch in the refuel position and any control rod withdrawn. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Refuel position one-rod-out A.1 Suspend control rod Immediately interlock inoperable, withdrawal. AND'A.2 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all'insertable,-control rods in core&cells containing one or ore fuelassemblies. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANC E FREQUENCY SR 3.9.2.1 Verify reactor mode switch 16cked in reuel -position.S R 3.9.2.2------------- Not required to'be performed until 1 hour after Y'r control rod is withdrawn. _Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. ..HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-3 Amendment No. I Control Rod Position 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.3 Control

Rod Position LCO 3.9.3 All control rods shall be fully inserted.APPLICABILITY: When loading fuel assemblies into the core.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more control rods A.1 Suspend loading fuel Immediately not fully inserted, assemblies into the core.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .,_, SURVEILLANCE .FREQUENCY SR 3.9.Z3.1 Verify all control rods are fully inserted. ' 42-heuW4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-4 Amendment No. M I Control Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling 3.9.5 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.5 Control

Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling LCO 3.9.5.APPLICABILITY: Each withdrawn control rod shall be OPERABLE.MODE 5.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more withdrawn A.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately control rods inoperable, insert inoperable withdrawn control rods.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.5.1 ----- -NOTE --------------- NOT ------------ Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn. Insert each withdrawn control rod at least one notch.,/*accumulator pressure is >940 ,sgJg Insert I HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-7 Amendment No. , RPV Water Level 3.9:6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.6 Reactor

Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level LCO 3.9.6 APPLICABILITY: RPV water level shall be > 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV.During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV, During movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV, when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated within the RPV.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RPV water level not within A.1 Suspend movement of Immediately limit, fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.6.1 Verify RPV water level is > 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV. -/I~nser 1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-8 Amendment No. RHR -,'High Water Level 3'.9.7 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND B.4 Initiate action to, restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.C. No RHR shutdown cooling C.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND Once per 12 hours thereafter AND C.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .......... SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.7.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating. Iinserti1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-10 Amendment No. P RHR -Low Water Level 3.9.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.C. No RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in operation. C.1 Verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method.1 hour from discovery of no reactor coolant.circulation AND Once per 12 hours thereafter Once per hour AND C.2 Monitor reactor coolant temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY. SR 3.9.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating. Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 1.3.9-12 Amendment No. Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing 3.10ý2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3.1 Place the -reactor mode 1 hour switch in the shutdown.position.OR A.3.2 -NOTE------ Only applicable in MODE 5.Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the refuel position.HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-4 Amendment No. F] Single:Control Rod Withdrawal -Hot Shutdown 3.10.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.3.1 Perform the applicable SRs for the required LCOs. According to the applicable SRs SR 3.10.3.2 -------------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.3.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.3.d.1 requirements. Verify all control rods, other than the control rod being withdrawn, in a five by five array cen~tered/i on the control rod being withdrawni-are disar d.I'Veif al ontolrosother than t ntrol rod SR 3.10.3.3 conyal oto being withdrawn, are fully inse. .HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-7 Amendment No.,P Single Control Rod WithdraWal -Cold Shutdown 3.10.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2.1 Initiate aection to fully Immediately insert all control rods.Insert 1 IO.2 Initiate action to satisfy Immediately, t the requirements of this SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE\ FREQUENCY SR 3.10.4.1 Perform the applicable SRs f thleeq ed LCOs. According to the applicable SRs SR 3.10.4.2 -------- ---------NOTE ----- ----------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10. 1 is s isfie for LCO 3.10.4,.c.1 requirements. Verify all control rods, other than the c trol ro being withdrawn, in a fi~ve by five~array red SR .104.4--------------NTE----------


on the6 control rod being withdrawn, are d amd SIR 3.10.4.3 Verify all control rods, other than the Control o., being Withdrawn, are fully inserted.SR 3110.4.4 ---------------

NOTE -------- -------Not required to be met if SR 3.10.4.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.4.b.1 requirements. Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted.HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-10 Amendment No.

  • Single CRD Removal -Refueling 3.10.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.5.1 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, are fully inserted.SR 3.10.5.2 Verify all control rods, other than the control r d withdrawn for the removal of the associated RD, in a five by five array centered on the contr I rod withdrawn for the removal of the associa d CR are disarmed.SR 3.10.5.3 Verify a control rod withdrawal blo/is i serted.SR 3.10.5.4 PerformSR3.1.1.1.

According to SR 3.1.1.1 SR 3.10.5.5 Verify no CORE ALTE ONS e in progress.Ilnsert 1 'HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-12 Amendment No. q Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal -Refueling 3.10.6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. OR A.3.2 Initiate action to satisfy Immediately the requirements of this LCO.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.6.1 Verify the four fuel assemblies are removed from core cells associated With each control rod or CRD removed., .:.SR 3.10.6.2 Verify all other control rods in core cells cont ning one or more fuel assemblies are fully inse d.SR 3.10.6.3-1 NOTE& -" Only required to be met during fuelf Verify fuel assemblies bei compliance with an appro sequence. /Insert 1I HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-14 Amendment No. , SMD Test -Refueling 3.10.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.83 -------------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.8.2 satisfied. Verify movement of control rods is in compliance During control rod with the approved control rod sequence for the movement SDM test by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.S R 3.10.8.4 Verify no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress. SR 3.10.8.5 Verify each withdrawn control rod s not go to Each time the the withdrawn overtravel posi .control rod is withdrawn to full-out position Insert AND Prior to satisfying LCO 3.10.8.c requirement after work on control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling SR 3.10.8.6 Verify CRD charging water header pressure>940 psig.HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-19 Amendment No. P Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakagqe Rate Testing Program (continued) The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-17 Amendment No. M Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 4 Markup for HNP Unit 2 Proposed TS Changes Insert 1 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Insert 2 The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Insert 3 5.5.13 Surveillance Frequency Control Program This program provides controls for the Surveillance Frequencies. The program shall ensure that Surveillance Requirements specified in the Technical Specifications are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation are met.a. The Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall contain a list of Frequencies of those Surveillance Requirements for which the Frequency is controlled by the program.b. Changes to the Frequencies listed in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall be made in accordance with the NEI 04-10, "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies," Revision 1.c. The provisions of Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are applicable to the Frequencies established in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Definitions 1.1 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION

1.1 Definitions


NOTE .... m -The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and Bases.Term Definition ACTIONS ACTIONS shall be that part of a Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times.ALTERNATE TEST BASIS An ALTERI-NAT TES I BASIS shall consist 0f theo testing 01 systems,..ubs,,cims, channels, or other deSignated componqntq durcnh w hi trl oifiod bytho su1eiliae Fraequcncy, 6o that all systems, two cr nsecu1tiuriV i *llanco Frroegnlt. n, irlnn---.-..vT intorvals acorino these pauia AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)CHANNEL CALIBRATION testi.n foula that follows. wh-"ere nis th--t-tal number of systems;subsysteme,. 0chahnele, or othor dosign4ated comýpGonets iR the as9 ia If thet-otal humboer f pystemsu -... ..ystem, Ghannels, r other deso~nat4od cdmponehts Js even, then P122 a06 tostod during each'in4terval speciodmby,- ho If the toAl, nume, of : IyStms~ubyc~m , hannols, or, other desinae copnentsi odd, then eith~er (n+1.)!2 Or (n 41 )2 arA testedl dring tho fi~rst toet nerat the SPOdfifiod Surveillance FrFequency. The 6ystem s-- subsystemsF, cha~els, Ar other dia noet tsi;; during the first interval tested d-urJng tke next imte~gal: TheAPLHGR shall be applicable to a specific planar height and is equal to the sum of the LHGRs for all the fuel rods in the specified' bundle at the specified height divided by the number of fuel rods in the fuel bundle at the height.A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of'the channel output such that it responds within the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter that the channel monitors.. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel, including the required sensor, alarm, display, and trip ftinctions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Calibration of instrument channels with resistance temperature detector (RTD).or thermocouple sensors may consist of an inplace qualitative assessment of sensor behavior and normal calibration of the remaining adjustable devices in the channel. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be perfdrmed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or'total channel steps so that the entire channel is calibrated. ' (continued) Amendment No. -76 HATCH UNIT 2 1.1-1 . Definitions .1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) PHYSICS TESTS RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP)REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)RESPONSE TIME SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation. These tests are: a. Described in Chapter 14, Initial Tests and Operation, of the FSAR;b. Authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59; or c. Otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2804 MWt.The RPS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its RPS trip setpoint at the channel sensor until de-,energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total, steps so that the entire response time is measured, SDM shall be'the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical assuming that: a. The reactor is xenonfree;

b. The moderator temperature is 68°F; and c. AI[ control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.

With co htrol rods not capable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of these control rods must be accounted for in the ,,determinition of SDM.A TEST BASIS shall GRnbýit Of the tosing of Pe ot.... cyt,,4 sub. ytem,,o c-hann,,,,, or "othor. dosignp." od compon.ents... durngthcite~l specified. by the SuFilneFoqucncy, so that all ystems', c1'Ann!s, ' .tho. cOMPo."nts are tt during .,, n SUR--ilncc, F "equency itcrls, whor n is the total numbehr of svstem sulbsvsters ohzannels. Or oth6r desionated STAGGERED TEST BASIS compbnehts n; the AsSociated function.I THERMAL POWER THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 1.1 -5 Amendment No. 1-84 Control Rod OPERABILITY

3.1.3 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, or D not met.OR Nine or more control rods inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.3.1 Determine the position of each control rod.24 heurs+SR 3.1.3.2-NOTE ---------------- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM.Insert each fully withdrawn-control rod at least one notch.SR 3.1.3.3----------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 31 days after the control rod is withdraw and THERMAL POWER is greater than the; LPSP of the RWM.--- -----------------------------------------------------........... ---Insert each partially withdrawn control rod at least one notch.34 days (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-7 Amendment No. 4-95 Control Rod Scram Times 3.1.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE.-------------------


During single control rod scram time Surveillances, the control rod drive (CR0) pumps shall be isolated from the associated scram accumulator.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.4.1 Verify each control rod scram time is within the Prior to exceeding limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with reactor steam dome 40% RTP after fuel pressure > 800 psig. movement within the reactor pressure vessel AND Prior to exceeding 40% RTP after each reactor shutdown> 120 days SR 3.1.4.2 Verify, for a representative sample, each tested control rod scram time is within the limits of Table'3.1.4-1 with reaictor steam dome pressure 800 psig.2 9 0-dayp MODE4 SR 3.1.4.3 Verify each.affected control rod scram time is Prior to declaring within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with any reactor control-rod. steam dome pressure. OPERA.BLE after work on cDontrol rod*or CD System that affect"scram timre6 SR 3.1.4.4 Verify each affected control rod scram time is Prior'to exceeding within the limits of Table 3.1,4-1 with reactor 40% RTP after steam dome pressure > 800 psig. work on control rod or CRD System that could affect scram time.: HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-10 Amendment No. 4-98 Control Rod Scram Accumulators

3.1.5 SIIRVFII

I ANCF RFO11IRFMFNT~ SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.5.1 Verify each control rod scram accumulator pressure is > 940 psig.7. days HATCH, UN IT 2 3.1-14 Amendment No. 435 Rod Pattern Contrbl 3.1.6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME.B. (continued) B.2 Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the shutdown position.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.6.1 Verify all OPERABLE control rods comply with BPWS.24 heu~s HATCH, UNIT 2-I 3.1-16 Amendment No. 435 SLC System 3.1.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.7.1 Verify available volume of sodium pentaborate solution is within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-1.24 hours SR 3.1.7.2 Verify temperature of sodium pentaborate solution is within the Region A limitsof Figure 3.1.7-2.2A her6 SR 3.1.7.3 Verify temperature of pump suction piping is within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2.24 hGFs SR 3.1.7.4 Verify continuity of explosive charge.31 days SR 3.1.7.5 Verify the concentration of sodium pentaborate in solution is within the Region A limits of Figure 3.11.7-1.,31,days AND Once within 24 hours after water or sodium pentaborate is added to solution AND Once within 24 hours after solution temperature'is restored within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2 SR 3.1.7.6" Verify each SLC subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path that is hot locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position, or can be aligned to the correct position.31 days (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-18 Amendment No. 4-35 SLC System 3.1.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.7.7 Verify each pump develops a flow rate > 41.2 gpm In accordance at a discharge pressure > 1232 psig. with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.1.7.8 Verify flow through one SLC subsystem from pump into reactor pressure vessel..1-SR 3.1.7.9 Verify all heat traced piping between storage tank and pump suction is unblocked. 24 ot -o Insert 1 i T-ES-T BAgt 24Insert 1 AND Once within 24 hours after pump suction piping temperature is restored within the ,Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7,-2 ,SR 3.1.7.10-Verify sodium pentaborate enrichment is Prior to addition to> 60.0 atom percent B-10. SLC tank HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-19 Amendment No. 4-74 SDV Vent and Drain Valves 3.1.8 SUR-VEILLANCE I-REQUIIR-EMEN I TS_, SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.8.1---------- NOTE--- ------Not required to be met on vent and drain valves closed during performance of SR 3.1.8.2.Verify each SDV vent and drain valve is open.31 days 92-days SR 3.1.8.2 Cycle each SDV vent and drain valve to the fully closed and fully open position.SR 3.1.8.3 Verify each SDV vent and drain valve: a. Closes in -5 60 seconds after receipt of an actual or simulated scram signal; and b. 'Opens when the actual or simulated scram signal is reset.24-menth, HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-23 Amendment No. 1-74 APLHGR 3.2.1 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)LCO 3.2.1 All APLHGRs shall be less than or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any APLHGR not within A.1 Restore APLHGR(s) to 2 hours limits, within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.1.1 Verify a!l APLHGRs are less than or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.Once within 12 hours after>24% RTP AND h.. ih tho.eafte n HATCH UNIT 2 3.2-1 Amendment No. 4-80 MCPR 3.2.2'3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.22 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)LCO 3.2.2 APPLICABILITY: All MCPRs shall be greater than or equal to the MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR.THERMAL POWER,> 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any MCPR not within limits. A.1 Restore MCPR(s) to 2 hours within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I SR 3.2.2.1 Verify all MCPRs are greater than or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.Once within 12 hours after>224% RTP AND 21 heurs thoroaftPr (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.2-2 Amendment No. 4.90 LHGR 3.2.3 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)*LCO 3.2.3 APPLICABILITY: All LHGRs shall be less than or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any LHGR not within'limits. A.1 Restore LHGR(s) to 2 hours within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.3.1 Verify all LHGRs are less t ha.n or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.Once within 12 hours after--,24% RTPýAND, 24 hourc therosafte insert-*This Specification is effective starting from Hatch 2/Cycle 19.HATCH UNIT 2 3.2-4 Amendment No. 1-82 RPS Instrumentation 3.3:1.1 +'~,,'4;n 14r CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1. As required by Required 1.1.. Initiate alternate method 12 hours Action D.1 and referenced to detect and suppress in Table 3.3.1.1-1. thermal-hydraulic instability oscillations. AND 1.2 Restore required 120 days channels to OPERABLE.J. Required Action and J.1 Be in MODE 2. 4 hours associated Completion Time of Condition I not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


.


NOTES-----------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRsapply for each RPS Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveill'ances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability..

SURVE -- -- U RY * " , SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.1.1.2----------------- NOTE -------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.-. ----- --;-. .. .. -- ----7.. ...-- --- -------- ------ m --.. ....: ..--- .-Verify the absolute difference between the average power range monitor (APRM)'channels and the calculated power is < 2% RTP while operating at _ 24% RTP.1~2 -hus 7-days (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-3 Amendment No. 1-80 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.3 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.4--NOTE ----------------------------- Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.1.1.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.44Inser 1 SR 3.3.1.1.6 Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and Prior to.,intermediate'range monitor (IRM) channels withdrawing SRMs overlap. from the ful.ly inserted position........ I SR 3.3.1.1.7-NOTE ....Only required to be met during entry. into MODE 2 from MODE 1.Verify the IRM and APRM chiannels overlap.7- days~-~-{3~rti SR 3.3.1.1.8 Calibrate the local power range monitors.SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST. 1000 offectivo, full ALTERNATE TEST-BASIS Insert I 1.4 day&i SR 3.3.1.1.10 --NOTE-----


F6r Function 2.a, not required to be perfo.rmed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-4 Amendment No. 1-76 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS. (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.11 Verify Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is >27.6% RTP.2-p~eRthg SR 3.3.1.1.12 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.24 m~ent 4-fImer 4.SR 3.3.1.1.13


NOTES--------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.2. For.Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 -nel4ht 4Aj~e~1 SR 3.3.1.1.14 (Not used.) I 24 menh SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.*_EiýSR 3.3.1.1.16


NOTES-----


1. Neutron detectors are excluded.2. (Not used.)3. For Function 5, "n" equals,4.channels for the purpose of determining the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency.

Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is withid limits.21 mongths on a TACE- -InsertR I TTr-BTAI S (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-5 Amendment No. 8 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.17 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power is > 25% and recirculation drive flow is,< 60% of rated recirculation drive flow.-24Ambth *--[3n~i HATCH UNIT 2 -3.3-6 Amendment No. 4-74 SRM instrumentation 3.3.1.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One or more required E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately SRMs inoperable in ALTERATIONS except MODE 5. for control rod insertion. AND E.2 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS S- 7 ---------------


.-- Refer to Table 3.31.1.2-1 to deteiiiiine which SRs apply for each applicable MODE or other specified conditions..

2. Wheh'a channel. is placed in an inoperable statuis solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to '6 hours provided ihe other re'quired-channel(s) is OPERABLE: SSURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.1 Perform 'CHANNEL CHECK.12 hel;Fe Aý(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3:3-11 HAmendment No. 435 SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 SIIRV\11 I ANICE RE UIIRFNAFNTS (continupilr S.URVEILLANCE ' FREQUENCY' SR 3.3.1.2.2 NOTES --------------

1. Only required to be met during CORE ALTERATIONS.
2. One SRM may be used to satisfy more than one of the following.

Verify an OPERABLE SRM detector is located in: a. The fueled region;b. The core quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, when the associated SRM is included in the fueled region; and c. A core quadrant adjacent to where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, when..,the associated SRM is included in the fueled region.SR 3.3.1.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.!2 ho'urs-sr1 GORE Insert 1 ALTERATI.ONS AND SR 3.3.1.2.4----------------- NOTES--------------

1. Not required to be met with less than or equal to four fuel assemblies adjacent to the SRM and no other fuel assemblies in the associated core quadrant.'2. Not required to be met during spiral unloading.

Verify count rate is > 3.0 cps with a signal to noise ratio > 2:1.24-heu-s*_Eý(continued) HATCH UNIT2 3.3-12 Amendment No. 435 SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1;.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and determination of signal to noise ratio.7-days SIR 3.3.1.2.6--NOTE Not required to be performed until 12 hours after IRMs on Range 2 or below.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and determination of signal to noise ratio.SR 3.3.1.2.7------------------ NOTES -------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.2. Not required to be performed until 12 hours after IRMs on Range 2 or below.31 days 24 -Rienths Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-13 Amendment No. 4-74 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I, It% " '.......................................................... l\ii I I.... -- -------- -------- ------- -------- -------- ----- ------ .........


--, I L .,-1. Refer to Table 3.3.2.1 -1 to determine which SRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.2. When an RBM channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.484 days 4fl~i SR 3.3.2.1.2--------------- NOTE -------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn at < 10% RTP in MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.2.1.3-- --. "NOTE ---- ----------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP in MODE 1.Sdays- OR an ALTERhATE TEST ALTERNATE TEST Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.(continued) HATCH U NIT 2 3.3-17 Amendment No. 1-7-6 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.4-NOTE --------------- 1 -------------- Neutron detectors are excluded.Verify the RBM: a. Low Power Range -Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL, POWER is> 29% and < 64% RTP.b. Intermediate Power Range -Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 64% and < 84% RTP.c. High Power Range -Upscale Function -is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 84% RTP.24 menth&-A i 24MEoRth6 SR 3.3.2.1.5 Verify the RWM is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP.SR 3.3.2.1.6----------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after reactor, mode switch isinthe shutdown position.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.2.1.7--NOTE --------------- Neutron detectors are excluded.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR :3.3.2.1.8 Verify control rod sequences input to the RWM are Prior to declaring in conformance with BPWS. RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-18 Amendment No. 474 Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation 3:3.2.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


-m -------------------

N --NOTE.------------------------------ When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided feedwater and main turbine high water level trip capability is maihtained. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY+SR 3.3.2.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.2.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Value shall be 5 55.5 inches.92dys'GR-aR BASIS Insert 1--eth 24-Rment'SR 3.3.2.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST including valve actuation..HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-21 Amendment No. 4-7-6 PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. As required by Required F.1 Initiate action in Immediately Action D.1 and referenced accordance with in Table 3.3.3.1-1. Specification 5.6.6.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES-------------------------------

1. These SRs apply to each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1.
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions~and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required channel(s) in the associated Function is OPERABLE.--------------------

--'-----S- -RVEILLANCE--- 7 .FREQ-------------U N--CY- -------------- .... " .SURVEILLANCE .FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.31 day6 Inser 1 1 SR 3.3.3.1.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 MentIhS HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-23 Amend ment No. 4-74 Remote Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS



NOTE ------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours.--------------------------------------------....


.

....----- -.. ........I.. ...--.--- -....---.----.....------ --.................---- SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required instrumentation channel that is normally energized. SR '3.3.3.2.2 Verify each required control circuit and. transfer switch is capable of performing the intended function.31 days 4H~24 *-1IthS 24-meGRthG SR 3.3.3.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each required instrumentation channel.O HATCH UNIT 2.3.3-26 Amendment No. 4-74 EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more Functions with B.1 Restore EOC-RPT trip 2 hours EOC-RPT trip capability not capability. maintained. OR AND B.2 Apply the MCPR limit 2 hours MCPR limit for inoperable for inoperable EOC-RPT not made EOC-RPT as specified applicable, in the COLR.C. Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated 4 hours associated Completion recirculation pump from Time not met. service.OR C.2 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours POWER to <.27.6%RTP.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS



NOTE ------ .- ---- -------- ---When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances ,rentry into associated Conditions and RequiredýActions may be,ldelayed for up. to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE ' FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.92-djays Ra ALTERNATrE TEST 2 ie lks SR 3.314.1.2 Verify. TSV -Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are not bypassed When THERMAL POWER is >27.6% RTP;(continued) Amendment No. 480 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-28 EOC-RPT Instrumentation. 3.3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE .. FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be: TSV -Closure: < 10% closed; and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low: > 600 psig.24 MGRth6 SR 3.3.4.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST including breaker actuation. SR 3.3.4.1.5-NOTE ------------------------------- Breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.6. 24-men4hs <-- Insert 1 21 moneths on a TlET BASIS fi mnth '~sr Verify the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is within limits.SR 3.3.4.1.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-29 Amendment No. 1-74 ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Both Functions with C.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip 1 hour ATWS-RPT trip capability capability for one not maintained. Function.D. Required Action and D.1 Remove the associated 6 hours associated Completion recirculation pump from Time not met. service.OR D.2 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS S-----------------NOTE------------------------------ When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST..1.2 hours -'-,Is t1 I 92 day- e-a ALTERNATE TEST.A... Inser 1 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-31 Amendment No. 4-76 ATWS-RPT Instrumentatiorn 3.3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS' (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be: a. Reactor Vessel Water'Level -ATWS-RPT Level: > -73 inches; and b. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure High: <1175 psig. SR 3.3.4.2.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST including breaker actuation. I'HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-32 Amendment No. 4-7-4 EccS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTES----------------


NOTES------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.35.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.2. When a channeI is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required 'Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Functions 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains initiation capability; SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.12 he,-rs+/-SR 3.3.5.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST..i.SR 3.3.5.1.3 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.5.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

.24 FnbRths+SR 3.3.5.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.2A4,RGRth§


HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-37 Amendment No. 1-7-6 RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS




NOTES------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to.determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.2. When a channel is plabced in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions maybe delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hoursfor Function,2; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1, 3, and 4 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.5.2.3 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.5.2.4 PerformCHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 mry~nhe SR 3.3.5.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.24 meRths -V~HATCH UNIT,2 3.3-45 Amendment No. 4-76 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1. As required by Required 1.1 Initiate action to restore immediately Action C.1 and referenced channel to OPERABLE in Table 3.3.6.1-1. status.OR 1.2 Initiate action to isolate Immediately the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Shutdown Cooling System.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


------------

NOTES--------------


1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.2. When a Channel is placed in an inoperable.

status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. SURVEILLANCE. FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.12 heuws SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.92Q days an ALTERNCE TEST SR 3.3.6.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. BASAR (continued) HATCH UNIT ý3.3-49 Amendment No. 1-76 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 OUrMV-ILL-IAIL,- IMr-- UIIEIVIEIN 10 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. IA- 4 ..days SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 mnoths:Iiierj=SR 3.3.6.1.7----------------- NOTE ------------------------------- Channel sensors are excluded.Verify the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is within limits.24 months on a STBAGGERED n HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-50 Amendment No. 76 Secondary Containment. Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1 Place the associated 1 hour standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) in operation. OR C.2.2 Declare associated 1 hour SGT subsystem(s) inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


.................--

NOTES---------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.2-1 to determine Which SRs apply for each Secondary Containment Isolation Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY. SR 3.3.6.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.4i2 h-rs SR 3.3.6.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.SR 3.3.6.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.6.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 mentRhs 4-ri~~1 SR 3.3.6.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.24- mehths HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-56 Amendment No. 1-7-6 LLS Instrurhentation 3.3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Require d Action and D.1 Declare the associated Immediately associated Completion LLS valve(s)Time of Condition A, B, inoperable. or C not met.OR Two 'or more LLS valves with initiation capability not maintained. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS



,.t.---_,NOTES


1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.3-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of.,required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditionsand Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided LLS'initiatipn.capability-is maintained.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.6.3.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for portion of the channel outside primary containment. ALERAT TEFSTI-1 .lnsert 1 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2:3.3-59 Amendment No. 47-6 LLS Instrumentation ,3.3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.3-NOTE-------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 during each scheduled outage > 72 hours when entry is made into primary containment. Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for portions of the channel inside primary containment. 92 day-en- aR ALTERNATE TEST BASIS SR 3.3.6.3.4 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.BASIS SR 3.3.6.3.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.6.3.6 Perform LOGICSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.4~j~ert1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-60 Amendment No. 1-76 MCREC System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE ----When a Control Room Air Inlet Radiation -High channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other channel is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.24 heypsi SR 3.3.7.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.31-days SR 3.3.7.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Value shall be -1 mr/hour.AILT-ERjNATE TEST'BAS.IS Insert 1 SR 3.3.7.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.24 menth 417j~1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-63 Amendment No. 1-76 LOP Instrumentation 3.18.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES -----------------------


1. Refer to Table 3.3.8.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each LOP Function.'

2. When a 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains initiation

'capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3)..........................


.................................

................................................................. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.SR 3.3.8.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.48.MORthe -TSi 24 n neI4ehte SR 3.3.8.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.8.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-65 Amendment No. 486 RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


-----------.....----------------------------

NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------- When an RPS electric power monitoring assembly is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other RPS electric power monitoring assembly for the associated power supply maintains trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.2.1------------------ NOTE-------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, when in MODE 4 for> 24 hours.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.-I-SR 3.3.8.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be: a. Overvoltage < 132 V, with time delay set to<4 seconds.b. Undervoltage > 108 V, with time delay set to < 4 seconds.c. Underfrequency > 57 Hz, with time delay set to < 4 seconds.14 Adays 140ays 4-SR 3.3.8.2.3 Perform a system functional test.14 4days e-HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-69 Amendment No. 1-74 Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.1 Satisfy the 24 hours LCO not met. requirements of the LCO.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.OR No recirculation loops in operation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1----------- --NOTE --------------- Not required to be performed until 24 hours after both recirculation loops are in operation. Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch with both recirculation loops in operation is: a. -- 10% of rated core flow when operating at< 70% of rated core flow; and b. < 5% of rated core flow when operating at> 70% of rated core flow.A-4hours-

  • -El i~i SR 3.4.1.2 (Not used.)HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-2 Amendment No. 4-54 Jet Pumps 3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.2.1-NOTES ----------------------------
1. Not required to be performed until 4 hours after associated recirculation loop is in operation.
2. Not required to be performed until 24 hours after > 25% RTP.Verify at least one of the following criteria (a, b, or c) is satisfied for each operating recirculation loop: a. Recirculation pump flow to speed ratio differs by < 5% from established patterns,, and jet pump loop flow to recirculation pump speed ratio differs by < 5% from established patterns.b. Each jet pump diffuser to-lower plenum differential pressure differsby

< 20% from established patterns.c. Each jet pump flow differs by < 10% from established patterns.24ho-r < Insert1 I HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-5 Amendment No. *95 RCS Operbtional LEAKAGE 3.4.4 5~I IR\/FII I AN('.P. PFOL.IIPFMFNT~ SURVEILLANCE. FREQUENNCY SR .3.4.4.1 Verify RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.42 heyFs fj i HATCH UNIT 2 -3.4-9 Amendment No. 43$.4 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

3.4.5 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND, not met.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours D. All required leakage D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately detection systems inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS N Ir\rr-I--I------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required leakage detection instrumentati6n is OPERABLE.-C---E-- .----- ----------- --...C---- ---- ---SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1'Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of required primary containment atmospheric monitoring system.*4R heus 4+sG*31-Eiey& -A"SR 3.4.5.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of required leakage detection instrumentation. SR 3:4.5.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required leakage detection instrumentation. -21 MPRtlýg HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-11 Amendment No. 1-74 RCS Specific Activity 3.4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.6.1---------------- NOTE ---------------- Only required to be performed in MODE 1.Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 specific activity is < 0.2 pCi/gm.7 days HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-13 Amendment No. 4-35 RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Hot Shutdown 3.4.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.7.1---------------------- NOTE- ------------------- Not required to be met until .2 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR low pressure permissive pressure.Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is operating. 12 hewFs HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-16 Amendment No. 4-5 RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Cold Shutdown 3.4.8 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. No RHR shutdown cooling B.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND AND No recirculation pump in operation. Once per 12 hours thereafter AND B.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is operating. 12-heuF s 4-Il jnserti'.j. ____________________________ HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-18 Amendment No. 435 I-- RCS P/T Lirmits 3.4.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY-30 minutes &Iset SR 3.4.9.1 Verify: a. RCS pressure and RCS temperature are within the limits specified in Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2 during RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and during RCS non-nuclear heatup and cooldown operations; and b. RCS heatup and cooldown rates are 5 100'F in any 1 hour period'during RCS heatup and cooldown operations, and RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.SR 3.4.9.2-NOTE---,------------ Only required to be met when the reactor. is critical and immediately prior to control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality. Verify RCS pressure and RCS temperature are within the criticality limits specified in Figure 3.4.9-3.Once within 15 minutes prior to initial control rod Withdrawal. for the purpose of achieving criticality SR 3.4.9.3 --------------------- NOTE ----------- ---Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 during startup of a recirculation pump.-' '----Verify the difference between the bottom head Once within coolant temperature and the reactor pressure 15 minutes prior to vessel (RPV) coolant temperature is < 145 0 F. starting an idle' recirculation pump tUI lil V !U IU)HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-20 Amendment No. 1 I Reactor.Steam Dome Pressure 3.4'.10 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure LCO 3.4.10 APPLICABILITY: The reactor steam dome pressure shall be _ 1058 psig.MODES 1 and 2.I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Reactor steam dome A.1 Restore reactor steam 15 minutes pressure not within limit, dome pressure to within limit.B. Required Action.and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3'4.10.1 Verify reactor steam dome pressure is< 1058 psig.12 hours 4 'Insert !.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-25 Amendment No. 4-U? ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE.REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.1 Verify, for each ECCs injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.31 dayst SR 3.5.1.2--NOTE--------------- Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) low pressure permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is'not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in. position, is in the correct position.34-dys 34 daysi 3-1i SR 3.5.1.3 Verify ADS air supply header pressure is,> 90 psig.SR 3.5.1.4, Verify the RHR System cross tie'valve is closed and power is removed from the valve operator., SR 3.5.1.5 (Not used.)'I SR 3.5.1.6---------- --: --NOTE---- ---------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, when in MODE 4> 48 hours.Verify each recirculation pump discharge valve cycles through one complete cycle of full travel or is de-energized in the closed position.31 days 4 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-3 Amendment No. 452 r-_ ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.7 Verify the following ECCS pumps develop the In accordance with specified flow rate against a system head the Inservice corresponding to the specified reactor pressure. Testing Program SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING NO. OF TO A REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE PUMPS PRESSURE OF CS 'a! 4250 gpm 1 'a 113 psig LPCI > 17,000 gpm 2 > 20 psig SR 3.5.1.8-NOTE ------------------

..------Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure < 1058 psig and_> 920 psig',the HPCI pump can develop a flow rate > 4250 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure.SR 3.5.1.9 SNOTE --------Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.p2 days 24 MOWIi Verify, with reactor pressure < 165 psig, the HPCI pump can develop a flow rate > 4250 gpm against asystem head corresponding to reactor system pressure.SR 3.5.1.10--------------------

NOTE-----------------


Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.24-Fehh (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-4 Amendment No. 474 ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS. (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.11-NOTE ------------------------------- Valve actuation may be excluded.Verify the ADS actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.SR 3.5.1.12 Verify each ADS valve relief mode actuator strokes when manually actuated.24 MOets 24-m ORths 24 -ne~ths 4 _1sr SR 3.5.1.13-NOTE---- ------------------------ ECCS injection/spray initiation instrumentation response time may be assumed from established limits.Verify each. ECCS injection/spray subsystem ECCS RESPONSE TIME is within limits.A ______________________ HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-5 Amendment No. 4-74 ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2 Initiate action to restore Immediately required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status, AND D.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify, for each required low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem, the suppression pool water level is -- 146 inches.SR 3.5.2.2 Verify, for each required core spray (CS)subsystem, the: a. Suppression pool water level is>146 inches; or b. ---------------- NOTE ------------ Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during OPDRVs.12 heuiFs A ~ j Condensate storage tank water level is>15 ft.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-7 Amendment No. 4-43 ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE IFREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.3 Verify, for each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.SR 3.5.2.4-- -NOTE-- ----------- One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. Verify each required ECCS, injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.31 days 31 days+SR 3.5.2.5 Verify each required ECCS pump develops the specified flow rate against a system head corresponding to the specified reactor pressure.In accordance with the Inservice. Testing Program NO. OF.SYSTEM FLOW RATE. PUMPS SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING TOA REACTOR PRESSURE OF> 113 psig> 20 psig CS.LPCI> 4250 gpm>"7700 gpm 1 1+SR 3.5.2.6 NOTE --------------- Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.24 menths HATCH UNIT 2.3.5-8 Amendment No. 4-7-4 RCIC System.3.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS. ,.SURVEILLANCE

IFREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 Verify the RCIC System piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.i SR 3.5.3.2 Verify each RCIC System manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.SR 3.5.3.3 NOTE -----------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours after, reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure -1058 psig and-920 psig, the RCIC pump 6an develop a flow rate > 400 gpm against a, system head corresponding to reactor pressure.31 dayt sr.31 days 92 as 4 -rInser 24 months 4 f~~4Mnnh& fl;SR 3.5.3.4"-NOTE -------- ------Not required to 6e performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify,' with reactor pressure < 165 psig,:the RCIC pump.can develop a flow rate >400Wgpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure, SR 3.5.3.5-NOTE ..... --------------------

Vessel injection may be excluded...- ,--- ........--- -.. .... ..-7 ......... ......... --- -- -- --- -- -- --- -- --Verify the RCIC System actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-10 Amendment No. 1-7-4 ( Primary Containment 3.6.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE N FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of 1 psid.24 Innsert AND.------ NOTE ---------- Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass---- --- --- ------------ 14 ment Ihs HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-2 Amendment No. 474 Primary Containment Air, Lock 3.6.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE, FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.2.1


NOTES--------------

1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1.

Perform required primary containment air lock In accordance with leakage rate testing, in accordance with the the Primary Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Containment Program. Leakage Rate Testing Program SF 3.6.1.2.2 -- ---------


NOTE----------------

Only required to be performed upon entry or exit...through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted. -- ------ -.... ...--- ------ ... -----,-- -.. ....--------- ... ..Verify only one door in the primary containment air lock can be opened at a time.HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-6 Amendment No. 444 PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and F.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion suspend operations Time of Condition A, B, C, with a potential for or D not met for PCIV(s) draining the reactor required to be OPERABLE vessel.during MODE 4 or 5.OR F.2 -------NOTE------ Only applicable for inoperable RHR shutdown cooling valves.Initiate action to restore Immediately valve(s) to OPERABLE status.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1---------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be met when the 18 inch primary containment purge valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge valve is closed.31-days *-Lj]1 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-10 Amendment No. 4-W PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I SR 3.6.1.3.2------------------ NOTES --------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.31 days SR 3.6.1.3.3-----------------

NOTES--------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge.31 daY6 SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power operated In accordance with and each automatic PCIV, except for MSIVs, is the Inservice within limits. Testing Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-11 Amendment No. 4-M PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance with_ 3 seconds and < 5 seconds. the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.24 -RenthS SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV (of a representative sample) actuates to restrict flow to within limits.24 menthe -f.~SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP system.TEST- BASIS SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify the combined leakage rate for all In accordance with secondary containment bypass leakage paths is the Primary< 0.009 La when pressurized to > Pa. Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is In accordance with< 100 scfh, and a combined maximum the Primary pathway leakage < 250 scfh for all four main Containment steam lines, when tested at > 28.8 psig. Leakage Rate Testing Program However, the leakage rate acceptance criteria for the first test following discovery of leakage through an MSIV not meeting the 100 scfh limit, shall be < 11.5 scfh for that MSIV.SR 3.6.1.3.12 Deleted SR 3.6.1.3.13 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper to the fully closed and fully open position.2,4 -R'th 4Fj~1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-12 Amendment No. 1-92 Drywell Pressure 3.6.1.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.4 Drywell Pressure LCO 3.6.1.4 APPLICABILITY: Drywell pressure shall be < 1.75 psig.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Drywell pressure not within A.1 Restore drywell 1 hour limit. pressure to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.4.1 Verify drywell pressure is within limit.12 heuws 4*-Fj~srt1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-13 Amendment No. 45 Drywell Air Temperature 3.6.1.5 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature LCO 3.6.1.5 APPLICABILITY: Drywell average air temperature shall be < 150'F.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Drywell average air A.1 Restore drywell 8 hours temperature not within limit, average air temperature to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.5.1 Verify drywell average air temperature is within limit.24 heu~s 4 -lsr HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-14 Amendment No. 442 LLS Valves 3.6.1.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.6.1 Verify each LLS valve relief mode actuator strokes when manually actuated.SR 3.6.1.6.2---------------- NOTE --------------- Valve actuation may be excluded.Verify the LLS System actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal..24 FnGLthi 24 ME)Rths HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-16 Amendment No. 4-74 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.7.1------------------- NOTES-------------

1. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances.
2. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers open when performing their intended function.Verify each vacuum breaker is closed.14 days SR 3.6.1.7.2 Perform a functional test of each vacuum breaker. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.7.3 Verify the opening setpoint of each vacuum breaker is < 0.5 psid.24 mERths HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-18 Amendment No. 4-74 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i SR 3.6.1.8.1--NOTE ---------------

Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances. Verify each vacuum breaker is closed.1A4dayLs *i SR 3.6.1.8.2 Perform a functional test of each required vacuum breaker.3 1 days 4--EýAND Within 12 hours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the S/RVs SR 3.6.1.8.3 Verify the opening setpoint of each required vacuum breaker is < 0.5 psid.24 MA3th HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-20 Amendment No. 1-74 Suppression Pool Average Temperature 3.6.2.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Suppression pool average E.1 Depressurize the 12 hours temperature > 120°F. reactor vessel to< 200 psig.AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1.1 Verify suppression pool average temperature is within the applicable limits.24-heurs AND 5 minutes when performing testing that adds heat to the suppression pool HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-23 Amendment No. 4-M Suppression Pool Water Level 3.6.2.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level LCO 3.6.2.2 APPLICABILITY: Suppression pool water level shall be > 146 inches and < 150 inches.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Suppression pool water A.1 Restore suppression 2 hours level not within limits, pool water level to within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.2.1 Verify suppression pool water level is within limits.24 heum HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-24 Amendment No. 4-35 RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling LCO 3.6.2.3 APPLICABILITY: Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression pool A.1 Restore RHR 7 days cooling subsystem suppression pool inoperable, cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.B. Two RHR suppression pool B.1 Restore one RHR 8 hours cooling subsystems suppression pool inoperable, cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.3.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.31 days 4--Finsert 1 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-25 Amendment No. 4-35 RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray LCO 3.6.2.4 APPLICABILITY: Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression pool A.1 Restore RHR 7 days spray subsystem suppression pool spray inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.B. Two RHR suppression pool B.1 Restore one RHR 8 hours spray subsystems suppression pool spray inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.4.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.31-days A~(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-27 Amendment No. 45 RHR Suppression Pool Spray 1 3.6.2.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2,4.2 Verify each suppression pool spray nozzle is unobstructed. U-Y 4-tesartI I ____________________________________________________________ HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-28 Amendment No. 4-95 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration 3.6.3.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.2 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration LCO 3.6.3.2 APPLICABILITY: The primary containment oxygen concentration shall be < 4.0 volume percent.MODE 1 during the time period: a. From 24 hours after THERMAL POWER is > 15% RTP following startup, to b. 24 hours prior to reducing THERMAL POWER to < 15% RTP prior to the next scheduled reactor shutdown.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Primary containment A.1 Restore oxygen 24 hours oxygen concentration not concentration to within within limit, limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours associated Completion POWER to < 15% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.2.1 Verify primary containment oxygen concentration is within limits.7-days HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-31 Amendment No. 436 Drywell Cooling System Fans 3.6.3.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.3 Drywell Cooling System Fans LCO 3.6.3.3 APPLICABILITY: Two drywell cooling system fans shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required drywell A.1 Restore required 30 days cooling system fan drywell cooling system inoperable, fan to OPERABLE status.B. Two required drywell B.1 Restore one required 7 days cooling system fans drywell cooling system inoperable, fan to OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Associated Completion Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.3.1 Operate each required drywell cooling system fan for,? 15 minutes.9 2 dayr, HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-32 Amendment No. 9 Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND C.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed.31 days-Insert 1 SR 3.6.4.1.3------------------ NOTE ----------------------------- The number of standby gas treatment (SGT)subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. Verify required SGT subsystem(s) will draw down the secondary containment to > 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in < 120 seconds.24 months on a STAGS REst TEST-BASIS -Inet (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-34 Amendment No. 4-7-8 Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.4-------------- NOTE --------------- The number of SGT subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3,"Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. Verify required SGT subsystem(s) can maintain> 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment for 1 hour at a flow rate< 4000 cfm for each subsystem. 24 months on a STAGGERE TEST BASIS Insert 1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-35 Amendment No. 4-74 SCIVs 3.6.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.2.1-------------- NOTES --------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for SCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each secondary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.*1-SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verify the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic SCIV is within limits.31-days 4 j 1 92 days 24 M9RthS -l~SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verify each automatic SCIV actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-38 Amendment No. 1-7-4 SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Two or more required SGT E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.F. Two or more required SGT F.1 ----------- NOTE------ subsystems inoperable LCO 3.0.3 is not during movement of applicable. irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE Suspend movement of Immediately ALTERATIONS, or during irradiated fuel OPDRVs. assemblies in secondary containment. AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND F.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each required SGT subsystem for_> 15 continuous minutes.SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in accordance In accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). the VFTP SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each required SGT subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal.24 meRths -l~HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-41 Amendment No. 2-$ RHRSW System 3.7.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Both RHRSW subsystems


NOTE ------------------ inoperable for reasons Enter applicable Conditions and other than Condition B. Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7 for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.D.1 Restore one RHRSW 8 hours subsystem to OPERABLE status.E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify each RHRSW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.31 days HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-2 Amendment No. 4-35 PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Verify the water level in each PSW pump well of the intake structure is > 60.7 ft mean sea level (MSL).4 day -- ne r AND 12 hours when water level is< 61.7 ft MSL SR 3.7.2.2----------------- NOTE ---------Isolation of flow to individual components or systems does not render PSW System inoperable. Verify each PSW subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow paths servicing safety related systems or components, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.31-daY&24 -neRths SR 3.7.2.3 Verify each PSW subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal.HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-5 Amendment No. 1-7-4 DG 1 B SSW System 3.7.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify each DG 1B SSW System manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.31 days 24 AE)RtfhG SR 3.7.3.2 Verify the DG 1 B SSW System pump starts automatically when DG 1 B starts and energizes the respective bus.HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-7 Amendment No. 1-74 MCREC System 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two MCREC subsystems


NOTE ---------inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately during CORE irradiated fuel ALTERATIONS, or during assemblies in the OPDRVs. secondary containment. AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND F.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Operate each MCREC subsystem > 15 minutes.31 days --SR 3.7.4.2 Perform required MCREC filter testing in In accordance with accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing the VFTP Program (VFTP).SR 3.7.4.3 Verify each MCREC subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal.24 -nenthG -E (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-10 Amendment No. 4--74 MCREC System 3.7.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i SR 3.7.4.4 Verify each MCREC subsystem can maintain a positive pressure of > 0.1 inches water gauge relative to the turbine building during the pressurization mode of operation at a subsystem flow rate of < 2750 cfm and an outside air flow rate< 400 cfm.24 monthS on a STAGGERE HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-11 Amendment No. 144 Control Room AC System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each control room AC subsystem has the capability to remove the assumed heat load.24 FmGRthG4--F~1nsr HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-15 Amendment No. 1-74 Main Condenser Offgas 3.7.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1-------------- NOTE ------------------ Not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line not isolated and SJAE in operation. Verify the gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases is 5 240 mCi/second.

1. days AND Once within 4 hours after a> 50% increase in the nominal steady state fission gas release after factoring out increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER level HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-17 Amendment No. 4-35 Main Turbine Bypass System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System LCO 3.7.7 The Main Turbine Bypass System shall be OPERABLE.OR LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System, as specified in the COLR, are made applicable.

APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the LCO A.1 Satisfy the requirements 2 hours not met. of the LCO.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 Verify one complete cycle of each main turbine bypass valve..4.SR 3.7.7.2 Perform a system functional test.31 days Ei 24 ME)RthS SR 3.7.7.3 Verify the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is within limits.HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-18 Amendment No. 41-8W Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level LCO 3.7.8 APPLICABILITY: The spent fuel storage pool water level shall be -> 21 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks.During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Spent fuel storage pool A.1 ------- NOTE------ water level not within limit. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 Verify the spent fuel storage pool water level is> 21 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks.7 days HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-19 Amendment No. 435 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE------------------------------- SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18 are applicable only to the Unit 2 AC sources. SR 3.8.1.19 is applicable only to the Unit 1 AC sources.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.1 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated 7-4ays -net1 power availability for each required offsite circuit.SR 3.8.1.2 --------------------- NOTES---------------

1. Performance of SR 3.8.1.5 satisfies this SR.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.3. A modified DG start involving idling and gradual acceleration to synchronous speed may be used for this SR as recommended by the manufacturer.

When modified start procedures are not used, the time, voltage, and frequency tolerances of SR 3.8.1.5.a must be met.4. For the swing DG, a single test will satisfy this Surveillance for both units, using the starting circuitry of Unit 2 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 2F for one periodic test, and the starting circuitry of Unit 1 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 1F during the next periodic test.5. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-7 Amendment No. 469 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.2 (continued)


NOTES -------------

6. Starting transients above the upper voltage limit do not invalidate this test.7. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.8. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.Verify each DG: a. Starts from standby conditions and achieves steady state voltage > 3740 V and < 4243 V and frequency

> 58.8 Hz and< 61.2 Hz; and b. Operates for > 60 minutes at a load> 1710 kW and <2000 kW.31 days 48A-days +-Flnset SR 3.8.1.3 Verify each day tank contains > 500 gallons of fuel oil.SR 3.8.1.4 Check for and remove accumulated water from each day tank.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-8 Amendment No. 4-69 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.5 --------------------- NOTES---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.
3. Momentary load transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.4. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.5. For the swing DG, a single test will satisfy this Surveillance for both units, using the starting circuitry of Unit 2 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 2F for one periodic test and the starting circuitry of Unit 1 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 1F during the next periodic test.Verify each DG: 184 .day a. Starts from standby conditions and achieves, in < 12 seconds, voltage> 3740 V and frequency

> 58.8 Hz and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage > 3740 V and < 4243 V and frequency > 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz;and b. Operates for > 60 minutes at a load> 2764 kW and < 2825 kW for DG 2A,> 2360 kW and < 2425 kW for DG 1B, and> 2742 kW and < 2825 kW for DG 2C.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-9 Amendment No. 469 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.6----------------- NOTE---------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify automatic and manual transfer of unit power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit.4 SR 3.8.1.7----------------- NOTES---------------

1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, except for the swing DG.For the swing DG, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2 using the Unit 2 controls.

Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.2. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.24 menths 24 me44hs Verify each DG rejects a load greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load, and: a. Following load rejection, the frequency is< 65.5 Hz; and b. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the voltage is > 3740 V and S 4580 V.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-10 Amendment No. 1-74 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.8---------------- NOTES --------------

1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, except for the swing DG.For the swing DG, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2 using the Unit 2 controls.

Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.2. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition, the power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG operating at a power factor -0.88 does not trip and voltage is maintained

< 4800 V during and following a load rejection of > 2775 kW.24mOrnthr, (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-11 Amendment No. 4-7-4 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.9-------------- NOTES ---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal: a. De-energization of emergency buses;b. Load shedding from emergency buses;and c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and: 1. Energizes permanently connected loads in <- 12 seconds, 2. Energizes auto-connected shutdown loads through automatic load sequence timing devices, 3. Maintains steady state voltage> 3740 V and < 4243 V, 4. Maintains steady state frequency> 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz, and 5. Supplies permanently connected and auto-connected shutdown loads for > 5 minutes.24 menG~hs -;(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-12 Amendment No. 4-74 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) 'SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY.4.SR 3.8.1.10--------------- NOTES --------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify on an actual or simulated Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation signal each DG auto-starts from standby condition and: a. In < 12 seconds after auto-start achieves voltage > 3740 V, and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage> 3740 V and < 4243 V;b. In < 12 seconds after auto-start achieves frequency

> 58.8 Hz, and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains frequency > 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz;, and c. Operates for > 5 minutes.24-RMGRths,& -E ý(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-13 Amendment No. 1-74 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.11---------------- NOTE --------------------------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify each DG's automatic trips are bypassed on actual or simulated loss of voltage signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal except: a. Engine overspeed;

b. Generator differential current; and c. Low lube oil pressure.24 ME)Rthe (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-14 Amendment No. 4-74 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.12---------------- NOTES ---------------

1. Momentary transients outside the load and power factor ranges do not invalidate this test.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, unless the other two DGs are OPERABLE.

If either of the other two DGs becomes inoperable, this Surveillance shall be suspended. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.3. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition, the power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

4. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG operating at a power factor < 0.88 operates for > 24 hours: a. For > 2 hours loaded > 3000 kW; and b. For the remaining hours of the test loaded> 2775 kW and < 2825 kW.24 A-Aths (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-15 Amendment No. 1-74 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13--------------- NOTES ---------------

1. This Surveillance shall be performed within 5 minutes of shutting down the DG after the DG has operated > 2 hours loaded_> 2565 kW. Momentary transients outside of load range do not invalidate this test.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG starts and achieves, in<-12 seconds, voltage > 3740 V and frequency> 58.8 Hz; and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage > 3740 V and < 4243 V and frequency

> 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz.24 4-rnt1 24 m-f7hi SR 3.8.1.14------------- NOTE ---------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify each DG: a. Synchronizes with offsite power source while loaded with emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;b. Transfers loads to offsite power source;and c. Returns to ready-to-load operation.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-16 Amendment No. 4-74 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.15-NOTE ------------------------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify with a DG operating in test mode and connected to its bus, an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal overrides the test mode by: a. Returning DG to ready-to-load operation; and b. Automatically energizing the emergency load from offsite power.24 -months SR 3.8.1.16-------------- NOTE--------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify interval between each sequenced load block is within +/- 10% of design interval for each load sequence timing device.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-17 Amendment No. 4-74 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i SR 3.8.1.17------------- NOTES --------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify, on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal: a. De-energization of emergency buses;b. Load shedding from emergency buses;and c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and: 1. Energizes permanently connected loads in < 12 seconds, 2. Energizes auto-connected emergency loads through automatic load sequence timing devices, 3. Achieves steady state voltage> 3740 V and < 4243 V, 4. Achieves steady state frequency 58.8 Hz and <61.2 Hz, and 5. Supplies permanently connected and auto-connected emergency loads for > 5 minutes.24 meRths (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-18 Amendment No. 4-74 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.18----------------- NOTE All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.Verify, when started simultaneously from standby condition, the Unit 2 DGs achieve, in< 12 seconds, voltage > 3740 V and frequency> 58.8 Hz.10 yeaFs SR 3.8.1.19 For required Unit 1 AC Sources, the SRs of In accordance with Unit 1 Technical Specifications are applicable, applicable SRs except SR 3.8.1.6, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.17.HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-19 Amendment No. 4-9 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY-f SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil storage tank contains > 33,320 gallons of fuel.34- days 31 days -F. I SR 3.8.3.2 Verify each required DG lube oil inventory is> 400 gallons.SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil total particulate concentration of In accordance with Unit 2 and swing DG stored fuel oil are tested in the Diesel Fuel Oil accordance with, and maintained within the limits Testing Program of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each required DG air start receiver pressure is > 225 psig.+SR 3.8.3.5 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer subsystem operates to automatically transfer fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tank.31-days 31 day1 248moays daIys 24 MGRthr-SR 3.8.3.6 Check for and remove accumulated water from each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil storage tank.SR 3.8.3.7 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer subsystem operates to manually transfer fuel from the associated fuel oil storage tank to the day tank of each required DG.HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-25 Amendment No. 1-74 DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE ----------------------------------------------------- SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8 are applicable only to the Unit 2 DC sources. SR 3.8.4.9 is applicable only to the Unit 1 DC sources.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.1 Verify battery terminal voltage is > 125 V on float charge.+Verify no visible corrosion at battery terminals and SR 3.8.4.2 Verify no visible corrosion at battery terminals and connectors. OR Verify battery connection resistance is within limits.-4-SR 3.8.4.3 Verify battery cells, cell plates, and racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration. 7day's 92 days -isr1 24 mnpths -V~24 months+SR 3.8.4.4 Remove visible corrosion, and verify battery cell to cell and terminal connections are coated with anti-corrosion material.+SR 3.8.4.5 Verify battery connection resistance is within limits.SR 3.8.4.6 Verify each required battery charger supplies> 400 amps for station service subsystems, and> 100 amps for DG subsystems at > 129 V for> 1 hour.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-28 Amendment No. 1-74 DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY+SR 3.8.4.7----------------- NOTES--------------

1. The modified performance discharge test in SR 3.8.4.8 may be performed in lieu of the service test in SR 3.8.4.7.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except for the swing DG battery. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify battery capacity is adequate to supply, and maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a battery service test.24 Me94he -F (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-29 Amendment No. 1-74 DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.8------------------ NOTE-------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except for the swing DG battery.However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify battery capacity is > 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test or a modified performance discharge test.60 moRths 4I[ I AND 12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85% of expected life with capacity < 100% of manufacturer's rating AND 24 months when battery has reached 85% of expected life with capacity -> 100% of manufacturer's rating SR 3.8.4.9 For required Unit 1 DC sources, the SRs of Unit 1 In accordance with Specification 3.8.4 are applicable, applicable SRs HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-30 Amendment No. 1-69 Battery Cell Parameters

3.8.6 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion battery inoperable. Time of Condition A not met.OR One or more batteries with average electrolyte temperature of the representative cells not within limits.OR One or more batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within Category C limits.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.6.1 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.8.6-1 Category A limits.SR 3.8.6.2 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.8.6-1 Category B limits.92-edays AND Once within 24 hours after battery overcharge > 150V SR 3.8.6.3 Verify average electrolyte temperature of representative cells is > 65°F for each station service battery, and > 40'F for each DG battery.92 days HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-34 Amendment No. 4-69 Distribution Systems -Operating 3.8.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.7.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems. 7 days HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-38 Amendment No. 46-Distribution Systems -Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.AND A.2.4 Initiate actions to Immediately restore required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND A.2.5 Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems. 7-days HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-40 Amendment No. 4-69 Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY+SR 3.9.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each of the following required refueling equipment interlock inputs: a. All-rods-in, b. Refuel platform position, c. Refuel platform fuel grapple, fuel loaded, d. Refuel platform fuel grapple full-up position, e. Refuel platform frame-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, f. Refuel platform trolley-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, and g. Service platform hoist, fuel loaded.7dayLs HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-2 Amendment No. 1-97 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.2 Refuel

Position One-Rod-Out Interlock LCO 3.9.2 The refuel position one-rod-out interlock shall be OPERABLE.MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position and any control rod withdrawn. APPLICABILITY: ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Refuel position one-rod-out A.1 Suspend control rod Immediately interlock inoperable, withdrawal. AND A.2 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.2.1 Verify reactor mode switch locked in refuel position.SR 3.9.2.2--NOTE Not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn. 12 hou~s Fj, Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-3 Amendment No. 4-W Control Rod Position 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.3 Control

Rod Position LCO 3.9.3 APPLICABILITY: All control rods shall be fully inserted.When loading fuel assemblies into the core.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more control rods A.1 Suspend loading fuel Immediately not fully inserted, assemblies into the core.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY-J SR 3.9.3.1 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.42 how6*e E HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-4 Amendment No. 4-97 Control Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling 3.9.5 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.5 Control

Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling LCO 3.9.5 APPLICABILITY: Each withdrawn control rod shall be OPERABLE.MODE 5.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more withdrawn A.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately control rods inoperable, insert inoperable withdrawn control rods.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.5.1-------------- NOTE ----------------- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn. Insert each withdrawn control rod at least one notch.7 days 7 ays SR 3.9.5.2 Verify each withdrawn control rod scram accumulator pressure is > 940 psig.HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-7 Amendment No. 497 RPV Water Level 3.9.6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.6 Reactor

Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level LCO 3.9.6 APPLICABILITY: RPV water level shall be > 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV.During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV, During movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV, when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated within the RPV.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RPV water ievel not within A.1 Suspend movement of Immediately limit. fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.6.1 Verify RPV water level is > 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV.24 heu~ 4-&ýHATCH UNIT 2 3.9-8 Amendment No. 4-97 RHR -High Water Level 3.9.7 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND B.4 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.C. No RHR shutdown cooling C.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND Once per 12 hours thereafter AND C.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.7.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating. 42 hew~s, HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-10 Amendment No. 1-9W RHR -Low Water Level 3.9.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.C. No RHR shutdown cooling C.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND Once per 12 hours thereafter AND C.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating. 12 hnwrs HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-12 Amendment No. -97 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing 3.10.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3.1 Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the shutdown position.OR A.3.2 --------NOTE-----Only applicable in MODE 5.Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the refuel position.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.2.1 Verify all control rods are fully inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. 1~2 heum +ýnse 24 h-h~-r Fj;SR 3.10.2.2 Verify no CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress.HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-4 Amendment No. 435 Single Control Rod Withdrawal -Hot Shutdown 3.10.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.3.1 Perform the applicable SRs for the required LCOs. According to the applicable SRs SR 3.10.3.2----------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.3.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.3.d.1 requirements. Verify all control rods, other than the control rod being withdrawn, in a five by five array centered on the control rod being withdrawn, are disarmed.24 hGUF S4 f j t 24 heum'- Iset+SR 3.10.3.3 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod being withdrawn, are fully inserted.HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-7 Amendment No. 4-35 Single Control Rod Withdrawal -Cold Shutdown 3.10.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all control rods.OR B.2.2 Initiate action to satisfy Immediately the requirements of this LCO.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.4.1 Perform the applicable SRs for the required LCOs. According to the applicable SRs SR 3.10.4.2-------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.4.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.4.c.1 requirements. Verify all control rods, other than the control rod being withdrawn, in a five by five array centered on the control rod being withdrawn, are disarmed.SR 3.10.4.3 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod being withdrawn, are fully inserted.24 heu~s 24 heu~s SR 3.10.4.4-------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.4.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.4.b.1 requirements. Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted.HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-10 Amendment No. 435 Single CRD Removal -Refueling 3.10.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.5.1 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, are fully inserted.SR 3.10.5.2 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, in a five by five array centered on the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, are disarmed.24 heu~s *- Iset 24-heuFs 24 hous SR 3.10.5.3 Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted.SR 3.10.5.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1. According to SR 3.1.1.1 SR 3.10.5.5 Verify no CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress.24 heu~s HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-12 Amendment No. 4-35 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal -Refueling 3.10.6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. OR A.3.2 Initiate action to satisfy Immediately the requirements of this LCO.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.6.1 Verify the four fuel assemblies are removed from core cells associated with each control rod or CRD removed.SR 3.10.6.2 Verify all other control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.24 heuw 4f&~24 hewFs A 1 24 hew~s i SR 3.10.6.3------------- NOTE ---------------- Only required to be met during fuel loading.Verify fuel assemblies being loaded are in compliance with an approved spiral reload sequence.HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-14 Amendment No. 4-35 SDM Test -Refueling 3.10.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.8.3 -------------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.8.2 satisfied. Verify movement of control rods is in compliance During control rod with the approved control rod sequence for the movement SDM test by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.SR 3.10.8.4 Verify no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress.12 heuFs*--ýInsýertl ýSR 3.10.8.5 Verify each withdrawn control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position.Each time the control rod is withdrawn to full-out position AND Prior to satisfying LCO 3.10.8.c requirement after work on control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling.1.SR 3.10.8.6 Verify CRD charging water header pressure? 940 psig.7-days _E HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-19 Amendment No. 435 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued) The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.SInsert 3 HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-17 Amendment No. 1-44 Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 5 Clean Typed Pages for HNP Unit 1 Proposed TS Changes Definitions 1.1 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION

1.1 Definitions


NOTE.The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and Bases.Term Definition ACTIONS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)CHANNEL CALIBRATION CHANNEL CHECK ACTIONS shall be that part of a Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times.The APLHGR shall be applicable to a specific planar height and is equal to the sum of the LHGRs for all the fuel rods in the specified bundle at the specified height divided by the number of fuel rods in the fuel bundle at the height.A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds within the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter that the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel, including the required sensor, alarm, display, and trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Calibration of instrument channels with resistance temperature detector (RTD) or thermocouple sensors may consist of an inplace qualitative assessment of sensor behavior and normal calibration of the remaining adjustable devices in the channel. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is calibrated. A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 1.1-1 Amendment No. Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CORE ALTERATION A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY, including required alarm, interlock, display, and trip functions, and channel failure trips. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. The following exceptions are not considered to be CORE ALTERATIONS:

a. Movement of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement);

and b. Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.The COLR is the unit specific document that provides cycle specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle specific limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification

5.6.5. Plant

operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications. DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 shall be that concentration of 1-131 (microcuries/gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of 1-131, 1-132, 1-133, 1-134, and 1-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, AEC, 1962,"Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites";Table E-7 of Regulatory Guide 1.109, Rev. 1, NRC, 1977; or ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, pages 192-212, Table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity." CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 (continued) Amendment No.HATCH UNIT 1 1.1-2 Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) SDM shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)THERMAL POWER TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME SDM shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical assuming that: a. The reactor is xenon free;b. The moderator temperature is 68*F; and c. All control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. With control rods not capable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of these control rods must be accounted for in the determination of SDM.THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.The TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME consists of two components:

a. The time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until 80% of the turbine bypass capacity is established; and b. The time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until initial movement of the turbine bypass valve.The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.I HATCH UNIT 1 1.1 -5 Amendment No.

Control Rod OPERABILITY

3.1.3 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, or D not met.OR Nine or more control rods inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.3.1 Determine the position of each control rod. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.3.2 ---------------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM.Insert each fully withdrawn control rod at least one In accordance with notch. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.3.3 -------------------- NOTE -------------- Not required to be performed until 31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM.Insert each partially withdrawn control rod at least In accordance with one notch. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-7 Amendment No. Control Rod Scram Times 3.1.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE------------------------------- During single control rod scram time Surveillances, the control rod drive (CRD) pumps shall be isolated from the associated scram accumulator. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.4.1 Verify each control rod scram time is within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with reactor steam dome pressure >- 800 psig.Prior to exceeding 40% RTP after fuel movement within the reactor pressure vessel AND Prior to exceeding 40% RTP after each reactor shutdown> 120 days SR 3.1.4.2 Verify, for a representative sample, each tested In accordance with control rod scram time is within the limits of the Surveillance Table 3.1.4-1 with reactor steam dome pressure Frequency Control> 800 psig. Program SR 3.1.4.3 Verify each affected control rod scram time is Prior to declaring within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with any reactor control rod steam dome pressure. OPERABLE after work on control rod or CRD System that could affect scram time SR 3.1.4.4 Verify each affected control rod scram time is Prior to exceeding within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with reactor 40% RTP after steam dome pressure > 800 psig. work on control rod or CRD System that could affect scram time HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-10 Amendment No. Control Rod Scram Accumulators

3.1.5 SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.5.1 Verify each control rod scram accumulator In accordance with pressure is > 940 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-14 Amendment No. Rod Pattern Control 3.1.6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2 Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the shutdown position.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.6.1 Verify all OPERABLE control rods comply with In accordance with BPWS. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-16 Amendment No. SLC System 3.1.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.7.1 Verify available volume of sodium pentaborate In accordance with solution is within the Region A limits of the Surveillance Figure 3.1.7-1. Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.7.2 Verify temperature of sodium pentaborate solution In accordance with is within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.7.3 Verify temperature of pump suction piping is within In accordance with the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.7.4 Verify continuity of explosive charge. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-18 Amendment No. SLC System 3.1.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY-t SR 3.1.7.5 Verify the concentration of sodium pentaborate in solution is within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-1.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Once within 24 hours after water or sodium pentaborate is added to solution AND Once within 24 hours after solution temperature is restored within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2 SR 3.1.7.6 Verify each SLC subsystem manual and power In accordance with operated valve in the flow path that is not locked, the Surveillance sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the Frequency Control correct position, or can be aligned to the correct Program position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-19 Amendment No. SLC System 3.1.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.7.7 Verify each pump develops a flow rate >_ 41.2 gpm In accordance at a discharge pressure _ 1232 psig. with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.1.7.8 Verify flow through one SLC subsystem from pump In accordance with into reactor pressure vessel, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.7.9 Verify all heat traced piping between storage tank In accordance with and pump suction is unblocked, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Once within 24 hours after pump suction piping temperature is restored within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2 SR 3.1.7.10 Verify sodium pentaborate enrichment is Prior to addition to> 60.0 atom percent B-10. SLC tank HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-20 Amendment No. SLC System 3.1.7 SPB Solution Volume vs. Concentration Requirements 13 12 1I 0 0.5 Q-(u U 10 9 8 7 6 5 1 20 14 100 10 2 2 20 2 0L I0r 3I0 40 4 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800 3000 3200 3400 3600 3800 4000 4200 4400 4600 4800 Gross Volume of Solution Tank (gal)Figure 3.1.7-1 (page 1 of 1)Sodium Pentaborate Solution Volume Versus Concentration Requirements HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-21 Amendment No. SLC System 3.1.7 120 110 (5%, 120 0 F)Q% .I :::;;': 7.0% -100!5.0% -N go i CL E.so 70 1 601 50 -40 I k (7.0%, 40 F)1n j0 5 10 15 20 Concentration (Weight Percent Sodium Pentaborate in Solution)1 25 Figure 3.1.7-2 (page 1 of 1)Sodium Pentaborate Solution Temperature Versus Concentration Requirements HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-22 Amendment No. I SDV Vent and Drain Valves 3.1.8 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves LCO 3.1.8 APPLICABILITY: Each SDV vent and drain valve shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONS---------------------------- NOTES -----------------------------

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SDV vent and drain line.2. An isolated line may be unisolated under administrative control to allow draining and venting of the SDV.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more SDV vent A.1 Isolate the associated 7 days or drain lines with one line.valve inoperable.

B. One or more SDV vent B.1 Isolate the associated 8 hours or drain lines with both line.valves inoperable. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met.HATCH UNIT 11 3.1-23 Amendment No. I SDV Vent and Drain Valves 3.1.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.8.1 -------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be met on vent and drain valves closed during performance of SR 3.1.8.2.Verify each SDV vent and drain valve is open. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.8.2 Cycle each SDV vent and drain valve to the fully In accordance with closed and fully open position. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.8.3 Verify each SDV vent and drain valve: In accordance with the Surveillance

a. Closes in < 45 seconds after receipt of an Frequency Control actual or simulated scram signal; and Program b. Opens when the actual or simulated scram signal is reset.HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-24 Amendment No.

APLHGR 3.2.1 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)LCO 3.2.1 APPLICABILITY: All APLHGRs shall be less than or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.THERMAL POWER a 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any APLHGR not within A.1 Restore APLHGR(s) to 2 hours limits. within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.1.1 Verify all APLHGRs are less than or equal to the Once within limits specified in the COLR. 12 hours after 24% RTP AND In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.2-1 Amendment No. MCPR 3.2.2 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)LCO 3.2.2 APPLICABILITY: All MCPRs shall be greater than or equal to the MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR.THERMAL POWER ? 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any MCPR not within limits. A.1 Restore MCPR(s) to 2 hours within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.2.1 Verify all MCPRs are greater than or equal to the Once within limits specified in the COLR. 12 hours after 24% RTP AND In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.2-2 Amendment No. LHGR 3.2.3 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)*LCO 3.2.3 APPLICABILITY: All LHGRs shall be less than or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any LHGR not within limits. A.1 Restore LHGR(s) to 2 hours within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.3.1 Verify all LHGRs are less than or equal to the Once within limits specified in the COLR. 12 hours after>24% RTP AND In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program*This Specification is effective starting from Hatch 1/Cycle 22.HATCH UNIT 1 3.2-4 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. As required by Required 1.1 Initiate alternate method 12 hours Action D.1 and referenced to detect and suppress in Table 3.3.1.1-1. thermal-hydraulic instability oscillations. AND 1.2 Restore required 120 days channels to OPERABLE.J. Required Action and J.1 Be in MODE 2. 4 hours associated Completion Time of Condition I not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-3 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.2


NOTE-------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.Verify the absolute difference between the In accordance with average power range monitor (APRM) channels the Surveillance and the calculated power is < 2% RTP while Frequency Control operating at a 24% RTP. Program SR 3.3.1.1.3 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.4


NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance'with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.6 Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and Prior to intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels withdrawing SRMs overlap. from the fully inserted position (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-4 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.7 -- ----------------- NOTE -------------- Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.8 Calibrate the local power range monitors. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.10


NOTE----------------- For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.11 Verify Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and In accordance with Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil the Surveillance Pressure -Low Functions are not bypassed Frequency Control when THERMAL POWER is > 27.6% RTP. Program SR 3.3.1.1.12 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-5 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.13


NOTES--------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.2. For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.14 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In'accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.16


NOTE-------------- Neutron detectors are excluded.Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.17 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM In accordance with Simulated Thermal Power is a 25% and the Surveillance recirculation drive flow is < 60% of rated Frequency Control recirculation drive flow. Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-6 Amendment No. SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One or more required E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately SRMs inoperable in ALTERATIONS except MODE 5. for control rod insertion. AND E.2 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES -----------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each applicable MODE or other specified conditions.
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required channel(s) is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT I 3.3-11 Amendment No. SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.2----------------- NOTES --------------

1. Only required to be met during CORE ALTERATIONS.
2. One SRM may be used to satisfy more than one of the following.

Verify an OPERABLE SRM detector is located in: a. The fueled region;b. The core quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, when the associated SRM is included in the fueled region; and c. A core quadrant adjacent to where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, when the associated SRM is included in the fueled region.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-12 Amendment No. SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.4----------------- NOTES--------------

1. Not required to be met with less than or equal to four fuel assemblies adjacent to the SRM and no other fuel assemblies in the associated core quadrant.2. Not required to be met during spiral unloading.

Verify count rate is > 3.0 cps with a signal to noise ratio > 2:1.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.2.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and In accordance with determination of signal to noise ratio. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.2.6


NOTE ---------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after IRMs on Range 2 or below.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and In accordance with determination of signal to noise ratio, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.2.7


NOTES -------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.2. Not required to be performed until 12 hours after IRMs on Range 2 or below.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-13 Amendment No. Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.2.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.2. When an RBM channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program S R 3.3.2.1.2


NOTE------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn at < 10% RTP in MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.1.3 -- ---------------------------- NOTE ----------------------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP in MODE 1.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-17 Amendment No. Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.4------------------- NOTE --------------------------- Neutron detectors are excluded.Verify the RBM: a. Low Power Range -Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is>_ 29% and < 64% RTP.b. Intermediate Power Range -Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 64% and < 84% RTP.c. High Power Range -Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is> 84% RTP.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.1.5 Verify the RWM is not bypassed when THERMAL In accordance with POWER is < 10% RTP. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.1.6


NOTE ---------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.1.7


NOTE--------------- Neutron detectors are excluded.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-18 Amendment No. Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.8 Verify control rod sequences input to the RWM are Prior to declaring in conformance with BPWS. RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-19 Amendment No. I Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2.1-1 (page 1 of 1)Control Rod Block Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Rod Block Monitor a. Low Power Range -Upscale (a) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 < 115.5/125 SR 3.3.2.1.4 divisions of full SR 3.3.2.1.7 scale b. Intermediate Power Range -Upscale (b) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 5 109.7/125 SR 3.3.2.1.4 divisions of full SR 3.3.2.1.7 scale c. High Power Range -Upscale (c) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 ! 105.9/125 SR 3.3.2.1.4 divisions of full SR 3.3.2.1.7 scale d. Inop (d) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 NA e. Downscale (d) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 a 93/125 SR 3.3.2.1.7 divisions of full scale 2. Rod Worth Minimizer l(e), 2(e) 1 SR 3.3.2.1.2 NA SR 3.3.2.1.3 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.8 3. Reactor Mode Switch -Shutdown Position (f) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.6 NA a) THERMAL POWER a 29% and < 64% RTP.(b) THERMAL POWER _ 64% and < 84% RTP.(c) THERMAL POWER a 84%.(d) THERMAL POWER -> 29%, (e) With THERMAL POWER < 10% RTP, except during the reactor shutdown process if the coupling of each withdrawn control rod has been confirmed.(f) Reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-20 Amendment No. I Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation 3.3.2.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2.2 APPLICABILITY: Three channels of feedwater and main turbine trip instrumentation shall be OPERABLE.THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.ACTIONS-NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One feedwater and main A.1 Place channel in trip. 7 days turbine high water level trip channel inoperable. B. Two or more feedwater and B.1 Restore feedwater and 2 hours main turbine high water main turbine high water level trip channels level trip capability. inoperable. C. Required Action and C.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-21 Amendment No. I Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation 3.3.2.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE ------------------------------ When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided feedwater and main turbine high water level trip capability is maintained. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The In accordance with Allowable Value shall be < 56.5 inches. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST In accordance with including valve actuation. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-22 Amendment No. PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.3.1 APPLICABILITY: The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONS------------------ NOTE ------Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Restore required 30 days one required channel channel to OPERABLE inoperable, status.B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action in Immediately associated Completion accordance with Time of Condition A not Specification 5.6.6.met.C. One or more Functions with C.1 Restore all but one 7 days two or more required required channel to channels inoperable. OPERABLE status.D. Required Action and D.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition C not Table 3.3.3.1-1 for the met. channel.E. As required by Required E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.3.1-1.(continued) HATCH UNIT I 3.3-23 Amendment No. I PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. As required by Required F.1 Initiate action in Immediately Action D.1 and referenced accordance with in Table 3.3.3.1-1. Specification 5.6.6.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. These SRs apply to each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1.
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required channel(s) in the associated Function is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.3.1.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-24 Amendment No. PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 Table 3.3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 1)Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation CONDITIONS REFERENCED REQUIRED FROM REQUIRED FUNCTION CHANNELS ACTION D.1 1. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure 2. Reactor Vessel Water Level a. -317 inches to -17 inches b. -150 inches to +60 inches c. 0 inches to +60 inches d. 0 inches to +400 inches 3. Suppression Pool Water Level a. 0 inches to 300 inches b. 133 inches to 163 inches 4. Drywell Pressure a. -10 psig to +90 psig b. -5 psig to +5 psig c. 0 psig to +250 psig 5. Drywell Area Radiation (High Range)6. Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position 7. (Deleted)8. (Deleted)9. Suppression Pool Water Temperature

10. Drywell Temperature in Vicinity of Reactor Level Instrument Reference Leg 11. Diesel Generator (DG) Parameters
a. Output Voltage b. Output Current c. Output Power d. Battery Voltage 12. RHR Service Water Flow 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 per penetration flow path (a)(b)2(c)6 1 per DG 1 per DG 1 per DG 1 per DG 2 E E E E NA E E E E E F E E E NA NA NA NA E (a) Not required for isolation valves whose associated penetration flow path is isolated by at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.(b) Only one position indication channel is required for penetration flow paths with only one installed control room indication channel.(c) Monitoring each of four quadrants.

HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-25 Amendment No. I Remote Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System LCO 3.3.3.2 APPLICABILITY: The Remote Shutdown System Functions shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONS I.[ Iir----------------------------------- PJLI" r -------------------------------------------------------------- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required 30 days Functions inoperable. Function to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-26 Amendment No. I Remote Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE------------------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required In accordance with instrumentation channel that is normally the Surveillance energized. Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.3.2.2 Verify each required control circuit and transfer In accordance with switch is capable of performing the intended the Surveillance function. Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.3.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each In accordance with required instrumentation channel. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-27 Amendment No. EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4.1 a. Two channels per trip system for each EOC-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE: 1. Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) -Closure; and 2. Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low.OR b. LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR are made applicable. APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER > 27.6% RTP.ACTIONS-NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 72 hours inoperable. OPERABLE status.OR A.2 --------NOTE ------------ Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.Place channel in trip. 72 hours (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-28 Amendment No. I EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more Functions with B.1 Restore EOC-RPT trip 2 hours EOC-RPT trip capability not capability. maintained. OR AND B.2 Apply the MCPR limit 2 hours MCPR limit for inoperable for inoperable EOC-RPT not made EOC-RPT as specified applicable, in the COLR.C. Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated 4 hours associated Completion recirculation pump from Time not met. service.OR C.2 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours POWER to < 27.6%RTP.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE------------------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.2 Verify TSV -Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip In accordance with Oil Pressure -Low Functions are not bypassed the Surveillance when THERMAL POWER is > 27.6% RTP. Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-29 Amendment No. EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The In accordance with Allowable Values shall be: the Surveillance Frequency Control TSV -Closure: < 10% closed; and Program TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low: 2:.600 psig.SR 3.3.4.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST In accordance with including breaker actuation. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.5


NOTE--------------- Breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.6. Verify the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME In accordance with is within limits. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-30 Amendment No. ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4.2 Two channels per trip system for each ATWS-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE: a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -ATWS-RPT Level; and b. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High.APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.ACTIONS----------------------- II I r ------------------------------------------------------------- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 14 days inoperable. OPERABLE status.OR A.2 --------NOTE------ Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.Place channel in trip. 14 days B. One Function with B.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip 72 hours ATWS-RPT trip capability capability. not maintained.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-31 Amendment No. I ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Both Functions with C.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip 1 hour ATWS-RPT trip capability capability for one not maintained. Function.D. Required Action and D.1 Remove the associated 6 hours associated Completion recirculation pump from Time not met. service.OR D.2 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE ------------------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-32 Amendment No. ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The In accordance with Allowable Values shall be: the Surveillance Frequency Control a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Program ATWS-RPT Level: > -73 inches; and b. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High: < 1175 psig.SR 3.3.4.2.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST In accordance with including breaker actuation. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-33 Amendment No. ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.1 APPLICABILITY: The ECCS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.According to Table 3.3.5.1-1. ACTIONS Separate Condition entry is allowed-NOTE----- for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable, referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 for the channel.B. As required by Required B.1 --------- NOTES------ Action A.1 and referenced

1. Only applicable in in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

MODES 1, 2, and 3.2. Only applicable for Functions 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, and 2.b.Declare supported 1 hour from discovery feature(s) inoperable, of loss of initiation capability for feature(s) in both divisions AND (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-34 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2 ------- NOTE ------Only applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b.Declare High Pressure 1 hour from discovery Coolant Injection of loss of HPCI (HPCI) System initiation capability inoperable. AND B.3 Place channel in trip. 24 hours C. As required by Required C.-1 ----------- NOTES ---------- Action A.1 and referenced

1. Only applicable in in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

MODES 1, 2, and 3.2. Only applicable for Functions 1.c, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f.Declare supported 1 hour from discovery feature(s) inoperable, of loss of initiation capability for feature(s) in both divisions AND C.2 Restore channel to 24 hours OPERABLE status.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-35 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 ---------NOTE-----Action A. 1 and referenced Only applicable if HPCI in Table 3.3.5.1-1. pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool.Declare HPCI System 1 hour from discovery inoperable, of loss of HPCI initiation capability AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip. 24 hours OR D.2.2 Align the HPCI pump 24 hours suction to the suppression pool.E. As required by Required E.-1 -------NOTES ---------- Action A.1 and referenced

1. Only applicable in in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

MODES 1, 2, and 3.2. Only applicable for Functions 1 .d and 2.g.Declare supported 1 hour from discovery feature(s) inoperable, of loss of initiation capability for subsystems in both divisions AND E.2 Restore channel to 7 days OPERABLE status.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-36 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. As required by Required F.1 Declare Automatic 1 hour from discovery Action A.1 and referenced Depressurization of loss of ADS in Table 3.3.5.1-1. System (ADS) valves initiation capability in inoperable, both trip systems AND F.2 Place channel in trip. 96 hours from discovery of inoperable channel concurrent with HPCI or reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) inoperable AND 8 days G. As required by Required G.1 Declare ADS valves 1 hour from discovery Action A.1 and referenced inoperable, of loss of ADS in Table 3.3.5.1-1. initiation capability in both trip systems AND G.2 Restore channel to 96 hours from OPERABLE status. discovery of inoperable channel concurrent with HPCI or RCIC inoperable AND 8 days H. Required Action and H.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion supported feature(s) Time of Condition B, C, D, inoperable. E, F, or G not met.HATCH UNIT 1 3,3-37 Amendment No. I Q ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Functions 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.3 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance

  • Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT I 3.3-38 Amendment No. ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 1 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Core Spray System a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low, Level 1 b. Drywell Pressure -High c. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -Low (Injection Permissive) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)1,2,3 1,2,3 4(a), 5(a)4 (b)4(b)4 B B C SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5_ -113 inches< 1.92 psig> 390 psig and< 476 psig a 390 psig and_< 476 psig>610 gpm and< 825 gpm 4 B d. Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow -Low (Bypass)2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low, Level 1 b. Drywell Pressure -High 1,2,3, 1 per 4(a), 5(a) subsystem E 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)1,2,3 4(b)4(b)B B SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5> -113 inches_< 1.92 psig (continued)(a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.(b) Also required to initiate the associated diesel generator (DG) and isolate the associated plant service water (PSW)turbine building (T/B) isolation valves.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-39 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 2. LPCI System (continued)

c. Reactor Steam Dome 1,2,3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 2 390 psig Pressure -Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 and (Injection Permissive)

SR 3.3.5.1.4 ,5 476 psig SR 3.3.5.1.5 4(a), 5(a) 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 390 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.4 5 476 psig SR 3.3.5.1.5 d. Reactor Steam Dome 1(c), 2(c), 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 >- 335 psig Pressure -Low 3(c) SR 3.3.5.1.2 (Recirculation SR 3.3.5.1.4 Discharge Valve SR 3.3.5.1.5 Permissive)

e. Reactor Vessel Shroud 1, 2, 3 2 B SR 3.3.5.1.1

->-202 inches Level -Level 0 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 f. Low Pressure Coolant 1,2, 3, 1 per C SR 3.3.5.1.4 Injection Pump Start -4(a), 5(a) pump SR 3.3.5.1.5 Time Delay Relay Pumps A, B, D 9 seconds and s 15 seconds Pump C 5 1 second g. Low Pressure Coolant 1, 2, 3, 1 per E SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 1670 gpm Injection Pump 4(a), 5(a) subsystem SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Discharge Flow -SR 3.3.5.1.4 !5 2205 gpm Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)(a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.(c) With associated recirculation pump discharge valve open.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-40 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System a. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 > -47 inches Level -Low Low, 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b. Drywell Pressure -High 1, 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 1.92 psig 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 c. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 _< 56.5 inches Level -High, Level 8 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 d. Condensate Storage 1, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.3 _2.58 ft Tank Level -Low 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.5 e. Suppression Pool 1, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 < 154 inches Water Level -High 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 f. High Pressure Coolant 1, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 >605 gpm Injection Pump 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Discharge Flow -Low SR 3.3.5.1.4 _< 865 gpm (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)(d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-41 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 4 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low, Level 1 b. Drywell Pressure -High c. Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer d. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 (Confirmatory)

e. Core Spray Pump Discharge Pressure -High f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure -High g. Automatic Depressurization System Low Water Level Actuation Timer 1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)2 F 2 F 1 G F SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5_-113 inches_< 1.92 psig 2 G< 114 seconds_ 0 inches 2! 137 psig and 5 180 psig> 112 psig and< 180 psig 4 G 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.4

< 12 minutes SR 3.3.5.1.5 18 seconds (continued)(d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-42 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 5 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 5. ADS Trip System B a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low, Level 1 b. Drywell Pressure -High c. Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer d. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 (Confirmatory)

e. Core Spray Pump Discharge Pressure -High f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure -High g. Automatic Depressurization System Low Water Level Actuation Timer 1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)1, 2(d), 3(d)2 2 F 1 1 F G F SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5> -113 inches_< 1.92 psig< 114 seconds> 0 inches> 137 psig and! 180 psig>112 psig and< 180 psig 2 4 2 G G G SR 3.3.5.1.4

__ 12 minutes SR 3.3.5.1.5 18 seconds (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.HATCH UNIT I 3.3-43 Amendment No. I RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.2 APPLICABILITY: The RCIC System instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.ACTIONS------------------- NOT Separate Condition entry is allowed for each chat I ------------------------------------------------------------- CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable, referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for the channel.B. As required by Required B.1 Declare RCIC System 1 hour from discovery Action A.1 and referenced inoperable, of loss of RCIC in Table 3.3.5.2-1. initiation capability AND B.2 Place channel in trip. 24 hours C. As required by Required C.1 Restore channel to 24 hours Action A.1 and referenced OPERABLE status.in Table 3.3.5.2-1.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-44 Amendment No. I RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1- -------- NOTE ------------- Action A.1 and referenced Only applicable if RCIC in Table 3.3.5.2-1. pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool.Declare RCIC System 1 hour from discovery inoperable, of loss of RCIC initiation capability AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip. 24 hours OR D.2.2 Align RCIC pump 24 hours suction to the suppression pool.E. Required Action and E.1 Declare RCIC System Immediately associated Completion inoperable. Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-45 Amendment No. I RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I. f, I 1- it"-'------------------------------------ JY~!-----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Function 2; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1, 3, and 4 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.3 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-46 Amendment No. RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 1 of 1)Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation CONDITIONS REQUIRED REFERENCED CHANNELS FROM PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE Reactor Vessel Water Level -4 B SR 3.3.5.2.1 a- -47 inches Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.4 SR 3.3.5.2.5 2. Reactor Vessel Water Level -2 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 5 56.5 inches High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.4 SR 3.3.5.2.5 3. Condensate Storage Tank 2 D SR 3.3.5.2.3 2! 0.87 ft Level -Low SR 3.3.5.2.5 4. Suppression Pool Water 2 D SR 3.3.5.2.3 < 151 inches Level -High SR 3.3.5.2.5 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-47 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 APPLICABILITY: The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.According to Table 3.3.6.1-1. ACTIONS-------------------- NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours for channels inoperable. Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 6.b AND 24 hours for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 6.b B. ---------- NOTE ---------B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour Not applicable for capability. Function 5.c.One or more automatic Functions with isolation capability not maintained. C. Required Action and C.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition A or B Table 3.3.6.1-1 for the not met. channel.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-48 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 Isolate associated main 12 hours Action C.1 and referenced steam line (MSL).in Table 3.3.6.1-1. OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours E. As required by Required E.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. F. As required by Required F.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour Action C.1 and referenced penetration flow in Table 3.3.6.1-1. path(s).G. As required by Required G.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. AND OR G.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F not met.H. As required by Required H.1 Declare Standby Liquid 1 hour Action C.1 and referenced Control (SLC) System in Table 3.3.6.1-1. inoperable. OR H.2 Isolate the Reactor 1 hour Water Cleanup (RWCU) System.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-49 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. As required by Required 1.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately Action C.1 and referenced channel to OPERABLE in Table 3.3.6.1-1. status.OR 1.2 Initiate action to isolate Immediately the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Shutdown Cooling System.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-50 Amendment No. Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-51 Amendment No. Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 1 of 4)Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Main Steam Line Isolation a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -1,2,3 2 0 SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 -113 inches Low Low Low, Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 b. Main Steam Line Pressure -1 2 E SR 3.3.6.1.3 ->825 psig Low SR 3.3.6.1.6 c. Main Steam Line 1,2,3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 !5 138% rated Flow -High MSL SR 3.3.6.1.2 steam flow SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 d. Condenser Vacuum -Low 1, 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.3 > 7 inches Hg 2(a), 3(a) SR 3.3.6.1.6 vacuum e. Main Steam Tunnel 1,2,3 6 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1941F Temperature -High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 f. Turbine Building Area 1,2,3 16(b) D SR 3.3.6.1.2 s 2001F Temperature -High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 2. Primary Containment Isolation a. Reactor Vessel Water Level 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 0 inches-Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 b. Drywell Pressure -High 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 1.92 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 (continued)(a) With any turbine stop valve not closed.(b) With 8 channels per trip string. Each trip string shall have 2 channels per main steam line, with no more than 40 ft separating any two OPERABLE channels.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-52 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 2 of 4)Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 2. Primary Containment Isolation (continued)

c. Drywell Radiation

-High d. Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation -High e. Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation -High 3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Isolation a. HPCI Steam Line Flow -High b. HPCI Steam Supply Line Pressure -Low c. HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure -High d. Drywell Pressure -High e. HPCl Pipe Penetration Roon Temperature -High f. Suppression Pool Area Ambient Temperature -High 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1 2 2 F G G SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 5 138 R/hr S 80 mR/hr S 80 mR/hr 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1.2.3 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 5 303% rated steam flow 100 psig 5 20 psig:s 1.92 psig s 1691F 5 1691F (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-53 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 3 of 4)Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 3. HPCI System Isolation (continued)

g. Suppression Pool Area Temperature

-Time Delay Relays h. Suppression Pool Area Differential Temperature -High i. Emergency Area Cooler Temperature -High 4. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation a. RCIC Steam Line Flow -High b. RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure -Low c. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure -High d. Drywell Pressure -High e. RCIC Suppression Pool Ambient Area Temperature -High f. Suppression Pool Area Temperature -Time Delay Relays 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 F F F SR 3.3.6.1.4 < 16 minutes SR 3.3.6.1.6 15 seconds SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6,1.6 5 42*F-5 169*F 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3,6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 5 306% rated steam flow? 60 psig 5 20 psig:5 1.92 psig S 169°F SR 313.6.1.4 S; 31 minutes SR 3.3.6.1.6 15 seconds (continued) HATCH UNIT 1.3.3-54 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 4)Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION CA1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 4. RCIC System Isolation (continued)

g. RCIC Suppression Pool Area Differential Temperature

-High h. Emergency Area Cooler Temperature -High 5. RWCU System Isolation a. Area Temperature -High b. Area Ventilation Differential Temperature -High c. SLC System Initiation

d. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low, Level 2 6. RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High b. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1 F 1 1,2,3 1 per area 1,2,3 1 per area F F H F SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3,3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 s 1501F<671F NA? -47 inches 542'F s 169*F 1,2 1,2,3 1(c)2 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1,5 SR 3.3.6.1,6 5 145 psig-0 inches 3,4,5 2 (d)(c) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one of the two trip systems.(d) Only one trip system required in MODES 4 and 5 when RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained.

HATCH UNIT I 3.3-55 Amendment No. I Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.2 APPLICABILITY: The secondary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.According to Table 3.3.6.2-1. ACTIONS------------------------- NOTE----.Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours for inoperable. Function 2 AND 24 hours for Functions other than Function 2 B. One or more automatic B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour Functions with isolation capability. capability not maintained. C. Required Action and C.1.1 Isolate the associated 1 hour associated Completion penetration flow Time of Condition A or B path(s).not met.OR C.1.2 Declare associated 1 hour secondary containment isolation valves inoperable. AND (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-56 Amendment No. I Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1 Place the associated 1 hour standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) in operation. OR C.2.2 Declare associated 1 hour SGT subsystem(s) inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Secondary Containment Isolation Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT I 3.3-57 Amendment No. Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-58 Amendment No. Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Table 3.3.6.2-1 (page 1 of 1)Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED OTHER CHANNELS SPECIFIED PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS TRIP SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level 1 2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 ->-47 inches Low -Low, Level 2 (a) SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 2. Drywell Pressure -High 1,2, 3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 5 1.92 psig SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 3. Reactor Building Exhaust 1,2, 3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 s 80 mR/hr Radiation -High (a) SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 4. Refueling Floor Exhaust 1,2, 3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 S 80 mR/hr Radiation -High 5(a),(b) SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 (a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.(b) During CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment. HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-59 Amendment No. I LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.3 Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.3 APPLICABILITY: The LLS valve instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One LLS valve with A.1 Restore LLS valve 24 hours initiation capability not initiation capability. maintained. B. One or more safety/relief B. 1 Restore tailpipe Prior to entering valves (S/RVs) with one pressure switches to MODE 2 or 3 from Function 3 channel OPERABLE status. MODE 4 inoperable. C. ---------NOTE ---------C.1 Restore one tailpipe 14 days Separate Condition entry is pressure switch to allowed for each S/RV. OPERABLE status.One or more S/RVs with two Function 3 channels inoperable.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-60 Amendment No. I LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued) .CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Declare the associated Immediately associated Completion LLS valve(s)Time of Condition A, B, inoperable. or C not met.OR Two or more LLS valves with initiation capability not maintained. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.3-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided LLS initiation capability is maintained.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.3.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for In accordance with portion of the channel outside primary the Surveillance containment. Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-61 Amendment No. LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.3------------------ NOTE--------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 during each scheduled outage > 72 hours when entry is made into primary containment. Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for portions of the channel inside primary containment. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.3.4 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.3.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.3.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-62 Amendment No. LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 Table 3.3.6.3-1 (page 1 of 1)Low-Low Set Instrumentation REQUIRED CHANNELS PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High 1 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3.1 S 1085 psig SR 3.3.6.3.4 SR 3.3.6.3.5 SR 3.3.6.3.6 2. Low-Low Set Pressure Setpoints 2 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3,1 Low: SR 3.3.6.3.4 Open s 1005 psig SR 3.3.6.3,5 Close S 857 psig SR 3.3.6.3.6 Medium-Low: Open S 1020 psig Close s 872 psig Medium-High: Open s 1035 psig Close 5 887 psig High: Open 5 1045 psig Close < 897 psig 3. Tailpipe Pressure Switch 2 per S/RV SR 3.3.6.3.2 -> 80 psig and SR 3.3.6.3.3 5 100 psig SR 3.3.6.3.5 SR 3.3.6.3.6 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-63 Amendment No. I MCREC System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7.1 APPLICABILITY: Two channels of the Control Room Air Inlet Radiation -High Function shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).ACTIONS--------------- I'j r -------------------------------------------------------------- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or both channels A.1 Declare associated 1 hour from discovery inoperable. MCREC subsystem(s) of loss of MCREC inoperable, initiation capability in both trip systems AND A.2 Place channel in trip. 6 hours B. Required Action and B.1 Place the associated 1 hour associated Completion MCREC subsystem(s) Time not met. in the pressurization mode of operation. OR B.2 Declare associated 1 hour MCREC subsystem(s) inoperable. HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-64 Amendment No. I MCREC System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


ItJkI S.-------------------------------------------------------------- When a Control Room Air Inlet Radiation -High channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other channel is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.7.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.7.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The In accordance with Allowable Value shall be < 1 mr/hour. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.7.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-65 Amendment No. LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8.1 APPLICABILITY: The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3, When the associated diesel generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources -Shutdown." ACTIONS-------------------- NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 1 hour inoperable for Functions 1 OPERABLE status.and 2.B. One or more channels B. 1 Verify voltage on Once per hour inoperable for Function 3. associated 4.16 kV bus is > 3825 V.C. Required Action and C.1 Declare associated DG Immediately associated Completion inoperable. Time not met.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-66 Amendment No. I LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.8.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each LOP Function.2. When a 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains initiation capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3).SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-67 Amendment No. LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 Table 3.3.8.1-1 (page 1 of 1)Loss of Power Instrumentation REQUIRED CHANNELS PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS VALUE 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)a. Bus Undervoltage 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 a 2800 V SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1,4 b. Time Delay 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 < 6.5 seconds SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 2. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)a. Bus Undervoltage 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 ->3280 V SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 b. Time Delay 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 5 21.5 seconds SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 3. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Annunciation)

a. Bus Undervoltage 2 SR 3.3,8.1.1

- 3825 V SR 3.3,8.1.2 SR 3.3,8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 b. Time Delay 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 65 seconds SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-68 Amendment No. I RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring LCO 3.3.8.2 APPLICABILITY: Two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies shall be OPERABLE for each inservice RPS motor generator set or alternate power supply.MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODES 4 and 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies or with both residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling (SDC) isolation valves open.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or both inservice A.1 Remove associated 72 hours power supplies with one inservice power electric power monitoring supply(s) from service.assembly inoperable. B. One or both inservice B.1 Remove associated 1 hour power supplies with both inservice power electric power monitoring supply(s) from service.assemblies inoperable. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1,2, or 3.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours (continued) HATCH UNIT .1 3.3-69 Amendment No. I RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately associated Completion insert all insertable Time of Condition A or B control rods in core not met in MODE 4 or 5 cells containing one or with any control rod more fuel assemblies. withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel AND assemblies or with both RHR SDC isolation valves D.2.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately open. one electric power monitoring assembly to OPERABLE status for inservice power supply(s) supplying required instrumentation. OR D.2.2 Initiate action to isolate Immediately the RHR SDC.HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-70 Amendment No. I RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE -------------------------------------- When an RPS electric power monitoring assembly is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other RPS electric power monitoring assembly for the associated power supply maintains trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.2.1------------------ NOTE ---------------------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, when in MODE 4 for>- 24 hours.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be: a. Overvoltage 5 132 V, with time delay set to 5 4 seconds.b. Undervoltage a 108 V, with time delay set to 5 4 seconds.c. Underfrequency >- 57 Hz, with time delay set to 5 4 seconds.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.2.3 Perform a system functional test. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-71 Amendment No. Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.1 Satisfy the 24 hours LCO not met. requirements of the LCO.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.OR No recirculation loops in operation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.11 ---------------------- NOTE-------------- Not required to be performed until 24 hours after both recirculation loops are in operation. Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch In accordance with with both recirculation loops in operation is: the Surveillance Frequency Control a. :5 10% of rated core flow when operating at Program< 70% of rated core flow; and b. 5 5% of rated core flow when operating at> 70% of rated core flow.SR 3.4.1.2 (Not used.)HATCH UNIT I 3.4-2 Amendment No. Jet Pumps 3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.2.1------------------- NOTES---------------

1. Not required to be performed until 4 hours after associated recirculation loop is in operation.
2. Not required to be performed until 24 hours after > 25% RTP.Verify at least one of the following criteria (a, b, or c) is satisfied for each operating recirculation loop: a. Recirculation pump flow to speed ratio differs by < 5% from established patterns, and jet pump loop flow to recirculation pump speed ratio differs by < 5% from established patterns.b. Each jet pump diffuser to lower plenum differential pressure differs by S 20% from established patterns.c. Each jet pump flow differs by < 10% from established patterns.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-5 Amendment No.

RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.4.1 Verify RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE and In accordance with unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-9 Amendment No. RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

3.4.5 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours D. All required leakage D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately detection systems inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


IJI I .-------------------------------------------------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required leakage detection instrumentation is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of required primary In accordance with containment atmospheric monitoring system. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.4.5.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of In accordance with required leakage detection instrumentation, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.4.5.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required In accordance with leakage detection instrumentation, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-11 Amendment No. RCS Specific Activity 3.4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.6.1 --------------------- NOTE --------------- Only required to be performed in MODE 1.Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 In accordance with specific activity is < 0.2 jICi/gm. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-13 Amendment No. RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Hot Shutdown 3.4.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY t SR 3.4.7.1------------------ NOTE-------------- Not required to be met until 2 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR low pressure permissive pressure.Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is operating. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-16 Amendment No. RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Cold Shutdown 3.4.8 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. No RHR shutdown cooling B.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND AND No recirculation pump in operation. Once per 12 hours thereafter AND B.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or In accordance with recirculation pump is operating. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-18 Amendment No. RCS P/T Limits 3.4.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i SR 3.4.9.1 Verify: a. RCS pressure and RCS temperature are within the limits specified in Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2 during RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and during RCS non-nuclear heatup and cooldown operations; and b. RCS heatup and cooldown rates are< 100°F in any 1 hour period during RCS heatup and cooldown operations, and RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.4.9.2------------------ NOTE--------------- Only required to be met when the reactor is critical and immediately prior to control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality. Verify RCS pressure and RCS temperature are within the criticality limits specified in Figure 3.4.9-3.Once within 15 minutes prior to initial control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality SR 3.4.9.3 --------------------- NOTE--------------- Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 during startup of a recirculation pump.Verify the difference between the bottom head Once within coolant temperature and the reactor pressure 15 minutes prior to vessel (RPV) coolant temperature is < 145°F. starting an idle recirculation pump (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-20 Amendment No. RCS P/T Limits 3.4.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.4 ---------------------- NOTE--------------- Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 during startup of a recirculation pump.Verify the difference between the reactor coolant Once within temperature in the recirculation loop to be started 15 minutes prior to and the RPV coolant temperature is < 50'F. starting an idle recirculation pump SR 3.4.9.5 ---------------------- NOTE--------------- Only required to be met when tensioning/ detensioning the reactor vessel head bolting studs.Verify reactor vessel flange and head flange Once within temperatures are > 76 0 F. 30 minutes prior to tensioning/ detensioning the reactor vessel head bolting studs and in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-21 Amendment No. RCS P/T Limits 3.4.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.6 ---------------------- NOTE--------------- Only required to be met when the reactor vessel head is tensioned. Verify reactor vessel flange and head flange Once within 12 hours temperatures are > 76 0 F. after RCS temperature is< 106'F in MODE 4, and in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Once within 30 minutes after RCS temperature is< 86°F in MODE 4, and in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-22 Amendment No. RCS P/T Limits 3.4.9 1400 1300 1200 1100'~1000 X 900 a-J 800 V)L.J 700 0 Li 600 CJ Z i 500 400 D (--(/a. 300 INITIAL RTndt VALUES ARE-20'F FOR BELTLINE, 40F FOR UPPER VESSEL, AND 10'F FOR BOTTOM HEAD I HEATUP/COOLDOWN RATE 20"F/HR BELTLINE CURVES ADJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)20 130.7 54 A[Al Al r//A[7 312 PSIG A[A=SYSTEM LANGE HYDROTEST LIMITS 7EION7 WITH FUEL IN THE 76F VESSEL 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 REACTOR VESSEL METAL TEMPERATURE ('F)BELTUNE CURVES DJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT (*F)32 154.6 BELTLINE CURVES DJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)36 161.0 BELTLINE CURVES DJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)40 167.5 BELTLINE CURVES)JUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)44 173.7 BELTLUNE CURVES DJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)48 179.4 BELTLINE CURVES)JUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)54 187.2 IBELTLINE LIMITS AND UPPER VESSEL LIMITS--BOTTOM HEAD LIMITS 200 100 0 0 50 MINIMUM Figure 3.4.9-1 (page 1 of 1)Pressure/Temperature Limits for Inservice Hydrostatic and Inservice Leakage Tests HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-23 Amendment No. I RCS P/T Limits 3.4.9 1400 1300 1200 1100 C 1000 0 900 Uj 800 U, w S700 0 600 Z 500 D 400 V0 U, CL 300 INITIAL RTndt VALUES ARE-20F FOR BELTLINE, 40'F FOR UPPER VESSEL, AND 10*F FOR BOTTOM HEAD HEATUP/COOLDOWN RATE 100"F/HR BELTLINE CURVES ADJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)20 130.7 BELTLINE CURVES ADJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)32 154.6 BELTLINE CURVES ADJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)54 187.2 200 100 0-BELTLINE LIMITS AND UPPER VESSEL LIMITS----BOTTOM HEAD LIMITS 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 MINIMUM REACTOR VESSEL METAL TEMPERATURE ('F)Figure 3.4.9-2 (page 1 of 1)Pressure/Temperature Limits for Non-Nuclear Heatup, Low Power Physics Tests, and Cooldown Following a Shutdown HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-24 Amendment No. I RCS P/T Limits 3.4.9 2M U)C.0 0 Uj 4r w3 zn V)1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 I HEATUP/COOLDOWN RATE 100"F/HR I INITIAL RTndt VALUES ARE-20"F FOR BELTLINE, 40'F FOR UPPER VESSEL, AND 10*F FOR BOTTOM HEAD BELTLINE CURVES ADJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)20 130.7 BELTLINE CURVES ADJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)32 154.6 BELTLINE CURVES ADJUSTED AS SHOWN: EFPY SHIFT ('F)54 187.2 200 100-BELTLINE LIMITS AND UPPER VESSEL LIMITS 0 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 MINIMUM REACTOR VESSEL METAL TEMPERATURE ('F)Figure 3.4.9-3 (page 1 of 1)Pressure/Temperature Limits for Criticality ACAD F349.31 HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-25 Amendment No. I Reactor Steam Dome Pressure 3.4.10 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure LCO 3.4.10 APPLICABILITY: The reactor steam dome pressure shall be < 1058 psig.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Reactor steam dome A.1 Restore reactor steam 15 minutes pressure not within limit, dome pressure to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.10.1 Verify reactor steam dome pressure is In accordance with< 1058 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.4-26 Amendment No. ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.1 Verify, for each ECCS injection/spray subsystem, In accordance with the piping is filled with water from the pump the Surveillance discharge valve to the injection valve. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.2 --------------------- NOTE ---------------- Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) low pressure permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem In accordance with manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the Surveillance the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or Frequency Control otherwise secured in position, is in the correct Program position.SR 3.5.1.3 Verify ADS air supply header pressure is In accordance with> 90 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.4 Verify the RHR System cross tie valve is closed In accordance with and power is removed from the valve operator. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.5 (Not used.)(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-3 Amendment No. ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.6------------------ NOTE ---------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, when in MODE 4 > 48 hours.Verify each recirculation pump discharge valve cycles through one complete cycle of full travel or is de-energized in the closed position.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.7 Verify each required ECCS pump develops the specified flow rate against a system head corresponding to the specified reactor pressure.In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program NO. OF SYSTEM FLOW RATE PUMPS SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING TO A REACTOR PRESSURE OF-113 psig 20 psig CS LPCI a 4250 gpm> 1700 gpm 1 1 SR 3.5.1.8 --------------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure < 1058 psig and In accordance with> 920 psig, the HPCI pump can develop a flow rate the Surveillance > 4250 gpm against a system head corresponding Frequency Control to reactor pressure. Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-4 Amendment No. ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.9------------------ NOTE ------------------------------ Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure s 165 psig, the HPCI pump can develop a flow rate > 4250 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor system pressure.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.10 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem In accordance with actuates on an actual or simulated automatic the Surveillance initiation signal. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.11 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- Valve actuation may be excluded.Verify the ADS actuates on an actual or simulated In accordance with automatic initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.12 Verify each ADS valve relief mode actuator In accordance with strokes when manually actuated. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-5 Amendment No. ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2 Initiate action to restore Immediately required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND D.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify, for each required low pressure coolant In accordance with injection (LPCI) subsystem, the suppression pool the Surveillance water level is > 146 inches. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.2 Verify, for each required core spray (CS) In accordance with subsystem, the: the Surveillance Frequency Control a. Suppression pool water level is Program> 146 inches; or b. ---------------- NOTE------------ Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during OPDRVs.Condensate storage tank water level is> 13 ft.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-7 Amendment No. ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.3 Verify, for each required ECCS injection/ spray In accordance with subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the the Surveillance pump discharge valve to the injection valve. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.4 --------------------- NOTE--------------- One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. Verify each required ECCS injection/spray In accordance with subsystem manual, power operated, and the Surveillance automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, Frequency Control sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the Program correct position.SR 3.5.2.5 Verify each required ECCS pump develops the In accordance with specified flow rate against a system head the Inservice corresponding to the specified reactor pressure. Testing Program SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING NO. OF TO A REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE PUMPS PRESSURE OF CS > 4250 gpm 1 >l113 psig LPCI > 7700 gpm 1 >- 20 psig SR 3.5.2.6 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.Verify each required ECCS injection/spray In accordance with subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated the Surveillance automatic initiation signal. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-8 Amendment No. RCIC System 3.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 Verify the RCIC System piping is filled with water In accordance with from the pump discharge valve to the injection the Surveillance valve. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.3.2 Verify each RCIC System manual, power In accordance with operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, the Surveillance that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in Frequency Control position, is in the correct position. Program SR 3.5.3.3 --------------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure < 1058 psig and In accordance with> 920 psig, the RCIC pump can develop a flow the Surveillance rate a 400 gpm against a system head Frequency Control corresponding to reactor pressure. Program S R 3.5.3.4 --------------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure < 165 psig, the RCIC In accordance with pump can develop a flow rate a 400 gpm against a the Surveillance system head corresponding to reactor pressure. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.3.5 --------------------- NOTE-- -------------- Vessel injection may be excluded.Verify the RCIC System actuates on an actual or In accordance with simulated automatic initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-10 Amendment No. Primary Containment 3.6.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of 1 psid.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND--------- NOTE --------Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass 9 months HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-2 Amendment No. Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.2.1-------------- NOTES--------------

1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1.

Perform required primary containment air lock leakage rate testing in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program+SR 3.6.1.2.2-------------- NOTE ---------------- Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted. Verify only one door in the primary containment air lock can be opened at a time.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-6 Amendment No. PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and F.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion suspend operations Time of Condition A, B, C, with a potential for or D not met for PCIV(s) draining the reactor required to be OPERABLE vessel.during MODE 4 or 5.OR F.2 --------NOTE-----Only applicable for inoperable RHR shutdown cooling valves.Initiate action to restore Immediately valve(s) to OPERABLE status.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1


NOTE--------------- Not required to be met when the 18 inch primary containment purge valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge In accordance with valve is closed. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-10 Amendment No. PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.2------------------- NOTES--------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program i SR 3.6.1.3.3------------------

NOTES--------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe In accordance with (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power operated In accordance with and each automatic PCIV, except for MSIVs, is the Inservice within limits. Testing Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-11 Amendment No. PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR, 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance with-> 3 seconds and 5 5 seconds. the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, In accordance with actuates to the isolation position on an actual or the Surveillance simulated isolation signal. Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV (of In accordance with a representative sample) actuates to restrict flow the Surveillance to within limits. Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each In accordance with shear isolation valve of the TIP system. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is In accordance with 5 11.5 scfh when tested at > 28.0 psig. the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.11 Deleted SR 3.6.1.3.12 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper In accordance with to the fully closed and fully open position. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-12 Amendment No. Drywell Pressure 3.6.1.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.4 Drywell Pressure LCO 3.6.1.4 APPLICABILITY: Drywell pressure shall be < 1.75 psig.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Drywell pressure not within A.1 Restore drywell 1 hour limit. pressure to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.4.1 Verify drywell pressure is within limit. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-13 Amendment No. Drywell Air Temperature 3.6.1.5 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature LCO 3.6.1.5 APPLICABILITY: Drywell average air temperature shall be < 150°F.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Drywell average air A.1 Restore drywell 8 hours temperature not within limit, average air temperature to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.5.1 Verify drywell average air temperature is within In accordance with limit. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-14 Amendment No. LLS Valves 3.6.1.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.6.1 Verify each LLS valve relief mode actuator strokes In accordance with when manually actuated. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.6.2 -- ----------------- NOTE --------------- Valve actuation may be excluded.Verify the LLS System actuates on an actual or In accordance with simulated automatic initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-16 Amendment No. Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.7.1


NOTES--------------

1. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances.
2. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers open when performing their intended function.Verify each vacuum breaker is closed. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.7.2 Perform a functional test of each vacuum breaker. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.7.3 Verify the opening setpoint of each vacuum In accordance with breaker is < 0.5 psid. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-18 Amendment No.

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.8.1


NOTE--------------- Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances. Verify each vacuum breaker is closed. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.8.2 Perform a functional test of each required vacuum In accordance with breaker. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Within 12 hours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the S/RVs SR 3.6.1.8.3 Verify the opening setpoint of each required In accordance with vacuum breaker is s 0.5 psid. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-20 Amendment No. Suppression Pool Average Temperature 3.6.2.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Suppression pool average E.1 Depressurize the 12 hours temperature > 120°F. reactor vessel to< 200 psig.AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1.1 Verify suppression pool average temperature is In accordance with within the applicable limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 5 minutes when performing testing that adds heat to the suppression pool HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-23 Amendment No. Suppression Pool Water Level 3.6.2.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level LCO 3.6.2.2 APPLICABILITY: Suppression pool water level shall be a 146 inches and < 150 inches.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Suppression pool water A.1 Restore suppression 2 hours level not within limits, pool water level to within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.2.1 Verify suppression pool water level is within limits. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-24 Amendment No. RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling LCO 3.6.2.3 APPLICABILITY: Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression pool A.1 Restore RHR 7 days cooling subsystem suppression pool inoperable, cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.B. Two RHR suppression pool B.1 Restore one RHR 8 hours cooling subsystems suppression pool inoperable, cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.3.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling In accordance with subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic the Surveillance valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or Frequency Control otherwise secured in position is in the correct Program positionor can be aligned to the correct position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-25 Amendment No. RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray LCO 3.6.2.4 APPLICABILITY: Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression pool A.1 Restore RHR 7 days spray subsystem suppression pool spray inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.B. Two RHR suppression pool B.1 Restore one RHR 8 hours spray subsystems suppression pool spray inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.4.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool spray In accordance with subsystem manual, power operated, and the Surveillance automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, Frequency Control sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the Program correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-27 Amendment No. RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.4.2 Verify each suppression pool spray nozzle is unobstructed. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-28 Amendment No. CAD System 3.6.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.1.1 Verify -> 2000 gal of liquid nitrogen are contained In accordance with in each N 2 storage tank. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.3.1.2 Verify each CAD subsystem manual, power In accordance with operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that the Surveillance is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in Frequency Control position is in the correct position or can be aligned Program to the correct position.HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-30 Amendment No. Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration 3.6.3.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.2 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration LCO 3.6.3.2 APPLICABILITY: The primary containment oxygen concentration shall be < 4.0 volume percent.MODE 1 during the time period: a. From 24 hours after THERMAL POWER is > 15% RTP following startup, to b. 24 hours prior to reducing THERMAL POWER to < 15% RTP prior to the next scheduled reactor shutdown.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Primary containment A.1 Restore oxygen 24 hours oxygen concentration not concentration to within within limit, limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours associated Completion POWER to < 15% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.2.1 Verify primary containment oxygen concentration In accordance with is within limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-31 Amendment No. Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND C.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all secondary containment equipment In accordance with hatches are closed and sealed. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one secondary containment access door in In accordance with each access opening is closed, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.3


NOTE--------------- The number of standby gas treatment (SGT)subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. Verify required SGT subsystem(s) will draw In accordance with down the secondary containment to > 0.20 inch the Surveillance of vacuum water gauge in < 120 seconds. Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-33 Amendment No. Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.4-NOTE ------------------------------ The number of SGT subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3,"Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. Verify required SGT subsystem(s) can maintain a 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment for 1 hour at a flow rate< 4000 cfm for each subsystem. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-34 Amendment No. SCIVs 3.6.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.2.1----------------- NOTES--------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for SCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each secondary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verify the isolation time of each power operated In accordance with and each automatic SCIV is within limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verify each automatic SCIV actuates to the In accordance with isolation position on an actual or simulated the Surveillance actuation signal. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-37 Amendment No.

SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two or more required SGT F.1 --------NOTE------ subsystems inoperable LCO 3.0.3 is not during movement of applicable. irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE Suspend movement of Immediately ALTERATIONS, or during irradiated fuel OPDRVs. assemblies in secondary containment. AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND F.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each required SGT subsystem for In accordance with> 15 continuous minutes. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in accordance In accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). the VFTP SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each required SGT subsystem actuates on In accordance with an actual or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-40 Amendment No. RHRSW System 3.7.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Both RHRSW subsystems


NOTE ---------inoperable for reasons Enter applicable Conditions and other than Condition B. Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7 for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.D.1 Restore one RHRSW 8 hours subsystem to OPERABLE status.E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify each RHRSW manual, power operated, and In accordance with automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, the Surveillance sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the Frequency Control correct position or can be aligned to the correct Program position.HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-2 Amendment No. PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Verify the water level in each PSW pump well of the intake structure is >- 60.7 ft mean sea level (MSL).In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 12 hours when water level is< 61.7 ft MSL SR 3.7.2.2----------------- NOTE ------------------------------- Isolation of flow to individual components or systems does not render PSW System inoperable. Verify each PSW subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow paths servicing safety related systems or components, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.2.3 Verify each PSW subsystem actuates on an actual In accordance with or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-5 Amendment No. DG 1 B SSW System 3.7.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify each DG 1B SSW System manual, power In accordance with operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, the Surveillance that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in Frequency Control position, is in the correct position. Program SR 3.7.3.2 Verify the DG 1B SSW System pump starts In accordance with automatically when DG 1 B starts and energizes the Surveillance the respective bus. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-7 Amendment No. MCREC System 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two MCREC subsystems


NOTE ---------inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, F. 1 Suspend movement of Immediately during CORE irradiated fuel ALTERATIONS, or during assemblies in the OPDRVs. secondary containment. AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND F.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Operate each MCREC subsystem > 15 minutes. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.4.2 Perform required MCREC filter testing in In accordance with accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing the VFTP Program (VFTP)..SR 3.7.4.3 Verify each MCREC subsystem actuates on an In accordance with actual or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-10 Amendment No. MCREC System 3.7.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.4 Verify each MCREC subsystem can maintain a In accordance with positive pressure of > 0.1 inches water gauge the Surveillance relative to the turbine building during the Frequency Control pressurization mode of operation at a subsystem Program flow rate of < 2750 cfm and an outside air flow rate< 400 cfm.HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-11 Amendment No. Control Room AC System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each control room AC subsystem has the In accordance with capability to remove the assumed heat load. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-15 Amendment No. Main Condenser Offgas 3.7.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1------------------ NOTE --------------- Not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line not isolated and SJAE in operation. Verify the gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases is < 240 mCi/second. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Once within 4 hours after a> 50% increase in the nominal steady state fission gas release after factoring out increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER level HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-17 Amendment No. Main Turbine Bypass System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System LCO 3.7.7 The Main Turbine Bypass System shall be OPERABLE.OR LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System, as specified in the COLR, are made applicable. APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the LCO A.1 Satisfy the requirements 2 hours not met. of the LCO.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 Verify one complete cycle of each main turbine In accordance with bypass valve, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.7.2 Perform a system functional test. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-18 Amendment No. Main Turbine Bypass System 3.7.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY In accordance with SR 3.7.7.3 Verify the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE th Survance TIME is within limits. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT I 3.7-19 Amendment No. Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level LCO 3.7.8 APPLICABILITY: The spent fuel storage pool water level shall be > 21 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks.During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Spent fuel storage pool A.1 ---------NOTE-----water level not within limit. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 Verify the spent fuel storage pool water level is In accordance with> 21 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies the Surveillance seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-20 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.1 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated In accordance with power availability for each required offsite circuit. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.2 --------------------- NOTES--------------

1. Performance of SR 3.8.1.5 satisfies this SR.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.3. A modified DG start involving idling and gradual acceleration to synchronous speed may be used for this SR as recommended by the manufacturer.

When modified start procedures are not used, the time, voltage, and frequency tolerances of SR 3.8.1.5.a must be met.4. For the swing DG, a single test will satisfy this Surveillance for both units, using the starting circuitry of Unit 1 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 1F for one periodic test, and the starting circuitry of Unit 2 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 2F during the next periodic test.5. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-7 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY*1-SR 3.8.1.2 (continued)


NOTES---------------

6. Starting transients above the upper voltage limit do not invalidate this test.7. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.8. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.Verify each DG: a. Starts from standby conditions and achieves steady state voltage > 3740 V and < 4243 V and frequency

> 58.8 Hz and< 61.2 Hz; and b. Operates for > 60 minutes at a load> 1710 kW and < 2000 kW.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.3 Verify each day tank contains > 500 gallons of In accordance with fuel oil. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.4 Check for and remove accumulated water from In accordance with each day tank. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-8 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.5----------------- NOTES---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.
3. Momentary load transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.4. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.5. For the swing DG, a single test will satisfy this Surveillance for both units, using the starting circuitry of Unit 1 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 1 F for one periodic test and the starting circuitry of Unit 2 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 2F during the next periodic test.Verify each DG: a. Starts from standby conditions and achieves, in < 12 seconds, voltage> 3740 V and frequency

> 58.8 Hz and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage > 3740 V and 5 4243 V and frequency > 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz;and b. Operates for > 60 minutes at a load> 2250 kW and : 2400 kW for DGs 1A and 1C, and > 2360 kW and< 2425 kW for DG 1 B.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-9 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.6----------------- NOTE ------------------------------ This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify automatic and manual transfer of unit power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.7------------- NOTES ---------------

1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, except for the swing DG.For the swing DG, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2 using the Unit 1 controls.

Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.2. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG rejects a load greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load, and: a. Following load rejection, the frequency is 5 65.5 Hz; and b. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the voltage is > 3740 V and 5 4580 V.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-10 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.8 -------------------- NOTES---------------

1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, except for the swing DG.For the swing DG, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2 using the Unit 1 controls.

Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.2. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition, the power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG operating at a power factor < 0.88 In accordance with does not trip and voltage is maintained

< 4800 V the Surveillance during and following a load rejection of > 2775 kW. Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-11 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.9-------------- NOTES---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal: a. De-energization of emergency buses;b. Load shedding from emergency buses;and c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and: 1. Energizes permanently connected loads in < 12 seconds, 2. Energizes auto-connected shutdown loads through automatic load sequence timing devices, 3. Maintains steady state voltage> 3740 V and < 4243 V, 4. Maintains steady state frequency-> 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz, and 5. Supplies permanently connected and auto-connected shutdown loads for > 5 minutes.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-12 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY+SR 3.8.1.10-------------- NOTES ---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify on an actual or simulated Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation signal each DG auto-starts from standby condition and: a. In 5 12 seconds after auto-start achieves voltage > 3740 V, and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage> 3740 V and 5 4243 V;b. In < 12 seconds after auto-start achieves frequency

> 58.8 Hz, and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains frequency > 58.8 Hz and 5 61.2 Hz; and c. Operates for > 5 minutes.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-13 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.11-NOTE -------------------------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify each DG's automatic trips are bypassed on actual or simulated loss of voltage signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal except: a. Engine overspeed;

b. Generator differential current; and c. Low lube oil pressure.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-14 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY.9.SR 3.8.1.12------------- NOTES---------------

1. Momentary transients outside the load and power factor ranges do not invalidate this test.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, unless the other two DGs are OPERABLE.

If either of the other two DGs becomes inoperable, this surveillance shall be suspended. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.3. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition, the power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

4. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG operating at a power factor : 0.88 operates for > 24 hours: a. For > 2 hours loaded > 3000 kW; and b. For the remaining hours of the test loaded> 2775 kW and : 2825 kW.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-15 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13-------------- NOTES --------------

1. This Surveillance shall be performed within 5 minutes of shutting down the DG after the DG has operated -> 2 hours loaded-> 2565 kW. Momentary transients outside of load range do not invalidate this test.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG starts and achieves, in 5 12 seconds, voltage > 3740 V and frequency> 58.8 Hz; and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage > 3740 V and 5 4243 V and frequency

> 58.8 Hz and 5 61.2 Hz.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.14-------NOTE ---------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify each DG: a. Synchronizes with offsite power source while loaded with emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;b. Transfers loads to offsite power source;and c. Returns to ready-to-load operation. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-16 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.15-------------- NOTE ---------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify with a DG operating in test mode and connected to its bus, an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal overrides the test mode by: a. Returning DG to ready-to-load operation; and b. Automatically energizing the emergency load from offsite power.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.16---------------- NOTE --------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify interval between each sequenced load block is within +/- 10% of design interval for each load sequence timing device.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-17 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.17-NOTES ----------------------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify, on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal: a. De-energization of emergency buses;b. Load shedding from emergency buses;and c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and: 1. Energizes permanently connected loads in < 12 seconds, 2. Energizes auto-connected emergency loads through automatic load sequence timing devices, 3. Achieves steady state voltage> 3740 V and < 4243 V, 4. Achieves steady state frequency a 58.8 Hz and 5 61.2 Hz, and 5. Supplies permanently connected and auto-connected emergency loads for a 5 minutes.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-18 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.18 -------------------- NOTE--------------- All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.Verify, when started simultaneously from standby In accordance with condition, the Unit 1 DGs and the swing DG the Surveillance achieve, in < 12 seconds, voltage -3740 V and Frequency Control frequency > 58.8 Hz. Program SR, 3.8.1.19 For required Unit 2 AC Sources, the SRs of In accordance with Unit 2 Technical Specifications are applicable, applicable SRs except SR 3.8.1.6, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.17.HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-19 Amendment No. Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil storage In accordance with tank contains > 33,320 gallons of fuel. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.2 Verify each required DG lube oil inventory is In accordance with> 400 gallons. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil total particulate concentration of In accordance with Unit 1 and swing DG stored fuel oil are tested in the Diesel Fuel Oil accordance with, and maintained within the limits Testing Program of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each required DG air start receiver pressure In accordance with is > 225 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.5 Verify each Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil transfer In accordance with subsystem operates to automatically transfer fuel the Surveillance oil from the storage tank to the day tank. Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.6 Check for and remove accumulated water from In accordance with each Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil storage tank. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.7 Verify each Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil transfer In accordance with subsystem operates to manually transfer fuel from the Surveillance the associated fuel oil storage tank to the day tank Frequency Control of each required DG. Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-25 Amendment No. DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i --........................................................... SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8 are applicable only to the Unit 1 DC sources. SR 3.8.4.9 is applicable only to the Unit 2 DC sources.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.1 Verify battery terminal voltage is > 125 V on float In accordance with charge. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.4.2 Verify no visible corrosion at battery terminals and In accordance with connectors. the Surveillance Frequency Control OR Program Verify battery connection resistance is within limits.SR 3.8.4.3 Verify battery cells, cell plates, and racks show no In accordance with visual indication of physical damage or abnormal the Surveillance deterioration. Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.4.4 Remove visible corrosion, and verify battery cell to In accordance with cell and terminal connections are coated with the Surveillance anti-corrosion material. Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.4.5 Verify battery connection resistance is within In accordance with limits. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-28 Amendment No. DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.6 Verify each required battery charger supplies In accordance with> 400 amps for station service subsystems, and the Surveillance -> 100 amps for DG subsystems at > 129 V for Frequency Control> 1 hour. Program SR 3.8.4.7 --------------------- NOTES--------------

1. The modified performance discharge test in SR 3.8.4.8 may be performed in lieu of the service test in SR 3.8.4.7.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except for the swing DG battery. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify battery capacity is adequate to supply, and In accordance with maintain in OPERABLE status, the required the Surveillance emergency loads for the design duty cycle when Frequency Control subjected to a battery service test. Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-29 Amendment No. DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY*1-SR 3.8.4.8------------------ NOTE--------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except for the swing DG battery.However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify battery capacity is > 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test or a modified performance discharge test.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85% of expected life with capacity < 100% of manufacturer's rating AND 24 months when battery has reached 85% of expected life with capacity > 100% of manufacturer's rating SR 3.8.4.9 For required Unit 2 DC sources, the SRs of Unit 2 In accordance with Specification 3.8.4 are applicable, applicable SRs HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-30 Amendment No. Battery Cell Parameters

3.8.6 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion battery inoperable. Time of Condition A not met.OR One or more batteries with average electrolyte temperature of the representative cells not within limits.OR One or more batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within Category C limits.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.6.1 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.8.6-1 In accordance with Category A limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.6.2 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.8.6-1 In accordance with Category B limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Once within 24 hours after battery overcharge > 150 V SR 3.8.6.3 Verify average electrolyte temperature of In accordance with representative cells is > 65°F for each station the Surveillance service battery, and > 40'F for each DG battery. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-34 Amendment No. Distribution Systems -Operating 3.8.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.7.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to In accordance with required AC and DC electrical power distribution the Surveillance subsystems. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-38 Amendment No. Distribution Systems -Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.AND A.2.4 Initiate actions to Immediately restore required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND A.2.5 Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to In accordance with required AC and DC electrical power distribution the Surveillance subsystems. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-40 Amendment No. Refueling Equipment Interlocks

3.9.1 SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each In accordance with of the following required refueling equipment the Surveillance interlock inputs: Frequency Control Program a. All-rods-in, b. Refuel platform position, c. Refuel platform fuel grapple, fuel loaded, d. Refuel platform fuel grapple full-up position, e. Refuel platform frame-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, f. Refuel platform trolley-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, and g. Service platform hoist, fuel loaded.HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-2 Amendment No. Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.2 Refuel

Position One-Rod-Out Interlock LCO 3.9.2 APPLICABILITY: The refuel position one-rod-out interlock shall be OPERABLE.MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position and any control rod withdrawn. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Refuel position one-rod-out A.1 Suspend control rod Immediately interlock inoperable, withdrawal. AND A.2 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.2.1 Verify reactor mode switch locked in refuel In accordance with position. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.9.2.2 ---------------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn. Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-3 Amendment No. Control Rod Position 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.3 Control

Rod Position LCO 3.9.3 APPLICABILITY: All control rods shall be fully inserted.When loading fuel assemblies into the core.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more control rods A.1 Suspend loading fuel Immediately not fully inserted, assemblies into the core.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.3.1 Verify all control rods are fully inserted. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-4 Amendment No. Control Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling 3.9.5 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.5 Control

Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling LCO 3.9.5 APPLICABILITY: Each withdrawn control rod shall be OPERABLE.MODE 5.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more withdrawn A.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately control rods inoperable, insert inoperable withdrawn control rods.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.5.1 --------------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn. Insert each withdrawn control rod at least one In accordance with notch. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.9.5.2 Verify each withdrawn control rod scram In accordance with accumulator pressure is > 940 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-7 Amendment No. RPV Water Level 3.9.6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.6 Reactor

Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level LCO 3.9.6 APPLICABILITY: RPV water level shall be > 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV.During During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV, movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV, when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated within the RPV.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RPV water level not within A.1 Suspend movement of Immediately limit. fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.6.1 Verify RPV water level is >_ 23 ft above the top of In accordance with the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the the Surveillance RPV. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-8 Amendment No. RHR -High Water Level 3.9.7 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND B.4 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.C. No RHR shutdown cooling C.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND Once per 12 hours thereafter AND C.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.7.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is In accordance with operating. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-10 Amendment No. RHR -Low Water Level 3.9.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.C. No RHR shutdown cooling C.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND Once per 12 hours thereafter AND C.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is In accordance with operating. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-12 Amendment No. Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing 3.10.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3.1 Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the shutdown position.OR A.3.2 -------NOTE------ Only applicable in MODE 5.Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the refuel position.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.2.1 Verify all control rods are fully inserted in core In accordance with cells containing one or more fuel assemblies, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.2.2 Verify no CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT I 3.10-4 Amendment No. Single Control Rod Withdrawal -Hot Shutdown 3.10.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.3.1 Perform the applicable SRs for the required LCOs. According to the applicable SRs SR 3.10.3.2 ------------------ NOTE --------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.3.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.3.d.1 requirements. Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with being withdrawn, in a five by five array centered the Surveillance on the control rod being withdrawn, are disarmed. Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.3.3 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with being withdrawn, are fully inserted, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-7 Amendment No. Single Control Rod Withdrawal -Cold Shutdown 3.10.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all control rods.OR B.2.2 Initiate action to satisfy Immediately the requirements of this LCO.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.4.1 Perform the applicable SRs for the required LCOs. According to the applicable SRs SR 3.10.4.2 --------------------------- NOTE -------------------------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.4.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.4.c.1 requirements. Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with being withdrawn, in a five by five array centered the Surveillance on the control rod being withdrawn, are disarmed. Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.4.3 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with being withdrawn, are fully inserted, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.4.4 ------------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.4.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.4.b.1 requirements. Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-10 Amendment No. Single CRD Removal -Refueling 3.10.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.5.1 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, the Surveillance are fully inserted. Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.5.2 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, the Surveillance in a five by five array centered on the control rod Frequency Control withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, Program are disarmed.SR 3.10.5.3 Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.5.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1. According to SR 3.1.1.1 SR 3.10.5.5 Verify no CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-12 Amendment No. Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal -Refueling 3.10.6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. OR A.3.2 Initiate action to satisfy Immediately the requirements of this LCO.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.6.1 Verify the four fuel assemblies are removed from In accordance with core cells associated with each control rod or CRD the Surveillance removed. Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.6.2 Verify all other control rods in core cells containing In accordance with one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.6.3 -- ----------------- NOTE ---------------- Only required to be met during fuel loading.Verify fuel assemblies being loaded are in In accordance with compliance with an approved spiral reload the Surveillance sequence. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-14 Amendment No. SMD Test -Refueling 3.10.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.8.3 ----------------------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.8.2 satisfied. Verify movement of control rods is in compliance During control rod with the approved control rod sequence for the movement SDM test by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.SR 3.10.8.4 Verify no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in In accordance with progress. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.8.5 Verify each withdrawn control rod does not go to Each time the the withdrawn overtravel position. control rod is withdrawn to full-out position AND Prior to satisfying LCO 3.10.8.c requirement after work on control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling SR 3.10.8.6 Verify CRD charging water header pressure In accordance with-> 940 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 1 3.10-19 Amendment No. Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued) The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.5.5.13 Surveillance Frequency Control Program This program provides controls for the Surveillance Frequencies. The program shall ensure that Surveillance Requirements specified in the Technical Specifications are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation are met.a. The Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall contain a list of Frequencies of those Surveillance Requirements for which the Frequency is controlled by the program.b. Changes to the Frequencies listed in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall be made in accordance with the NEI 04-10, "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies," Revision 1.c. The provisions of Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are applicable to the Frequencies established in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-17 Amendment No. Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 6 Clean Typed Pages for HNP Unit 2 Proposed TS Changes Definitions 1.1 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION

1.1 Definitions


NOTE The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and Bases.Term Definition ACTIONS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)CHANNEL CALIBRATION CHANNEL CHECK ACTIONS shall be that part of a Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times.The APLHGR shall be applicable to a specific planar height and is equal to the sum of the LHGRs for all the fuel rods in the specified bundle at the specified height divided by the number of fuel rods in the fuel bundle at the height.A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds within the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter that the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel, including the required sensor, alarm, display, and trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Calibration of instrument channels with resistance temperature detector (RTD) or thermocouple sensors may consist of an inplace qualitative assessment of sensor behavior and normal calibration of the remaining adjustable devices in the channel. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is calibrated. A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 1.1-1 Amendment No. Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CORE ALTERATION A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY, including required alarm, interlock, display, and trip functions, and channel failure trips. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. The following exceptions are not considered to be CORE ALTERATIONS:

a. Movement of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement);

and b. Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.The COLR is the unit specific document that provides cycle specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle specific limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification

5.6.5. Plant

operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications. DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 shall be that concentration of 1-131 (microcuries/gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of 1-131, 1-132, 1-133, 1-134, and 1-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, AEC, 1962,"Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites";Table E-7 of Regulatory Guide 1.109, Rev. 1, NRC, 1977; or ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, pages 192-212, Table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity." CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 (continued) Amendment No.HATCH UNIT 2 1.1 -2 Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) PHYSICS TESTS RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP)REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)RESPONSE TIME SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation. These tests are: a. Described in Chapter 14, Initial Tests and Operation, of the FSAR;b. Authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59; or c. Otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2804 MWt.The RPS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its RPS trip setpoint at the channel sensor until de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.SDM shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical assuming that: a. The reactor is xenon free;b. The moderator temperature is 68°F; and c. All control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. With control rods not capable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of these control rods must be accounted for in the determination of SDM.THERMAL POWER THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 1.1-5 Amendment No. Control Rod OPERABILITY

3.1.3 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, or D not met.OR Nine or more control rods inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.3.1 Determine the position of each control rod. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.3.2 --------------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM.Insert each fully withdrawn control rod at least one In accordance with notch. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.3.3 ------------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be performed until 31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM.Insert each partially withdrawn control rod at least In accordance with one notch. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-7 Amendment No. Control Rod Scram Times 3.1.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS During single control rod scram time Surveillances, the control rod drive (CRD) pumps shall be isolated from the associated scram accumulator. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i SR 3.1.4.1 Verify each control rod scram time is within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with reactor steam dome pressure > 800 psig.Prior to exceeding 40% RTP after fuel movement within the reactor pressure vessel AND Prior to exceeding 40% RTP after each reactor shutdown> 120 days SR 3.1.4.2 Verify, for a representative sample, each tested In accordance with control rod scram time is within the limits of the Surveillance Table 3.1.4-1 with reactor steam dome pressure Frequency Control> 800 psig. Program SR 3.1.4.3 Verify each affected control rod scram time is Prior to declaring within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with any reactor control rod steam dome pressure. OPERABLE after work on control rod or CRD System that could affect scram time SR 3.1.4.4 Verify each affected control rod scram time is Prior to exceeding within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with reactor 40% RTP after steam dome pressure > 800 psig. work on control rod or CRD System that could affect scram time HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-10 Amendment No. Control Rod Scram Accumulators

3.1.5 SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.5.1 Verify each control rod scram accumulator In accordance with pressure is > 940 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-14 Amendment No. Rod Pattern Control 3.1.6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2 Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the shutdown position.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.6.1 Verify all OPERABLE control rods comply with In accordance with BPWS. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-16 Amendment No. SLC System 3.1.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.7.1 Verify available volume of sodium pentaborate In accordance with solution is within the Region A limits of the Surveillance Figure 3.1.7-1. Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.7.2 Verify temperature of sodium pentaborate solution In accordance with is within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.7.3 Verify temperature of pump suction piping is within In accordance with the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.7.4 Verify continuity of explosive charge. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.7.5 Verify the concentration of sodium pentaborate in In accordance with solution is within the Region A limits of the Surveillance Figure 3.1.7-1. Frequency Control Program AND Once within 24 hours after water or sodium pentaborate is added to solution AND Once within 24 hours after solution temperature is restored within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-18 Amendment No. SLC System 3.1.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.7.6 Verify each SLC subsystem manual and power In accordance with operated valve in the flow path that is not locked, the Surveillance sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the Frequency Control correct position, or can be aligned to the correct Program position.SR 3.1.7.7 Verify each pump develops a flow rate > 41.2 gpm In accordance at a discharge pressure -> 1232 psig. with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.1.7.8 Verify flow through one SLC subsystem from pump In accordance with into reactor pressure vessel, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.7.9 Verify all heat traced piping between storage tank In accordance with and pump suction is unblocked, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Once within 24 hours after pump suction piping temperature is restored within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2 SR 3.1.7.10 Verify sodium pentaborate enrichment is Prior to addition to> 60.0 atom percent B-10. SLC tank HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-19 Amendment No. SDV Vent and Drain Valves 3.1.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.8.1 --------------------- NOTE---------------- Not required to be met on vent and drain valves closed during performance of SR 3.1.8.2.Verify each SDV vent and drain valve is open. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.8.2 Cycle each SDV vent and drain valve to the fully In accordance with closed and fully open position. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.1.8.3 Verify each SDV vent and drain valve: In accordance with the Surveillance

a. Closes in < 60 seconds after receipt of an Frequency Control actual or simulated scram signal; and Program b. Opens when the actual or simulated scram signal is reset.HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-23 Amendment No.

MCPR 3.2.2 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)LCO 3.2.2 All MCPRs shall be greater than or equal to the MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR.APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER >24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any MCPR not within limits. A.1 Restore MCPR(s) to 2 hours within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.2.1 Verify all MCPRs are greater than or equal to the Once within limits specified in the COLR. 12 hours after a 24% RTP AND In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.2-2 Amendment No. LHGR 3.2.3 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)*LCO 3.2.3 APPLICABILITY: All LHGRs shall be less than or equal to the limits specified in the COLR.THERMAL POWER -24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any LHGR not within limits. A.1 Restore LHGR(s) to 2 hours within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.3.1 Verify all LHGRs are less than or equal to the Once within limits specified in the COLR. 12 hours after> 24% RTP AND In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program*This Specification is effective starting from Hatch 2/Cycle 19.HATCH UNIT 2 3.2-4 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1. As required by Required 1.1 Initiate alternate method 12 hours Action D.1 and referenced to detect and suppress in Table 3.3.1.1-1. thermal-hydraulic instability oscillations. AND 1.2 Restore required 120 days channels to OPERABLE.J. Required Action and J.1 Be in MODE 2. 4 hours associated Completion Time of Condition I not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES -----------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-3 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.2


NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after THERMAL POWER -24% RTP.Verify the absolute difference between the In accordance with average power range monitor (APRM) channels the Surveillance and the calculated power is " 2% RTP while Frequency Control operating at > 24% RTP. Program SR 3.3.1.1.3 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.4


NOTE --------------- Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.6 Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and Prior to intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels withdrawing SRMs overlap. from the fully inserted position (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-4 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.7


NOTE--------------- Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.8 Calibrate the local power range monitors. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.10


NOTE--------------- For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.11 Verify Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and In accordance with Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil the Surveillance Pressure -Low Functions are not bypassed Frequency Control when THERMAL POWER is a 27.6% RTP. Program SR 3.3.1.1.12 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-5 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.13


NOTES---------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.2. For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.14 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.16


NOTES --------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.2. (Not used.)3. For Function 5, "n" equals 4 channels for the purpose of determining the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency.

.................................................................. Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-6 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.17 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM In accordance with Simulated Thermal Power is ? 25% and the Surveillance recirculation drive flow is < 60% of rated Frequency Control recirculation drive flow. Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-7 Amendment No. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Intermediate Range Monitor a. Neutron Flux -High 2 5(a)2(d)2(d)2(d)2(d)b. Inop 2 5(a)2. Average Power Range Monitor a. Neutron Flux -High (Setdown)b. Simulated Thermal Power -High c. Neutron Flux -High d. Inop 2 1 1,2 3(c)3(c)3(c)3(c)G SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1 4 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 G SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.15 H SR 3.3,1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.15 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 F SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 F SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 G SR 3.3.1.1.10 NA 5 120/125 divisions of full scale< 120/125 divisions of full scale NA< 20% RTP!5 0.57W +56.8% RTP and < 115.5%RTp(b)5 120% RTP NA (continued)(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.(b) 0.57W + 56.8% -0.57 AW RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4. 1, "Recirculation Loops Operating." (c) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.(d) One channel in each quadrant of the core must be OPERABLE whenever the IRMs are required to be OPERABLE. Both the RWM and a second licensed operator must verify compliance with the withdrawal sequence when less than three channels in any trip system are OPERABLE.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-8 Amendment No. I RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 3)Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 2. Average Power Range Monitor (continued)

e. Two-out-of-Four Voter f. OPRM Upscale 3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure -High 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 5. Main Steam Isolation Valve -Closure 6. Drywell Pressure -High 7. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level -High a. Resistance Temperature Detector 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 2 3(c)2 2 8 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16 1 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.17 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 33.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 F SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 H SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 G SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.15 H SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA NA 5 1085 psig> 0 inches 5: 10% closed< 1.92 psig 1,2 5(a)1,2 5(a)2 2 2 2 5 57.15 gallons 5 57.15 gallons< 57.15 gallons< 57.15 gallons b. Float Switch (continued)(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.(c) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-9 Amendment No. I RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 3 of 3)Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 .REQUIREMENTS VALUE 8. Turbine Stop Valve -Closure 2 27.6% RTP 4 E SR 3.3.1.1.9
10% closed SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16
9. Turbine Control Valve Fast a 27.6% RTP 2 E SR 3.3.1.1.9

>600 psig Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -SR 3.3.1.1.11 Low SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16

10. Reactor Mode Switch -1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.12 NA Shutdown Position SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.12 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15
11. Manual Scram 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-10 Amendment No. I SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.2 APPLICABILITY: The SRM instrumentation in Table 3.3.1.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.According to Table 3.3.1.2-1. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required SRMs 4 hours SRMs inoperable in to OPERABLE status.MODE 2 with intermediate range monitors (IRMs) on Range 2 or below.B. Three required SRMs B.1 Suspend control rod Immediately inoperable in MODE 2 with withdrawal. IRMs on Range 2 or below.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.D. One or more required D.1 Fully insert all 1 hour SRMs inoperable in insertable control rods.MODE 3 or 4.AND D.2 Place reactor mode 1 hour switch in the shutdown position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-11 Amendment No. I SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One or more required E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately SRMs inoperable in ALTERATIONS except MODE 5. for control rod insertion. AND E.2 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each applicable MODE or other specified conditions.
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required channel(s) is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-12 Amendment No. SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 4 SR 3.3.1.2.2---------------------------- NOTES--------------

1. Only required to be met during CORE ALTERATIONS.
2. One SRM may be used to satisfy more than one of the following.

Verify an OPERABLE SRM detector is located in: a. The fueled region;b. The core quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, when the associated SRM is included in the fueled region; and c. A core quadrant adjacent to where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, when the associated SRM is included in the fueled region.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-13 Amendment No. SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.4----------------- NOTES--------------

1. Not required to be met with less than or equal to four fuel assemblies adjacent to the SRM and no other fuel assemblies in the associated core quadrant.2. Not required to be met during spiral unloading.

Verify count rate is >- 3.0 cps with a signal to noise ratio > 2:1.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.2.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and In accordance with determination of signal to noise ratio. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.2.6


NOTE-------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after IRMs on Range 2 or below.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and In accordance with determination of signal to noise ratio. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.2.7


NOTES -------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.2. Not required to be performed until 12 hours after IRMs on Range 2 or below.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-14 Amendment No. SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 Table 3.3.1.2-1 (page 1 of 1)Source Range Monitor Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS 1 Source Range Monitor 2(a) 3 SR 3.3.1.2.1 SR 3.3.1.2.4 SR 3.3.1.2.6 SR 3.3.1.2.7 3,4 2 SR 3.3.1.2.3 SR 3.3.1.2.4 SR 3.3.1.2.6 SR 3.3.1.2.7 5 2(b)(c) SR 3.3.1.2.1 SR 3.3.1.2.2 SR 3.3.1.2.4 SR 3.3.1.2.5 SR 3.3.1.2.7 (a) With IRMs on Range 2 or below.(b) Only one SRM channel is required to be OPERABLE during spiral offload or reload when the fueled region includes only that SRM detector.(c) Special movable detectors may be used in place of SRMs if connected to normal SRM circuits.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-15 Amendment No. I Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2.1 APPLICABILITY: The control rod block instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.According to Table 3.3.2.1-1. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One rod block monitor A.1 Restore RBM channel 24 hours (RBM) channel inoperable, to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Place one RBM 1 hour associated Completion channel in trip.Time of Condition A not met.OR Two RBM channels inoperable. C. Rod worth minimizer C.1 Suspend control rod Immediately (RWM) inoperable during movement except by reactor startup. scram.OR C.2.1.1 Verify a 12 rods Immediately withdrawn. OR (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-16 Amendment No. I Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1.2 Verify by administrative Immediately methods that startup with RWM inoperable has not been performed in the last calendar year.AND C.2.2 Verify movement of During control rod control rods is in movement compliance with banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.D. RWM inoperable during D.1 Verify movement of During control rod reactor shutdown. control rods is in movement compliance with BPWS by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.E. One or more Reactor Mode E.1 Suspend control rod Immediately Switch -Shutdown Position withdrawal. channels inoperable. AND E.2 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-17 Amendment No. I Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.2.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.2. When an RBM channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.1.2


NOTE-------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn at < 10% RTP in MODE 2.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.1.3


NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP in MODE 1.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-18 Amendment No. Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.4------------------ NOTE ----------------------------- Neutron detectors are excluded.Verify the RBM: a. Low Power Range -Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is> 29% and < 64% RTP.b. Intermediate Power Range -Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 64% and < 84% RTP.c. High Power Range -Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is>84% RTP.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.1.5 Verify the RWM is not bypassed when THERMAL In accordance with POWER is < 10% RTP. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.1.6


NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.1.7


NOTE--------------- Neutron detectors are excluded.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-19 Amendment No. Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.8 Verify control rod sequences input to the RWM are Prior to declaring in conformance with BPWS. RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-20 Amendment No. I Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2.1-1 (page 1 of 1)Control Rod Block Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1 Rod Block Monitor a. Low Power Range -Upscale (a) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 5 115.5/125 SR 3.3.2.1.4 divisions of full SR 3.3.2.1.7 scale b. Intermediate Power Range -Upscale (b) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 5 109.7/125 SR 3.3.2.1.4 divisions of full SR 3.3.2.1.7 scale c. High Power Range -Upscale (c) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 5 105.9/125 SR 3.3.2.1.4 divisions of full SR 3.3.2.1.7 scale d. Inop (d) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 NA e. Downscale (d) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 a 93/125 SR 3.3.2.1.7 divisions of full scale 2. Rod Worth Minimizer 1(e), 2(e) 1 SR 3.3.2.1.2 NA SR 3.3.2.1.3 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.8 3. Reactor Mode Switch -Shutdown Position (f) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.6 NA (a) THERMAL POWER a 29% and < 64% RTP.(b) THERMAL POWER a 64% and < 84% RTP.(c) THERMAL POWER ->84%.(d) THERMAL POWER -29%.(e) With THERMAL POWER < 10% RTP, except during the reactor shutdown process if the coupling of each withdrawn control rod has been confirmed.(f) Reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-21 Amendment No. I Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation 3.3.2.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2.2 APPLICABILITY: Three channels of feedwater and main turbine trip instrumentation shall be OPERABLE.THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP.ACTIONS------------------ NOTE----Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One feedwater and main A.1 Place channel in trip. 7 days turbine high water level trip channel inoperable. B. Two or more feedwater and B.1 Restore feedwater and 2 hours main turbine high water main turbine high water level trip channels level trip capability. inoperable. C. Required Action and C.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-22 Amendment No. I Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation 3.3.2.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE --------------------------------------------


When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided feedwater and main turbine high water level trip capability is maintained. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The In accordance with Allowable Value shall be < 55.5 inches. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST In accordance with including valve actuation. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-23 Amendment No. PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.3.1 APPLICABILITY: The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONSr-"----------------------------------------------- rJJ!----------


Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Restore required 30 days one required channel channel to OPERABLE inoperable, status.B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action in Immediately associated Completion accordance with Time of Condition A not Specification 5.6.6.met.C. One or more Functions with C.1 Restore all but one 7 days two or more required required channel to channels inoperable. OPERABLE status.D. Required Action and D. 1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition C not Table 3.3.3.1-1 for the met. channel.E. As required by Required E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.3.1-1.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-24 Amendment No. I PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. As required by Required F.1 Initiate action in Immediately Action D.1 and referenced accordance with in Table 3.3.3.1-1. Specification 5.6.6.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES-------------------------------

1. These SRs apply to each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1.
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required channel(s) in the associated Function is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.3.1.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-25 Amendment No. PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 Table 3.3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 1)Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation CONDITIONS REFERENCED REQUIRED FROM REQUIRED FUNCTION CHANNELS ACTION D.1 1. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure 2. Reactor Vessel Water Level a. -317 inches to -17 inches b. -150 inches to +60 inches c. 0 inches to +60 inches d. 0 inches to +400 inches 3. Suppression Pool Water Level a. 0 inches to 300 inches b. 133 inches to 163 inches 4. Drywell Pressure a. -10 psig to +90 psig b. -5 psig to +5 psig c. 0 psig to +250 psig 5. Drywell Area Radiation (High Range)6. Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position 7. (Deleted)8. (Deleted)9. Suppression Pool Water Temperature

10. Drywell Temperature in Vicinity of Reactor Level Instrument Reference Leg 11. Diesel Generator (DG) Parameters
a. Output Voltage b. Output Current c. Output Power d. Battery Voltage 12. RHR Service Water Flow 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 per penetration flow path(a)(b) 2(c)6 1 per DG 1 per DG 1 per DG 1 per DG 2 E E E E NA E E E E E F E E E NA NA NA NA E (a) Not required for isolation valves whose associated penetration flow path is isolated by at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.(b) Only one position indication channel is required for penetration flow paths with only one installed control room indication channel.(c) Monitoring each of four quadrants.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-26 Amendment No. I Remote Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System LCO 3.3.3.2 APPLICABILITY: The Remote Shutdown System Functions shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONS--------------------------------------- I r------------------------------------------------------------- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required 30 days Functions inoperable. Function to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-27 Amendment No. I Remote Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOT E ---------------------------------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required In accordance with instrumentation channel that is normally the Surveillance energized. Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.3.2.2 Verify each required control circuit and transfer In accordance with switch is capable of performing the intended the Surveillance function. Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.3.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each In accordance with required instrumentation channel. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-28 Amendment No. EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4.1 a. Two channels per trip system for each EOC-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE: 1. Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) -Closure; and 2. Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low.OR b. LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR are made applicable. APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER > 27.6% RTP.ACTIONS t Ir%-rr------------------------------------- IN.J" S------------------------------------------------------------ Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 72 hours inoperable. OPERABLE status.OR A.2 --------NOTE ----------- Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.Place channel in trip. 72 hours (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-29 Amendment No. I EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more Functions with B.1 Restore EOC-RPT trip 2 hours EOC-RPT trip capability not capability. maintained. OR AND B.2 Apply the MCPR limit 2 hours MCPR limit for inoperable for inoperable EOC-RPT not made EOC-RPT as specified applicable, in the COLR.C. Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated 4 hours associated Completion recirculation pump from Time not met. service.OR C.2 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours POWER to < 27.6%RTP.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE ----------------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.2 Verify TSV -Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip In accordance with Oil Pressure -Low Functions are not bypassed the Surveillance when THERMAL POWER is > 27.6% RTP. Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-30 Amendment No. EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The In accordance with Allowable Values shall be: the Surveillance Frequency Control TSV -Closure: < 10% closed; and* Program TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low: > 600 psig.SR 3.3.4.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST In accordance with including breaker actuation. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.5


NOTE ---------------- Breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.6. Verify the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME In accordance with is within limits. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-31 Amendment No. ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4.2 Two channels per trip system for each ATWS-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE: a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -ATWS-RPT Level; and b. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High.APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.ACTIONS------------------- NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each chan 7 ------------------------------------------------------------ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 14 days inoperable. OPERABLE status.OR A.2 ------------ NOTE ----------- Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.Place channel in trip. 14 days B. One Function with B.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip 72 hours ATWS-RPT trip capability capability. not maintained.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-32 Amendment No. I ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Both Functions with C.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip 1 hour ATWS-RPT trip capability capability for one not maintained. Function.D. Required Action and D.1 Remove the associated 6 hours associated Completion recirculation pump from Time not met. service.OR D.2 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE ------------------------------ When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-33 Amendment No. ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The In accordance with Allowable Values shall be: the Surveillance Frequency Control a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Program ATWS-RPT Level: 2 -73 inches; and b. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High: 1175 psig.SR 3.3.4.2.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST In accordance with including breaker actuation. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-34 Amendment No. ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.1 APPLICABILITY: The ECCS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.According to Table 3.3.5.1-1. ACTIONS------------------- NOT Separate Condition entry is allowed for each cha r -------------------------------------------------------------- CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable, referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 for the channel.B. As required by Required B.1 ---------- NOTES----- Action A. 1 and referenced

1. Only applicable in in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

MODES 1, 2, and 3.2. Only applicable for Functions 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, and 2.b.Declare supported 1 hour from discovery feature(s) inoperable, of loss of initiation capability for feature(s) in both divisions AND (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-35 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2 -------NOTE------ Only applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b.Declare High Pressure 1 hour from discovery Coolant Injection (HPCI) of loss of HPCI System inoperable, initiation capability AND B.3 Place channel in trip. 24 hours C. As required by Required C.1 ---------- NOTES----- Action A.1 and referenced

1. Only applicable in in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

MODES 1, 2, and 3.2. Only applicable for Functions 1 .c, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f.Declare supported 1 hour from discovery feature(s) inoperable, of loss of initiation capability for feature(s) in both divisions AND C.2 Restore channel to 24 hours OPERABLE status.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-36 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 ----------- NOTE-----Action A.1 and referenced Only applicable if in Table 3.3.5.1-1. HPCI pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool.Declare HPCI System 1 hour from discovery inoperable, of loss of HPCI initiation capability AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip. 24 hours OR D.2.2 Align the HPCI pump 24 hours suction to the suppression pool.E. As required by Required E.1 ---------- NOTES----- Action A.1 and referenced

1. Only applicable in in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

MODES 1, 2, and 3.2. Only applicable for Functions 1.d and 2.g.Declare supported 1 hour from discovery feature(s) inoperable, of loss of initiation capability for subsystems in both divisions AND E.2 Restore channel to 7 days OPERABLE status.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-37 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. As required by Required F.1 Declare Automatic 1 hour from discovery Action A. 1 and referenced Depressurization of loss of ADS in Table 3.3.5.1-1. System (ADS) valves initiation capability in inoperable, both trip systems AND F.2 Place channel in trip. 96 hours from discovery of inoperable channel concurrent with HPCI or reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) inoperable AND, 8 days G. As required by Required G.1 Declare ADS valves 1 hour from discovery Action A.1 and referenced inoperable, of loss of ADS in Table 3.3.5.1-1. initiation capability in both trip systems AND G.2 Restore channel to 96 hours from OPERABLE status. discovery of inoperable channel concurrent with HPCI or RCIC inoperable AND 8 days H. Required Action and H.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion supported feature(s) Time of Condition B, C, D, inoperable. E, F, or G not met.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-38 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Functions 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.3 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-39 Amendment No. ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 1 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Core Spray System a. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3, 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 -113 inches Water Level -Low 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low Low, Level 1 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b. Drywell Pressure -1,2,3 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 5 1.92 psig High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 c. Reactor Steam 1,2,3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 - 390 psig Dome Pressure -SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Low (Injection SR 3.3.5.1.4 5 476 psig Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1,5 4(a), 5(a) 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 390 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.4 476 psig SR 3.3.5.1.5 d. Core Spray Pump 1,2,3, 1 per E SR 3.3.5.1.1 ->570 gpm Discharge Flow -4(a), 5(a) subsystem SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.4 !5 745 gpm SR 3.3.5.1.5 2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System a. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3, 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 a -113 inches Water Level -Low 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low Low, Level 1 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b. Drywell 1,2.3 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 5 1.92 psig Pressure -High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)(a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.(b) Also required to initiate the associated diesel generator (DG) and isolate the associated plant service water (PSW)turbine building (T/B) isolation valves.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-40 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 2. LPCI System (continued)

c. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -Low (Injection Permissive)
d. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -Low (Recirculation Discharge Valve Permissive)
e. Reactor Vessel Shroud Level -Level 0 f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start -Time Delay Relay 1,2,3 4(a), 5(a)1 (c), 2(c), 3(c)1,2,3 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)4 4 4 2 1 per pump C B C B C SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 2t 390 psig and S 476 psig a 390 psig and! 476 psig-a 335 psig a -202 inches Pumps A, B, D Pump C 2: 9 seconds and:515 seconds:5 1 second at 1675 gpm and!5 2215 gpm g. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow -Low (Bypass)1,2,3, 1 per 4(a), 5(a) subsystem E SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)(a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.(c) With associated recirculation pump discharge valve open.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-41 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System a. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1

->-47 inches Level -Low Low, 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b. Drywell Pressure -High 1, 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 5 1.92 psig 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 c. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 S 56.5 inches Level -High, Level 8 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 d. Condensate Storage 1, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.3 > 2.61 ft Tank Level -Low 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.5 e. Suppression Pool 1, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 5 154 inches Water Level -High 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 f. High Pressure Coolant 1, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 ->590 gpm Injection Pump 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Discharge Flow -Low SR 3.3.5.1.4 s 845 gpm (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)(d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.I HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-42 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 4 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A a. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 2-113 inches Level -Low Low Low, 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b. Drywell 1, 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 5 1.92 psig Pressure -High 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 c. Automatic 1, 1 G SR 3.3.5.1.4

5 114 seconds Depressurization 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.5 System Initiation Timer d. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.1

>0 inches Level -Low, Level 3 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 (Confirmatory) SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 e. Core Spray Pump 1, 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.1 > 137 psig Discharge Pressure -2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and High SR 3.3.5.1.4 < 180 psig SR 3.3.5.1.5 f. Low Pressure Coolant 1, 4 G SR 3.3.5.1.1 >112 psig Injection Pump 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Discharge Pressure -SR 3.3.5.1.4 < 180 psig High SR 3.3.5.1.5 g. Automatic 1, 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.4 !5 12 minutes Depressurization 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.5 18 seconds System Low Water Level Actuation Timer (continued)(d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-43 Amendment No. I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 5 of 5)Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 5. ADS Trip System B a. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 2:-113 inches Level -Low Low Low, 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b. Drywell Pressure -High 1, 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 5 1.92 psig 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 c. Automatic 1, 1 G SR 3.3.5.1.4 5 114 seconds Depressurization 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.5 System Initiation Timer d. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 > 0 inches Level -Low, Level 3 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 (Confirmatory) SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 e. Core Spray 1, 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.1 _ 137 psig Pump Discharge 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Pressure -High SR 3.3.5.1.4 !S 180 psig SR 3.3.5.1.5 f. Low Pressure Coolant 1, 4 G SR 3.3.5.1.1 -112 psig Injection Pump 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Discharge Pressure -SR 3.3.5.1.4 S 180 psig High SR 3.3.5.1.5 g. Automatic 1, 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.4 5 12 minutes Depressurization 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.5 18 seconds System Low Water Level Actuation Timer (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-44 Amendment No. I RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.2 APPLICABILITY: The RCIC System instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.ACTIONS----------------------------------------------------------- IM k r ------------------------------------------------------------- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable, referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for the channel.B. As required by Required B.1 Declare RCIC System 1 hour from discovery Action A.1 and referenced inoperable, of loss of RCIC in Table 3.3.5.2-1. initiation capability AND B.2 Place channel in trip. 24 hours C. As required by Required C.1 Restore channel to 24 hours Action A.1 and referenced OPERABLE status.in Table 3.3.5.2-1.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-45 Amendment No. I RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 ---------- NOTE ------------ Action A.1 and referenced Only applicable if RCIC in Table 3.3.5.2-1. pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool.Declare RCIC System 1 hour from discovery inoperable, of loss of RCIC initiation capability AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip. 24 hours OR D.2.2 Align RCIC pump 24 hours suction to the suppression pool.E. Required Action and E.1 Declare RCIC System Immediately associated Completion inoperable. Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-46 Amendment No. I RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Function 2; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1, 3, and 4 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.3 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-47 Amendment No. RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 1 of 1)Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation CONDITIONS REQUIRED REFERENCED CHANNELS FROM PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level -4 B SR 3.3.5.2.1 --47 inches Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.4 SR 3.3.5.2.5 2. Reactor Vessel Water Level -2 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 S 56.5 inches High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.4 SR 3.3.5.2.5 3. Condensate Storage Tank 2 D SR 3.3.5.2.3 2! 1.0 ft Level -Low SR 3.3.5.2.5 4. Suppression Pool Water 2 D SR 3.3.5.2.3 5 151 inches Level -High SR 3.3.5.2.5 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-48 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 APPLICABILITY: The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.According to Table 3.3.6.1-1. ACTIONS------------------ NOTE--.Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours for channels inoperable. Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 6.b AND 24 hours for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 6.b B. ---------NOTE -------------- B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour Not applicable for capability. Function 5.c.One or more automatic Functions with isolation capability not maintained. C. Required Action and C.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition A or B Table 3.3.6.1-1 for the not met. channel.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-49 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 Isolate associated main 12 hours Action C.1 and referenced steam line (MSL).in Table 3.3.6.1-1. OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours E. As required by Required E.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. F. As required by Required F.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour Action C.1 and referenced penetration flow in Table 3.3.6.1-1. path(s).G. As required by Required G.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. AND OR G.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F not met.H. As required by Required H.1 Declare Standby Liquid 1 hour Action C.1 and referenced Control (SLC) System in Table 3.3.6.1-1. inoperable. OR H.2 Isolate the Reactor 1 hour Water Cleanup (RWCU) System.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-50 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. As required by Required 1.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately Action C.1 and referenced channel to OPERABLE in Table 3.3.6.1-1. status.OR 1.2 Initiate action to isolate Immediately the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Shutdown Cooling System.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-51 Amendment No. Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.7


NOTE ---------------- Channel sensors are excluded.Verify the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE In accordance with TIME is within limits. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-52 Amendment No. Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 1 of 4)Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Main Steam Line Isolation a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low, Level 1 b. Main Steam Line Pressure -Low c. Main Steam Line Flow -High 1,2,3 1 1,2,3 2 2 2 per MSL D E D SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 2 -113 inches-825 psig s 138% rated steam flow d. Condenser Vacuum -Low e. Main Steam Tunnel Temperature -High f. Turbine Building Area Temperature -High 2. Primary Containment Isolation 1, 2(a), 3(a)1,2,3 1,2,3 2 6 16(b)D D D SR 3.3.6.1.3 -7 inches Hg SR 3.3.6.1.6 vacuum SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6!5 194'F S 200'F a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 b. Drywell Pressure -High 1,2,3 1,2,3 2 2 G G SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6> 0 inches< 1.92 psig (continued)(a) With any turbine stop valve not closed.(b) With 8 channels per trip string. Each trip string shall have 2 channels per main steam line, with no more than 40 ft separating any two OPERABLE channels.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-53 Amendment No. Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 2 of 4)Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 2. Primary Containment Isolation (continued)

c. Drywell Radiation

-High d. Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation -High e. Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation -High 3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Isolation a. HPCI Steam Line Flow -High b. HPCI Steam Supply Line Pressure -Low c. HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure -High d. Drywell Pressure -High e. HPCI Pipe Penetration Room Temperature -High f. Suppression Pool Area Ambient Temperature -High 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1 2 2 G G 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1 F 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3,6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 138 R/hr< 80 mR/hr s 80 mR/hr 2 F< 303% rated steam flow a 100 psig 5 20 psig 5 1.92 psig 169'F s 169°F I F I F 1 F (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-54 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 3 of 4)Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 3. HPCI System Isolation (continued)

g. Suppression Pool Area Temperature

-Time Delay Relays h. Suppression Pool Area Differential Temperature -High i. Emergency Area Cooler Temperature -High 4. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation a. RCIC Steam Line Flow -High b. RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure -Low c. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure -High d. Drywell Pressure -High e. RCIC Suppression Pool Ambient Area Temperature -High f. Suppression Pool Area Temperature -Time Delay Relays 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1 1 F F F SR 3.3.6.1.4 5 16 minutes SR 3.3.6.1.6 15 seconds SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6:542'F:s 169'F 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6,1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 5 307% rated steam flow a 60 psig20 psig 5 1.92 psig 5 169°F SR 3.3.6.1.4 < 31 minutes SR 3.3.6.1.6 15 seconds (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 313-55 Amendment No. I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 4)Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 4. RCIC System Isolation (continued)

g. RCIC Suppression Pool Area Differential Temperature

-High h. Emergency Area Cooler Temperature -High 5. RWCU System Isolation a. Area Temperature -High b. Area Ventilation Differential Temperature -High c. SLC System Initiation

d. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low, Level 2 6. RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation 1,2,3 1 F 1,2,3 F 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2 1,2,3 1 per area 1 per area 1 (c)2 F F H F SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6!542*F!5 169'F s 150'F 67°F NA-47 inches a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High b. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 1,2,3 3,4,5 1 2(d)F SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 S 145 psig 2! 0 inches (c) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one of the two trip systems.(d) Only one trip system required in MODES 4 and 5 when RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-56 Amendment No. I Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.2 APPLICABILITY: The secondary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.According to Table 3.3.6.2-1. ACTIONS------------------- NOI Separate Condition entry is allowed for each cha r ------------------------------------------------------------- CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours for inoperable. Function 2 AND 24 hours for Functions other than Function 2 B. One or more automatic B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour Functions with isolation capability. capability not maintained. C. Required Action and C.1.1 Isolate the associated 1 hour associated Completion penetration flow Time of Condition A or B path(s).not met.OR C.1.2 Declare associated 1 hour secondary containment isolation valves inoperable. AND (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-57 Amendment No. Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1 Place the associated 1 hour standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) in operation. OR C.2.2 Declare associated 1 hour SGT subsystem(s) inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES ------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Secondary Containment Isolation Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-58 Amendment No. Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.2.5. Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-59 Amendment No. Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Table 3.3.6.2-1 (page 1 of 1)Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED OTHER CHANNELS SPECIFIED PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS TRIP SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2, 3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 2-:47 inches Level -Low Low, Level 2 (a) SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SIR 3.3.6.2.5 2. Drywell Pressure -High 1, 2, 3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 s 1.92 psig SIR 3.3.6.2.2 SIR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 3. Reactor Building Exhaust 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 5 80 mR/hr Radiation -High (a) SIR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 4. Refueling Floor Exhaust 1,2, 3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 < 80 mRPhr Radiation -High 5(a), (b) SR 3.3.6.2.3 SIR 3.3.6.2.5 (a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.(b) During CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment. HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-60 Amendment No. I LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.3 Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.3 APPLICABILITY: The LLS valve instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One LLS valve with A.1 Restore LLS valve 24 hours initiation capability not initiation capability. maintained. B. One or more safety/relief B.1 Restore tailpipe Prior to entering valves (S/RVs) with one pressure switches to MODE 2 or 3 from Function 3 channel OPERABLE status. MODE 4 inoperable. C. ---------NOTE -------------- 0 C.1 Restore one tailpipe 14 days Separate Condition entry is pressure switch to allowed for each S/RV. OPERABLE status.One or more S/RVs with two Function 3 channels inoperable.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-61 Amendment No. I LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Declare the associated Immediately associated Completion LLS valve(s)Time of Condition A, B, inoperable. or C not met.OR Two or more LLS valves with initiation capability not maintained. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTES-------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.3-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Function.2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided LLS initiation capability is maintained.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.3.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for In accordance with portion of the channel outside primary the Surveillance containment. Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-62 Amendment No. LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.3


NOTE-------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 during each scheduled outage > 72 hours when entry is made into primary containment. Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for In accordance with portions of the channel inside primary the Surveillance containment. Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.3.4 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.3.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.3.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-63 Amendment No. LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 Table 3.3.6.3-1 (page 1 of 1)Low-Low Set Instrumentation REQUIRED CHANNELS PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High 1 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3.1 S 1085 psig SR 3.3.6.3.4 SR 3.3.6.3.5 SR 3.3.6.3.6 2. Low-Low Set Pressure Setpoints 2 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3.1 Low: SR 3.3.6.3.4 Open :5 1010 psig SR 3.3.6.3.5 Close 5 860 psig SR 3.3.6.3.6 Medium-Low: Open s 1025 psig Close S 875 psig Medium-High: Open s 1040 psig Close < 890 psig High: Open s 1050 psig Close 5 900 psig 3. Tailpipe Pressure Switch 2 per S/RV SR 3.3.6.3.2 a: 80 psig and SR 3.3.6.3.3 100 psig SR 3.3.6.3.5 SR 3.3.6.3.6 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-64 Amendment No. I MCREC System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7.1 APPLICABILITY: Two channels of the Control Room Air Inlet Radiation -High Function shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).ACTIONS---------------------------------------------------------- IvI J Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or both channels A.1 Declare associated 1 hour from discovery inoperable. MCREC subsystem(s) of loss of MCREC inoperable, initiation capability in both trip systems AND A.2 Place channel in trip. 6 hours B. Required Action and B.1 Place the associated 1 hour associated Completion MCREC subsystem(s) Time not met. in the pressurization mode of operation. OR B.2 Declare associated 1 hour MCREC subsystem(s) inoperable. HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-65 Amendment No. I MCREC System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE.When a Control Room Air Inlet Radiation -High channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other channel is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.7.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.7.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The In accordance with Allowable Value shall be < 1 mr/hour. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.7.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-66 Amendment No. LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8.1 APPLICABILITY: The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3, When the associated diesel generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources -Shutdown." ACTIONS-------------------- NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 1 hour inoperable for Functions 1 OPERABLE status.and 2.B. One or more channels B.1 Verify voltage on Once per hour inoperable for Function 3. associated 4.16 kV bus is > 3825 V.C. Required Action and C.1 Declare associated DG Immediately associated Completion inoperable. Time not met.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-67 Amendment No. I LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ..........................................


J I-------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.8.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each LOP Function.2. When a 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains initiation capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3).SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3,3-68 Amendment No. LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 Table 3.3.8.1-1 (page 1 of 1)Loss of Power Instrumentation REQUIRED CHANNELS PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)a. Bus Undervoltage 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 -2800 V SR 3.3.8.1,3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 b. Time Delay 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 56.5 seconds SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 2. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)a. Bus Undervoltage 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 -.3280 V SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 b. Time Delay 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 S 21.5 seconds SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 3. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Annunciation)

a. Bus Undervoltage 1 SR 3.3.8.1.1 a 3825 V SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 b. Time Delay 1 SR 3.3.8.1.2 S 65 seconds SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-69 Amendment No. I RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring LCO 3.3.8.2 APPLICABILITY:

Two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies shall be OPERABLE for each inservice RPS motor generator set or alternate power supply.MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODES 4 and 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies or with both residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling (SDC) isolation valves open.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or both inservice A.1 Remove associated 72 hours power supplies with one inservice power electric power monitoring supply(s) from service.assembly inoperable. B. One or both inservice B.1 Remove associated 1 hour power supplies with both inservice power electric power monitoring supply(s) from service.assemblies inoperable. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-70 Amendment No. I RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately associated Completion insert all insertable Time of Condition A or B control rods in core not met in MODE 4 or 5 cells containing one or with any control rod more fuel assemblies. withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel AND assemblies or with both RHR SDC isolation valves D.2.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately open. one electric power monitoring assembly to OPERABLE status for inservice power supply(s) supplying required instrumentation. OR D.2.2 Initiate action to isolate Immediately the RHR SDC.HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-71 Amendment No. I RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------- When an RPS electric power monitoring assembly is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other RPS electric power monitoring assembly for the associated power supply maintains trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.2.1


NOTE-------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, when in MODE 4 for-> 24 hours.Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The In accordance with Allowable Values shall be: the Surveillance Frequency Control a. Overvoltage < 132 V, with time delay set to Program< 4 seconds.b. Undervoltage > 108 V, with time delay set to < 4 seconds.c. Underfrequency > 57 Hz, with time delay set to 5 4 seconds.SR 3.3.8.2.3 Perform a system functional test. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-72 Amendment No. Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.1 Satisfy the 24 hours LCO not met. requirements of the LCO.B. Required Action and B. 1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.OR No recirculation loops in operation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1 ------------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be performed until 24 hours after both recirculation loops are in operation. Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch In accordance with with both recirculation loops in operation is: the Surveillance Frequency Control a. < 10% of rated core flow when operating at Program< 70% of rated core flow; and b. < 5% of rated core flow when operating at 2- 70% of rated core flow.SR 3.4.1.2 (Not used.)HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-2 Amendment No. Jet Pumps 3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.2.1---------------------------- NOTES -----------------------------

1. Not required to be performed until 4 hours after associated recirculation loop is in operation.
2. Not required to be performed until 24 hours after > 25% RTP.Verify at least one of the following criteria (a, b, or c) is satisfied for each operating recirculation loop: a. Recirculation pump flow to speed ratio differs by S 5% from established patterns, and jet pump loop flow to recirculation pump speed ratio differs by 5% from established patterns.b. Each jet pump diffuser to lower plenum differential pressure differs by < 20% from established patterns.c. Each jet pump flow differs by < 10% from established patterns.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-5 Amendment No.

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

3.4.5 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours D. All required leakage D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately detection systems inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE------------------------------- When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required leakage detection instrumentation is OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of required primary In accordance with containment atmospheric monitoring system. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.4.5.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of In accordance with required leakage detection instrumentation, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.4.5.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required In accordance with leakage detection instrumentation, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-11 Amendment No. RCS Specific Activity 3.4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.6.1 ------------------ NOTE ---------------- Only required to be performed in MODE 1.Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 In accordance with specific activity is < 0.2 pCi/gm. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-13 Amendment No. RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Hot Shutdown 3.4.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.7.1------------------ NOTE--------------- Not required to be met until 2 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR low pressure permissive pressure.Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is operating. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-16 Amendment No. RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Cold Shutdown 3.4.8 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. No RHR shutdown cooling B.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND AND No recirculation pump in operation. Once per 12 hours thereafter AND B.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or In accordance with recirculation pump is operating. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-18 Amendment No. RCS P/T Limits 3.4.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY.4-SR 3.4.9.1 Verify: In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program a. RCS pressure and RCS temperature are within the limits specified in Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2 during RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and during RCS non-nuclear heatup and cooldown operations; and b. RCS heatup and cooldown rates are< 100'F in any 1 hour period during RCS heatup and cooldown operations, and RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.SR 3.4.9.2------------------ NOTE--------------- Only required to be met when the reactor is critical and immediately prior to control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality. Verify RCS pressure and RCS temperature are within the criticality limits specified in Figure 3.4.9-3.Once within 15 minutes prior to initial control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality SR 3.4.9.3 ------------------- NOTE --------------- Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 during startup of a recirculation pump.Verify the difference between the bottom head Once within coolant temperature and the reactor pressure 15 minutes prior to vessel (RPV) coolant temperature is < 145°F. starting an idle recirculation pump (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-20 Amendment No. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure 3.4.10 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure LCO 3.4.10 APPLICABILITY: The reactor steam dome pressure shall be < 1058 psig.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Reactor steam dome A.1 Restore reactor steam 15 minutes pressure not within limit, dome pressure to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.10.1 Verify reactor steam dome pressure is In accordance with S 1058 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-25 Amendment No. ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.1 Verify, for each ECCS injection/spray subsystem, In accordance with the piping is filled with water from the pump the Surveillance discharge valve to the injection valve. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.2 ---------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------ Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) low pressure permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem In accordance with manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the Surveillance the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or Frequency Control otherwise secured in position, is in the correct Program position.SR 3.5.1.3 Verify ADS air supply header pressure is In accordance with> 90 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.4 Verify the RHR System cross tie valve is closed In accordance with and power is removed from the valve operator. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.5 (Not used.)(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-3 Amendment No. ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.6------------------ NOTE-------------- Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, when in MODE 4> 48 hours.Verify each recirculation pump discharge valve cycles through one complete cycle of full travel or is de-energized in the closed position.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.7 Verify the following ECCS pumps develop the specified flow rate against a system head corresponding to the specified reactor pressure.-SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING NO. OF TO A REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE PUMPS PRESSURE OF In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program CS > 4250 gpm 1 LPCI > 17,000 gpm 2 113 psig 20 psig SR 3.5.1.8 -------------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure < 1058 psig and In accordance with> 920 psig, the HPCI pump can develop a flow the Surveillance rate a 4250 gpm against a system head Frequency Control corresponding to reactor pressure. Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-4 Amendment No. ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.9------------------ NOTE-------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure < 165 psig, the HPCI pump can develop a flow rate > 4250 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor system pressure.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.10 -------------------- NOTE--------------- Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem In accordance with actuates on an actual or simulated automatic the Surveillance initiation signal. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.11 ---------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------- Valve actuation may be excluded.Verify the ADS actuates on an actual or simulated In accordance with automatic initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.12 Verify each ADS valve relief mode actuator In accordance with strokes when manually actuated. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-5 Amendment No. ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.13-NOTE ---------------------------- ECCS injection/spray initiation instrumentation response time may be assumed from established limits.Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem ECCS RESPONSE TIME is within limits.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-6 Amendment No. ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.2 ECCS -Shutdown LCO 3.5.2 APPLICABILITY: Two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.MODE 4, MODE 5, except with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and water level > 22 ft 1/8 inches over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required ECCS A.1 Restore required ECCS 4 hours injection/spray subsystem injection/spray inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B. 1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion suspend operations with Time of Condition A not a potential for draining met. the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).C. Two required ECCS C.1 Initiate action to Immediately injection/spray subsystems suspend OPDRVs.inoperable. AND C.2 Restore one ECCS 4 hours injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.D. Required Action C.2 and D.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately associated Completion secondary containment Time not met. to OPERABLE status.AND (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-7 Amendment No. I ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2 Initiate action to restore Immediately required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND D.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify, for each required low pressure coolant In accordance with injection (LPCI) subsystem, the suppression pool the Surveillance water level is a 146 inches. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.2 Verify, for each required core spray (CS) In accordance with subsystem, the: the Surveillance Frequency Control a. Suppression pool water level is Program'a 146 inches; or b. ----------------- NOTE------------- Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during OPDRVs.Condensate storage tank water level is 2! 15 ft.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-8 Amendment No. ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.3 Verify, for each required ECCS injection/spray In accordance with subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the the Surveillance pump discharge valve to the injection valve. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.4 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. Verify each required ECCS injection/spray In accordance with subsystem manual, power operated, and the Surveillance automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, Frequency Control sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the Program correct position.SR 3.5.2.5 Verify each required ECCS pump develops the In accordance with specified flow rate against a system head the Inservice corresponding to the specified reactor pressure. Testing Program SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING NO. OF TO A REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE PUMPS PRESSURE OF CS a 4250 gpm 1 a 113 psig LPCI a 7700 gpm 1 -20 psig SR 3.5.2.6 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.Verify each required ECCS injection/spray In accordance with subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated the Surveillance automatic initiation signal. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-9 Amendment No. RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 APPLICABILITY: The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.ACTIONS-NOTE.LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCIC System inoperable. A.1 Verify by administrative 1 hour means high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)System is OPERABLE.AND A.2 Restore RCIC System 14 days to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Reduce reactor steam 36 hours dome pressure to< 150 psig.HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-10 Amendment No. RCIC System 3.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 Verify the RCIC System piping is filled with water In accordance with from the pump discharge valve to the injection the Surveillance valve. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.3.2 Verify each RCIC System manual, power In accordance with operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, the Surveillance that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in Frequency Control position, is in the correct position. Program SR 3.5.3.3 ---------------------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure < 1058 psig and In accordance with> 920 psig, the RCIC pump can develop a flow the Surveillance rate >- 400 gpm against a system head Frequency Control corresponding to reactor pressure. Program SR 3.5.3.4 --------------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.Verify, with reactor pressure < 165 psig, the RCIC In accordance with pump can develop a flow rate a 400 gpm against a the Surveillance system head corresponding to reactor pressure. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.3.5 --------------------- NOTE--------------- Vessel injection may be excluded.Verify the RCIC System actuates on an actual or In accordance with simulated automatic initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-11 Amendment No. Primary Containment 3.6.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential In accordance with pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch the Surveillance water gauge per minute tested over a 10 minute Frequency Control period at an initial differential pressure of 1 psid. Program AND.------ NOTE ---------- Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-2 Amendment No. Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.2.1---------------- NOTES --------------

1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1.

Perform required primary containment air lock leakage rate testing in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.2.2-NOTE ------------------------------- Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted. Verify only one door in the primary containment air lock can be opened at a time.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-6 Amendment No. PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and F.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion suspend operations Time of Condition A, B, C, with a potential for or D not met for PCIV(s) draining the reactor required to be OPERABLE vessel.during MODE 4 or 5.OR F.2 -------NOTE------ Only applicable for inoperable RHR shutdown cooling valves.Initiate action to restore Immediately valve(s) to OPERABLE status.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1


NOTE --------------- Not required to be met when the 18 inch primary containment purge valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge In accordance with valve is closed. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-10 Amendment No. PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.2------------------------------ NOTES ---------------------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.3------------------

NOTES--------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe In accordance with (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power operated In accordance with and each automatic PCIV, except for MSIVs, is the Inservice within limits. Testing Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 316-11 Amendment No. PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance with> 3 seconds and s 5 seconds. the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, In accordance with actuates to the isolation position on an actual or the Surveillance simulated isolation signal. Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV (of In accordance with a representative sample) actuates to restrict flow the Surveillance to within limits. Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each In accordance with shear isolation valve of the TIP system. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify the combined leakage rate for all In accordance with secondary containment bypass leakage paths is the Primary 5 0.009 La when pressurized to > Pa. Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is In accordance with< 100 scfh, and a combined maximum the Primary pathway leakage -; 250 scfh for all four main Containment steam lines, when tested at a 28.8 psig. Leakage Rate Testing Program However, the leakage rate acceptance criteria for the first test following discovery of leakage through an MSIV not meeting the 100 scfh limit, shall be < 11.5 scfh for that MSIV.SR 3.6.1.3.12 Deleted (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-12 Amendment No. PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.13 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper In accordance with to the fully closed and fully open position. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-13 Amendment No. Drywell Pressure 3.6.1.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.4 Drywell Pressure LCO 3.6.1.4 APPLICABILITY: Drywell pressure shall be s 1.75 psig.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Drywell pressure not within A.1 Restore drywell 1 hour limit. pressure to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.4.1 Verify drywell pressure is within limit. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-14 Amendment No. Drywell Air Temperature 3.6.1.5 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature LCO 3.6.1.5 APPLICABILITY: Drywell average air temperature shall be < 150'F.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Drywell average air A.1 Restore drywell 8 hours temperature not within limit, average air temperature to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.5.1 Verify drywell average air temperature is within In accordance with limit. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-15 Amendment No. LLS Valves 3.6.1.6 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.6 Low-Low Set (LLS) Valves LCO 3.6.1.6 The LLS function of three of four safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Two or more LLS valves A. 1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours inoperable. AND A.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-16 Amendment No. I LLS Valves 3.6.1.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.6.1 Verify each LLS valve relief mode actuator strokes In accordance with when manually actuated, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.6.2


NOTE --------------- Valve actuation may be excluded.Verify the LLS System actuates on an actual or In accordance with simulated automatic initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-17 Amendment No. Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.7 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.7 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers LCO 3.6.1.7 APPLICABILITY: Each reactor build ing-to-suppression chamber vacuum breaker shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS-------------------- NOT Separate Condition entry is allowed for each line.I -------------------------------------------------------------- CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more lines with one A.1 Close the open vacuum 72 hours reactor building-to-breaker.suppression chamber vacuum breaker not closed.B. One or more lines with two B. 1 Close one open 1 hour reactor building-to-vacuum breaker.suppression chamber vacuum breakers not closed.C. One line with one or more C.1 Restore the vacuum 72 hours reactor building-to-breaker(s) to suppression chamber OPERABLE status.vacuum breakers inoperable for opening.D. Two lines with one or more D.1 Restore all vacuum 1 hour reactor building-to-breakers in one line to suppression chamber OPERABLE status.vacuum breakers inoperable for opening.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-18 Amendment No. I Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.7.1


NOTES ---------------------------

1. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances.
2. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers open when performing their intended function.Verify each vacuum breaker is closed. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.7.2 Perform a functional test of each vacuum breaker. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.7.3 Verify the opening setpoint of each vacuum In accordance with breaker is S 0.5 psid. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-19 Amendment No.

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.8 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers LCO 3.6.1.8 Ten suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE for opening.AND Twelve suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers shall be closed, except when performing their intended function.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required suppression A.1 Restore one vacuum 72 hours chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker to OPERABLE breaker inoperable for status.opening.B. One suppression chamber- B.1 Close the open vacuum 2 hours to-drywell vacuum breaker breaker.not closed.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-20 Amendment No. I Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.8.1 -- ---------------------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances. Verify each vacuum breaker is closed. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.8.2 Perform a functional test of each required vacuum In accordance with breaker. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Within 12 hours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the S/RVs SR 3.6.1.8.3 Verify the opening setpoint of each required In accordance with vacuum breaker is 5 0.5 psid. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-21 Amendment No. Suppression Pool Average Temperature 3.6.2.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature LCO 3.6.2.1 Suppression pool average temperature shall be: a. < 100°F when any OPERABLE intermediate range monitor (IRM)channel is > 25/40 divisions of full scale on Range 7 and no testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed;

b. < 105 0 F when any OPERABLE IRM channel is > 25/40 divisions of full scale on Range 7 and testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed; and c. .1 10°F when all OPERABLE IRM channels are < 25/40 divisions of full scale on Range 7.APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Suppression pool average A.1 Verify suppression pool Once per hour temperature > 100°F but average temperature <110°F. <110°F.AND AND Any OPERABLE IRM A.2 Restore suppression 24 hours channel > 25/40 divisions pool average of full scale on Range 7. temperature to 5 100 0 F.AND Not performing testing that adds heat to the suppression pool.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-22 Amendment No. I Suppression Pool Average Temperature 3.6.2.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 12 hours associated Completion POWER until all Time of Condition A not OPERABLE IRM met. channels< 25/40 divisions of.full scale on Range 7.C. Suppression pool average C.1 Suspend all testing that Immediately temperature > 105°F. adds heat to the suppression pool.AND Any OPERABLE IRM channel > 25/40 divisions of full scale on Range 7.AND Performing testing that adds heat to the suppression pool.D. Suppression pool average D.1 Place the reactor mode Immediately temperature > 1 10°F but switch in the shutdown< 120 0 F. position.AND D.2 Verify suppression pool Once per 30 minutes average temperature < 120 0 F.AND D.3 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-23 Amendment No. I Suppression Pool Average Temperature 3.6.2.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Suppression pool average E.1 Depressurize the 12 hours temperature > 120°F. reactor vessel to< 200 psig.AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1.1 Verify suppression pool average temperature is In accordance with within the applicable limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 5 minutes when performing testing that adds heat to the suppression pool HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-24 Amendment No. Suppression Pool Water Level 3.6.2.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level LCO 3.6.2.2 APPLICABILITY: Suppression pool water level shall be 146 inches and < 150 inches.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Suppression pool water A.1 Restore suppression 2 hours level not within limits, pool water level to within limits.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.2.1 Verify suppression pool water level is within limits. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-25 Amendment No. RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling LCO 3.6.2.3 APPLICABILITY: Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression pool A.1 Restore RHR 7 days cooling subsystem suppression pool inoperable, cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.B. Two RHR suppression pool B.1 Restore one RHR 8 hours cooling subsystems suppression pool inoperable, cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.3.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling In accordance with subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic the Surveillance valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or Frequency Control otherwise secured in position is in the correct Program position or can be aligned to the correct position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-26 Amendment No. RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.3.2 Verify each required RHR pump develops a flow In accordance with rate > 7700 gpm through the associated heat the Inservice exchanger while operating in the suppression pool Testing Program cooling mode.HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-27 Amendment No. I RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray LCO 3.6.2.4 APPLICABILITY: Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression pool A.1 Restore RHR 7 days spray subsystem suppression pool spray inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.B. Two RHR suppression pool B.1 Restore one RHR 8 hours spray subsystems suppression pool spray inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.4.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool spray In accordance with subsystem manual, power operated, and the Surveillance automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, Frequency Control sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the Program correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-28 Amendment No. RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.4.2 Verify each suppression pool spray nozzle is In accordance with unobstructed. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-29 Amendment No. Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration 3.6.3.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.2 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration LCO 3.6.3.2 APPLICABILITY: The primary containment oxygen concentration shall be < 4.0 volume percent.MODE 1 during the time period: a. From 24 hours after THERMAL POWER is > 15% RTP following startup, to b. 24 hours prior to reducing THERMAL POWER to < 15% RTP prior to the next scheduled reactor shutdown.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Primary containment A. 1 Restore oxygen 24 hours oxygen concentration not concentration to within within limit, limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours associated Completion POWER to < 15% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.2.1 Verify primary containment oxygen concentration In accordance with is within limits. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-32 Amendment No. Drywell Cooling System Fans 3.6.3.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.3 Drywell Cooling System Fans LCO 3.6.3.3 APPLICABILITY: Two drywell cooling system fans shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required drywell A.1 Restore required 30 days cooling system fan drywell cooling system inoperable, fan to OPERABLE status.B. Two required drywell B.1 Restore one required 7 days cooling system fans drywell cooling system inoperable, fan to OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Associated Completion Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.3.1 Operate each required drywell cooling system fan In accordance with for a 15 minutes. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-33 Amendment No. Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment LCO 3.6.4.1 APPLICABILITY: The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRV).ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment A.1 Restore secondary 4 hours inoperable in MODE 1, 2, containment to or 3. OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met.B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours C. Secondary containment C.1 --------NOTE------ inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not movement of irradiated fuel applicable. assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE Suspend movement of Immediately ALTERATIONS, or during irradiated fuel OPDRVs. assemblies in the secondary containment. AND (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-34 Amendment No. I Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND C.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all secondary containment equipment In accordance with hatches are closed and sealed. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one secondary containment access door in In accordance with each access opening is closed, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.3


NOTE--------------- The number of standby gas treatment (SGT)subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. Verify required SGT subsystem(s) will draw In accordance with down the secondary containment to > 0.20 inch the Surveillance of vacuum water gauge in :5 120 seconds. Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-35 Amendment No. Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 4.SR 3.6.4.1.4-------------- NOTE --------------- The number of SGT subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3,"Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. Verify required SGT subsystem(s) can maintain> 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment for 1 hour at a flow rate< 4000 cfm for each subsystem. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-36 Amendment No. SCIVs 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)LCO 3.6.4.2 APPLICABILITY: Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRV).ACTIONS-------------------------------------- NOTES-------------------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIVs.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more penetration A.1 Isolate the affected 8 hours flow paths with one SCIV penetration flow path by inoperable, use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.AND A.2 .--------NOTE ------------

Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is isolated.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-37 Amendment No. I SCIVs 3.6.4.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more penetration B.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours flow paths with two SCIVs penetration flow path by inoperable, use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours D. Required Action and D.1 --------NOTE -----associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A or B applicable. not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the Suspend movement of Immediately secondary containment, irradiated fuel during CORE assemblies in the ALTERATIONS, or during secondary containment. OPDRVs.AND D.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND D.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-38 Amendment No. I SCIVs 3.6.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.2.1


NOTES--------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.2. Not required to be met for SCIVs that are open under administrative controls.Verify each secondary containment isolation In accordance with manual valve and blind flange that is required to the Surveillance be closed during accident conditions is closed. Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verify the isolation time of each power operated In accordance with and each automatic SCIV is within limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verify each automatic SCIV actuates to the In accordance with isolation position on an actual or simulated the Surveillance actuation signal. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-39 Amendment No.

SGT System 3.6.4.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO 3.6.4.3 APPLICABILITY: The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT subsystems required to support LCO 3.6.4.1,"Secondary Containment," shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRV).ACTIONS IMLJI------------------------------------- J I-- .................... I----------------------------------------- When two Unit 1 SGT subsystems are placed in an inoperable status solely for inspection of the Unit 1 hardened vent rupture disk, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 24 hours, provided both Unit 2 SGT subsystems are OPERABLE.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required Unit 1 SGT A.1 Restore required Unit 1 30 days from subsystem inoperable SGT subsystem to discovery of failure to while: OPERABLE status. meet the LCO 1. Four SGT subsystems required OPERABLE, and 2. Unit 1 reactor building-to-refueling floor plug not installed.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-40 Amendment No. I SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS (continued) I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One required Unit 2 SGT B.1 Restore required SGT 7 days subsystem inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status. AND OR 30 days from One required Unit 1 SGT discovery of failure to subsystem inoperable for meet the LCO reasons other than Condition A.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours D. Required Action and ----------- NOTE --------associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. Time of Condition A or B not met during movement of irradiated fuel D.1 Place remaining Immediately assemblies in the OPERABLE SGT secondary containment, subsystem(s) in during CORE operation. ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. OR D.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment. AND D.2.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND D.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-41 Amendment No. I SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Two or more required SGT E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.F. Two or more required SGT F.1 --------NOTE------ subsystems inoperable LCO 3.0.3 is not during movement of applicable. irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE Suspend movement of Immediately ALTERATIONS, or during irradiated fuel OPDRVs. assemblies in secondary containment. AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND F.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each required SGT subsystem for In accordance with a 15 continuous minutes. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in accordance In accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). the VFTP SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each required SGT subsystem actuates on In accordance with an actual or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-42 Amendment No. RHRSW System 3.7.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Both RHRSW subsystems


NOTE ------------------ inoperable for reasons Enter applicable Conditions and other than Condition B. Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7 for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.D.1 Restore one RHRSW 8 hours subsystem to OPERABLE status.E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify each RHRSW manual, power operated, and In accordance with automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, the Surveillance sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the Frequency Control correct position or can be aligned to the correct Program position.HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-2 Amendment No. PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Verify the water level in each PSW pump well of the intake structure is > 60.7 ft mean sea level (MSL).In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 12 hours when water level is s61.7 ft MSL SR 3.7.2.2------------------ NOTE ---------Isolation of flow to individual components or systems does not render PSW System inoperable. Verify each PSW subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow paths servicing safety related systems or components, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.2.3 Verify each PSW subsystem actuates on an actual In accordance with or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-5 Amendment No. DG 1 B SSW System 3.7.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify each DG 1B SSW System manual, power In accordance with operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, the Surveillance that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in Frequency Control position, is in the correct position. Program SR 3.7.3.2 Verify the DG 1B SSW System pump starts In accordance with automatically when DG 1B starts and energizes the Surveillance the respective bus. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-7 Amendment No. MCREC System 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two MCREC subsystems


NOTE ---------inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately during CORE irradiated fuel ALTERATIONS, or during assemblies in the OPDRVs. secondary containment. AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND F.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Operate each MCREC subsystem > 15 minutes. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.4.2 Perform required MCREC filter testing in In accordance with accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing the VFTP Program (VFTP).SR 3.7.4.3 Verify each MCREC subsystem actuates on an In accordance with actual or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-10 Amendment No. MCREC System 3.7.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.4 Verify each MCREC subsystem can maintain a In accordance with positive pressure of > 0.1 inches water gauge the Surveillance relative to the turbine building during the Frequency Control pressurization mode of operation at a subsystem Program flow rate of 2750 cfm and an outside air flow rate< 400 cfm.HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-11 Amendment No. Control Room AC System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each control room AC subsystem has the In accordance with capability to remove the assumed heat load. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-15 Amendment No. Main Condenser Offgas 3.7.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1-NOTE ---------.-.....------.-.-- Not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line not isolated and SJAE in operation. Verify the gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases is < 240 mCi/second. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Once within 4 hours after a a 50% increase in the nominal steady state fission gas release after factoring out increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER level HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-17 Amendment No. Main Turbine Bypass System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS, 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System LCO 3.7.7 The Main Turbine Bypass System shall be OPERABLE.OR LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System, as specified in the COLR, are made applicable. APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER ? 24% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the LCO A.1 Satisfy the requirements 2 hours not met. of the LCO.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 24% RTP.Time not met.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 Verify one complete cycle of each main turbine In accordance with bypass valve, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.7.2 Perform a system functional test. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.7.3 Verify the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM In accordance with RESPONSE TIME is within limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-18 Amendment No. Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level LCO 3.7.8 APPLICABILITY: The spent fuel storage pool water level shall be > 21 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks.During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Spent fuel storage pool A.1 ---------- NOTE------ water level not within limit. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 Verify the spent fuel storage pool water level is In accordance with> 21 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies the Surveillance seated in the spent fuel storage pool tacks. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-19 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------- SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18 are applicable only to the Unit 2 AC sources. SR 3.8.1.19 is applicable only to the Unit 1 AC sources.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.1 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated In accordance with power availability for each required offsite circuit. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.2 --------------------- NOTES ---------------

1. Performance of SR 3.8.1.5 satisfies this SR.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.3. A modified DG start involving idling and gradual acceleration to synchronous speed may be used for this SR as recommended by the manufacturer.

When modified start procedures are not used, the time, voltage, and frequency tolerances of SR 3.8.1.5.a must be met.4. For the swing DG, a single test will satisfy this Surveillance for both units, using the starting circuitry of Unit 2 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 2F for one periodic test, and the starting circuitry of Unit 1 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 1F during the next periodic test.5. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-7 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY+SR 3.8.1.2 (continued)


NOTES--------------

6. Starting transients above the upper voltage limit do not invalidate this test.7. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.8. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.Verify each DG: a. Starts from standby conditions and achieves steady state voltage > 3740 V and < 4243 V and frequency 58.8 Hz and< 61.2 Hz; and b. Operates for > 60 minutes at a load> 1710 kW and S 2000 kW.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.3 Verify each day tank contains a 500 gallons of In accordance with fuel oil. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.4 Check for and remove accumulated water from In accordance with each day tank. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-8 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) I SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.5---------------------------- NOTES---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.
3. Momentary load transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.4. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.5. For the swing DG, a single test will satisfy this Surveillance for both units, using the starting circuitry of Unit 2 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 2F for one periodic test and the starting circuitry of Unit 1 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 1F during the next periodic test.Verify each DG: a. Starts from standby conditions and achieves, in : 12 seconds, voltage> 3740 V and frequency

> 58.8 Hz and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage > 3740 V and < 4243 V and frequency > 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz;and b. Operates for a 60 minutes at a load> 2764 kW and < 2825 kW for DG 2A, a 2360 kW and < 2425 kW for DG 1B, and> 2742 kW and : 2825 kW for DG 2C.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-9 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.6------------------ NOTE ---------


This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify automatic and manual transfer of unit power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.7----------------- NOTES--------------

1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, except for the swing DG.For the swing DG, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2 using the Unit 2 controls.

Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.2. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG rejects a load greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load, and: a. Following load rejection, the frequency is< 65.5 Hz; and b. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the voltage is > 3740 V and < 4580 V.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-10 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.8------------------ NOTES--------------

1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, except for the swing DG.For the swing DG, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2 using the Unit 2 controls.

Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.2. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition, the power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG operating at a power factor < 0.88 does not trip and voltage is maintained

< 4800 V during and following a load rejection of > 2775 kW.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-11 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.9-------------- NOTES---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal: a. De-energization of emergency buses;b. Load shedding from emergency buses;and c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and: 1. Energizes permanently connected loads in < 12 seconds, 2. Energizes auto-connected shutdown loads through automatic load sequence timing devices, 3. Maintains steady state voltage-> 3740 V and < 4243 V, 4. Maintains steady state frequency_> 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz, and 5. Supplies permanently connected and auto-connected shutdown loads for > 5 minutes.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-12 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY+SR 3.8.1.10--------------- NOTES --------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify on an actual or simulated Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation signal each DG auto-starts from standby condition and: a. In < 12 seconds after auto-start achieves voltage > 3740 V, and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage> 3740 V and < 4243 V;b. In < 12 seconds after auto-start achieves frequency

> 58.8 Hz, and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains frequency > 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz; and c. Operates for > 5 minutes.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-13 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 1--SR 3.8.1.11------------- NOTE ----------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify each DG's automatic trips are bypassed on actual or simulated loss of voltage signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal except: a. Engine overspeed;

b. Generator differential current; and c. Low lube oil pressure.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-14 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.12------------ NOTES---------------

1. Momentary transients outside the load and power factor ranges do not invalidate this test.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, unless the other two DGs are OPERABLE.

If either of the other two DGs becomes inoperable, this Surveillance shall be suspended. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.3. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition, the power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

4. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG operating at a power factor < 0.88 operates for > 24 hours: a. For > 2 hours loaded > 3000 kW; and b. For the remaining hours of the test loaded> 2775 kW and < 2825 kW.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-15 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13------------- NOTES ---------------

1. This Surveillance shall be performed within 5 minutes of shutting down the DG after the DG has operated _> 2 hours loaded> 2565 kW. Momentary transients outside of load range do not invalidate this test.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.Verify each DG starts and achieves, in< 12 seconds, voltage > 3740 V and frequency> 58.8 Hz; and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage _ 3740 V and < 4243 V and frequency

> 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program+SR 3.8.1.14------------- NOTE ---------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify each DG: a. Synchronizes with offsite power source while loaded with emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;b. Transfers loads to offsite power source;and c. Returns to ready-to-load operation. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-16 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.15-NOTE ------------------------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify with a DG operating in test mode and connected to its bus, an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal overrides the test mode by: a. Returning DG to ready-to-load operation; and b. Automatically energizing the emergency load from offsite power.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.16-------------- NOTE --------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify interval between each sequenced load block is within +/- 10% of design interval for each load sequence timing device.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-17 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.17------------- NOTES---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify, on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal: a. De-energization of emergency buses;b. Load shedding from emergency buses;and c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and: 1. Energizes permanently connected loads in < 12 seconds, 2. Energizes auto-connected emergency loads through automatic load sequence timing devices, 3. Achieves steady state voltageý 3740 V and < 4243 V, 4. Achieves steady state frequency-> 58.8 Hz and < 61.2 Hz, and 5. Supplies permanently connected and auto-connected emergency loads for > 5 minutes.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-18 Amendment No. AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.18 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.Verify, when started simultaneously from standby In accordance with condition, the Unit 2 DGs achieve, in the Surveillance < 12 seconds, voltage > 3740 V and frequency Frequency Control> 58.8 Hz. Program SR 3.8.1.19 For required Unit 1 AC Sources, the SRs of In accordance with Unit I Technical Specifications are applicable, applicable SRs except SR 3.8.1.6, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.17.HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-19 Amendment No. Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil storage In accordance with tank contains > 33,320 gallons of fuel. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.2 Verify each required DG lube oil inventory is In accordance with> 400 gallons. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil total particulate concentration of In accordance with Unit 2 and swing DG stored fuel oil are tested in the Diesel Fuel Oil accordance with, and maintained within the limits Testing Program of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each required DG air start receiver pressure In accordance with is a 225 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.5 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer In accordance with subsystem operates to automatically transfer fuel the Surveillance oil from the storage tank to the day tank. Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.6 Check for and remove accumulated water from In accordance with each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil storage tank. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.3.7 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer In accordance with subsystem operates to manually transfer fuel from the Surveillance the associated fuel oil storage tank to the day tank Frequency Control of each required DG. Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-25 Amendment No. DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE------------------------------- SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8 are applicable only to the Unit 2 DC sources. SR 3.8.4.9 is applicable only to the Unit 1 DC sources.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.1 Verify battery terminal voltage is a 125 V on float In accordance with charge. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.4.2 Verify no visible corrosion at battery terminals and In accordance with connectors. the Surveillance Frequency Control OR Program Verify battery connection resistance is within limits.SR 3.8.4.3 Verify battery cells, cell plates, and racks show no In accordance with visual indication of physical damage or abnormal the Surveillance deterioration. Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.4.4 Remove visible corrosion, and verify battery cell to In accordance with cell and terminal connections are coated with the Surveillance anti-corrosion material. Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.4.5 Verify battery connection resistance is within In accordance with limits. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.4.6 Verify each required battery charger supplies In accordance with> 400 amps for station service subsystems, and the Surveillance > 100 amps for DG subsystems at > 129 V for Frequency Control> 1 hour. Program (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-28 Amendment No. DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) I SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY*1-SR 3.8.4.7----------------------------- NOTES ----------------------------

1. The modified performance discharge test in SR 3.8.4.8 may be performed in lieu of the service test in SR 3.8.4.7.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except for the swing DG battery. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify battery capacity is adequate to supply, and maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a battery service test.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-29 Amendment No. DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY*1-SR 3.8.4.8------------------- NOTE ---------------------------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except for the swing DG battery.However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Verify battery capacity is > 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test or a modified performance discharge test.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85% of expected life with capacity < 100% of manufacturer's rating AND 24 months when battery has reached 85% of expected life with capacity > 100% of manufacturer's rating SR 3.8.4.9 For required Unit 1 DC sources, the SRs of Unit 1 In accordance with Specification 3.8.4 are applicable, applicable SRs HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-30 Amendment No. Battery Cell Parameters

3.8.6 ACTIONS

(continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion battery inoperable. Time of Condition A not met.OR One or more batteries with average electrolyte temperature of the representative cells not within limits.OR One or more batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within Category C limits.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.6.1 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.8.6-1 In accordance with Category A limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.6.2 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.8.6-1 In accordance with Category B limits, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Once within 24 hours after battery overcharge > 150 V SR 3.8.6.3 Verify average electrolyte temperature of In accordance with representative cells is ? 65°F for each station the Surveillance service battery, and > 40°F for each DG battery. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-34 Amendment No. Distribution Systems -Operating 3.8.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.7.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to In accordance with required AC and DC electrical power distribution the Surveillance subsystems. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-38 Amendment No. Distribution Systems -Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.AND A.2.4 Initiate actions to Immediately restore required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND A.2.5 Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to In accordance with required AC and DC electrical power distribution the Surveillance subsystems. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-40 Amendment No. Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each of the following required refueling equipment interlock inputs: a. All-rods-in, b. Refuel platform position, c. Refuel platform fuel grapple, fuel loaded, d. Refuel platform fuel grapple full-up position, e. Refuel platform frame-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, f. Refuel platform trolley-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, and g. Service platform hoist, fuel loaded.In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-2 Amendment No. Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.2 Refuel

Position One-Rod-Out Interlock LCO 3.9.2 APPLICABILITY: The refuel position one-rod-out interlock shall be OPERABLE.MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position and any control rod withdrawn. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Refuel position one-rod-out A.1 Suspend control rod Immediately interlock inoperable, withdrawal. AND A.2 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.2.1 Verify reactor mode switch locked in refuel In accordance with position. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.9.2.2 --------------------- NOTE --------------- Not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn. ................................................................... Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-3 Amendment No. Control Rod Position 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.3 Control

Rod Position LCO 3.9.3 APPLICABILITY: All control rods shall be fully inserted.When loading fuel assemblies into the core.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more control rods A.1 Suspend loading fuel Immediately not fully inserted, assemblies into the core.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.3.1 Verify all control rods are fully inserted. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-4 Amendment No. Control Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling 3.9.5 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.5 Control

Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling LCO 3.9.5 APPLICABILITY: Each withdrawn control rod shall be OPERABLE.MODE 5.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more withdrawn A.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately control rods inoperable, insert inoperable withdrawn control rods.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.5.1 --------------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn. Insert each withdrawn control rod at least one In accordance with notch. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.9.5.2 Verify each withdrawn control rod scram In accordance with accumulator pressure is > 940 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-7 Amendment No. RPV Water Level 3.9.6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.6 Reactor

Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level LCO 3.9.6 APPLICABILITY: RPV water level shall be a 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV.During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV, During movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV, when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated within the RPV.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RPV water level not within A.1 Suspend movement of Immediately limit, fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.6.1 Verify RPV water level is > 23 ft above the top of In accordance with the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the the Surveillance RPV. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-8 Amendment No. RHR -High Water Level 3.9.7 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.AND B.4 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.C. No RHR shutdown cooling C.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND Once per 12 hours thereafter AND C.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.7.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is In accordance with operating. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-10 Amendment No. RHR -Low Water Level 3.9.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.C. No RHR shutdown cooling C.1 Verify reactor coolant 1 hour from discovery subsystem in operation. circulation by an of no reactor coolant alternate method. circulation AND Once per 12 hours thereafter AND C.2 Monitor reactor coolant Once per hour temperature. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is In accordance with operating. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-12 Amendment No. Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing 3.10.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3.1 Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the shutdown position.OR A.3.2-------- NOTE -----Only applicable in MODE 5.Place the reactor mode 1 hour switch in the refuel position.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.2.1 Verify all control rods are fully inserted in core In accordance with cells containing one or more fuel assemblies, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.2.2 Verify no CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-4 Amendment No. Single Control Rod Withdrawal -Hot Shutdown 3.10.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.3.1 Perform the applicable SRs for the required LCOs. According to the applicable SRs SR 3.10.3.2 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.3.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.3.d.1 requirements. Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with being withdrawn, in a five by five array centered the Surveillance on the control rod being withdrawn, are disarmed. Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.3.3 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with being withdrawn, are fully inserted, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-7 Amendment No. Single Control Rod Withdrawal -Cold Shutdown 3.10.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all control rods.OR B.2.2 Initiate action to satisfy Immediately the requirements of this LCO.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.4.1 Perform the applicable SRs for the required LCOs. According to the applicable SRs SR 3.10.4.2 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.4.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.4.c. 1 requirements. Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with being withdrawn, in a five by five array centered the Surveillance on the control rod being withdrawn, are disarmed. Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.4.3 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with being withdrawn, are fully inserted, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.4.4 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.4.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.4.b.1 requirements. Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2, 3.10-10 Amendment No. Single CRD Removal -Refueling 3.10.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.5.1 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, the Surveillance are fully inserted. Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.5.2 Verify all control rods, other than the control rod In accordance with withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, the Surveillance in a five by five array centered on' the control rod Frequency Control withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, Program are disarmed.SR 3.10.5.3 Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.5.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1. According to SR 3.1.1.1 SR 3.10.5.5 Verify no CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-12 Amendment No. Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal -Refueling 3.10.6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately insert all control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. OR A.3.2 Initiate action to satisfy Immediately the requirements of this LCO.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.6.1 Verify the four fuel assemblies are removed from In accordance with core cells associated with each control rod or CRD the Surveillance removed. Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.6.2 Verify all other control rods in core cells containing In accordance with one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.6.3 -------------------- NOTE ---------------- Only required to be met during fuel loading.Verify fuel assemblies being loaded are in In accordance with compliance with an approved spiral reload the Surveillance sequence. Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-14 Amendment No. SDM Test -Refueling 3.10.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.8.3 -------------------- NOTE--------------- Not required to be met if SR 3.10.8.2 satisfied. Verify movement of control rods is in compliance During control rod with the approved control rod sequence for the movement SDM test by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.SR 3.10.8.4 Verify no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in In accordance with progress. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.10.8.5 Verify each withdrawn control rod does not go to Each time the the withdrawn overtravel position. control rod is withdrawn to full-out position AND Prior to satisfying LCO 3.10.8.c requirement after work on control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling SR 3.10.8.6 Verify CRD charging water header pressure In accordance with> 940 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program HATCH UNIT 2 3.10-19 Amendment No. Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued) The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.5.5.13 Surveillance Frequency Control Program This program provides controls for the Surveillance Frequencies. The program shall ensure that Surveillance Requirements specified in the Technical Specifications are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation are met.a. The Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall contain a list of Frequencies of those Surveillance Requirements for which the Frequency is controlled by the program.b. Changes to the Frequencies listed in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall be made in accordance with the NEI 04-10, "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies," Revision 1.c. The provisions of Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are applicable to the Frequencies established in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-17 Amendment No. Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 7 TS Bases Changes for HNP Unit 1 Insert 1 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Insert 2 The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Insert 3 5.5.13 Surveillance Frequency Control Program This program provides controls for the Surveillance Frequencies. The program shall ensure that Surveillance Requirements specified in the Technical Specifications are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation are met.a. The Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall contain a list of Frequencies of those Surveillance Requirements for which the Frequency is controlled by the program.b. Changes to the Frequencies listed in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall be made in accordance with the NEI 04-10, "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies," Revision 1.c. The provisions of Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are applicable to the Frequencies established in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Control Rod OPERABILITY B 3.1.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued) E._1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, or D are not met, or there are nine or more inoperable control rods, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. This ensures all insertable control rods are inserted and places the reactor in a condition that does not require the active function (i.e., scram) of the control rods. The number of control rods permitted to be inoperable when operating above 10% RTP (e.g., no CRDA considerations) could be more than the value specified, but the occurrence of a large number of inoperable control rods could be indicative of a generic problem, and investigation and resolution of the potential problem should be undertaken. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 " SR 3.1.3.1 The position of each control rod must be determined to ensure adequate information on control rod position is available to the operator for determining control rod OPERABILITY and controlling rod patterns. Control rod position may be determined by the use of OPERABLE position indicators, by moving control rods to a position with an OPERABLE indicator, or by the use of other appropriate methods. The 24 hour FrequencY of thi. SIR i based on operatiRg uxuur eate +uitj Gu1u U(XQ8G]~tet ft1IaUtIL 113 UUI1[+ký k;!;+ ; + 1 A ;+; ; A; +;91i FOG P9t6ILIUI jARG-..- ý- .Cl Ir tv %ý"ri r" M1 W"a "ri ri tva "N., " V "Wrl r- r-tir".SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 Control rod insertion capability is demonstrated by inserting each partially or fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch and observing that the control rod moves. The control rod may then be returned to its original position. This ensures the control rod is not stuck and is free to insert on a scram signal. These Surveillances are not required when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the actual LPSP of the RWM, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of the Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1). T4he 7 day Frequency of SR 3.1.3.2 is based onR operating experienco rolatod to the changos in ORD) per~formancor and the easo of (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-16 Control Rod OPERABILITY B 3.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS peoform.ing no.tch testing R, fully withdrawn contro-l rods. Pa4rtialy withdrawn control rod, are tested at a 31 day baedn tho potential power roduction roquirod to allow the control rod Insert 2 movement and considering the large testing sample of SR 3.1.3-.2.7 Futhermofe, the 31 day Frequency takes into accoun.t experience related to changes performance. At any time, if a control rod is immovable, a determination of that control rod's tripability (capable of insertion by scram, i.e., OPERABILITY) must be made and appropriate action taken.These SRs are each modified by a Note that allows 7 days and 31 days, respectively, after withdrawal of the control rod and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that the control rod must first be withdrawn and THERMAL POWER must be greater than the LPSP before performance of the Surveillance, and therefore avoids potential conflicts with SR 3.0.3 and SR 3.0.4.SR 3.1.3.4 Verifying that the scram time for each control rod to notch position 06 is < 7 seconds provides reasonable assurance that the control rod will insert when required during a DBA or transient, thereby completing its shutdown function. This SR is performed in conjunction with the control rod scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and the functional testing of SDV vent and drain valves in LCO 3.1.8, "Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves," overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The associated Frequencies are acceptable, considering the more frequent testing performed to demonstrate other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY and operating experience, which shows scram times do not significantly change over an operating cycle.SR 3.1.3.5 Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the CRDM and will perform its intended function when necessary. The Surveillance requires verifying a control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position. The overtravel position (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-17 REVISION I Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.4.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS acceptable scram times for the transients analyzed in References 3 and 4.Maximum scram insertion times occur at a reactor steam dome pressure of approximately 800 psig because of the competing effects of reactor steam dome pressure and stored accumulator energy.Therefore, demonstration of adequate scram times at reactor steam dome pressure > 800 psig ensures that the measured scram times will be within the specified limits at higher pressures. Limits are specified as a function of reactor pressure to account for the sensitivity of the scram insertion times with pressure and to allow a range of pressures over which scram time testing can be performed. To ensure that scram time testing is performed within a reasonable time following fuel movement within the reactor pressure vessel or after a shutdown> 120 days or longer, control rods are required to be tested before exceeding 40% RTP. In the event fuel movement is limited to selected core cells, it is the intent of this SR that only those CRDs associated with the core cells affected by the fuel movements are required to be scram time tested. This Frequency is acceptable considering the additional surveillances performed for control rod OPERABILITY, the frequent verification of adequate accumulator pressure, and the required testing of control rods affected by work on control rods or the CRD System.SR 3.1.4.2 Additional testing of a sample of control rods is required to verify the continued performance of the scram function during the cycle. A representative sample contains at least 10% of the control rods. The sample remains representative if no more than 7.5% of the control rods in the sample tested are determined to be "slow". With more than 7.5% of the sample declared to be "slow" per the criteria in Table 3.1.4-1, additional control rods are tested until this 7.5%criterion (i.e., 7.5% of the entire sample size) is satisfied, or until the total number of "slow" control rods (throughout the core, from all Surveillances) exceeds the LCO limit. For planned testing, the control rods selected for the sample should be different for each test. Data from inadvertent scrams should be used whenever possible to avoid unnecessary testing at power, even if the control rods with data may have been previously tested in a sample. The 200 day Fr.equ.n.. i baF'Sed ORn perating experience that has GhoWn control) rod scram times do9 net Significantly change over an operating cycle. Ti FrFeauencY is also reasonable based on the additional gur.'illancos (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-22 REVISION 59 Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.4.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS dono9 on the GRDS at moroG froquont itR al n acodanccwit Insert 2GLCO 3.1.3 and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Red Scram Accumu!aters." SR 3.1.4.3 When work that could affect the scram insertion time is performed on a control rod or the CRD System, testing must be done to demonstrate that each affected control rod retains adequate scram performance over the range of applicable reactor pressures from zero to the maximum permissible pressure. The scram testing must be performed once before declaring the control rod OPERABLE. The required scram time testing must demonstrate the affected control rod is still within acceptable limits. The limits for reactor pressures < 800 psig, required by footnote (b), are included in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 7) and are established based on a high probability of meeting the acceptance criteria at reactor pressures > 800 psig. The limits for reactor pressures > 800 psig are found in Table 3.1.4-1. If testing demonstrates the affected control rod does not meet these limits, but is within the 7 second limit of Table 3.1.4-1, Note 2, the control rod can be declared OPERABLE and "slow." Specific examples of work that could affect the scram times are (but are not limited to) the following: removal of any CRD for maintenance or modification; replacement of a control rod; and maintenance or modification of a scram solenoid pilot valve, scram valve, accumulator, isolation valve or check valve in the piping required for scram.The Frequency of once prior to declaring the affected control rod OPERABLE is acceptable because of the capability to test the control rod over a range of operating conditions and the more frequent surveillances on other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY. SR 3.1.4.4 When work that could affect the scram insertion time is performed on a control rod or CRD System, testing must be done to demonstrate each affected control rod is still within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with the reactor steam dome pressure > 800 psig. Where work has been performed at high reactor pressure, the requirements of SR 3.1.4.3 and SR 3.1.4.4 can be satisfied with one test. However, for a control rod affected by work performed while shutdown, a zero pressure test and a high pressure test may be required. This testing ensures that, (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-23 REVISION 0 Control Rod Scram Accumulators B 3.1.5 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) With one or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable and the reactor steam dome pressure < 900 psig, the pressure supplied to the charging water header must be adequate to ensure that accumulators remain charged. With the reactor steam dome pressure < 900 psig, the function of the accumulators in providing the scram force becomes much more important since the scram function could become severely degraded during a depressurization event or at low reactor pressures. Therefore, immediately upon discovery of charging water header pressure < 940 psig concurrent with Condition C, all control rods associated with inoperable accumulators must be verified to be fully inserted. Withdrawn control rods with inoperable accumulators may fail to scram under these low pressure conditions. The associated control rods must also be declared inoperable within 1 hour. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable for Required Action C.2, considering the low probability of a DBA or transient occurring during the time that the accumulator is inoperable. D.1 The reactor mode switch must be immediately placed in the shutdown position if either Required Action and associated Completion Time associated with the loss of the CRD charging pump (Required Actions B.1 and C.1) cannot be met. This ensures that all insertable control rods are inserted and that the reactor is in a condition that does not require the active function (i.e., scram) of the control rods.This Required Action is modified by a Note stating that the action is not applicable if all control rods associated with the inoperable scram accumulators are fully inserted, since the function of the control rods has been performed. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.5.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.5.1 requires that the accumulator pressure be checked eveiy 7-eays-to ensure adequate accumulator pressure exists to provide sufficient scram force. The primary indicator of accumulator OPERABILITY is the accumulator pressure. A minimum accumulator periodically pressure is specified, below which the capability of the accumulator to D/ perform its intended function becomes degraded and the accumulator is considered inoperable. The minimum accumulator pressure of 940 psig is well below the expected pressure of 1100 psig (Ref. 1).(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-28 REVISION -0 Control Rod Scram Accumulators B 3.1.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.5.1 (continued) Declaring the accumulator inoperable when the minimum pressure is not maintained ensures that significant degradation in scram times does not occur. The 7 day Frequency has been .hewn to be acceptable thrugh nnaratinn ^vnrin' A +n Ln W n+, +r~r ;n AmM in+;n 0! k! ;- +kk Insert 2 un C. ýv n " UýVwun M V= ýnv caý= U V ri ýREFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 3.4.2. FSAR, Appendix M.3. FSAR, Sections 14.3 and 14.4.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCHUNIT 1 B 3.1-29 REVISION -0 Rod Pattern Control B 3.1.6 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

Control rod withdrawal should be suspended immediately to prevent the potential for further deviation from the prescribed sequence. Control rod insertion to correct control rods withdrawn beyond their allowed position is allowed since, in general, insertion of control rods has less impact on control rod worth than withdrawals have. Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note which allows the RWM to be bypassed to allow the affected control rods to be returned to their correct position.LCO 3.3.2.1 requires verification of control rod movement by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.When nine or more OPERABLE control rods are not in compliance with BPWS, the reactor mode switch must be placed in the shutdown position within 1 hour. With the mode switch in shutdown, the reactor is shut down, and as such, does not meet the applicability requirements of this LCO. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable to allow insertion of control rods to restore compliance, and is appropriate relative to the low probability of a CRDA occurring with the control rods out of sequence.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.6.1 REQUIREMENTS The control rod patte verified to be in compliance with the BPWS........ n ... Feq Y to ensure the assumptions of the CRDA periodically analyses are met. The 24 hour Frequoncy was considering that the pwimars chock on compliance With the BPWS is pe~orMed by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1), Which Wovides control rod blocks to enforce the required sequence and is req d to be OPERABLE when operating at < 10% RTP.The RWM REFERENCES

1. NEDE-2401 1-P-A-US, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Supplement for United States," (revision specified in the COLR).2. Letter from T. A. Pickens (BWROG) to G. C. Lainas (NRC),"Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-2401 1-P-A," BWROG-8644, August 15, 1988.3. NUREG-0979, Section 4.2.1.3.2, April 1983.4. NUREG-0800, Section 15.4.9, Revision 2, July 1981.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-33 REVISION 64-SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock," resulting in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met instead of at the time Condition B was entered. The 10 day Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely. C..1 If both SLC subsystems are inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is considered acceptable given the low probability of a DBA or transient occurring concurrent with the failure of the control rods to shut down the reactor.D_1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time is not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.7.1, SR 3.1.7.2, and SR 3.1.7.3 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.7.1 through SR 3.1.7.3 arc 24 hour S-,-eillanccs verifyi4g certain characteristics of the SLC System (e.g., the volume and temperature of the borated solution in the storage tank), thereby ensuring SLC System OPERABILITY without disturbing normal plant operation. These Surveillances ensure that the proper borated solution volume and temperature, including the temperature of the pump suction piping, are maintained (within Region A limits of Figures 3.1.7-1 and 3.7.1-2). Maintaining a minimum specified borated solution temperature is important in ensuring that the boron remains in solution and does not precipitate out in the storage tank or in the pump suction piping. The temperature versus concentration curve of Figure 3.1.7-2 ensures that a 10°F margin will be maintained (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-38 REVISION 64-SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.7.1, SR 3.1.7.2, and SR 3.1.7.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS above the saturation temperature. The 24 hour F... y i based on opcrating Rxcinead has sho)Wn therc aro relatively Glow I Insert 2 I Insert 2 in the meas-rod parameters of vol'mo and tomperaturo. SR 3.1.7.4 and SR 3.1.7.6 SR 3.1.7.4 verifies the continuity of the explosive charges in the injection valves to ensure that proper operation will occur if required.Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Fr=equelnc i base on operating experin .and, h demonstrated the reliabilitY o he epoIe carge continuity-. SR 3.1.7.6 verifies that each valve in the system is in its correct position, but does not apply to the squib (i.e., explosive) valves.Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the SLC System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for system operation. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position from the control room, or locally by a dedicated operator at the valve control. This is acceptable since the SLC System is a manually initiated system. This Surveillance also does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This verification of valve alignment does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The 31 day Frequency is based on engneeingjudgment and is consistent With the procedural control Insert 2 g lve operation that ensures correct valve positions. SR 3.1.7.5 This Surveillance requires an examination of the sodium pentaborate solution by using chemical analysis to ensure that the proper concentration of boron exists in the storage tank (within Region A limits of Figures 3.1.7-1 and 3.1.7-2). SR 3.1.7.5 must be performed any time sodium pentaborate or water is added to the storage tank solution to determine that the boron solution concentration is within the specified limits. SR 3.1.7.5 must also be performed any time the temperature is restored to within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2, (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-39 REVISION 65 SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.7.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS to ensure that no significant boron precipitation occurred. The 31 da FreqwuRGy of thiS SurVeill vis ;ppror;ate be-ause the rola4tvely slo vaiaton f boronR concentraqtio be~yoon surweillancos. Insert 2 SR 3.1.7.7 Demonstrating that each SLC System pump develops a flow rate > 41.2 gpm at a discharge pressure > 1232 psig ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the fuel cycle. This minimum pump flow rate requirement ensures that, when combined with the sodium pentaborate solution concentration requirements, the rate of negative reactivity insertion from the SLC System will adequately compensate for the positive reactivity effects encountered during power reduction, cooldown of the moderator, and xenon decay.This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this Surveillance is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.SR 3.1.7.8 and SR 3.1.7.9 Insert 2 These Surveillances ensure that there is a functioning flow path from the sodium pentaborate solution storage tank to the RPV, including the firing of an explosive valve. The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of that batch successfully fired. The pump and explosive .alve tested ever; 48 months at alternating 24 month inter-:as. The Surveillance may be performed in separate steps to prevent injecting boron into the RPV. An acceptable method for verifying flow from the pump to the RPV is to pump demineralized water from a test tank through one SLC subsystem and into the RPV. The 21 month F=requency is based OR the need to perform this Su.villance undcr the conditions that! !Insert 2 apply duFring A plant outage and the pot.ntial for an uRnplaned trasient if the Speila Wer perfome.d with the ,n t. power.The ~ ~ ~ G 21mnhFrqec f SR 3.1.7.8 is based onarve ;f the surveilance te t hitoy and Reference 4.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-40 REIS \ION I 6l 4 SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.7.8 and SR 3.1.7.9 (continued) Demonstrating that all heat traced piping between the sodium pentaborate solution storage tank and the suction inlet to the injection pumps is unblocked ensures that there is a functioning flow path for injecting the sodium pentaborate solution. An acceptable method for verifying that the suction piping is unblocked is to pump from the storage tank to the test tank.The 1 mo-n'th Fro.u i acceptbleino there is a low phrbability tha:t th Q 06be t su Pe*l t i~ i g .. ..ill b e bl9 Gk ed, d u e , te P " e ip;÷a t÷ ( R th e. b ...Insert 2 frcmn se16tien in the. tra,. pipi4 This is especially true in light of the temperature verification of this piping required by SR 3.1.7.3.However, if, in performing SR 3.1.7.3, it is determined that the temperature of this piping has fallen below the specified minimum, SR 3.1.7.9 must be performed once within 24 hours after the piping temperature is restored to within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2.The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.1.7.9 is based on a review of the ureilli1ance test hirtor,' and RofoenRe 41.SR 3.1.7.10 Enriched sodium pentaborate solution is made by mixing granular, enriched sodium pentaborate with water. Isotopic tests on the granular sodium pentaborate to verify the actual B-1 0 enrichment must be performed prior to addition to the SLC tank in order to ensure that the proper B-10 atom percentage is being used.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.62.2. FSAR, Section 3.8.4.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-41 RE=VIS!ON1 R

SDV Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 Insert 2 SR 3.1.8.1 (continued) intended functions during normal operation. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that the valves are in the correct position.Insert 2 The 31 day FrFequency ic based on enginerin judgment andi G.cnsistent With the procodural controlS go.erning valve epcration, w..hic.h enSu.ro crect valve psitions.SR 3.1.8.2 During a scram, the SDV vent and drain valves should close to contain the reactor water discharged to the SDV piping. Cycling each valve through its complete range of motion (closed and open) ensures that the valve will function properly during a scram. T-he- 2-day y is based on operating experience and takes *nRt account the level of redundaRncy in the system design.SR 3.1.8.3 SR 3.1.8.3 is an integrated test of the SDV vent and drain valves to verify total system performance. After receipt of a simulated or actual scram signal, the closure of the SDV vent and drain valves is verified.The closure time of 45 seconds after receipt of a scram signal is based on the bounding leakage case evaluated in the accident analysis (Ref. 1). Similarly, after receipt of a simulated or actual scram reset signal, the opening of the SDV vent and drain valves is verified. Although not explicitly stated in the SR, the valves are required to open prior to receipt of a control rod block on high SDV level. This criterion ensures the valves can open in time to preclude a scram on SDV high level and maintain sufficient volume in the SDV to receive and contain the water discharged by the control rod drives during a scram per the requirements of the applicable safety analysis (Ref.1). The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1 and the scram time testing of control rods in LCO 3.1.3 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 24 mPoth Fr.equency is, based On the need to pefoFrm this under the conRditions that apply durinrg a plaRt ou1tage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance W8er~perfermed with the reactor at power. The 24 moGnth FrFequency is based On a review of the surveillance test histe~' and Reference 5.(continued) REVISION 64-HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-45 SDV Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1.8 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 3.4.2. 10 CFR 100.3. NUREG-0803, "Generic Safety Evaluation Report Regarding Integrity of BWR Scram System Piping," August 1981.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report forF Amendmcnt 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.1-46 REVISION 64 APLHGR B 3.2.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

B. 1 If the APLHGR cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to< 24% RTP within 4 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 24% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.1.1 periodically REQUIREMENTS APLHGRs are required to be initially calculated within 12 ho after THERMAL POWER is > 24% RTP and then ver',' 24 hoursA hereafter. They are compared to the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis.The 24 hou r FrcequencY is bhaisod o-n boAth engineering judgment an Insert 2 recgni f the slWRneSS Of cha ns .In p Fw r distribution during normal operation. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER> 24% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels.REFERENCES

1. NEDE-2401 1-P-A "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel," (revision specified in the COLR).2. (Not used)3. FSAR, Chapter 6.4. FSAR, Chapter 15, Unit 2.5. (Not used)6. NEDC-32749P, "Extended Power Uprate Safety Analysis Report for Edwin I. Hatch Units 1 and 2," July 1997.7. NEDC-30474-P "Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Monitor and Technical Specification Improvements (ARTS)Program for E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2," December 1983.8. (Not used)(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.2-3 REVISION 37-MCPR B 3.2.2 BASES (continued) ACTIONS A.1 If any MCPR is outside the required limits, an assumption regarding an initial condition of the design basis transient analyses may not be met. Therefore, prompt action should be taken to restore the MCPR(s) to within the required limits such that the plant remains operating within analyzed conditions. The 2 hour Completion Time is normally sufficient to restore the MCPR(s) to within its limits and is acceptable based on the low probability of a transient or DBA occurring simultaneously with the MCPR out of specificationm B.1 If the MCPR cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 24% RTP within 4 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 24% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.2.1 periodically REQUIREMENTS The MCPR is required to be initially calculated within 12 hours er THERMAL POWER is > 24% RTP and thcn every 24 hours thereafter. It is compared to the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. The 24 hour Fr.equency is based On both engineein Inset 2 udgmcnt and recognition of the slowness of changes in power Insert 2 distribution during normal operation. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER > 24% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels.SR 3.2.2.2 Because the transient analysis takes credit for conservatism in the scram speed performance, it must be demonstrated that the specific scram speed distribution is consistent with that used in the transient analysis. SR 3.2.2.2 determines the value of -t, which is a measure of the actual scram speed distribution compared with the assumed distribution. The MCPR operating limit is then determined based on an interpolation between the applicable limits for Option A (scram (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.2-7 REVISION LHGR B 3.2.3 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.2.3.1 1 periodically The LHGR is required to be initially calculated within l/ ours after THERMAL POWER is > 24% RTP and ethereafter. It is compared to the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis.Insert 2 , ne. n oun ,nu ,,[]~]~Ut] (Hi unin enuinjeerinin ininiunnienin

iniu_ocGnf4Ri9io Of tho Glow chAngoc in ;pow dis6tribu6tion during nrmFFal operatiq.

The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER> 24% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at lower power levels.REFERENCES

1. NEDE-2401 1-P-A "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel." 2. FSAR, Chapter 15 (Unit 2).3. NUREG-0800, Section II.A.2(g), Revision 2, July 1981.4. NEDC-32749P, "Extended Power Uprate Safety Analysis Report for Edwin I. Hatch Units 1 and 2," July 1997.5. NEDC-30474-P, "Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Monitor and Technical Specification Improvements (ARTS)Program for E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2," December 1983.6. NRC approval of "Amendment 26 to GE Licensing Topical Report NEDE-2401 1-P-A, "GESTAR Ir'"-Implementing Improved GE Steady-State Methods (TAC No. MA6481)," November 10, 1999.7. NEDO-24154-A, "Qualification of the One-Dimensional Core Transient Model (ODYN) for Boiling Water Reactors," August 1986, and NEDE-24154-P-A, Supplement 1, Volume 4, Revision 1, February 2000.8. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.9. Letter from Global Nuclear Fuel, M. E. Harding to E. B. Gibson, January 22, 2004, "Plant Hatch Technical Specification Modification to include LHGR." HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.2-12 REVISION 3-7 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS 1.2 (continued)

The alternate method to detect and suppress oscillations implemented in accordance with Required Action 1.1 was evaluated based on use up to 120 days (Ref. 12). The evaluation, based on engineering judgment, concluded that the likelihood of an instability event that could not be adequately handled by the alternate method during this 120 day period is negligibly small. The 120 day period is intended to be an outside limit to allow for the case where design changes or extensive analysis may be required to understand or correct some unanticipated characteristic of the instability detection algorithm or equipment. This action is not intended to be, and was not evaluated as, a routine alternative to returning failed or inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status. Correction of routine equipment failure or inoperability is expected to normally be accomplished within the Completion Times allowed for Required Actions for Conditions A and B.SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS REUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 9) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary. SR 3.3.1.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK onco ovo,'y 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-23 REVISION 16 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.1 (continued) between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a m.mhinaition nf the c.hanne.I in~qtrLrnm.nt iinr in'.Iludinrl Insert 2 indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it mE an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.1\\\"'The FrequoncGy ir, based upon oporating oxerienceG that demon..trate channel is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.1.1.2 ay be I Insert 2 To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are calibrated to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance. The Frequency Of once per7 days is'barcod on minor changes in L=PRM SensitiVfity, Which coul-d- -affecAt the ADDFUI A; k,~..- + -F C'm 1 4 40... .-.. .1t::0 mg "-vv-.t:PN VE:"0FMc1Rt3e6 " 0 ..0.A restriction to satisfying this SR when < 24% RTP is provided that requires the SR to be met only at > 24% RTP because it is difficult to accurately maintain APRM indication of core THERMAL POWER consistent with a heat balance when < 24% RTP. At low power levels, a high degree of accuracy is unnecessary because of the large, inherent margin to thermal limits (MCPR and APLHGR). At> 24% RTP, the Surveillance is required to have been satisfactorily performed within the last 7 days, in accordance with SR 3.0.2. A Note is provided which allows an increase in THERMAL POWER above 24% if the 7-day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours after reaching or exceeding 24% RTP. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-24 REVISION 96 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.1.3 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.4 is not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1, since testing of the MODE 2 required IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODE 2 if the 7-day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours after entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.Insert 2 A FF~eq ioncY of 7 days provides an acceptable level of system~avcrage unavailability over the Frequency interwal and is based oni reliability analysis (Ref-. 9.SR 3.3.1.1.5 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A FrFequ1ency Of 7 dayS provides an; acceptable level of system average availability over the Frequency and is basod on the..eliability analysis of Reference

9. (The Manual ScG,-r Functien's C-HANNIEL FUNCTIONAL TEST FrFequency was credited in the analysis to extend many automatic scramn FuncRtions' FrFequencies.)

SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 These Surveillances are established to ensure that no gaps in neutron flux indication exist from subcritical to power operation for monitoring core reactivity status.The overlap between SRMs and IRMs is required to be demonstrated to ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. This is required prior to (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-25 REVISION 16 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (continued) withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs.The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range. On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block, or IRM upscale rod block.Overlap between the SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to withdrawing an SRM from the fully inserted position, its associated IRMs have cleared their downscale rod block Allowable Values, prior to the SRM having reached its upscale rod block Allowable Value.Plant procedures should be consulted to determine the associated detectors. As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.7 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the Insert 2 current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable. "\ A Frequoncy ef 7 days is reasonablo based ona- .... ..ard the reliability of the IRMs and APRMs.SR 3.3.1.1.8 LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles Insert 2 measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) System. This establishes the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System. The 1000 f por ho, re ,FquoncGy i based on enuFring powF 6,eru tainty 0i Within the licensing basis analysis.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-26 REVISION 269 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.12 (continued) A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended Insert 2 function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on ,flALTERNATE TEST BASIS Frequency of SR 3.3.i.1.9 is Da5C0 On a roview OT tno G.urvoiiiancoR~ %o61 nismor', dAr analysiG OT !Re associated trip un~its (if applicable), and RefcFRcnc 20.Insert 2 J. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.12 is based on the need to peFfrem this under the conditionS that apply during n plant outage and the potential for an un~planned transient ifth S'eila3nco were performed With the at power. The 21 Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.12 is based on a review of the surveillance test history and RefereRco 18.SR 3.3.1.1.10 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. For the APRM Functions, this test supplements the automatic self-test functions that operate continuously in the APRM and voter channels. The APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST covers the APRM channels (including recirculation flow processing -applicable to Function 2.b only), the two-out-of-four voter channels, Insert 2 and the interface connections to the RPS trip systems from the voter channels. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 184 day FrFequency of SR 3....0is based on the roliabilk' analysis of References 12 and 16. (NOTE: The aGctua' veting logic ot the -o out of four -Voter channe!s is tested as part of SR 3.3.1.1.15.) For Function 2.a, a Note that requires this SR to be performed within 12 hours of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 is provided. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM Function cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers or lifted leads. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.SR 3.3.1.1.11 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-27 RE=ViSlaO 3! RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.11 (continued) REQUIREMENTS POWER is > 27.6% RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER > 27.6% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid.If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at > 27.6% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valve(s) or other reasons), then the affected Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition (Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Insert 2 Pressure -Low Functions are enabled), this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.,\ 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the s'rveillance test histor,', drift of the associated inStrumentation, and Reference 18.SR 3.3.1.1.13 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. For MSIV -Closure, SDV Water Level -High (Float Switch), and TSV -Closure Functions, this SR also includes a physical inspection and actuation of the switches. For the APRM Simulated Thermal Power -High Function, this SR also includes calibrating the associated recirculation loop flow channel.Note 1 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7-4ay calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the l00o effectiV-full power hours LPRM calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3.1.1.8). A second Note is provided that requires the IRM SRs (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-28 REVISION 36 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.13 (continued) to be performed within 12 hours of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.Testing of the MODE 2 IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.The 24 month Frequency is based On a review ef the sur'eillance test 1iqtnw' drift analysis of the aSSOciated instrumontatien (if annlicnble! and Rorfernce 18.SR 3.3.1.1.14 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.15 I I Insert 2 \ \The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDV vent and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8), overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.The 24 month Frequoncy ic based On the need to perform this the otenial or n unlannd tAnpet if the SR'..'oilANceM wpeo pefo...od with the reactor at pewer. The 24 month Frequency is based- on a; reviewý o-f the swrveillance test hitetoy and Referonee 18.The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for APRM Function 2.e simulates APRM and OPRM trip conditions at the two-out-of-four voter channel inputs to check all combinations of two tripped inputs to the two-out-of-four logic in the voter channels and APRM related redundant RPS relays.SR 3.3.1.1.16 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-29 REVISION 3! RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.16 (continued) REQUIREMENTS analysis. This test may be performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 10.RPS RESPONSE TIME for APRM Two-out-of-Four Voter Function 2.e includes the output relays of the voter and the associated RPS relays and contactors. (The digital portions of the APRM and two-out-of-four voter channels are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because self-testing and calibration check the time base of the digital electronics.) Confirmation of the time base is adequate to assure required response times are met. Neutron detectors are excluded Insert 2 from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time.RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This Frequency is consistent with the typical industr;y refuelfing cYcle and is based upon plant operating\experience, Which rhows that randomR failuresof iA1nstuentato co.ponenRtS cau..ingerios9 response time degradatioe, but net channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. The4 -24. moln-it-hion a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, is also based en a review of the sur~e;Ianco test histor; and Reference 18.SR 3.3.1.1.17 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from OPRM Upscale Function 2.f will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER, as indicated by APRM Simulated Thermal Power, is> 25% RTP and core flow, as indicated by recirculation drive flow, is< 60% rated core flow. This normally involves confirming the bypass setpoints. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. The actual Surveillance ensures that the OPRM Upscale Function is enabled (not bypassed) for the correct values of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow. Other Surveillances ensure that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation flow properly correlate with THERMAL POWER and core flow, respectively. If any bypass setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the OPRM Upscale Function is bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power is -> 25%and recirculation drive flow is < 60% rated), the affected channel is considered inoperable for the OPRM Upscale Function.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-30 REVISION 34-RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.3.1.1.17 (continued) Alternatively, the bypass setpoint may be adjusted to place the channel in a conservative condition (unbypass). If placed in the unbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.The 24 month Frequency iG based on a review of the curoeillanco test Him tury" UU K 14UICrRG,, I-.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.2.2. FSAR, Chapter 14.3. FSAR, Section 6.5.4. FSAR, Appendix M.5. FSAR, Subsection 14.3.3.6. NEDO-23842, "Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal in the Startup Range," April 18, 1978.7. FSAR, Subsections 14.4.2 and 14.5.5.8. P. Check (NRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC), "BWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.9. NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," March 1988.10. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T5.0-1.11. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.12. NEDC-3241 OP-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," October 1995.13. NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-31 REVISION 40 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

14. NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.15. NEDO-32465-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology and Reload Applications," March 1996.16. NEDO-32410P-A, Supplement 1, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," November 1997.17. Letter, L.A. England (BWROG) to M.J. Virgilio, "BWR Owners'Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action," June 6, 1994.Not used i!8.J r NRGi~ Safety EvaluatIOn Keperr Tor ikmenament
19. GE Letter NSA 02-250, "Plant Hatch IRM Technical Specifications," April 19, 2002.20. NRC Safcty Eyaluation.

Repo for A Survillnce xt...o.... fF1R dment 234, Quarterly HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-32.REVISION 3!- SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.1 and SR 3.3.1.2.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.Inset 2The Frequency of onco ever,' 12 hours for SR 3.3.1.2.1 is based on operating expeienc that demonstrateS channel failure is rare. While inMOE 3 and 4, reactiVity changos aro not expected; thorefore, the 42 hour y i relaxed to 24 hours SR 3.3.1.2.3. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.1.2.2 To provide adequate coverage of potential reactivity changes in the core when the fueled region encompasses more than one SRM, one SRM is required to be OPERABLE in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, and the other OPERABLE SRM must be in an adjacent quadrant containing fuel. Note 1 states that the SR is required to be met only during CORE ALTERATIONS. It is not required to be met at other times in MODE 5 since core reactivity changes are not occurring. This Surveillance consists of a review of plant logs to ensure that SRMs required to be OPERABLE for given CORE ALTERATIONS are, in fact, OPERABLE. In the event that only one SRM is required to be OPERABLE (when the fueled region encompasses only one SRM), per Table 3.3.1.2-1, footnote (b), only the a. portion of this SR is required. Note 2 clarifies that more than Insert 2 one of the three requirements can be met by the same OPERABLE SRM. The 12 hour FrFequency is based upon operating experiee and supplements operatiGnal controls over r8fueli4ng acv" i"ie 4hat incl~ude steps to ensure that the SRMs required by the LCO are in the PFG9FqadiaRt. SR 3.3.1.2.4 This Surveillance consists of a verification of the SRM instrument readout to ensure that the SRM reading is greater than a specified minimum count rate, which ensures that the detectors are indicating count rates indicative of neutron flux levels within the core. This surveillance also requires the signal to noise ratio to be verified to be> 2:1. A signal to noise ratio that meets this requirement ensures the detectors are inserted to an acceptable operating level. Therefore, to meet this portion of the surveillance, it is necessary only to verify the (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-38 REViSiON 115 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS detectors are inserted to the same operating level as they were when SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 were performed satisfactorily. SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 require the actual ratio (and hence, an acceptable operating level) to be determined periodically while the detectors are required to be OPERABLE. With few fuel assemblies loaded, the SRMs will not have a high enough count rate to satisfy the SR. Therefore, allowances are made for loading sufficient "source" material, in the form of irradiated fuel assemblies, to establish the minimum count rate. To accomplish this, the SR is modified by a Note (Note 1) that states that the count rate is not required to be met on an SRM that has less than or equal to four fuel assemblies adjacent to the SRM and no other fuel assemblies are in the associated core quadrant. With four or fewer fuel assemblies loaded around each SRM and no other fuel assemblies in the associated core quadrant, even with a control rod withdrawn, the configuration will not be critical. In addition, Note 2 states that this requirement Insert 2 does not have to be met during spiral unloading. If the core is being unloaded in this manner, the various core configurations encountered will not be critical.The Frequency is based upon channel redundancy and other i4nformation available in the contrel room, and ensures that the required channels are #fquntY mon.itorod While core reactiV.ity changes .. ocrn When no..a.tiVity cha.g. s are in progress, the Frequ..c. is rlaxed from. 12 hour. to 21 hours.SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the associated channel will function properly. SR 3.3.1.2.5 is required in MODE 5, and the 7 day Frequency ensures that the channels are OPERABLE while core reactivity changes could be in progress. This Frequency is reasonable, based on operating experience and on other Surveillances (such as a CHANNEL CHECK), that ensure proper functioning between CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.Insert 2 SR 3.3.1.2.6 is required in MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below, and in MODES 3 and 4. Since core reacGtivity changes doG not nrmFFally take place in MODES 3 and 4 and core reactivity changes, are due only to conrol1 red moevement in MODE 2, the FrFequency has\ been extended from; 7 days to 31 days. The 31 day FrFequency is-based on o.peratig* experienced on other Su.ve.illances (such as CH4ANNEL CHECK) tha enueproer functioning between4 CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-39 REVISION !15 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 (continued) Determination of the signal to noise ratio also ensures that the detectors are inserted to an acceptable operating level. In a fully withdrawn condition, the detectors are sufficiently removed from the fueled region of the core to essentially eliminate neutrons from reaching the detector. Any count rate obtained while the detectors are fully withdrawn is assumed to be "noise" only.The Note to the SR 3.3.1.2.6 allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability (THERMAL POWER decreased to IRM Range 2 or below). The SR must be performed within 12 hours after IRMs are on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the 3-1day Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels.Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e., satisfactorily performing theCHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances. SR 3.3.1.2.7 Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at a Fr.equency.of Insert 2 24me. nths verifies the performance of the SRM detectors and associated circuitry. The Frequency considers the plant conditions required to perform the test, the ease of performing the test, and the likelihood of a change in the system or component status. T-he 2. mcnth Frequency is based on a review of the surveil!ance test history and Reforence

2. The neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION (Note 1) because they cannot readily be adjusted.

The detectors are fission chambers that are designed to have a relatively constant sensitivity over the range and with an accuracy specified for a fixed useful life.Note 2 to the Surveillance allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability. The SR must be performed in MODE 2 within 12 hours of entering MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the 24-meat-h Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-40 REVISION 29 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e., satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances. REFERENCES

1. NRC Safety Evaluation April 30, 1993.2. NRC Safotv E-valuation Report for Amendment 185, Insert 2 Report for Amndment 232.I HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-41 REVISION 29 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The Frequency ot iInsert 2 SR 3.3.2.1.2 and SR 3.3.2.1.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for the RWM to ensure that the entire system will perform the intended function. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the RWM is performed by attempting to withdraw a control rod not in compliance with the prescribed sequence and verifying a control rod block occurs. This test is performed as soon as possible after the applicable conditions are entered. As noted in the SRs, SR 3.3.2.1.2 is not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn at< 10% RTP in MODE 2, and SR 3.3.2.1.3 is not required to be performed until 1 hour after THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP in MODE 1. This allows entry into MODE 2 (and if entered during a shutdown, concurrent power reduction to < 10% RTP) for SR 3.3.2.1.2 and THERMAL POWER reduction to < 10% RTP in MODE 1 for SR 3.3.2.1.3 to perform the required Surveillances if the 92 day on an ALTERNATE TE=STT BASIS Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour allowance is based on operating experience Insert 2 and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SRs. The 92 day -n an AL TTERNlATE TEST BASIS FrFequency is based on a roVicW of the suR'cefillance test histor,' and Ref8eRnc 13.SR 3.3.2.1.4 The RBM setpoints are automatically varied as a function of power.Three Allowable Values are specified in Table 3.3.2.1-1, each within a specific power range. The power at which the control rod block Allowable Values automatically change are based on the APRM signal's input to each RBM channel. Below the minimum power setpoint, the RBM is automatically bypassed. These power Allowable Values must'be verified periodically to be less than or equal to the specified values. If any power range setpoint is nonconservative, then the affected RBM channel is considered inoperable. Alternatively, the power range channel can be placed in the conservative condition (i.e., enabling the proper RBM setpoint). If placed in this condition, the SR is met and the RBM channel is not considered inoperable. As noted, neutron detectors are excluded from the Surveillance because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Neutron detectors are adequately (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-49 6" i Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS tested in SR 3.3.1.1.2 and SR 3.3.1.1.8. The 24 month F=requencY Is based On a roview of the SUrveillance test hiStOrY and Reference 12.Insert 2 SR 3.3.2.1.5 The RWM is automatically bypassed when power is above a specified value. The power level is determined from APRM power signals. The automatic bypass setpoint must be verified periodically to be> 10% RTP. If the RWM low power setpoint is nonconservative, then the RWM is considered inoperable. Alternately, the low power setpoint channel can be placed in the conservative condition Insert 2 (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypassed condition, the SR is met and the RWM is not considered inoperable. The 24 menth Frequency Wis based on Reference 12.SR 3.3.2.1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for the Reactor Mode Switch -Shutdown Position Function to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the Reactor Mode Switch -Shutdown Position Function is performed by attempting to withdraw any control rod with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position and verifying a control rod block occurs.As noted in the SR, the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 1 hour after the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, since testing of this interlock with the reactor mode switch in any other position cannot be performed without using jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODES 3 and 4 if the 18 moIth Insert 2 Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.The 21 month Frequency is based o. th. need to perfrmt SuP-v:if=ace U[:cer tno GOnGROns that appl'y duirng a plant eutage a=no qhe potential fo9r t'rnsient if the SurveillanRc WoFe performed wioth the reaco at IPoe. The 24 month FrFequency i based on a review of the survefillance test history and Reference 12.SR 3.3.2.1.7 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-50 REVISION 64 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.2.1.7 (continued) measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. As noted, neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.Neutron detectors are adequately tested in SR 3.31.1.8.Thk 0A4 +knf Crr ;.r, : k- A,.rr f +hk I Insert 2 1 \hi.tory an~dR cfronrcc 12.ciftm- "-H C M-IMMMM.p "N SR 3.3.2.1.8 The RWM will only enforce the proper control rod sequence if the rod sequence is properly input into the RWM computer. This SR ensures that the proper sequence is loaded into the RWM so that it can perform its intended function. The Surveillance is performed once prior to declaring RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM, since this is when rod sequence input errors are possible.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.5.8.2.3.
2. FSAR, Section 7.2.2.4.3. NEDC-30474-P, "Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Monitor, and Technical Specification Improvements (ARTS)Program for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plants," December 1983.4. NEDE-240 11-P-A-US, "General Electrical Standard Application for Reload Fuel," Supplement for United States, (revision specified in the COLR).5. Letter from T. A. Pickens (BWROG) to G. C. Lainas (NRC),"Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-2401 1-P-A," BWROG-8644, August 15, 1986.6. NEDO-21231, "Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence," January 1977.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-51 REVISION 64 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

7. NRC SER, "Acceptance of Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDE-2401 1-P-A," "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Revision 8, Amendment 17," December 27, 1987.8. NEDC-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," October 1988.9. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases For Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-Of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.10. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.Not used 1.4 Not used 1-2.NEDC 3241 OP A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Centre! Pe'wer Range ,NeJtFr McniterNU CPRM Retrofit Plus Option III Stabili, Trip Function," OGctber 1995.NRC Safety Evaluation Repo"t for- Amondmo, t 232.I Not used.13. NRC Safety Evaluation Rpepot for Amendment Quartei Surveillace ExtenOn.14. NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, "Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process," July 2004.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-52 REVISION 64 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation B 3.3.2.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly REQUIREMENTS reduce the probability that the feedwater pump turbines and main (continued) turbine will trip when necessary.

SR 3.3.2.2.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function.Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. Due to the high turbine trip and reactor scram potential incurred when valving reactor water level differential pressure transmitters into and out of service, it is acceptable to perform the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for this logic from the input of the alarm unit.This is consistent with the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST definition requiring the signal to be injected "as close to the sensor as practicable." Additionally, due to the physical location of the turbine trip relays and their close proximity to other sensitive equipment, accessibility is extremely limited. Verification of relay actuation and associated relay contact status by accessing the relay introduces a high potential for turbine trip and reactor scram. One contact from each turbine trip relay energizes an amber light indicating relay actuation. Therefore, it is acceptable to terminate the test at the turbine trip relay, utilizing light indication for relay status. These allowances are only acceptable if the CHANNEL CALIBRATION and In 2 the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST overlap both the initiation Insert 2 I and termination point of this CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST such that the entire trip logic is tested.Tho 92 day on an ALIT-ERNATE-TEST BASIS Fr-oquRny is based ,n , roie, nof the su', illanr histF,,', drift analysis of the avGGociated trip units, and Referencc 5-.SR 3.3.2.2.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-57 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation B 3.3.2.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.2.2.2 (continued) +Re .6,1 GR r-r~Ufuriuy 1 uuseu en a ruviewG We LIt~U~iufvewaUU Wte Insert 2 histo--, drift analysis of thc aSSoc.iated insrumentation, and Refe-Fee 4 SR 3.3.2.2.3 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the feedwater and main turbine valves is included as part of this Surveillance and overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. Therefore, if a valve is incapable of operating, the associated instrumentation channels would also be inoperable. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform thsSurVeillance under the condfition ht pl dur~ing a plant outage ndthe potential forF an unplanned transien-;.t- ~if the Surveillance woee performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a r.view of theq suR-P-eillance tRet h*.toR' and Referenc... 4 I Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.3.2.1.2. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-Of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NRC Safety Evaluation Repert for Amendment 232.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Am SuReillance Extension.

It aRdmcnet 231, Quarterly HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-58 REVISION 34 PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. The Note is based upon a NRC Safety Evaluation Report (Ref. 2) which concluded that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability of properly monitoring post accident parameters, when necessary. SR 3.3.3.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel against a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure;thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including isolation, indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.The Fr.equency of 31 days is based upon plant operat*ng experience, with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, whic-h demonestrates that of morne than onc channel of a giVeRn FUnRcton in an 31 day inr al s ae. The CHANINEL CHECK SUPPlemfents less formal, but more frequent, checks of- channels during normal operatioral use of those displays associated with the chann requirFed by the LCO.Insert 2 SR 3.3.3.1.2 Insert 2 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION i0s peformed every 24 months.CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies the channel responds to measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy.ý- ýA ---ý ý--I -Isoryandh R requncey is. raxed the buFvemaRe tes history and Reference41.(continued) REVISION 28 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-68 PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," Revision 2, December 1980.2. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97," dated July 30, 1985.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.41. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-69 REVISION 29 Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in'which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when an instrument channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours.Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. The Note is based upon a NRC Safety Evaluation Report (Ref. 1) which concluded that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability of monitoring required parameters, when necessary. SR 3.3.3.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK onc cvery 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel against a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure;thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. As specified in the Surveillance, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those channels that are normally energized.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-73 REV!S!ON ! Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.3.2.1 (continued) The F=.equ.n. is basod upon plant operating oxperienco that domonstrates channel failur~e is rare.I sr2 insert 2 SR 3.3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.3.2.2 verifies each required Remote Shutdown System transfer switch and control circuit performs the intended function. This verification is performed from the remote shutdown panel and locally, as appropriate. Operation of equipment from the remote shutdown panel is not necessary. The Surveillance can be satisfied by performance of a continuity check, or, in the case of the DG controls, the routine Surveillances of LCO 3.8.1 (since local control is utilized during the performance of some of the Surveillances of LCO 3.8.1).This will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 from the remote shutdown panel and the local control stations. The 24 month FrequencY is based on the need to perform this Sur.'cilance under the conditio6n that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an Jnplanned transient if the were performed with the ratrat power. The 21 month Frqec is. based On a review Et the surveillance test histor,' and Rofercnncc 4 Insert 2 SR 3.3.3.2.3 Insert 2 CHANNEL CALIBRATIO and the sensor. The test parameter values with th The 24 month FrequenRG, histF,',' ad Referene 1.N is a complete check of the instrument loop verifies the channel responds to measured e necessary range and accuracy.I- J Z" II I £is based 9R ai reviow ef the sur1'ciiiancu tes r REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.2. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T6.0-1.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Am~endment 232-.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-74 DREVISIONlk Ar.

EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.4.1.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended finrt inn An. cI fn nin t mt lirit. IIn,,Int hnill ho1, nnnei*'altn. h "l'hY Insert 2 assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS FroqoRncy is baod on a roview of the su..ei..anc. test history and Rofcrcnce 8.SR 3.3.4.1.2 This SR ensures that an EOC-RPT initiated from the TSV -Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 27.6% RTP.This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure) the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER > 27.6% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid. If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at > 27.6% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TSV -Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition (Turbine Stop Valve -'Closure and Insert 2 Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are enabled), this SR is met with the channel considered OPERABLE.\The 24 month Fre histrf,, drift of the guency IS easca on G reVGeW oT Mnc surve"i'ance !eGS associated instrumentation,. nd Refercnce 7.SR 3.3.4.1.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. For the TSV -Closure Function, this SR also includes a physical inspection and actuation of the switches.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-81 REVISION 36 EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.4.1.3 (continued) The 24 mon~th FrequencY is based histor,', drift of the associated instr Ref eeRe-7-..... ; ..... 4-1-- ....... :11 .... -- ufi az FeVIeW 94. tmu turvutttji teG~uIenia(if app Gi-able),-afnd Insert 2 SR 3.3.4.1.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, to provide complete testing of the associated safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would also be inoperable. The Frequo-ny is based on the need to peform thi 9urve1iaRco under the coenditionms; that apply during a plant ou1tage and Insert 2 t; ptn"'m ce F- arl Urip ciRriv t-CIM0 "rit RV Ut-V"- cq"ýt:" WOM bes, baGE rmned With the at poer.Tahe 2T1. month Frrequerncy I .~d OR a review of the sur.'ellance test histor, and Reference 7.SR 3.3.4.1.5 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 5.A Note to the Surveillance states that breaker interruption (i.e., trip)time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.6. This is allowed since the time to open the contacts after energization of the trip coil and the arc suppression time are short and do not appreciably change, due to the design of the breaker opening device and the fact that the breaker is not routinely cycled.EGC RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests a-r c-Ronduted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS-. Response times cannot be Insert 2 determined at power because operation of final actuated devices is required. Therefore, this FrFequency is cRonsitent With the typical industr' refueling cycle and is bas:ed upon plant operating exein, which shows that random failures of insrumentatio copoetS that cause seiu respons time degradation, but not channel failure, are inPfreqen--'-t occu--rrenress. The 21 month F~reouencR-RV. on a (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-82 EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS ST-AGGERED TEST BASIS, is also based on a reio f tho su- rc;llance test histoFry and Refrence 7.SR 3.3.4.1.6 This SR ensures that the RPT breaker interruption time is provided to the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME test. Breaker interruption (i.e., trip) time is defined as breaker response time plus arc suppression time. Breaker response time is the time from application of voltage to the trip coil until the main contacts separate. Arc suppression time is the time from main contact separation until the complete suppression of the electrical arc across the open contacts.Breaker response shall be verified by testing and added to the manufacturer's design arc suppression time to determine breaker Insert 2 interruption time. The breaker arc suppression time shall be validated by the performance of periodic contact gap measurements in accordance with plant procedures. The 60 mon.th Fr.equencY of the testing is baSed on the difficulty of perfoFrming the test and the reliability Of the circuit breakers.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.17.2. FSAR, Subsection 14.3.1.3. Unit 2 FSAR, Paragraph 5.5.16.1 and Subsection 7.6.10.4. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases For Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals And Allowed Out-Of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.5. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T5.0-1.6. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.7. NRC Safety Evaluatio.n Repot feo Amendment 232.8. NRC Safety Evaluation Report fbo Amendment 234, Qua'terly SUR'J.ilance Extension.

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-83 REVISIONlk 401 ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued) The description of a Function maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability is discussed in the Bases for Required Action B.1 above.The 1 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the operator to take corrective action and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the ATWS-RPT instrumentation during this period.D.1 and D.2 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 2 within 6 hours (Required Action D.2).Alternately, the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation (Required Action D.1). The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, both to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions and to remove a recirculation pump from service in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 2) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the recirculation pumps will trip when necessary. SR 3.3.4.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-89 REVISION ! ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.Frequency is based upGR operating experience that demonstrates channoe failure is raFr. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.4.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. I -I Insert 2 The 92 day Gn T e-92 they--supve1!aRGe NTE TEST BASIS iS test histo~y, drift analysis of the nARACI A asse ciated trip units, and R Vtvr1i SR 3.3.4.2.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-90 REVISION3 ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The" 24 month Frequency i6 based on a review of the .... oillanco tost Inser 2 -histeo,' drift analysis of the associated instrumentation, and Insert 2 ýegS 3..4-..4 S R 3.3.4.2.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as part of this Surveillance and overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would be inoperable. Insert 2 ne lmk i iMnti!R FrequeRGY !6 96uW'eliaRco unRder thle cendi based on the need to poerfm;ti tions that apply during a plant outage A~. + ;-~- +;;+k 0 H~aRE1 the potcntial for an unplaRRe F-dri a 8-ri V ur-rv clritM vr--rlv pcrf.,med with tho. reacGto at PowErP

  • The 24 month Frequ nc .i based on a reviow of the sur~cillancc test histor/ and Reference 4.REFERENCES
1. FSAR, Section 7.23.2. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report feo Amendment 232.5. NRC Safety Evaluati~on Repor-t for Amendment 234, Quarterly Surveillancc E-xtenAsion..

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-91 REVISION 34 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours as follows: (a) for Functions 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 5)assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.5.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once evcry 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.I Insert 2\.The FrFequency is based upon operating exeiec hat demon strates channel fa..ilur.e is r.iar., The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-122 REVISIONH2 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.1.2 (continued) The 92 day on an ALTERNATE. TEST BASIS Froequency or, based On Insert 2 a review of the e test histoy, analySiS of the t, rip units, RefernRo 8.SR 3.3.5.1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the suR'-eilance test SR 3.3.5.1.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.1, LCO 3.5.2, LCO 3.7.2, LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function.I Insert 2 ohe 24 monAth Fr4quenGY is based 9o the need to pennrfrm this Survefillance under the conditionS that apply durinig a plant outage and performed with the reactor at power.OR+ !IF tHS WRFO The 24 month FrFequecyis test history and Referec .CIO" W" m flur 1VVT " IV cl""tv REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 4.8.2. FSAR, Section 6.5.3. FSAR, Section 14.4.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-123 3"4-ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

4. NEDC-31376-P, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant, SAFER/GESTR-LOCA, Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," December 1986.5. NEDC-30936-P-A, "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2," December 1988.6. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.7. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendmcnt 232-2.8. NSRC Safety Evaluation Surveillance ExteRsiGR.

Report for Amendment 234, WaFteFilj HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-124 REVISION 34-RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued) suppression pool). Alternatively, Required Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended function. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the RCIC suction piping), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.E.1 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable immediately. SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC System REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Function 2; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1, 3, and 4, provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 1) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ocGe eve,; 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a parameter on other similar channels. It is based on the (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-132 REI S '\ IO RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.SInsert 2 h r ... .., , o,,4.. ...,. ...: f ,,t. .-deeStrates chan,-,eI falure is Fare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.5.2.2 and SR 3.3.5.2.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Fre.quency is based onre-dewof the , ..... test , drcift of the associated trip unitrs, and Reference-1. SR 3.3.5.2.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-133 REVISION 3! RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.2.4 (continued) The 9-2 day on an AL-TEERNAT-ETEST BASIS Frequoncy of SR 3.35.2.3 is based on Insert 2 analysis of the asG The 21 month FrFe a review of the surveillancc test hisk)Fy, dFift;uuiaitu trip uRrrtt, aRiu RlrauiuRuruj GUencv of SR 3.3.5.2.1 is based On a rovicw of the%instrumnentation, and Reference 3.ASIR AT ;MR ;ascocar1Tee SR 3.3.5.2.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.Ie 2 The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Insert 2 , Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.The; 21 month FrFequiencY is based OR the need to pe4Form hi..',illance under the coRnditins that apply duriRg a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance Were performed with the reactOr at power. The 21 mon~th FrFequec Is.based 9n a review of thc surve*ilanc-e test hisstorv and- Reference 3.REFERENCES

1. GENE-770-06-2, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.3. NRG Safety Evaiuatwon Repert fer Amendment 232.4. NRC Safety Evaluation SurVeillance Extension.

Report for Amendment 231, Q ,ua.-terlyj HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-134 REVISION 34 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 4 and 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary. SR 3.3.6.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once eve,'y 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. p It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be 2 an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.Insert 2 The FrequencGY iS based on operating experienceP that demonsGAtrates1 channel fai!ure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.6.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-158 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1.2 (continued) function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. I I I Insert 2 The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Frcqu.ncy is basod on a review of the s'u,"voIancc test hister,', drift analysis of the tFrip urits (if applicable), and Reforoncc 8.SR 3.3.6.1.3. SR 3.3.6.1.4. and SR 3.3.6.1.5 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day 9, aR ALTERN"AlATE TEST BASIS FrequeRny of analysis of the asociated pres.ure (o vacuum) sWitches (io applicable), and Reference

8. The 184 day FrFequency of SR 3.3.6.1 A and the 24 moneth FrFequency of SR 3.3.6.1.5 are based on a riew of the sur'emillanco test hiStor,', drift analysis of th49 associoated instru mentation (if applicable), and Reference 7E.SR 3.3.6.1.6 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LCO 3.6.1.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 214 m rth is based oH the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply durina plant outage and the poGtential for an unplanned-tr-ansien-t Ifh II ~ I, ~rrr~n vrnrrw~r n at vw~rnm T~rn~Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test hiStorY and Refe~eR~e 7.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.2. FSAR, Chapter 14.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-159 REVISION 3! Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES REFERENCES

3. FSAR, Section 3.8.3.(continued)
4. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.5. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.6. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.7. NRC Safoty Evaluation Rpe- for 232.9. NRC Safety Evaluation Roepe. for Amendment 234, .ly S'uwew-laRncc Extonion.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-160 REVASION 3!

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the SCIVs will isolate the associated penetration flow paths and that the SGT System will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.6.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK oncc ever' 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.Insert 2 SI\" Th" e Fr.equency is based on oporating expe:ienc. that do..onstratos channol failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.6.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the Insert 2 assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Frequency is based on a eiwof the surveillance test histor,', drift analysis of the associated trip units, and Reference 9-.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-168 REVISION 3! Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.6.2.3 and SR 3.3.6.2.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day or an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS oG SR 3.3.6.2.3 is based On a review of the sSR 3illa.3e t2st!history and RefeMrene

9. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.6.2.4 is based on a reie of the surveilancc test history, drift analysis of the associatod nstrumontation, and RefeMrenc 8.Insert 2 SR 3.3.6.2.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed on SCIVs and the SGT System in LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3, respectively, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.Insert 2 i, This Sr-.;laGce cAn be pofrmod with the reactor at power for some of the Functions.

The 21 mon~th FrFequency is based On a V"Ir tvw " R Sur-rR o"Ge test SIEWY RRO 8 1-E-.RGe 8 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.2. FSAR, Section 14.4.3. FSAR, Sections 14.4.5 and 14.5.4.4. FSAR, Sections 14.4.3,14.4.4,14.5.2, and 14.5.3.5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.6. NEDC-30851 P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-169 REVISION 34 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES REFERENCES

7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical (continued)

Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.8. NRC Safety Evaluation Repo, -for Amondmet 232.9. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 234, Quwterly Sun.'cillancc EXtension. HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-170 REVISION 34 LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) The Surveillances are also modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains LLS initiation capability. LLS initiation capability is maintained provided three LLS valves are maintaining initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 3) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the LLS valves will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.6.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on another channel. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be Insert 2 an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.Froquoncy .s based upon operating experiecnce that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The.CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.6.3.2, SR 3.3.6.3.3, and SR 3.3.6.3.4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-176 RE\/lSlION I LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.3.2, SR 3.3.6.3.3, and SR 3.3.6.3.4 (continued) function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the I assumptions or tne current piant specific setpoint metnoaoI Insert 2 The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Frequency is ORbased on a :evicw of the sureillance test histery, drift analysis of the assOciatod trip units (if applicablo), and Refe~eRe-6-.)gy.A portion of the S/RV tailpipe pressure switch instrument channels are located inside the primary containment. The Note for SR 3.3.6.3.3,"Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 during each scheduled outage > 72 hours when entry is made into primary containment," is based on the location of these instruments, ALARA considerations, and compatibility with the Completion Time of the associated Required Action (Required Action B.1).For this Note, a scheduled outage is a refueling outage or an outage for which at least a 72 hour period exists between discovery of an off-normal condition and a corresponding change in power level.Outage duration is measured from the time the generator is removed from the grid to the time the generator is tied to the grid, i.e.,"breaker-to-breaker." SR 3.3.6.3.5 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. Thk .0AI k," '1 ÷ '-Insert 2 1 \r""rl f_1="UWr1t7V ti CIO", M" 0 Mv 1WVV " t W cytir-rWC CIMpt; ticdrift analysis of the aSSOGiatcd and Reference 5.insirw icntatiOn (if applicable), SR 3.3.6.3.6 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specified channel.The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.4.3, "Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)" and LCO 3.6.1.8, "Low-Low Set (LLS) Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)," for S/RVs overlaps this test to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-177 REVISION 34-LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.3.6 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 .......The Frequcy f oce every 24 mnth.... fo..r SIR .3.6.3.6 i. based on Inset 2the need to pe~form this Sup.ciancc under thc conditions that apply 1---during a plant outage and the potential forF an unplanned transient i the, Sur.c.... c were...... pe.,rmcd, w;ith the reactor at power.. The 21 moenth FrFequency is based on a review of the suR'cillance test hiStGoy REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.19.2. FSAR, Section 4.11.3. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Repo. t for Amendment 232.6. NIRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendm~ent 231, Quarterly Sur.'oilance Extension.

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-178 REV/ISION "34 MCREC System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the MCREC System will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.7.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.Insert 2 The Frequency is based upon eperating experience that demeostrates channel fa-lure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.7.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the Insert 2 assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating exereneit regard te channel OPERABILITY and drift, -hich demonstrates that failure of mo.r- than one channel RI any 31 day i*nteval is a rare event.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-183 REVHSTON UI 1 MCREC System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.7.1.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the Insert 2 plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST- BASIS Frcquency is based a re9ie2 of the surveillaRNE t ESt hiStoSy a rd Refeencse 9.SR 3.3.7.1.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System," overlaps this r 2Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety Insert 2 .function.F I This 96urveillan 0A rr^Mth Crn Ge ea~be performed with the reacter at power. The kc .,nInf ,r.nn A ~ ;k 0, g *,H!I n fn+history and Reference-48. OMV W" Cx MIT VIVY W V OU"o CIMM V-1 REFERENCES

1. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 7.3.5.2. FSAR, Section 5.2.3. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 6.4.1.2.2.
4. FSAR, Chapter 14.5. Unit 2 FSAR, Table 15.1-28.6. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.0. Ni-G Safety iEvaiuatiOn Reporr ror AFmeRGem t Z~z 9. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 234, Quartery Surveillance ExtenSion.

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-184 REVISION 34-LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) Since the intended function is to alert personnel to a lowering voltage condition and the voltage reading is available for each bus on the control room front panels, the Required Action is verification of the voltage to be above the annunciator setpoint (nominal) hourly.C.. 1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the associated Function does not maintain initiation capability for the associated emergency bus. Therefore, the associated DG(s) is declared inoperable immediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, which provide appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s).SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains initiation capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3).Functions 1 and 2 maintain initiation capability provided that, for 2 of the 3 emergency buses, the following can be initiated by the Function: DG start, disconnect from the offsite power source, DG output breaker closure, load shed, and activation of the ECCS pump power permissive. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.SR 3.3.8.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation or a failure of annunciation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is defined for Function 3 to be a comparison of the annunciator status to the bus voltage and an annunciator test confirming the annunciator is capable of lighting and sounding. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure or an annunciator failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-190 REVISION ! LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.3.8.1.1 (continued) continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The frequonc. is based upon operating p... that demoRstrates ,ha...l failuro i- raro. Thus, perfor.m.a.nVeof the CANL- C-H.ECK ei e~, U IdL ul uetuuiuu uuu tul it Ur i.Ii U w~i Ur dill iUi iL~iitur ~iuui U IL" limited to 12 hours. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.8.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The FrFequency of 31 days is based en operating exeiec with 4regard to channel OPEPR.BLITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure Of mere than one? channel Of a giVen FuncRtionR in any 31 day intorpa is a rare event-.SR 3.3.8.1.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. E7717771 insert .TheFrequnyi"e Soupo the Of the .agnitude ef eaw iipmcnt drift in the ÷ etpoint SR 3.3.8.1.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific channel.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-191 RF=VIS!ois4

4. 1 LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I Ins e r t 2 SR 3.3.8.1.4 (continued)

The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety functions. The Fr.equeny is based on the Reed to pe.form thi.SSuR'eAi~l;lanc undor the conditions that apply during a plant outage and[[1(~ uutt~riti:~i Ut :iri LJ[1I]f:]rlfl8fl ~rrin'if-~rii ii Inr~: ~LJr..'r~III:]nnr~ ~xere po.formed with the reactor at p.ower. The 24 mon.th freuonc.. i further based on a review of surwcillance test historý.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 8.4.2. FSAR, Section 4.8.3. FSAR, Section 6.5.4. FSAR, Chapter 14.5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-7192 REIS 4"4MA RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.8.2.1 (continued)

As noted in the Surveillance, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is only required to be performed while the plant is in a condition in which the loss of the RPS bus will not jeopardize steady state power operation (the design of the system is such that the power source must be removed from service to conduct the Surveillance). The 24 hours is intended to indicate an outage of sufficient duration to allow for scheduling and proper performance of the Surveillance. is The 184 day FreqUency and the Note in the Surveillance are based on guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-09 (Ref. 2 SR 3.3.8.2.2 1Insert 2 -CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.Insert 2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

  • I I A The 184 day i-r eouencV is based on KaereneRl.

SR 3.3.8.2.3--j .......... Performance of a system functional test demonstrates that, with a required system actuation (simulated or actual) signal, the logic of the system will automatically trip open the associated power monitoring assembly. Only one signal per power monitoring assembly is required to be tested. This Surveillance overlaps with the CHANNEL CALIBRATION to provide complete testing of the safety function. The system functional test of the Class 1 E circuit breakers is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function. If SInsert 2 the breakers are incapable of operating, the associated electric power Ie2monitoring assembly would be inoperable. A+ne 18-4 day I--rFeEaoncV is r~asea on Ko~erenco 4-.T *(continued) REVISION 28 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-198 RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 8.7.2. NRC Generic Letter 91-09, "Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electrical Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor Protection System." 3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NRC Safoty Eivaluation Ropo~t forF Aonedmont 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-199 REVISION 28 Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures the recirculation loops are within the allowable limits for mismatch. At low core flow (i.e., < 70% of rated core flow), the MCPR requirements provide larger margins to the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit such that the potential adverse effect of early boiling transition during a LOCA is reduced. A larger flow mismatch can therefore be allowed when core flow is < 70% of rated core flow.The recirculation loop jet pump flow, as used in this Surveillance, is the summation of the flows from all of the jet pumps associated with a single recirculation loop.The mismatch is measured in terms of percent of rated core flow. If the flow mismatch exceeds the specified limits, the loop with the lower flow is considered not in operation. The SR is not required when both In 2 loops are not in operation since the mismatch limits are meaningless Insert 2 r during single loop or natural circulation operation. The Surveillance must be performed within 24 hours after both loops are in operation. The 24 hou-r Froqueoncy is consistent with the Surveillance Frequ-ency \ for jct pump OPERABILITY Verification and has bcon shown by opertin exerincoto be adequate to detoct- off nrmFal jot Pump loop flows in a timely mnanner.SR 3.4.1.2 (Not used.)REFERENCES

1. NEDC-32720P, "E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," March 1997.2. FSAR, Section 4.3.5.3. NEDO-24205, "E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Single-Loop Operation," August 1979.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-5 REVISION 37 ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)

The description of a Function maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability is discussed in the Bases for Required Action B.1 above.The 1 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the operator to take corrective action and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the ATWS-RPT instrumentation during this period.D.1 and D.2 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 2 within 6 hours (Required Action D.2).Alternately, the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation (Required Action D.1). The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, both to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions and to remove a recirculation pump from service in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 2) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the recirculation pumps will trip when necessary. SR 3.3.4.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-89 ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.4.2.1 (continued) CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a r-Amhinntirin nf tha rnhknnnl inctr" ,men I "nr'rtnintioc inrh irtinr Insert 2 indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may' an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.demonstrates channol faieuro is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.4.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. be SInsert 2 The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Froquoncy is based on aGUUIJlate trip UR116~, a[nd I-.OCeferenu3. SR 3.3.4.2.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-90 ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I Insert 2 SR 3.3.4.2.3 (continued)-Y The 24 m'nth Fre-quncy is barbed on ,hkstery, drift analysis of the assEGiated RefeFRGe4. ..... : ..... ,t +/-k- --.ra-eview Gi .n, surv-e,:8ntHij t instru-mentation, and SR 3.3.4.2.4 I In s e rt 2 E, The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as part of this Surveillance and overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would be inoperable. The 214 month F=r..uencY is based -the need to Fhi the conditions that apply a plant outage A1o with the r.eactr a po-w'r. The 21 month Frequn Is P~qPA AP A rt'..IAPIN A+ [TAR uR1~~i:rc [e-9 [m-:[urA TART -IRemnc A'I REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.23.2. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.LI-WD IzL afetv Itvalwatin D-enart f-r AnmenglmnPt

£1;4............. j* .vr ........5. NRC Safety Evaluat*on Report for Amendment 234, Quai Surveillance EXtension. HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-91 REVISION 34-RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE; however, the total LEAKAGE would remain unchanged. The total LEAKAGE must be averaged over the previous 24 hours for comparison to the limit.B._1 An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time.The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase before the reactor must be shut down without unduly jeopardizing plant safety.C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.4.1 REQUIREMENTS The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates; however, any method may be used to quantify LEAKAGE within the guidelines of Reference con-,unc1ti9n With aarmis and Ecther adm tcntatinVu Insert 2(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-16 REVISION 0 RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.4.1 (continued) conrols6, a 12 hou--r FrequencGy for thinG uR'e1PPillance is appropriate for idetifingLEAKAGE and for tracking required trends (Ref. 8).The identified portion of the total LEAKAGE is usually determined by the drywell equipment drain sump monitoring system which collect expected leakage not indicative of a degraded RCS boundary. The system equipment and operation is identical to that of the drywell floor drain monitoring system described in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." If a contributor to the unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.2.2. 10 CFR 50.55a(c).
3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.4. GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.5. NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors," October 1975.6. FSAR, Section 4.10.3.2.7. Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.8. Generic Letter 88 01, Supplement 1, "NRC Position OR IGSCC i n BWVR AuStenitic Stainless Steel Piping," Februar,'

1992.9. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.Not used HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-17 R EVIS2-1QN 1 0 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.5 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued) With all required monitors inoperable, no required automatic means of monitoring LEAKAGE are available, and immediate plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 is required.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the other required instrumentation (either the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system or the primary containment atmospheric monitoring channel, as applicable) is OPERABLE. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. The Note is based upon a NRC Safety Evaluation Report (Ref. 6) which concluded that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability of detecting an unidentified LEAKAGE when necessary. SR 3.4.5.1 Insert 2 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK of the required primary containment atmospheric monitoring system. The check gives reasonable confidence that the channel is operating properly."The Frequency of 12 heurs is based on instr'-ment reliability and s FeroaGoable for dotectincj off nremal coenditions., SR 3.4.5.2 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST r 2of the required RCS leakage detection instrumentation. The test Insert 2 I ensures that the monitors can perform their function in the desired manner. The test also verifies the alarm setpoint and relative accuracy of the instrument string. The Fr.equencY of 31 days considers instrum~ent rcliability, and operating experfience has shown i pro9per for detecting degradation.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-22 REVISO ,15n RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.5.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration Insert 2 verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside containment. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillaRnc test histor-y aRnd Reference 8.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30.2. FSAR, Section 4.10.3.4.3. GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.4. NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors," October 1975.5. FSAR, Section 4.10.3.2.6. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 185, April 30, 1993.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.8. NRC Safety Evaluation Ropo, t for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-23 REIS\IG 2 t"tl 9 RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.6 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit, and the ability to restore transient specific activity excursions while the plant remains at, or proceeds to power operation.

B.1, B.2.1, B.2.2.1, and B.2.2.2 If the DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 cannot be restored to < 0.2 p.Ci/gm within 48 hours, or if at any time it is > 4.0 pCi/gm, it must be determined at least once every 4 hours and all the main steam lines must be isolated within 12 hours. Isolating the main steam lines precludes the possibility of releasing radioactive material to the environment in an amount that is not well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100 during a postulated MSLB accident. Alternatively, the plant can be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. This option is provided for those instances when isolation of main steam lines is not desired (e.g., due to the decay heat loads).In MODE 4, the requirements of the LCO are no longer applicable. The Completion Time of once every 4 hours is the time needed to take and analyze a sample. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to isolate the main steam lines in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.Also, the allowed Completion Times for Required Actions B.2.2.1 and B.2.2.2 for placing the unit in MODES 3 and 4 are reasonable, based on operating experience, to achieve the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SR 3.4.6.1 Insert 2 This Surveillance is performed to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation.. The 7 day Fruonc. !. adequate t trcnd changch in the iodine activity level.This SR is modified by a Note that requires this Surveillance to be performed only in MODE 1 because the level of fission products generated in other MODES is much less.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-26 RE=VIRIONI 40 RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Hot Shutdown B 3.4.7 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued) However, due to the potentially reduced reliability of the alternate methods of decay heat removal, it is also required to reduce the reactor coolant temperature to the point where MODE 4 is entered.B.1, B.2, and B.3 With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem and no recirculation pump in operation, except as permitted by LCO Note 1, reactor coolant circulation by the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump must be restored without delay.Until RHR or recirculation pump operation is re-established, an alternate method of reactor coolant circulation must be placed into service. This will provide the necessary circulation for monitoring coolant temperature. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the coolant circulation function and is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. Furthermore, verification of the functioning of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 12 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued temperature monitoring capability. During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem Insert 2 or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant.The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Froquency of 12 hours is sufficieni in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR subsystem in the GGRtFG[cFnGin (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-32 REV\ISIO RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Cold Shutdown B 3.4.8 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) function and is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. Furthermore, verification of the functioning of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 12 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued temperature monitoring capability. During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant.Insert 2 h required flwrate idermndby the flwrate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequoqcy of 12 hours is su'fficint in view of other visual and audible indications cc-,rc!A ... oc Gm.REFERENCES

1. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-38 H U 1ISB 3.4I-38Otqg N4 I RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) be completed before approaching criticality or heating up to > 212 0 F.Several methods may be used, including comparison with pre-analyzed transients, new analyses, or inspection of the components.

ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), may be used to support the evaluation; however, its use is restricted to evaluation of the beltline.Condition C is modified by a Note requiring Required Action C.2 be completed whenever the Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits.Restoration alone per Required Action C.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.9.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that oper Insert 2 RCS pressure planned changes. T4 of tho control room in-"'- -- -_ -.-ation is within limits is required every 30 minutes and temperature conditions are undergoing hic FrequoRncy 0s considered rcFasnablc in '-viw ,dicaton availablo to monitor RCS status. Also, 30 minutes permits a reasonable time for assessmcRt and cor..ction of m~inre deviations. Surveillance for heatup, cooldown, or inservice leakage and hydrostatic testing may be discontinued when the criteria given in the relevant plant procedure for ending the activity are satisfied. Verification of Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2 is required during non-nuclear heatups and cooldowns, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. Verification of the < 100°F change in any 1 hour period is required during any heatup or cooldown.SR 3.4.9.2 A separate figure is used when the reactor is critical. Consequently, the RCS pressure and temperature must be verified within the appropriate limits before withdrawing control rods that will make the reactor critical.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-44 REVISION !2-RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.9.3 and SR 3.4.9.4 (continued) General Electric test data from BWR plants shows that stratification up to the 145 0 F differential does not occur any sooner than 1 hour following the RPT (Refs. 10 and 11). Adding HPCI and RCIC injection, and feedwater temperature constraints provides assurance that the temperature differential will not be exceeded within 30 minutes of the RPT.An acceptable means of demonstrating compliance with the temperature differential requirement in SR 3.4.9.4 is to compare the temperatures of the operating recirculation loop and the idle loop.SR 3.4.9.3 and SR 3.4.9.4 have been modified by a Note that requires the Surveillance to be performed only in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In MODE 5, the overall stress on limiting components is lower.Th/refore, AT limits are not required.and in accordance with the Frequency r 3495 and SR 3.496 contained in the Surveillance in accordance with the Frequency contained in the Surveillance Frpn i ipnr.x/ r.nntrnl Prnnrnm thprimqfftn ! ...................... Fmr-it nnnrv'. Cnntrt- Prnnrqm th~rP~nft,-r To be verifie minutes, and the Surveillar Control Proqa Limits on the reactor vessel flange and head flange temperatures are generally bounded by the other P/T limits during system heatup and cooldown. However, operations approaching MODE 4/from MODE 5in MODE 4 with RCS temperature less than or equal to certain specified values require assurance that these temperatures meet the Once within LCO lirniits./ The flange temperatures must be verified to be above the limits J once within 30 L0 minutes before andvhile tensioning the vessel head bolting studs in accordance with to ensure that once the head is tensioned the limits are satisfied. ice Frequency Verification of flange temperatures is also required while detensioning ram thereafter is in progress until all reactor vessel head bolts are completely debtensioned. (The head is considered tensioned if one or more bolts are partly or completely tensioned.) When in MODE 4 with RCS\ o /temperature _ 86 0 F, 30 ..inutc chck. of the flange temperatures are requirefbecause of the reduced margin to the limits. When in MODE 4 with RCS temperature 5 1060F/monitoring of the flange 2 temperature is required eveFy 42 hours o ensure the temperature is 2 within the limits specified. Once within Insert The 30 minute Frequency reflects gthe urgency of maintaining the temp..aturo.s within limits, and also limnits-. the time that the temperature limits6 could be eXceeded. The 12 hour FrFequenyi reasonable based On the rate of temperature change possibleat these temperatur~es.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-46 REVISION 1-2 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure B 3.4.10 BASES APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the limit is not applicable because the reactor is shut down. In these MODES, the reactor pressure is well below the required limit, and no anticipated events will challenge the overpressure limits.ACTIONS A.1 With the reactor steam dome pressure greater than the limit, prompt action should be taken to reduce pressure to below the limit and return the reactor to operation within the bounds of the analyses. The 15 minute Completion Time is reasonable considering the importance of maintaining the pressure within limits. This Completion Time also ensures that the probability of an accident occurring while pressure is greater than the limit is minimized. B.1 If the reactor steam dome pressure cannot be restored to within the limit within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.10.1 Verification that reactor steam dome pressure is < 1058 psig ensures Insert 2 that the initial conditions of the vessel overpressure protection D-----analysis is met. Operating oxpericncc has sho)Wn the 12 hour operation within safety analyres assumptiosR. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Appendix M.2. FSAR, Section 14.3.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.4-50 HT UN1IB3.I4-50N-2" 1 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.5.1.1 The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI System, CS System, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. In addition, when HPCI is aligned to the suppression pool (instead of the CST), one acceptable method is to monitor pump suction pressure. The 31 day Frequencybased on the gradual nature of veid buildup in the ECCS piping, the proc)edural controlS governing system operation, and operating expe~RG9.SR 3.5.1.2 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.For the HPCI System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.The 31 day Frequency of this SR was derived from the InseriCoe Tes6ting Program~ requiremen.ts-fo-r peform~ing valve testing at least once ever' 92 days. The Frequency of 31 days is further justified because imprpoper valve position would only affect a single subsystem. This, FrFequency has been shown to be acceptal through operating experiene This SR is modified by a Note that allows LPCI subsystems to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the RHR low pressure permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-8 REVISION 4-9 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.5.1.2 (continued) manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. This allows operation in the RHR shutdown cooling mode during MODE 3, if necessary. SR 3.5.1.3 Verification days that ADS air supply header pressure is-> 90 psig ensures adequate air pressure for reliable ADS operation. The accumulator on each ADS valve provides pneumatic pressure for valve actuation. The design pneumatic supply pressure requirements for the accumulator are such that, following a failure of the pneumatic supply to the accumulator, at least two valve actuations can occur with the drywell at 70% of design pressure (Ref. 11). The ECCS safety analysis assumes only one actuation to achieve the depressurization required for operation of the low pressure ECCS.This minimum required pressure of > 90 psig (for one actuation) is provided by the ADS instrument air supply. The 31 day FrFequoncY Insert 2 air system and alarms. for low air SR 3.5.1.4 Verification evey- 3-1days that the RHR System cross tie valve is closed and power to its operator is disconnected ensures that each LPCI subsystem remains independent and a failure of the flow path in one subsystem will not affect the flow path of the other LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of removing power to the operator include de-energizing breaker control power or racking out or removing the breaker. If the RHR System cross tie valve is open or power has not been removed from the valve operator, both LPCI subsystems must be considered inoperable. The 31 day FrFequency has boon found acceptable, considering that those valves are under i6trict administrative controls that will onsuro the valve- s continu to remain closed with either control or motive power removed.SR 3.5.1.5 (Not used.)(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-9 REVISIGN 4-9 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.6 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Cycling the recirculation pump discharge valves through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will close when required. Upon initiation of an automatic LPCI subsystem injection signal, these valves are required to be closed to ensure full LPCI subsystem flow injection in the reactor via the recirculation jet pumps. De-energizing the valve in the closed position will also ensure the proper flow path for the LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of de-energizing the valve include de-energizing breaker control power, racking out the breaker or removing the breaker.Insert 2 D -Thc Spe"ificd F=requency.i. o e per 31 days. However, this SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, when in MODE 4 > 48 hours. Verification during or following MODE 4> 48 hours and prior to entering MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4 is an exception to the normal Inservice Testing Program generic valve cycling Frequency of 92 day-s, but is considered acceptable due to the demonstrated reliability of these valves. The 48 hours is intended to indicate an outage of sufficient duration to allow for scheduling and proper performance of the Surveillance. If the valve is inoperable and in the open position, the associated LPCI subsystem must be declared inoperable. SR 3.5.1.7, SR 3.5.1.8, and SR 3.5.1.9 The performance requirements of the low pressure ECCS pumps are determined through application of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix K criteria (Ref. 7). This periodic Surveillance is performed (in accordance with the ASME Code, Section XI, requirements for the ECCS pumps) to verify that the ECCS pumps will develop the flow rates required by the respective analyses. The low pressure ECCS pump flow rates ensure that adequate core cooling is provided to satisfy the acceptance criteria of Reference

9. The pump flow rates are verified against a system head equivalent to the RPV pressure expected during a LOCA. The total system pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure present during a LOCA. These values may be established during preoperational testing.The flow tests for the HPCI System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow is (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-10 REVISION 49 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.7, SR 3.5.1.8, and SR 3.5.1.9 (continued) REQUIREMENTS tested at both the higher and lower operating ranges of the system.The pump flow rates are verified against a system head corresponding to the RPV pressure. The total system pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure. Additionally, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the HPCI System diverts steam flow. The reactor steam pressure must be _> 920 psig to perform SR 3.5.1.8 and _> 150 psig to perform SR 3.5.1.9. Adequate steam flow for SR 3.5.1.8 is represented by at least two turbine bypass valves open, or >_ 200 MWE from the main turbine generator; and for SR 3.5.1.9 adequate steam flow is represented by at least 1.25 turbine bypass valves open, or total steam flow _ 1 E6 lb/hour.Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure and flow are achieved to perform these tests. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveillance test because the reactor pressure is low and the time allowed to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance test is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure test has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that HPCI is inoperable. Therefore, SR 3.5.1.8 and SR 3.5.1.9 are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours after the reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.The 12 hours allowed is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR.Insert 2 The Frequency for SR 3.5.1.7 and SR 3.5.1.8 is consistent with the Inservice Testing Program pump testing requirements. The-24 m4Fnh Frequency for SR 3.5.1.9 is based on the need to perferm the S'-,"oiance u-nder the conditions that apply just prier te or during a startuip fromn a plant outage. The 24 moenth FrFequency Of SR 3.5.1.9 i6 J based oni a FeiewERA tile sufveiIIJalUU test HisteLy andC R~iueteiu -1 a.SR 3.5.1.10 The ECCS subsystems are required to actuate automatically to perform their design functions. This Surveillance verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of HPCI, CS, and LPCI will cause the systems or subsystems to operate as designed, including actuation of the system (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-11 REVISION 4-9 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.5.1.10 (continued) throughout its emergency operating sequence, automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This SR also ensures that the HPCI System will automatically restart on an RPV low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.The 24 rnanth Frcquency is based on the need to peFfFrm the Sur~voillanco under the conditions that apply during a plant ou1tage and the potential for an unplannd transient if the 9ur...cI.lance were performned with the reactor at power. The 24 month FrFequec Is.based on a review of the survoe*ianco test histor,' and Reference 15.This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance. SR 3.5.1.11 The ADS designated S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to demonstrate that the mechanical portions of the ADS function (i.e., solenoids) operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated initiation signal, causing proper actuation of all the required components. SR 3.5.1.12 and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.The 21 month FrFequenc~y is based On the need to performth Survleillance under the conRditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential forF an un~planned transient if the Survellance were perform~ed with the reactor at power. The 21 month FrFequenyi basged 9A a review o-f the surveillance test histor,' and Reference15 This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents an RPV pressure blowdown.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-12 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.5.1.12 The pneumatic actuator of each ADS valve is stroked to verify that the pilot disc rod lifts when the actuator strokes. Pilot rod lift is determined by measurement of rod travel. The total amount of lift of the pilot rod from the valve closed position to the open position shall meet criteria established by the S/RV supplier. SRs 3.5.1.11 and 3.3.5.1.5 overlap this SR to provide testing of the S/RV relief mode function. Additional functional testing is performed by tests required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 14).I Insert 2!Thc 24 month FrequencY hister'y, and Ref~rcncc 5-.if1; OARPM An A rPV1PW At thf q1rveilAnceAP tes~t REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.4.3.2. FSAR, Section 6.4.4.3. FSAR, Section 6.4.1.4. FSAR, Section 6.4.2.5. FSAR, Section 14.4.3.6. FSAR, Section 14.4.5.7. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.8. FSAR, Section 6.5.9. NEDC-31376P, "E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," December 1986.10. 10 CFR 50.46.11. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC),"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.12. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-13 REVISION 2 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES REFERENCES

13. NEDC-32041P, "Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear (continued)

Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief Valve Performance Requirements," April 1996.14. ASME, OM Code -1995, "Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants," Appendix I.15. NRC Safety Evalwuation Report for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-14 REVISION 2---------- ECCS -Shutdown B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued) controls to assure isolation capability. The administrative controls can consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.). OPERABILITY may be verified by an administrative check, or by examining logs or other information, to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 The minimum water level of 146 inches required for the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the CS System and LPCI subsystem pumps, recirculation volume, and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit, all ECCS injection/spray subsystems are inoperable unless they are aligned to an OPERABLE CST.When suppression pool level is < 146 inches, the CS System is considered OPERABLE only if it can take suction from the CST, and the CST water level is sufficient to provide the required NPSH for the CS pump. Therefore, a verification that either the suppression pool water level is > 146 inches or that CS is aligned to take suction from the CST and the CST contains > 150,000 gallons of water, equivalent to 13 ft, ensures that the CS System can supply at least 50,000 gallons of makeup water to the RPV. The CS suction is uncovered at the 100,000 gallon level. However, as noted, only one required CS subsystem may take credit for the CST option during OPDRVs. During OPDRVs, the volume in the CST may not provide adequate makeup if the RPV were completely drained. Therefore, only one CS subsystem is allowed to use the CST. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.Insert 2 Th~ 1.2 fe these SRs was developed cnrsidering latod to Suppl so poo water lovel and- OST-e -rAtn exooRrtionca e X rAARR- -P e (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-18 REVISION ! 0 ECCS -Shutdown B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 (continued) water level variations and instrument drift during the applicable MODES. Fu,"thermore, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in vieW of other indications available in the control room, inc~luding alarms, to alert the operator to an abnrGmal SUPpr.so pool or CST water leVel conditinG. SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6 The Bases provided for SR 3.5.1.1, SR 3.5.1.7, and SR 3.5.1.10 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6, respectively. However, the LPCI flow rate requirement for SR 3.5.2.5 is based on a single pump, not the two pump flow rate requirement of SR 3.5.1.7.SR 3.5.2.4 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being Insert 2 mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The 31 day Frequency isaporate becauseF the valves, Are operated under procedurlal control and the probability of their befing mnispositiened during this time period is low.In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System may operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that allows one LPCI subsystem of the RHR System to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the RPV, and the system is not otherwise inoperable. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent RPV draindown should occur.(continued) REVISION I HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-19 RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.3.1 The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge line of the RCIC System full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the Reactor Coolant System upon Insert 2 demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring the line is full when aligned to the CST is to vent at the high points and, when aligned to the suppression pool, by monitoring pump suction pressure. T-he 1\ 31 day FrFequcncy is based on the gradual naturc of void buildup-in thc RCIC rpiRg, the conrItrl system opeiratioR, and operating experience. SR 3.5.3.2 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RCIC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for RCIC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.Insert 2 For the RCIC System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.The 31 day Frequeny Of thiy SR was derived from, the ,nscice Testing Progra rqiemets forF performing valve testing atlet onc~e eve' 92dy.The Frequency of 31 days is further justified because impro.per valve po.ition would affec only the RCGC System.This Fr.equency has been. show....n to be acceptable thrcugh operating epleG6 7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.3.3 and SR 3.5.3.4 The RCIC pump flow rates ensure that the system can maintain reactor coolant inventory during pressurized conditions With the RPV (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-25 REVISION RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.5.3.3 and SR 3.5.3.4 (continued) isolated. The required flow rate (400 gpm) is the pump design flow rate. Analysis has demonstrated that RCIC can fulfill its design function at a system flow rate of 360 gpm (Ref. 4). The pump flow rates are verified against a system head equivalent to the RPV pressure. The total system pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure.The flow tests for the RCIC System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow is tested both at the higher and lower operating ranges of the system.Additionally, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the RCIC System diverts steam flow. Reactor steam pressure must be > 920 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.3 and > 150 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.4. Adequate steam flow is represented by at least one turbine bypass valve open, or for SR 3.5.3.3 > 200 MWE from the main turbine-generator and for SR 3.5.3.4 total steam flow> 1E6 lb/hour. Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure and flow are achieved to perform these SRs. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveillance because the reactor pressure is low and the time allowed to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure Surveillance has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that RCIC is inoperable. Therefore, these SRs are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours after the reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.The 12 hours allowed is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR. A-92-day SFoqunRcy for SR 3.5.3.3 3s conSiStent With tho n.ervice Testing PreoRam requireoThe 21 motth Froequency fo SR 3.5.3.4 based on the need to pesform the Sufreillance undre conditioes that apply just prior to orF durinig a startup from a plant outage. The 21 month Frequency Of SR 38.58.34.4 is based on a review~ of th s~urveillance test history and Ref8erenc 6.S R 3.5.3.5 The RCIC System is required to actuate automatically in order to verify its design function satisfactorily. This Surveillance verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of the RCIC System will cause the system to operate as designed, including actuation of the system throughout its (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-26 REVISION 4 RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.5.3.5 (continued) emergency operating sequence; that is, automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This test also ensures the RCIC System will automatically. restart on an RPV low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.Insert 2 The 21 FreqWencY is based on the need pefor"F the under th GonRditions that apply duiRng a plant Outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance Were performed with the rF8actr at The 24 month Frequency is based on a Feview of the sur~veillance test history and Reference 6.This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 33.2. FSAR, Section 4.7.3. Memorandum from R. L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC),"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.4. GE Report AES-41-0688, "Safety Evaluation for Relaxation of RCIC Performance Requirements for Plant Hatch Units I and 2," July 1988.5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.6. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-27 REVIqSION 4-Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.1.1.2 Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression I 2 chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression Insrtchamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed eve,' 241 months. The 24 month Frequency was developed r,;conernng it is prudent that this Surpclanc b e porformoed during a unit ouitage and- -also in VioW Of the fact tha component failures that might have affected this test are identified by othor DrimFar. containment SRs. The 21 monEth FrFeuencyR is' based F II I Ill I I on a review of the 6u~ei..a..e test nistrFy and RefeRe 9. Twe consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected con'taitnment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicatese, increasing the FrFequency to) once every 9 monGths is required until the situatio is emedied as evidenced by passinRg tWo consecu1tive tests.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.2. FSAR, Section 14.4.3.3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.6. Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," September 1995.7. NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," Revision 0, July 26, 1995.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-4 REVISION 28 Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES REFERENCES

8. ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994, "American National Standard for (continued)

Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements," 1994.9. NRC Safety Evaluation Repeot for AmenRdment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-5 REVISIGNI2 Primary Containment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.6.1.2.2 The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely m.echanica nature of this interloc~k, and given that the interlock mechanism i6 only challenged When the primary containment air l9ock door is opo-nod, this teSt s onhly requirod to be performed upRn enteFrig or exiting the prma,'cntainment air lock, bu6t is no~t required more frequently than 18 aswhen prim~ary co~ntainment is de inertod. The 181 dayW Frquny is based on engineering judgment and as con~sidere I 1nn, I 1t I A $ n1 I -1I1 i1II J ,,+ , , n ' ' h 'j %I + -- f'A +;W W -I ---11-1 " -- 000 On ri VC3 WricI-- L--01 inerioc mesnnismstatu. avaiaoV Io oenns Dronl REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.3.4.5.
2. FSAR, Section 5.2.3. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-12 RE\/ISIONM.,v 5

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Note stating that the SR is not required to be met when the 18 inch purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The 18 inch purge valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA.Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other PCIV FrP- uireemctS discussed in SR 3.6.1.3.2. Insert 2 SR 3.6.1.3.2 This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those isolation devices outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. Since veorfication of valve position for isolation devices Insert 2 outide ri....a.y. cntainmet is relatively,'asy, the 31 day F=requ6ency wa; chosen to provide added assurance that the ioaondvisar in the Gorrect positions. Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons.Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.SR 3.6.1.3.3 This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and is (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-22 RE\VIS:ION , PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.3.3 (continued) required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For these isolation devices inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as "Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these isolation devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA and personnel safety reasons.Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low.A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.S R 3.6.1.3.4 The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Actuation and monitoring circuitry is provided in the main control room. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. The circuitry is such that a light illuminates upon loss of explosive charge continuity. Ensuring that the light illuminates when voltage is applied and that it is extinguished when installed in the circuit provides Insert 2 assurance of explosive valve continuity. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Froequoncy is based on 1\ "o'perating exeIcnc that has demonstrated the rcliability of the oxplo~iVo charge conRtinuity. SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-23 REVISION ! PClVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.6. The isolation time test ensures that each valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that listed in the FSAR and that no degradation affecting valve closure since the performance of the last Surveillance has occurred. (EFCVs are not required to be tested because they have no specified time limit). The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within 10 CFR 100 limits. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.SR 3.6.1.3.7 Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.6 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it s pr'udent that this be nRly duhrig a uRit outage 6inco.4]soatioR of would eliminate -ooling water flowa disrupt the normnal opertation o-f m~any critial comFponents. Th 21 monGth FrFequency i6 based on a reVioW of the- AcuRFPeanco tost histor; and Reference 8.SR 3.6.1.3.8 This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) (of a representative sample) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve reduces flow to within limits on an actual or simulated instrument line break condition. (The representative sample consists of an approximately equal number of EFCVs, such that each EFCV is tested at least once eVe,'y 10 years (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-24 REVISION 28 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.8 (continued) REQUIREMENTS ,,r",,al, In addition, the EFCVs in the sample are representative of the various plant configurations, models, sizes, and operating Insert 2 environments. This ensures that any potentially common problem with a specific type of application of EFCV is detected at the earliest possible time.) This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform as designed. The 24 menth Freguency is based on the Reed to perform thiS Survcillance under the conditionc that apply during a plant outage and the potontial for an unpiannod transiont if the Sur-ei!lance were performed with the reactor at power.The 24 morth Frlequeny ivs based n a review eof the curvehiarge test histon y and Reference

8. (The nominal 10 year intesd al is based Ro performncei tre ting as discused d in NEDO 32977 A, "Ehxtess Flovew Check Valvt e Testing Relaxation" (Ref. 7). Furthehroe, any EFCv faisuros will be evaluated toe dotrmane if additional testing On that tes i nterval is warranted to ensure overall reliability is mnaintained.

Operating e-princ has domonstrated that these componPents are highly reliable a;nd that failures to isolate are ve~' infrequent-. Therefore, testing of a representative sample was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.) Any EFCFV that fails to chock flow durngo its seance test well be dcufmented OinR the Hatch corrective actionaprogrm as a sueiae tet failure. The failure will be evaluated and corrected and, if the valve is Repaired and net replaced, itwill be added to the next cyclo's surveillance. S R 3.6.1.3.9 The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive Insert 2squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will Insert 2actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The FrFequency of 21 mon~ths On a STAGGERED TEFSTr BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls onR replacFemet charges and the frequent checks Of circuit continuity (SR 3.65.1.3.4). The 21 month FrFequency is based on a review of the survleillance test history and Reference 8.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-25 REVISION 29 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.6.1.3.10 The analyses in References 1 and 3 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be< 11.5 scfh when tested at > 28.0 psig.The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 6).SR 3.6.1.3.11 Deleted Insert 2 SR 3.6.1.3.12 This SR provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 24 month Frequ.enc i.bASPed on A rcveY*wA of the sun.'eillanc test history and Reference 8.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.4.2. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T7.0-1.3. FSAR, Section 5.2.4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.6. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.7. NEDO 32977 A, "Excess Flow Check Valve Testing ReaatiGo.8. NRC Safety Eivaluation RoPo~t for AmenGdment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-26 REVISION 54-Drywell Pressure B 3.6.1.4 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A._1 With drywell pressure not within the limit of the LCO, drywell pressure must be restored within 1 hour. The Required Action is necessary to return operation to within the bounds ofthe primary containment analysis. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.B.1 and B.2 If drywell pressure cannot be restored to within limit within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.4.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that drywell pressure is within limit ensures that unit Insert 2 operation remains within the limit assumed in the primary containment analysis. The 12 hour Frequency of this SR was developed, based On operating e ene ted to trending Of drW8-ell pre.sure variation-during the applicable MODES. Furthermore, the 12 hourF ..Frequ.cy is considered ad contro~l room, inc dpywllpFeeeuf~e equate in view ef other in.hgimt .,Irr6c +~ ! r+ tha!iGa-tions available in the nr+n +n Kn ý, hnr-a rig C1 carmn, " ca V w "purct Or " c3m ca rmr d r-nmCiUman REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Sections 5.2 and 14.4.3.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-28IO C Drywell Air Temperature B 3.6.1.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

[Insert 2 SR 3.6.1.5.1 (continued) For the situation in which some or all of the normal temperature channels are inoperable, plant procedures contain instructions on how to determine the volumetric average to determine an accurate representation of the actual average temperature using the remaining OPERABLE instruments. Depending upon the location and number of inoperable temperature channels and the plant condition, a correction factor may have to be added to the volumetric average temperature calculated from the remaining OPERABLE temperature channels. The correction factor accounts for the inoperable channels and ensures a reasonable value for the average volumetric temperature is calculated.-r"l.. A A L- .... r-- ........... +/-L. A r-..1 lie tE-f 11Uw riUqUunuy Uc it aK Wd Wt!fdF~if eearepu euUH oi pclditiii cxeIence rolated to drywell average air temperature variationc

And temperature in........

drift during the applicable MODES and the low~LHUUUIII d ci M UbLFII UUM-tý %uurii cewel UFYvciiijiiu. r-URHUHHURIcl,* -- J .... I J .£ ,ILL ,nc nour rrcouencV 1s consiper aeoUale, In VieW Gi ,,I I i 4i I I I I I inaicaIGl"Io vROIiaIo In th' control room. inci-llna alarms. 1o -lort the operator to an abnrm~pal dryevll air temnperature condition. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Sections 5.2 and 14.4.3.2. FSAR, Section 5.2.3.2.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-31 REVISION 465 LLS Valves B 3.6.1.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.6.1 (continued) mode function.

Additional functional testing is performed by tests required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2). The 24 month Fr.equency Is S R 3.6.1.6.2 The LLS designated S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions (i.e., solenoids) of the LLS function operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.3.6 overlaps this SR to provide Insert 2 complete testing of the safety function.The 24 Fmnhth Frequency i6 based OR the need to pe.form this Sur~oillanco under the conRditionS that apply duFrig a plant outage and the potential forF an unplanned transiont if the Surveillance were perforFMed With tho reactor at Po)Wor. The 21 mon~th Fre~quec Is based on a roviow of the surveillance test histor,' and Reference 5.This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents a reactor pressure vessel pressure blowdown.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 4.11.2. ASME, OM Code -1995, "Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix I." 3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NEDC-32041 P, "Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief Valve Performance Requirements," April 1996.5. ,NRC Safety Evaluation Report f9o 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-34 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.7 BASES ACTIONS C._1 (continued)

With one line with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the leak tight primary containment boundary is intact. The ability to mitigate an event that causes a containment depressurization is threatened, however, if both vacuum breakers in at least one vacuum breaker penetration are not OPERABLE. Therefore, the inoperable vacuum breaker must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. This is consistent with the Completion Time for Condition A and the fact that the leak tight primary containment boundary is being maintained. D.1 With two lines with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the primary containment boundary is intact. However, in the event of a containment depressurization, the function of the vacuum breakers is lost. Therefore, all vacuum breakers in one line must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which require that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.E.1 and E.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.7.1 REQUIREMENTS Each vacuum breaker is verified to be closed to ensure that a Insert 2 potential breach in the primary containment boundary is not present.This Surveillance is performed by observing local or control room indications of vacuum breaker position or by verifying a differential pressure of 0.5 psid is maintained between the reactor building and suppression chamber. The 14 day FrFequency i based on gesurefing judgment, is contidered adequathe incW biilf gtho (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-38 REVISION ! Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.7.1 (continued) indications of vacUUm breakerF t s availtabcle to op.r.tio porsonnel, and has been shoWn to be accoptable through of eFat'Rg Two Notes are added to this SR. The first Note allows reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers. The second Note is included to clarify that vacuum breakers, which are open due to an actual differential pressure, are not considered as failing this SR.SR 3.6.1.7.2 Each vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens properly to perform its design function and returns to its fully closed position.This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 92 day Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.SR 3.6.1.7.3 Demonstration of vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of < 0.5 psid is valid. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to peform this Sup-vellance under that apply during a plant outage and the potential for An Lunplanned transient if thc Sup~eillan~e Were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month FrFequency is ba sod OR a review of+k- +-.~ilcnn for hwetnn, -A D-f-rnt' A (continued)HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-39 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.7 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.2. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 6.2.1.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amondment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-40 I 29k Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert12 SR 3.6.1.8.1 (continued)

Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker Position Indication," as ACTIONS for inoperable closed position indicator channels.If position indication is reliable (dual or open indication while torus-to-drywell differential pressure is steady at 0 psid), and indicates open, the alternate methods outlined in the TRM T3.6.1 ACTIONS can prove the indication to be in error and the vacuum breaker closed.However, in this case the vacuum breaker is assumed open until otherwise proved to satisfy the leakage test, and this confirmation must be performed within the Technical Specification 3.6.1.8, Required Action B.1, Completion Time of 2 hours.Thc 14 day Frdequency is based on engineeinsg judgefmnt, is G9cosidcrod adequate in view of othcr indicationS of vacuum breaker status -available to operations personnel, and has been shoWn to be acceptable through operating oxp A Note is added to this SR which allows suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers.SR 3.6.1.8.2 Insert 2 Each required (i.e., required to be OPERABLE for opening) vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens adequately to perform its design function and returns to the fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. T-he-31-day Frequency Of this SR was developed, based o.R.ln e,...e Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once ever, S92 days. A 31 day FrFequ1ency war, hosen to provide additiona assurance that the vacuum. breakers are OPERABLE, since they are located in a hars~h envi9ronment (the suppression chamber airspace). In addition, this functional test is required within 12 hours after a discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the safety/relief valves.I SR 3.6.1.8.3 Verification of the vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-45 REVISION ! Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SIR 3.6.1.8.3 (continued) full open differential pressure of 0.5 psid is valid. The 21 month4 Frequency is based on the need to per-orm this Surveillanre under thGonditions that apply durFing a plant outage and the potential fora unplanned transient if the Surveillance were pe~formed with the reactor at power. The 24 mon~th FrFequlency is based on a review ot the surveýilance test history and RefeFrenc

5. it is further justified because of other surveillances pcF~femed at shertor Fr4equencies that convoy the proper func~tioning status o-f eac-h vacuu6m breaker-.REFERENCES
1. FSAR, Section 5.2.2. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 6.2.1.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. Technical Requirements Manual, TLCO 3.6.1.5. NRC Safety Evalua,,;, Repot for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-46 Suppression Pool Average Temperature B 3.6.2.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.6.2.1.1 The suppression pool average temperature (torus average bulk temperature) is regularly monitored to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The average temperature is determined by using a weighted average of functional suppression pool water temperature channels. The channels in the lower half of the suppression pool are averaged and the channels in the upper half of the suppression pool are averaged. The suppression pool average temperature is the average of the upper and lower average temperatures. For the situation in which some or all of either the upper half or the lower half temperature channels are inoperable, plant procedures contain instructions on how to determine the suppression pool average temperature using the remaining OPERABLE instruments. Depending upon the location and number of inoperable channels and the plant condition, a correction factor may have to be added to the average temperature calculated from the remaining OPERABLE temperature channels. The correction factor accounts for the inoperable channels and ensures a reasonable value for the average bulk temperature is calculated. The 24 hour FrFequency has been shown, based on operating exeine, to be acceptable. When heat ir, being added tote...uppr*" e.. pool by testing, hewever, R nGcessa~r to monitor suppression pool tempeFature more The 5 minute Frequency during testing is justified by the rates at which tests will heat up the suppression pool, has been shown to be acceptable Frequency is based on operating experience, and provides assurance that allowable pool temperatures are not exceeded. The -FeweRi8are-further justified in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool average temperature condition.

1. GE Report EAS-19-0388, "Elimination of the Suppression Pool REFERENCES
1. GE Report EAS-19-0388, "Elimination of the Suppression Pool Temperature Limit for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2," March 1988.2. NUREG-0783.
3. FSAR, Sections 5.2 and 14.4.3.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-51 REVISION 11 Suppression Pool Water Level B 3.6.2.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2 If suppression pool water level cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.2.2.1 Verification of the suppression pool water level is to ensure that the I Insert 2 Irequired limits are satisfied. Th e r4 hinictin ..... il.. o hib in was cont, l .. roo icldeuding plear, toR experiet e to tnabrmg suppresion poo pel wateri Rp dv.ae level cniin REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Sections 5.2 and 14.4.3.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-54 REVISION I RHR Suppression Pool Cooling B 3.6.2.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 With two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable, one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. In this condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment pressure and temperature mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to remove heat from primary containment are available. C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.6.2.3.1 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR suppression pool cooling mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the ' alves A re operated under procedural conRtrol, improper valvo position would affect only a-ingle subsystem, the probability of an veRnt iRitiatioR of the system is low, aRd the subsystem is a manually nlitiated system. This FrreL6u9RGYHa 1Jue. GHGWR tI.V19 Lue aG J ptabWUe UbasUG Un per~d*H expe~eRe7* v (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-57 REVISION !.5 RHR Suppression Pool Spray B 3.6.2.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.2.4.1 (continued) cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.Insert 2 The Fr.equcn.Y Of 31 days is justified because the valves ape operated und~er procedural control, improper valve position would affect only SiRgle subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the sys~tem is lOW, and the subsystem is a manually initiated systemn. This FrFequency has been sho)wn to be acceptable based an operating SR 3.6.2.4.2 This Surveillance is performed eeiy-1-OyeaFs to verify that the spray nozzles are not obstructed and that flow will be provided when required. The 10 year FrFequency is adequate to detect degradation in-~performance due to the passive nozzle design and its normally drY state and has been shown to be acceptable through operating Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Sections 5.2 and 14.4.3.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-62 REVISHOT 1U5 1 CAD System B 3.6.3.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

With two CAD subsystems inoperable, one CAD subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in the amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit, the amount of time available after the event for operator action to prevent exceeding this limit, and the availability of other hydrogen mitigating systems.C.1 If any Required Action cannot be met within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that there is > 2000 gallons of liquid nitrogen supply in each Nitrogen Storage Tank will ensure at least 7 days of post-LOCA CAD Insert 2 { operation. This minimum volume of liquid nitrogen allows sufficient

  • time after an accident to replenish the nitrogen supply for long term This i ;( olrifiedl evory 31 days to,- that, each
o~~~i of eor its- ;ntcnd-Ied functiof~rn

.,hcn.- re", rc. The, supply and on the availability of other hydrogen m~itigating systems.SR 3.6.3.1.2 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in each of the CAD subsystem flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-66 REVISION I CAD System B 3.6.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.3.1.2 (continued) A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within 9 hours. This is acceptable because the CAD System is manually initiated. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.The 31 day is appropriate because the valves are operated r proedural control, iproper valve positin WOUld. only~affet a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring system.REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision 0.2. FSAR, Section 5.2.3.4.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-67 RE\/IS i-IO Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration B 3.6.3.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 If oxygen concentration cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, power must be reduced to < 15% RTP within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce reactor power from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert2 2 SR 3.6.3.2.1 The primary containment (drywell and suppression chamber) must be determined to be inert by verifying that oxygen concentration is< 4.0 v/o. The 7 day F=roquonc.y .' baed on the slow rate at which oxygeRn coRnetratifonR can change and on other indication,, abnormnal conRditions; (which woul1d lead to mrnee frequent chccking by operators in accordance with plant procedueres). Also, this Frequlency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.4.9.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-70 REVISION !

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued) case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches and one access door in each access opening are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. SR 3.6.4.1.1 also requires equipment hatches to be sealed. In this application, the term"sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed. An access opening contains one inner and one outer door. The intent is not to breach the secondary containment at any time when secondary containment is required. This is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. When the secondary containment configuration excludes Zone I and/or Zone II, these SRs also include verifying the Insert 2 hatches and doors separating the common refueling floor zone from the reactor building(s). The 31 day Frcquency for tho-e S -hSRS boon shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other niain of doorF and hatch status that are available to the operator.SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems exhaust the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.3 verifies that the appropriate SGT System(s) will rapidly establish and maintain a negative pressure in the secondary containment. This is confirmed by demonstrating that the required SGT subsystem(s) will draw down the secondary containment to> 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in < 120 seconds (13 seconds of diesel generator startup and breaker closing time is included in the 120 second drawdown time). This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.4 (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-75 REVISION 53 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS demonstrates that the required SGT subsystem(s) can maintain> 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour at a flow rate < 4000 cfm for each SGT subsystem. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. Therefore, these two tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, each SGT subsystem or combination of subsystems will perform this test. The number of SGT subsystems and the required combinations are dependent on the configuration of the secondary containment and are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3). The Note to SR 3.6.4.1.3 and Insert 2 I SR 3.6.4.1.4 specifies that the number of required SGT subsystems be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. The surveil1ance test history and Roferencc 5.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Subsection 14.4.3.2. FSAR, Subsection 14.4.4.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Repfort f- Am^ndment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-76 REVISION 53 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.D.1, D.2, and D.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.6.4.2.1 This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those isolation devices in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.,Since these iselati On deVices arc readily accessiblo to personnel rlIIr.mr. nnrmnl ur, r11:3 rl"r 0 "W"t-0 WH ti" IVMI- t7tit "M t% t " r- 0WO t "M CY P-to elt IV" V (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-81 RE\VISION% 1 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.4.2.1 (continued) easy, the 31 day FrequencY was chosen to provide added assur~ance Wati Wue RUeiatIUII UVIUe aJJU II tHE? G9rruet P96ti1ORe. Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open.SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic SCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate Insert 2 OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The Frequency of thiG SR was developed based u1pon engineering judgment and the similarity to PCI Vs.SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verifying that each automatic SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.The 24 Fmnth is based on the need to pe,,r, this ,the potential for an unplaned transient if the Sureillance Were pe~fbrmed with the reactor at power. The 24 mnonth FrFequec Is based onR a review of the surve4ilance test histor; and Reference 5.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-82 REVISION 28 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Subsection 14.3.3.2. FSAR, Subsection 14.3.4.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Repet for Anmondmont 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-83 REVISION 40 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operating each required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT subsystem for> 15 continuous minutes ensures that they are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. The 31 day FrFequency was dovelopodi consideration of the knoWn reliability of fan motors ard controls ard the redund~ancy available in the system.SR 3.6.4.3.2 This SR verifies that the required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.SR 3.6.4.3.3 This SR verifies that each required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. This Sur-eillance can be performed with the reactor at power. The Insert 2 hiStGoy and Referene; 6.(continued)64 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-89 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.2. Unit 1 FSAR, Section 5.3.2.3.3. Unit 2 FSAR, Sections 6.2.4, 15.2 and 15.3.4. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.6. NRC Safety Evaluation Repoi4 for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-90 RHRSW System B 3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.Insert 2 The 31 day Frog elRunY i based on ongnrg judgmeRt, is consistent with the procedual cnOrols govering valve operation, and encrosFG corroct valve positions. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 10.6.2. FSAR, Subsection 14.4.3.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. General Electric, "RHR Heat Exchanger K-Value Study for Hatch Unit 1 and 2", GE-NE-0000-0037-9449-RO, April 2005.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-6 PSW System and UHS B 3.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.2.1 (continued)

Insert 2 margin to the minimum level requirement (60.7 ft MSL), so the Surveillance is only required to be performed every 14 days.A However, if the level is < 61.7 ft, the Surveillance must be performed more frequently (every 12 hours), since the conditions are closer to the minimum level limit.SR 3.7.2.2 Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each PSW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for PSW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position within the required time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.This SR is modified by a Note indicating that isolation of the PSW System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the PSW System. As such, when all PSW pumps, valves, and piping are OPERABLE, but a branch connection off the main header is isolated, the PSW System is still OPERABLE.Insert 2 The 31 day Frequency is based-e-e GRtFG4 gne..ring judgment, i6 6 goVerning valve opeR GO~siiiteRit WKLH We PFGuuuuurui G ensurFes corEc8t valve Dositions. tG, a, SR 3.7.2.3 This SR verifies that the automatic isolation valves of the PSW System will automatically switch to the safety or emergency position to provide cooling water exclusively to the safety related equipment during an accident event. This is demonstrated by the use of an actual or simulated initiation signal. This SR also verifies the automatic start capability (on a LOCA or LOSP signal) of one of the two PSW pumps in each subsystem.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-12 REVISION -0 PSW System and UHS B 3.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.2.3 (continued) The 214 month Frequ~encY is b history and ReferencG5 'asp'd on a r'vie';- of the su-,oillaREnc test2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 10.7.2. FSAR, Section 5.2.3. FSAR, Chapter 14.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendmnent 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-13 REVISION 28 DG 1B SSW System B 3.7.3 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.7.3.1 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the DG 1 B SSW System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for DG 1 B SSW System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet be considered in the correct position provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position, within the required time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The 31 day Frequency is based consfistent With the procedural Gi ensuroS corroct valve positions. PS u On engineeFrin judgment, ntrols govYerning valve op 8ais n-aRd SR 3.7.3.2 This SR ensures that the DG 1 B SSW System pump will automatically start to provide required cooling to the DG 1 B when the DG 1 B starts and the respective bus is energized. The 24 mor nth Frequency i based OR a review of the su5.eillanco test histor,' and Reference 5.REFERENCES

1. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 9.2.1.2. FSAR, Section 5.2.3. FSAR, Chapter 14.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRG Safety Evaluaveon Ropart for AmendIment 232 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-16 REVISION 29 MCREC System B 3.7.4 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly.As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem onco every 31 days provides an adequate check on this system. Since the MCREC System does Insert 2 not have heaters, each subsystem need only be operated for> 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the subsystem.the 31 day FrFequency is based on the known reliability of the eqimn and the two subsystem redundancy available. SR 3.7.4.2 This SR verifies that the required MCREC testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.Insert 2 SR 3.7.4.3 This SR verifies that on an actual or simulated initiation signal, each MCREC subsystem starts and operates. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.7.1.4 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. This Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is bas~ed en a review of the Gurveillanco test history and Reference 9.SR 3.7.4.4 This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas (the turbine building), is periodically tested to verify proper function of the MCREC System. During the pressurization mode of operation, the MCREC System is designed to slightly pressurize the control room > 0.1 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to the turbine building to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The MCREC System is designed to maintain this positive (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-23 P~V~ON-28 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-23 REVISION 29 MCREC System B 3.7.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.4.4 (continued) pressure at a flow rate of < 2750 cfm through the control room in the pressurization mode. This SR ensures the total flow rate meets the design analysis value of 2500 cfm +/- 10% and ensures the outside air flow rate is <- 400 cfm. The 24 month Fr.equencY, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, is based On a reView of the 2urvoillanco test histor, and Refe~e4Ree-@9 7 REFERENCES

1. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 6.4.2. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 9.4.1.3. FSAR, Section 5.2.4. FSAR, Chapter 14.5. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 6.4.1.2.2.
6. Unit 2 FSAR, Table 15.1-28.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.8. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T2.1-1.9. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amondment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-24 REVISION 4-0 Control Room AC System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS G.1, G.2, and G.3 (continued)

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with three control room AC subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is In 2 sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety Insert 2 analysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The 24 monpth Frcequoncy iaprpite GincoG significant degradationR of the CoAntrol Room AC SyStem i not oXPectod over this time poriod.The 21 mo~nth FrFequency is based onarvc f the suR';efillance test history and Refc~Rcne 1.REFERENCES

1. Unit 2 FSAR, Sections 6.4 and 9.4.1.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T2.1-1.4. NRC Safety Evaluation Repo, t for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-30 REVISION 40 Main Condenser Offgas B 3.7.6 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.6.1 This SR, on a 31 day Frequency, requires an isotopic analysis of an offgas sample to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-1 33, Xe-1 35, Xe-1 38, Kr-85m, Kr-87, and Kr-88. If the measured rate of radioactivity increases significantly (by > 50% after correcting for expected increases' due to changes in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is also performed within 4 hours after the increase is noted, to ensure that the increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate. The 31 day Fr-equ.encY is adequate in view of other instrumentation that continuousl6y monitor the offgas, and is acceptablc. based en nnieratna -gnPer0Pnrc. Insert SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolated and the SJAE is in operation. Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 9.4 and Appendix E.2. 10 CFR 100.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-33 REVISION 8-Main Turbine Bypass System B 3.7.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

< 24% RTP. As discussed in the Applicability section, operation at< 24% RTP results in sufficient margin to the required limits, and the Main Turbine Bypass System is not required to protect fuel integrity during the turbine generator load rejection transient. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS Cycling each main turbine bypass valve through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically Insert 2 OPERABLE and will function when required. The 31 day is based on G ,en jdgment, is With the procedural controls goVeng 3av peration, and ensuros correct valve_'__ýpesitieR6. Oporating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when perform~ed at the 31 day FrFequency. Therefore, the FrFequec Is ccepable from a reliability standpoint. SR 3.7.7.2 Insert 2 The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This SR demonstrates that, with the required system initiation signals, the valves will actuate to their required position. The 24 month Fr.equenc.y iS based- on the need to---........ pe~orm tnis uneer the conain~ons that apply auring a unit outageaR~ a ~e h OdGGtatapydFgAInd because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Su'-eillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month FrequenGy is based en a review of the test histof and SR 3.7.7.3 This SR ensures that the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE Insert 2 TIME is in compliance with the assumptions of the appropriate safety analysis. The response time limits are specified in Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3). The 24 moRth is based o-the need to perfoFrm this Surveillance under the conditions that apply duiga unit outage and because Of the potential for an unplanned tranSfient if the Sur'.'ollanco wore performed-wAith the reactorF at power.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-36 Main Turbine Bypass System B 3.7.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The 24 month Fre~quencY is based- onI .a r-Vevie of the cuR'eillance test histefy and REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.11.2. FSAR, Section 14.3.2.1.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T5.0-1.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Rcpo~t for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-37 REVISION 4!0 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level B 3.7.8 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY This LCO applies during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool since the potential for a release of fission products exists.ACTIONS A.1 Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.When the initial conditions for an accident cannot be met, action must be taken to preclude the accident from occurring. If the spent fuel storage pool level is less than required, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool is suspended immediately. Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of an irradiated fuel assembly to a safe position. This effectively precludes a spent fuel handling accident from occurring. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that sufficientwater is available in the event of a fuel Insert 2 handling accident. The water level in the spent fuel storage pool must be checked periodically. The 7 day F= ..eu.c I 3acceptable, based On .p..ating experience, considering that the water volume in the pool is nremally stable, and all water level changes are conroliled by U~t FGedwFes.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 10.3.2. NRC Safety Evaluation Report related to Unit 1 Amendment 172 and Unit 2 Amendment 112, August 28, 1991.3. 10 CFR 100.4. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Revision 1, July 1981.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-39 REVHSTON UI 1 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and Insert 2 loads are connected to their preferred power source and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The- 74ay FrequencY is adequate since position is Ret likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its statusi displayed in the control room.SR 3.8.1.2 This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition, and verifies that the DGs are capable of proper startup, synchronizing, and accepting a load approximately 50% of the continuous load rating. This demonstrates DG, capability while minimizing the mechanical stress and wear on the engine. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1.0 is an operational limitation. To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, this SR has been modified by a Note (Note 2) to indicate that all DG starts for this Surveillance may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup prior to loading.For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, the DG manufacturer recommends a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading.These start procedures are the intent of Note 3. Once voltage and frequency requirements are demonstrated, the DG may be tied to its respective 4160 V emergency bus, as directed by SR 3.8.1.2.b.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-19 REVISION 33 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS When the DG is tied to its bus, the electrical grid, due to its larger size compared to the DG, will dictate DG voltage and frequency. The DG operator cannot adjust either parameter. Therefore, the voltage and frequency requirements of SR 3.8.1.2.a no longer apply while the DG is tied to its bus and need not be met to satisfy the requirements of SR 3.8.1.2.b. Other SRs, notably SR 3.8.1.9, require that voltage and frequency requirements can be met while the DG is supplying load.SR 3.8.1.5.a requires that, at a 181 day F=r.qu....y, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis of FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4). The 12 second start requirement is not applicable to SR 3.8.1.2 (see Note 3), when a modified start procedure as described above is used. If a modified start is not used, the 12 second start voltage and frequency requirements of SR 3.8.1.5.a apply.Since SR 3.8.1.5.a does require a 12 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.2. This procedure is the intent of Note 1.To minimize testing of the swing DG, this SR is modified by a note (Note 4) to allow a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit)to satisfy the requirements for both units, using the starting circuitry of one unit for one periodic test and the starting circuitry of the other unit during the next periodic test. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance, to ensure DG OPERABILITY, is still being verified on the proper frequency, the starting circuits historically have a very low failure rate, as compared to the DG itself, and that, while each starting circuit is only being tested every second test (due to the staggering of the tests), some portions of the starting circuits are common to both units. If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillance, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.Note 5 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 6 modifies the Surveillance by stating that starting transients above the upper voltage limit do not invalidate this test.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-20 RE\/lSlION 33 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Note 7 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary load transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.Note 8 indicates that this Surveillance is required to be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that Insert 2 might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. The normal 31 day Fr.equencY for SR 3.8.1.2 . with Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10). This Freq .u.ny. proide adequate assur~ance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimiin deraato resulting from testing.SR 3.8.1.3 This volume is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour of DG operation at full load + 10%. The actual amount required to meet the SR (500 gallons) will provide approximately Insert 2 1.85 hours of DG operation at full load + 10%. Additionally, the volume of fuel in the day tanks is used in the calculation of the 7 day continuous DG run time. (See B 3.8.3.)The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient of fuel' oil ll av.i.,lable, ,o low level alarms are provided and operator~s would be aware of any large uses of fuel ofil durinigthis SPeriodic removal S ...Microbiological fou I 'or cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can gro 'I and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Remeval of water from the fuel oil day tanks once overyn 184 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival.This is a means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water in the day tank may come from condensation, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria.Checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-21 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance FrFequoncGY is based on engineering judgmenRt and Insert 2 ha- shoWn to be accoptabic through .p..atfing experience. This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that accumulated water is removed during performance of this Surveillance. SR 3.8.1.5 This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of a "fast cold" start, synchronizing, and accepting a load more closely simulating accident loads. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.SR 3.8.1.5 requires that, at a 184 day Fr.eqUeRny, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis of FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 4). Once voltage and frequency requirements are demonstrated, the DG may be tied to its respective 4160 V emergency bus, as directed by SR 3.8.1.2.b. When the DG is tied to its bus, the electrical grid, due to its much larger size compared to the DG, will dictate DG voltage and frequency. The DG operator cannot adjust either parameter. Therefore, the voltage and frequency requirements of SR 3.8.1.2.a no longer apply while the DG is tied to its bus and need not be met to satisfy the requirements of SR 3.8.1.2.b. Other SRs, notably SR 3.8.1.9, require that voltage and frequency requirements can be met while the DG is supplying load.For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging Insert 2 and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1.0 is an operational limitation. consistent With Generic Lote.r 841 5 (Ref. 7). This Frequency (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-22 REVISIONH 33 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS provide6 adequate a.suranc. of DG OPERABILITY,, whilo minimizing dcgradation rcsulting from testing.To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, this SR has been modified by a Note (Note 1) to indicate that all DG starts for this Surveillance may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup prior to loading.Note 2 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 3 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary load transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.Note 4 indicates that this Surveillance is required to be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 5 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units, with the DG started using the starting circuitry of one unit and synchronized to the ESF bus of that unit for one periodic test and started using the starting circuitry of the other unit and synchronized to the ESF bus of that unit during the next periodic test. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance, to ensure DG OPERABILITY, is still being verified on the proper frequency, and each unit's starting circuitry and breaker control circuitry, which is only being tested every second test (due to the staggering of the tests), historically have a very low failure rate. If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.SR 3.8.1.6 Transfer of each 4.16 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal Insert 2 offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the-,,,l^shutdown loads. The 24 moenth FrequencY of the i~ntene to. be ,cnsistent With expected fuol cGyle .(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-23 REVISION 3 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.6 (continued) The 24 month Froquenc history and Reference !, y is based nr a review of the suc-veilla-Ge test This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Proaram This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit.2 Technical stests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing onsequently, a test must be performed within the sp d Frequen for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1 or 2 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1 or 2.SR 3.8.1.7 Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. The largest single load for DGs 1A and 1C is a core spray pump at rated flow (1275 bhp). For DG 1B, the largest single load is a residual heat removal service water pump at rated flow (1225 bhp). This Surveillance may be accomplished by: a) tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load while paralleled to offsite power or while solely supplying the bus, or b) tripping its associated single largest post-accident load with the DG solely supplying the bus. Although Plant Hatch Unit 1 is not committed to IEEE-387-1984 (Ref. 12), this SR is consistent with the IEEE-387-1984 requirement that states the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-24 REVISION 3 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower. For all DGs, this represents 65.5 Hz, equivalent to 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint.The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the nominal Insert 2 range for the DG. SR 3.8.1.7.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.7.b is the voltage to which the DG must recover following load rejection. The 24 month FrFequency is.rcon siP.t&nt with the recommendation of Rcgulaton' Guide 1.108 (Ref.eur~oillance test histery and Rfeforonc 15.This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing is performed with only the DG providing power to the associated 4160 V ESF bus.The DG is not synchronized with offsite power.To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 2 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.SR 3.8.1.8 This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-25 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.8 (continued) REQUIREMENTS DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event, and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor < 0.88. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the Insert 2 DG would experience. Tho 24 mRonth FrFequnc iscnitcnt With the recommFendation ot FRegu 1flator Guido 1.108 (Ref. 10) and is intended to e conEE)Sistent With expected fuel GcGle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based o" a review of the sur~veillance test history and ReferencGe 15.This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 2 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e., system voltage is high), it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 3 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-26 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.9 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source and is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(1).This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.The DG auto-start time of 12 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis for responding to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved.The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and auto-connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs shall be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and Insert 2 oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The Frneqieny of 24 mon the iGs conistent With the reommendationfo of Rogulator'., Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(1), takes into consideration plant onrditiong required to perfolr the Surveillanre, and i6 intended to be consistent With expccted fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is, based on a roview of the surveillance test history and Reference15-. This SIR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-27 REVISION 3-3 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS contained in the Surveillance Frequency Cnntrol Pronrqm SR 3.8.1.9 (continued) offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system,-----and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned eveintsatisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associate the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 e al Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 sw ýngbs. Consequently, a test must be performed within the EeGified Frequenc for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit I in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.SR 3.8.1.10 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (12 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal)and operates for > 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability. The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the loading logic for loading onto offsite power. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, low pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. Insert 2 Th rireiiueRiuY GT1 rnurthS takes into consideration plant conditions F equredtope~form the SuR'E nc n mine t ~ onitn (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-28 REVISION 33 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.10 (continued) with the exp"cted fucf cYcle ,eagthn. The 24 month FRequence I.based on a review of the 6sur~cillanc~e test histor,' and Reference 15.contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Proaram This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could potentially cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken or unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the alicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The co arable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests he ap icable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus.Conseq ntly, a test must be performed within the speelfied Frequency or each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1 or 2 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1 or 2.SR 3.8.1.11 This Surveillance demonstrates that DG non-critical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ECCS initiation signal and critical protective functions (engine overspeed, generator differential current, and low lubricating oil pressure) are available to trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The non-critical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.The 24 month FreAuencv takes into consideration Blant conditions Insert 2 PG.1requirod to perform the Surweillancc, and ith expected fuel cycle lengths. The 21 is6 intended to be9 consistent moRnIn r-rieEWnRGi i6 ra6,Eo* f II On a review ot tne su..e.iian.e test nhsto,'y aRn Keoreencc "0.The SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DG from (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-29 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS contained in the Surveillance Frequency Cnntrol Prnornm SR 3.8.1.11 (continued) service. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Ui1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technic pecifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing .. Consequently, a test must be performed within the Frequen for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.SR 3.8.1.12 Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(3), requires demonstration onco per 24 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours. The first 22 hours of this test are performed at -> 2775 kW and < 2825 kW (which is near the continuous rating of the DG), and the last 2 hours of this test are performed at > 3000 kW. This is in accordance with commitments described in FSAR Section 8.4 (Ref. 2). The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelube and warmup, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, are applicable to this SR.In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor < 0.88. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience. A load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. Insert 2 The 24 moRth Frequ enc .. c. stent With the recomm..endatio-Rn o Regulator', Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(3); takes int consRideration plant conRditions required to per~form the Sur'.eillance;ý adiso int49R.nded to0 beq conGSiet With expected fulel cycle lengths. The IfC OJtl ILIIeRG rigcis based history and Reference 15;eR ai roVieW O TAP SU IRAPeII.arie test (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-30 REVISION 3 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.12 (continued) REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance has been modified by four Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. However, it is acceptable to perform this SR in MODES 1 and 2 provided the other two DGs are OPERABLE, since a perturbation can only affect one divisional DG. If during the performance of this Surveillance, one of the other DGs becomes inoperable, this Surveillance is to be suspended. The Surveillance may not be performed in MODES 1 and 2 during inclement weather and unstable grid conditions. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 3 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e., system voltage is high), it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 4 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.SR 3.8.1.13 This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from Insert 2 a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA.Tho 24 F=roqu..cY i6 conictont With the recommendations of Regulato.y Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(5). The 24 month Fr.equenc;y is based on a review of tho su.veillanccP-te-st histor-y aRnd Referenee 15.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-31 REIS\ION 33l~ AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.13 (continued) This SR is modified by three Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is_performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at near full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 3 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.SR 3.8.1.14 This Surveillance is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(6), and ensures that the manual synchronization and automatic load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.Insert 2 The FrFequencY of 24 mRonths iS conRSistont with the recommnMGdations of Regulator,' Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(6), and takes it consideration plant conditions roqu1ired to perform the Survei"llance. The 24 mRonth Frcquency is based on a review of the surwcillancce test history and RefoeneRG15. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-32 "2" AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.14 (continued) contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control PrnarqmFreque for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for orming the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.SR 3.8.1.15 Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions is not compromised as the result of testing. Interlocks to the LOCA sensing circuits cause the DG to automatically reset to ready-to-load operation if an ECCS initiation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready-to-load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. Although Plant Hatch Unit 1 is not committed to this standard, this SR is consistent with the provisions for automatic switchover required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 13), paragraph 6.2.6(2).The intent in the requirements associated with SR 3.8.1.15.b is to show that the emergency loading is not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.I Insert 2 I The 24 monGth FrFequec Is consitent With the rocommondations 9t Rogulato1y Guidc 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(8); takos into Gecosideratfion plant conditions required to perform the Survollancc; and- iso intended to be cons;itent With expected fuel ycl6e The 21 mnnth Fr.equencY is based OR a review of the su..illance test history and Reference 15.This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-33 33 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.15 (continued) contained in the Surveillance Frequency Conntrnl Prnarqm fpe~ified Freque for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for no ming the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does_ o have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.SR 3.8.1.16 Under accident conditions, loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequence timing devices. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents.The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.Insert 2-- ! ...... !--L-- .--L ..;J-L LI_+Rc ,-.e.ue.c" Of Z m .on. nS is con.....n .WRn Me reGEoMm.e. .ual.. ..of Regulator', Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(2); takes into , con.ideration plant condition;. required to perform the SureillanTo; and i6 intnAdeAd-to beA consistont with oxpoctod fuol cycle longthS. The 24 month FrFequency is based on a roview of the sur.eillancc test hitrdnwand Reference 15i contained in the Surveillance Frequency C ontrol Prnornm This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy tis SR.his Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swi us. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specificai s tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Co equently, a test must be performed within the spe~ified Frequenc for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-34 REVISION 33 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.17 REQUIREMENTS (continued) In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.This Surveillance demonstrates DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.9, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ECCS initiation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the Insert 2 DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The FrFequoncGy of 24 months takes into cons~iderationR plant conditions rcquired to pe"form the Surveillanco aRd is intended to be c..onitent with .A expected fuel cYcIe length. The 24 mon.th is based onarvew of the surveillance test histor,' and Reference 15 This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the speeified Frequen jqfor each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for notp inerr-ng the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does ye applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance sents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should no erformed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test Surveillance Frequency should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.SR 3.8.1.18 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously. For the purpose of this testing, (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-35 REVISION 33 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.18 (continued) REQUIREMENTS the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. It is permissible to place all three DGs in test simultaneously, for the performance of this Surveillance. Thc 10 is GGonistent With the roccmmondations o-t Reuaoy Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10). This SR is modified by a Note.Insert 2 The re0R. .for the Note is to ninimizo weron the D.G. during testing.SR 3.8.1.19 With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18) are applied only to the Unit 1 DG and offsite circuits, and swing DG. This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 2 DG and offsite circuit are governed by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 2 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 2 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 1 SR. Several exceptions are noted to the Unit 2 SRs: SR 3.8.1.6 is excepted since only one Unit 2 circuit is required by the Unit 1 Specification (therefore, there is not necessarily a second circuit to transfer to); SRs 3.8.1.10, 15, and 17 are excepted since they relate to the DG response to a Unit 2 ECCS initiation signal, which is not a necessary function for support of the Unit 1 requirement for an OPERABLE Unit 2 DG.The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 2 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.2. FSAR, Sections 8.3 and 8.4.3. FSAR, Chapter 5.4. FSAR, Chapter 6.5. FSAR, Chapter 14.6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-36 REVISION 33 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

7. Generic Letter 84-15.8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.9. Regulatory Guide 1.9, March 1971.10. Regulatory Guide 1.108, August 1977.11. Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979.12. IEEE Standard 387-1984.13. IEEE Standard 308-1980.14. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.15. NRC Safety Evaluation Repe,-t for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-37 K R-\VIiS:IO t 33fl '

Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued) With required starting air receiver pressure < 225 psig, sufficient capacity for five successive DG start attempts does not exist.However, as long as the receiver pressure is > 170 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start attempt, and the DG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most DG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.F. 1 With a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met, one or more required DG fuel oil transfer subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, one or more required DG fuel oil storage tanks with fuel oil level not within limits for reasons other than Condition B, or the stored diesel lube oil or the required starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Condition C or E, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the Unit 1 and swing DG storage tanks to support the required Insert 2 DGs' operation for 7 days at the assumed load. (See B 3.8.3.)The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficent supply operators WOUld be aWaro of any large uses of fuel oil durinRg thisA peded.SR 3.8.3.2 This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lubricating oil inventory (combined inventory in the DG lubricating oil sump and stored in the warehouse) is available to support at least 7 days of full load operation for each required DG. The 400 gal requirement is based on the DG manufacturer's consumption values for the run time of the DG.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-48 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.3.2 (continued) Implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the DG, since the DG lube oil sump does not hold adequate inventory for 7 days of full load operation without the level reaching the manufacturer's recommended Insert 2 minimum level.A 31 day Frcquoncy i s adequate to ensure that a SUfficient lubc oil supply iont, InoDG startS and FRu time are closoly monitored by the plant staff.SR 3.8.3.3 This SR verifies that the required Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil testing is performed in a accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. Tests are a means of monitoring the potential degradation related to long term storage and the potential impact to fuel filter plugging as a result of high particulate levels. Specific sampling requirements, frequencies, and additional information are discussed in detail in the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.SR 3.8.3.4 This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each required DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of five engine start cycles without recharging. A start cycle is defined by the DG vendor, but usually is measured in terms of time (seconds of cranking)or engine cranking speed. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest value at which the five starts can be accomplished using one air receiver.The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capac ity, capability, rodundGancy, and divorsity of the AC2 soeur-es anAd otheer inddications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to Insert 2 beIOw e nmal air stant pressure.SR 3.8.3.5 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. It is required to (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-49 REVISION 33 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 Insert 2 SR 3.8.3.5 (continued) support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pumps are OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer are OPERABLE.The de6,iR ef the fuel ystems1 i6 GUch that pumps operate automaticallv in ordor to maintain an adeauate volumo of fuel oil in FFeeRcGuny is Specifiod to correSpond to the maximuminealfrD Periodic S R 3.8.3.6 Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil de'gradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and c use fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive.t Remeval removal of water from the required Unit 1 and swing DG fuel storage tanks once every 184 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water in the storage tank may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provide data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Su'r'o-llace Frequency is based on cngneing judgment and has boon shown to be acccptal through operating cxpcrience. This SR is for preventive maintcnanco-. The presencGe of water doGs net necessarily represent failure of this SR, provided the accumulated water iS removed duFrig pe~formance of the Surveillance. S R 3.8.3.7 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to each required DG's day tank. It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources, since fuel from three storage tanks is needed to supply fuel for two DGs to meet the 7 day supply requirement discussed in the Background section of these Bases. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pumps are OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-50 ~4S4QN-33 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-50 REVISION Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control Is systems for manual fuel transfer are OPERABLE.Insert 2 Since tho fuel oil transfer pumps are be.Tg tested on a 31 day Frequency in accordance with SR 3.8.3.5, the 24 month FroqUency h-as boonP determ-ined to be accoptablo. The 24 month FrequocIs based on a reviow of the surveillanco test history and Reference 5.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 8.4.2. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.3. FSAR, Chapter 14.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5.NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 232.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-51 REIS:\ION i 33x DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7).E._1 Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the DC electrical power subsystems that causes a required safety function to be lost.When more than one DC source is lost, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis.

Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The SRs are modified by a Note to indicate that SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8 apply only to the Unit 1 DC sources,'and that SR 3.8.4.9 applies only to the Unit 2 DC sources.SR 3.8.4.1 Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in a fully charged state. Voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The voltage requirement for battery terminal voltage is based on the open circuit voltage of a lead-calcium cell of nominal 1.215 specific gravity.Without regard to other battery parameters, this voltage is indicative of a battery that is capable of performing its required safety function.The 7 day FrFeqUency i Gons istent With manufactureFr' recom~mendationis and- IEEE 4650 (Ref. 8).Insert 2 SR 3.8.4.2 Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each inter-cell, (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-57 REVISION 33 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.4.2 (continued) inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance. The connection resistance limits are established to maintain connection resistance as low as reasonably possible to minimize the overall voltage drop across the battery and the possibility of battery damage due to heating of connections. The resistance values for each battery connection are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 9).The fo"r these inspections, Which can detoct coRditions that;can ause power losscs duo to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequcncy iS co~nsidored acccptable based on operating exp.riec related to detccting corrosion trends&.Insert 2 SR 3.8.4.3 Insert 2 Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance. The 24 FrtequendOcyf the Surveillance takes inOt Thnsideoation the desirod plant conditions to performn the Surveillance. Th nRtH FF- UPRý 1ý kjýý-G GR -A r,_QV.P_1.AV G. -..P- SURAN-aArlp PIR histoRy and RefereR .8.4.SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5 Visual inspection and resistance measurements of inter-cell, inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connections provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anti-corrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection. The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of this Surveillance.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-58 REVISION 33 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5 (continued) The connection resistance limits are established to maintain connection resistance as low as reasonably possible to minimize the overall voltage drop across the battery and the possibility of battery damage due to heating of connections. The resistance values for each battery connection are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 9).Inciart 9 The 24 month Frequency of the SurVeillances takes into consideratieon the dlesired plant conditionS to perfo9rm the Surveillance. Th 24 Fr.equ.ency of SRs 3.8.4.4 and .3.8.4.5 is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 141.SR 3.8.4.6 Insert 2 Battery charger capability requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers (Ref. 4). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10), each battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied. The i- acceptable, given the unit d the, telt and the" Other exting' ,to ensure adequate charger performance during these 24 monRth ntewrals. In addition, this Frequency i- intenddtobe conrsistent wiAoth expected fuel cycle lengths. The 21 moneth FrFequency is based OR a review of the surveillance test history and Refeerence 14.SR 3.8.4.7 A battery service test is a special test of the battery's capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length corresponds to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-59 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 The F=requencY o f4 2monthG 06 conSitent w.,ith the recommendations of Rogulato"y Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10) and Regulator""- Guide 1.129 (Ref. r), which state that the batter,' cer.'ico test should bo performed during refueling operations or at some other outage.Th 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test histor; and RefeFr~ene 1.This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test.The modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates: the 1 minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated 1 minute discharge represent a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test.The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.A modified performance discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service discharge test.The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance. The swing DG DC battery is exempted from this restriction, since it is required by both units' LCO 3.8.4 and cannot be performed in the manner required by the Note without resulting in a dual unit shutdown.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-60 REVISION 33 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) Insert 2 SR 3.8.4.8 A battery performance discharge test is a constant current capacity test to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. Initial conditions consistent with IEEE-450 need to be met prior to the performing of a battery performance discharge test. The test results reflect the overall effects of usage and age.A battery modified performance discharge test is described in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.7. Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.8; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.8, while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.7 at the same time.The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance is consistent With IEEE-450 (Ref. 8) and IEEE-485 (Ref. 12). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating. Although there may be ample capacity, the battery rate of deterioration is rapidly increasing. The FrFequency for this test i6 normally 60 months. if the battr, shows degradation, or if the batter,' has reached 85% of its oxpected application service life and capacity iS < 100% of the manufaGcturcrs rat!ng, tho Sur'v-o!ance Froquency is reduced to 12mnd Howevor, if the batter0 sh9ow no degradatin bu, t h;as reached 85.., of its expected application life, the Su'veillance Froequency is only reduced to 24 monGths for batteries that retain capacity ý 100% of the mnanufacturer's Fating. Dogradation is in dicrated-according to IFEEE-150 (Ref. 8), WhEnR the batter; capacfiPY drops by more than 10% of rated capacity fromn its capacity on the pre.ious performance test or is merG than 10%0; below the manufacturer'rating. All these Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE 1450 (Ref.8)This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance. The swing DG DC battery is exempted from this restriction, since it is required by both units' LCO 3.8.4 and cannot be performed in the manner required by the Note without resulting in a dual unit shutdown.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-61 REVISION 33 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.8.4.9 With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8) are applied only to the Unit 1 DC sources. This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 2 DC sources are governed by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 2 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 2 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 1 SR.The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 2 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.2. Regulatory Guide 1.6.3. IEEE Standard 308-1971.4. FSAR, Section 8.5.5. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.6. FSAR, Chapter 14.7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.8. IEEE Standard 450-1987.9. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 9.0.INot used R 10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.11. Rcgulato; Guide 1.12_, Do c "mbcr 1974.2. IEEE Standard 485-1983.13. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.14. IN , , -n -Ft- A.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-62 REVISION 40 Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued) verification is repeated at 7 day intervals until the parameters are restored to Category A and B limits. This periodic verification is consistent with the normal Frequency of pilot cell surveillances.

Continued operation is only permitted for 31 days before battery cell parameters must be restored to within Category A and B limits.Taking into consideration that, while battery capacity is degraded, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and to allow time to fully restore the battery cell parameters to normal limits, this time is acceptable for operation prior to declaring the associated DC battery inoperable. B.1 When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limit for any connected cell, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not ensured and the corresponding DC electrical power subsystem must be declared inoperable. Additionally, other potentially extreme conditions, such as not completing the Required Actions of Condition A within the required Completion Time or average electrolyte temperature of representative cells falling below the appropriate limit (650F for station service and 40°F for DG batteries), also are cause for immediately declaring the associated DC electrical power subsystem inoperable. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that Category A battery cell parameters are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends regular battery inspections (at loset Gone per month) including voltage, specific gravity, and electrolyte level of pilot cells. Insert 2 IInsert 2 SR 3.8.6.2 The -2 day inspection of specific vity, cell voltage, and level is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3).g In addition, within 24 hours of a battery overcharge > 150 V, the battery must be demonstrated to meet Category B limits. This inspection is also consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends special inspections following a (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-69 REVISION 33 Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.6.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS severe overcharge, to ensure that no significant degradation of the battery occurs as a consequence of such overcharge. SR 3.8.6.3 I n 2This Surveillance verification that the average temperature of Insert 2 l representative cells is within limits is consistent with a recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) that states that the temperature of electrolyte in representative cells should be determined e.R-a Lower than normal temperatures act to inhibitor reduce battery capacity. This SR ensures that the operating temperatures remain within an acceptable operating range. This limit is based on IEEE-450 or the manufacturer's recommendations when provided.Table 3.8.6-1 This table delineates the limits on electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity for three different categories. The meaning of each category is discussed below.Category A defines the normal parameter limit for each designated pilot cell in each battery. The cells selected as pilot cells are those whose temperature, voltage, and electrolyte specific gravity approximate the condition of the entire battery.The Category A limits specified for electrolyte level are based on manufacturer's recommendations and are consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), with the extra 1/4 inch allowance above the high water level indication for operating margin to account for temperature and charge effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote (a) to Table 3.8.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be above the specified maximum level during equalizing charge, provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at float charge for at least 72 hours.The Category A limit specified for float voltage is > 2.13 V per cell.This value is based on the recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-70 REVISION 33 Distribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued) This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition D was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely. E.1 and E.2 If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.F. I Condition F corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical power distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystem is lost, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation.. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical buses are maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required Insert 2 bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well s control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequeny takes ioacunt the redunant capabili0ty of the AC and DC lcrclpwrdsrbto usses (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-80 REVISION 33 Distribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.7.1 (continued) aRnd other indiRcations aVailable in the control room that act the ,pc.ato, to subsystem malfunctions. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.2. FSAR, Chapter 14.3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-81 REVISION~k Distribution Systems -Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I Insert 2 -SR 3.8.8.1 This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem is functioning properly, with the buses energized. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. Thc 7 day Fequoncy takes into acco.unt the capability of the elecri',al powor diStributin subsystems, as well as.other indications ayailable in the control room that ale~t the operator to subsystem mnalfuncions. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.2. FSAR, Chapter 14.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-85 Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.9.1.1 Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.The 7 day Fr.equencyih based on ongncrtng tudgmcnt an .it considerod adequatcei view of otheri~ndiations of rofucwling interlocGks and their a6ssociatod iptstatus that aro available to ui oporations personnel-. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.2. FSAR, Section 7.6.3.3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.4. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.4.5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.(continued)

REVISION 657 HATCH UNIT 1 B] 3.9-5 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock B 3.9.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.9.2.1 (continued) OPERABLE when required. By "locking" the reactor mode switch in the proper position (i.e., removing the reactor mode switch key from the console while the reactor mode switch is positioned in refuel), an additional administrative control is in place to preclude operator errors from resulting in unanalyzed operation. The FrFegucncy Of 12 ho)urs is ;ufficient in view of othor adMiniStrativc controls u1tilized durin~g ref uoling operations to onsre6F safe operation. SR 3.9.2.2 Insert 2 Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel demonstrates the ,associated refuel position one-rod-out interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.The 7 day FrFequency is considered adequate because Of circuit reliability, prce duFal cGorlFl on cOnrolr rodG withdrawals, and visual and audible indications; available in the conrol1 room to alert the operator to conrol rods no~t fully inserted. To perform the required testing, the applicable condition must be entered (i.e., a control rod must be withdrawn from its full-in position). Alternatively, the control rod withdrawal, and the attempted withdrawal of the second control rod, may be simulated. In either case, SR 3.9.2.2 has been modified by a Note that states the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.2. FSAR, Section 7.6.3.3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.9-7 23 Control Rod Position B 3.9.3 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, loading fuel into core cells with the control rods withdrawn may result in inadvertent criticality. Therefore, the control rods must be inserted before loading fuel into a core cell. All control rods must be inserted before loading fuel to ensure that a fuel loading error does not result in loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and no fuel loading activities are possible. Therefore, this Specification is not applicable in these MODES.ACTIONS A.1 With all control rods not fully inserted during the applicable conditions, an inadvertent criticality could occur that is not analyzed in the FSAR.All fuel loading operations must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 REQUIREMENTS During refueling, to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical, all control rods must be fully inserted prior to and during fuel loading.Is Periodic checks of the control rod position ensure this condition is Insert 2 maintained. The 12 hour FrFeguoncy take6 into considcration the procedua controls on conrol1 rod mov9Femet during rofueling as well as the rcdundant functions of the refueling interlocks. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.2. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.4.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.9-9 REVISION 0 Control Rod OPERABILITY

-Refueling B 3.9.5 BASES LCO rods have already completed their reactivity control function, and (continued) therefore, are not required to be OPERABLE.J APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, withdrawn control rods must be OPERABLE to ensure that in a scram the control rods will insert and provide the required negative reactivity to maintain the reactor subcritical. For MODES 1 and 2, control rod requirements are found in LCO 3.1.2,"Reactivity Anomalies"; LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY"; LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times"; and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators." During MODES 3 and 4, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod OPERABILITY during these conditions. ACTIONS A. 1 With one or more withdrawn control rods inoperable, action must be immediately initiated to fully insert the inoperable control rod(s).Inserting the control rod(s) ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. Actions must continue until the inoperable control rod(s) is fully inserted.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2 REQUIREMENTS During MODE 5, the OPERABILITY of control rods is primarily required to ensure a withdrawn control rod will automatically insert if a signal requiring a reactor shutdown occurs. Because no explicit analysis exists for automatic shutdown during refueling, the shutdown function is satisfied if the withdrawn control rod is capable of r 2automatic insertion and the associated CRD scram accumulator Insert 2 pressure is > 940 psig.The 7 day FrFequency takes into conSidoration equipment roliabWl~, procodur~aI control; over the scra~macmlaos and control1 room1 alarms and indicating lights that iniaolow accumulator charge Piee6wie&- SR 3.9.5.1 is modified by a Note that allows 7 days after withdrawal of the control rod to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.9-14 REVISION -0 RPV Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES LCO radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are (continued) within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.The point from which the water level is measured is shown in Figure B 3.5.2-1.APPLICABILITY LCO 3.9.6 is applicable when moving fuel assemblies or handling control rods (i.e., movement with other than the normal control rod drive) within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present within the RPV, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.8,"Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." ACTIONS A.1 If the water level is < 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV, all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The suspension of fuel movement and control rod handling shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.6.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification of a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the Insert 2 consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in containment (Ref. 2).The Froequoncy of 24 hourS iS bacod On onglinooring judgmont and is concidcrcd adequate in viegw of the largc volume of wator and the normal procoedural ""nRol- on valve pEs.t... s, w.. make significaRt unplanned level changes uliklly.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.9-17 22-" RHR -High Water Level B 3.9.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued) stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.). This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, a Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.C.1 and C.2 If no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate. SURVEILLANCE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.9.7.1 This Surveillance demonstrates that the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. Thc F=requency f 12 h.u..iS s'ufficient iR view of other vis-al and audible av-a*lable to the operator for monlitring -RHIR subsystem in the GcntrIl rooM.(continued) REVISIMN 1 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.9-22 RHR -Low Water Level B 3.9.8 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that one required RHR shutdown Insert 2 cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. Thc Frequency of 12 hours is sufficiOnt in VieW of other visual and audiblc indications available to the operator for mon)itoring the RHR subs9ystmsM in the control roomR.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 34.2. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.9-28 REVISION 40 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing B 3.10.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2 (continued)

ALTERATIONS shall not preclude the completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure that all inserted control rods remain inserted and result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1.Alternatively, if in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch may be placed in the refuel position, which will also result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. A Note is added to Required Action A.3.2 to indicate that this Required Action is not applicable in MODES 3 and 4, since only the shutdown position is allowed in these MODES. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods and place the reactor mode switch in the required position, based on operating experience, and is acceptable given that all operations that could increase core reactivity have been suspended. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.10.2.1 and SR 3.10.2.2 Meeting the requirements of this Special Operations LCO maintains operation consistent with or conservative to operating with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (or the refuel position for MODE 5). The functions of the reactor mode switch interlocks that are not in effect, due to the testing in progress, are adequately compensated for by the Special Operations LCO requirements. The administrative controls are to be periodically verified to ensure that the operational requirements continue to be met. The Su......i.a.eS pofrfemed at the 12 huFr and 24 hour Frequornies aro irtended to pro)Vide assuranrc that perFating shift is aware ot and vorifioc comol~fianco6 wi4th theco Secia OoeDRr;#tion 1LCO ki epA.&-7 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.2.3.7.2. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.4.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.10-9 Single Control Rod Withdrawal

-Hot Shutdown B 3.10.3 BASES ACTIONS A.2.1 and A.2.2 (continued) and restore operation in accordance with Table 1.1-1. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour to place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.3.1, SR 3.10.3.2, and SR 3.10.3.3 REQUIREMENTS The other LCOs made applicable in this Special Operations LCO are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification in accordance with SR 3.10.3.2 is required to preclude the possibility of criticality. SR 3.10.3.2 has been modified by a Note, which clarifies that this SR is not required to be met if SR 3.10.3.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.3.d.1 requirements, since SR 3.10.3.2 demonstrates that the alternative Insert 2 LCO 3.10.3.d.2 requirements are satisfied. Also, SR 3.10.3.3 verifies that all control rods other than the control rod being withdrawn are fully inserted. The 24 hour Frequency ..acceptable be.ause of the administratie,- controls on contrel rod withdrawal, the protection afforded involvod, and hardw'ro interlocks that preclude additionGa contreo red withdrawal'-s. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.10-13 REVISION 56 Single Control Rod Withdrawal

-Cold Shutdown B 3.10.4 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2 (continued) Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are specified, based on the assumption that the control rod is being withdrawn. If the control rod is still insertable, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods and within 1 hour place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2 If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod not insertable, withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated CRD must be immediately suspended. If the CRD has been removed, such that the control rod is not insertable, the Required Actions require the most expeditious action be taken to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Insert 2 SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, and SR 3.10.4.4 The other LCOs made applicable by this Special Operations LCO are required to have their associated surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Verification that all the other control rods are fully inserted is required to meet the SDM requirements. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the affected control rod. The 24!. hour Frequency is acceptable bec6ause of the administrati-e controls on control rod withdrawals, the protection afforded by the LG~s in~volyed, and te prFcluhde an controI 'rld wytdFawak. SR 3.10.4.2 and SR 3.10.4.4 have been modified by Notes, which clarify that these SRs are not required to be met if the alternative requirements demonstrated by SR 3.10.4.1 are satisfied.(continued) REVISION 56 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.10-17 Single CRD Removal -Refueling B 3.10.5 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.10.5.1, SR 3.10.5.2, SR 3.10.5.3, SR 3.10.5.4, and SR 3.10.5.5 Verification that all the control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, are fully inserted is required to ensure the SDM is within limits. Verification that the local five by five array of control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for removal of the associated CRD, is inserted and disarmed, while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the withdrawn control rod. The Surveillance for LCO 3.1.1, which is made applicable by this Special Operations LCO, is required in order to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. Verification that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are being made is required to ensure the assumptions of the safety analysis are satisfied. While not required by this LCO, verification of the core loading may be prudent to ensure that a fuel loading error has not invalidated the assumptions of the safety analysis.Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. Tho 241 hour FrFequency ic accoptablo, giVen the admefiniStratiVe conRtrolS on control rod removal and hardWire intorlock to block an additional coentrol rod wmithdrawval. Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.10-22 REVISION 5ra Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal

-Refueling B 3.10.6 BASES (continued) ACTIONS A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2 If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for refueling (i.e., all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies) or with the exceptions granted by this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the affected CRDs and insert their control rods, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.6.1, SR 3.10.6.2, and SR 3.10.6.3 REQUIREMENTS Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Insert 2 Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Froquency is acceptable, given the administrative centrles on fuel assembly and contrle red removal, and takes into account ether indications of control red status available in thREe1 FcRo r tonm.REFERENCES 1 .FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.10-25 REIS:\IONCM SDM Test -Refueling B 3.10.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.8.4 REQUIREMENTS Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Insert 2 LCO will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of the safety analysis. The 12 hor: FrFeqUencY i6 intended to provide aprpiate aGGLurance that each operating shfift is aware of and SR 3.10.8.5 Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the control rod drive mechanism and will perform its intended function when necessary. The verification is required to be performed any time a control rod is withdrawn to the full-out notch position, or prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling. This Frequency is acceptable, considering the low probability that a control rod will become uncoupled when it is not being moved, as well as operating experience related to uncoupling events.SR 3.10.8.6 CRD charging water header pressure verification is performed to ensure the motive force is available to scram the control rods in the event of a scram signal. Since the reactor is depressurized in MODE 5, there is insufficient reactor pressure to scram the control rods. Verification of charging water header pressure ensures that if a scram were required, capability for rapid control rod insertion would exist. The minimum charging water header pressure of 940 psig, which is below the expected pressure of 1100 psig, still ensures sufficient pressure for rapid control rod insertion. The -7edy Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through pera*ting....ri..ce and takes into accounWt av-ailable i the control F90M~.Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. NEDE-2401 1-P-A-US, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Supplement for United States" (revision'specified in the COLR).2. Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G. C. Lainas, NRC,"Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-2401 1-P-A," August 15, 1986.HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.10-34 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 8 TS Bases Changes for HNP Unit 2 Insert 1 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Insert 2 The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Insert 3 5.5.13 Surveillance Frequency Control Program This program provides controls for the Surveillance Frequencies.

The program shall ensure that Surveillance Requirements specified in the Technical Specifications are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation are met.a. The Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall contain a list of Frequencies of those Surveillance Requirements for which the Frequency is controlled by the program.b. Changes to the Frequencies listed in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall be made in accordance with the NEI 04-10, "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies," Revision 1.c. The provisions of Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are applicable to the Frequencies established in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Control Rod OPERABILITY B 3.1.3 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued) If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, or D are not met, or there are nine or more inoperable control rods, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. This ensures all insertable control rods are inserted and places the reactor in a condition that does not require the active function (i.e., scram) of the control rods. The number of control rods permitted to be inoperable when operating above 10% RTP (e.g., no CRDA considerations) could be more than the value specified, but the occurrence of a large number of inoperable control rods could be indicative of a generic problem, and investigation and resolution of the potential problem should be undertaken. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.3.1 REQUIREMENTS The position of each control rod must be determined to ensure adequate information on control rod position is available to the operator for determining control rod OPERABILITY and controlling rod patterns. Control rod position may be determined by the use of OPERABLE position indicators, by moving control rods to a position with an OPERABLE indicator, or by the use of other appropriate methods. The 24 hour F.equencY of this SR is basod on operating.p...c..latod to expoctod chang .. in control rod p .ition And tho- aVailability Of control rod position indications in th, control room.[Insert 2 ----- -' S 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 Control rod insertion capability is demonstrated by inserting each partially or fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch and observing that the control rod moves. The control rod may then be returned to its original position. This ensures the control rod is not stuck and is free to insert on a scram signal. These Surveillances are not required when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the actual LPSP of the RWM, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of the Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1). -The 7- day Frequeny Of SR 3.1.3.2 is based on operating experince related to the changes in CRD) perFomance and- the eaeOf (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-16 REVISION -0 Control Rod OPERABILITY B 3.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS prform..i.g notch testing for fully withdrFawn rod,. wi6thdrFawn conRtrol rods arc tested at a 31 day Frequency, based On the potential powor reduction required to allow the conrol1 ro-d mnovement and conSidering the large teSting sample of SR 3.1.3.2.Fur~the~rmoro, the 31 da" Frequency takes into) account operating.A FA~t~ tAGhageSiR

RD 1n44-rrn;;..geAt any time, if a control rod is immovable, a dete o that control rod's trippability (ca ertion by scram, i.e., OPERABILITY) must I~nsrt 2e and appropriate action taken.These SRs are each modified by a Note that allows 7 days and 31 days, respectively, after withdrawal of the control rod and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP to perform the Surveillance.

This acknowledges that the control rod must first be withdrawn and THERMAL POWER must be greater than the LPSP before performance of the Surveillance, and therefore avoids potential conflicts with SR 3.0.3 and SR 3.0.4.SR 3.1.3.4 Verifying that the scram time for each control rod to notch position 06 is < 7 seconds provides reasonable assurance that the control rod will insert when required during a DBA or transient, thereby completing its shutdown function. This SR is performed in conjunction with the control rod scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and the functional testing of SDV vent and drain valves in LCO 3.1.8, "Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves," overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The associated Frequencies are acceptable, considering the more frequent testing performed to demonstrate other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY and operating experience, which shows scram times do not significantly change over an operating cycle.SR 3.1.3.5 Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the CRDM and will perform its intended function when necessary. The Surveillance requires verifying a control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position. The overtravel position (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-17 REVISION I Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.4.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS acceptable scram times for the transients analyzed in References 3 and 4.Maximum scram insertion times occur at a reactor steam dome pressure of approximately 800 psig because of the competing effects of reactor steam dome pressure and stored accumulator energy.Therefore, demonstration of adequate scram times at reactor steam dome pressure -> 800 psig ensures that the measured scram times will be within the specified limits at higher pressures. Limits are specified as a function of reactor pressure to account for the sensitivity of the scram insertion times with pressure and to allow a range of pressures over which scram time testing can be performed. To ensure that scram time testing is performed within a reasonable time following fuel movement within the reactor pressure vessel or after a shutdown> 120 days or longer, control rods are required to be tested before exceeding 40% RTP. In the event fuel movement is limited to selected core cells, it is the intent of this SR that only those CRDs associated with the core cells affected by the fuel movements are required to be scram time tested. This Frequency is acceptable considering the additional surveillances performed for control rod OPERABILITY, the frequent verification of adequate accumulator pressure, and the required testing of control rods affected by work on control rods or the CRD System.SR 3.1.4.2 Additional testing of a sample of control rods is required to verify the continued performance of the scram function during the cycle. A representative sample contains at least 10% of the control rods. The sample remains representative if no more than 7.5% of the control rods in the sample tested are determined to be "slow". With more than 7.5% of the sample declared to be "slow" per the criteria in Table 3.1.4-1, additional control rods are tested until this 7.5%criterion (i.e., 7.5% of the entire sample size) is satisfied, or until the total number of "slow" control rods (throughout the core, from all Surveillances) exceeds the LCO limit. For planned testing, the control rods selected for the sample should be different for each test. Data from inadvertent scrams should be used whenever possible to avoid unnecessary testing at power, even if the control rods with data may have been previously tested in a sample. The 200 day Frequency ic based on E.p..ati.g expenrenco that has shoW-n cntrol rod scram times do not Gignificantly chango over an operating cycle. Ti Froqu1ncy is also reasonable basod on the additional Su.,illaneo (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-22 REVISION 64I Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.4.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS done on the CRD6 at more frequent *Rte.a.s inR accordanc with Inser 2 When work that could affect the scram insertion time is performed on a control rod or the CRD System, testing must be done to demonstrate that each affected control rod retains adequate scram performance over the range of applicable reactor pressures from zero to the maximum permissible pressure. The scram testing must be performed once before declaring the control rod OPERABLE. The required scram time testing must demonstrate the affected control rod is still within acceptable limits. The limits for reactor pressures < 800 psig, required by footnote (b), are included in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 7) and are established based on a high probability of meeting the acceptance criteria at reactor pressures 800 psig. The limits for reactor pressures 800 psig are found in Table 3.1.4-1. If testing demonstrates the affected control rod does not meet these limits, but is within the 7 second limit of Table 3.1.4-1, Note 2, the control rod can be declared OPERABLE and "slow." Specific examples of work that could affect the scram times are (but are not limited to) the following: removal of any CRD for maintenance or modification; replacement of a control rod; and maintenance or modification of a scram solenoid pilot valve, scram valve, accumulator, isolation valve or check valve in the piping required for scram.The Frequency of once prior to declaring the affected control rod OPERABLE is acceptable because of the capability to test the control rod over a range of operating conditions and the more frequent surveillances on other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY. SR 3.1.4.4 When work that could affect the scram insertion time is performed on a control rod or CRD System, testing must be done to demonstrate each affected control rod is still within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with the reactor steam dome pressure > 800 psig. Where work has been performed at high reactor pressure, the requirements of SR 3.1.4.3 and SR 3.1.4.4 can be satisfied with one test. However, for a control rod affected by work performed while shutdown, a zero pressure test and a high pressure test may be required. This testing ensures that, (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-23 REVISION 0 Control Rod Scram Accumulators B 3.1.5 BASES ACTIONS (continued) C.1 and C.2 With one or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable and the reactor steam dome pressure < 900 psig, the pressure supplied to the charging water header must be adequate to ensure that accumulators remain charged. With the reactor steam dome pressure < 900 psig, the function of the accumulators in providing the scram force becomes much more important since the scram function could become severely degraded during a depressurization event or at low reactor pressures. Therefore, immediately upon discovery of charging water header pressure < 940 psig concurrent with Condition C, all control rods associated with inoperable accumulators must be verified to be fully inserted. Withdrawn control rods with inoperable accumulators may fail to scram under these low pressure conditions. The associated control rods must also be declared inoperable within 1 hour. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable for Required Action C.2, considering the low probability of a DBA or transient occurring during the time that the accumulator is inoperable. D._ 1 The reactor mode switch must be immediately placed in the shutdown position if either Required Action and associated Completion Time associated with the loss of the CRD charging pump (Required Actions B.1 and C.1) cannot be met. This ensures that all insertable control rods are inserted and that the reactor is in a condition that does not require the active function (i.e., scram) of the control rods.This Required Action is modified by a Note stating that the action is not applicable if all control rods associated with the inoperable scram accumulators are fully inserted, since the function of the control rods has been performed. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.5.1 1periodically I SR 3.1.5.1 requires that the accumulator pressure be checked eVeFy 7-days to ensure adequate accumulator pressure exists to provide sufficient scram force. The primary indicator of accumulator OPERABILITY is the accumulator pressure. A minimum accumulator pressure is specified, below which the capability of the accumulator to perform its intended function becomes degraded and the accumulator is considered inoperable. The minimum accumulator pressure of 940 psig is well below the expected pressure of 1100 psig (Ref. 1).(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-28 REVISION 0 Control Rod Scram Accumulators B 3.1.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.5.1 (continued) Declaring the accumulator inoperable when the minimum pressure is not maintained ensures that significant degradation in scram times does not occur. The 7 day Fr.equiency has boon ShoWn to be acceptablo through porFating rin anRdtakes account indications avail-able in the REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.2.2. FSAR, Supplement 5A.4.3.3. FSAR, Section 15.1.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-29 REVISION G0 Rod Pattern Control B 3.1.6 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

Control rod withdrawal should be suspended immediately to prevent the potential for further deviation from the prescribed sequence.Control rod insertion to correct control rods withdrawn beyond their allowed position is allowed since, in general, insertion of control rods has less impact on control rod worth than withdrawals have. Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note which allows the RWM to be bypassed to allow the affected control rods to be returned to their correct position. LCO 3.3.2.1 requires verification of control rod movement by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.When nine or more OPERABLE control rods are not in compliance with BPWS, the reactor mode switch must be placed in the shutdown position within 1 hour. With the mode switch in shutdown, the reactor is shut down, and as such, does not meet the applicability requirements of this LCO. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable to allow insertion of control rods to restore compliance, and is appropriate relative to the low probability of a CRDA occurring with the control rods out of sequence.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.6.1 periodically The control rod pattern is v~erified to be in compliance with the BPWS at a 24 hour Fr-quoncy to ensure the assumptions of the CRDA analyses are met. Tho- 2 houtr F..quo..Y wa, dovolopcd.,nsidoring that the prim .chcck o .c : omplianco with tho BPWS iS....... provides control rod blocks to enforce t sequence a is required to be when operating at < 10% RTP.IInsert 2 _SF /. RWM REFERENCES

1. NEDE-2401 1 -P-A-US, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Supplement for United States," (revision specified in the COLR).2. Letter from T. A. Pickens (BWROG) to G. C. Lainas (NRC),"Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," BWROG-8644, August 15, 1988.3. NUREG-0979, Section 4.2.1.3.2, April 1983 4. NUREG-0800, Section 15.4.9, Revision 2, July 1981.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-34 R-\/ISQIONl~ 6 SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock," resulting in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met instead of at the time Condition B was entered. The 10 day Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely. C.1 If both SLC subsystems are inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is considered acceptable given the low probability of a DBA or transient occurring concurrent with the failure of the control rods to shut down the reactor.D. 1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time is not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.7.1, SR 3.1.7.2, and SR 3.1.7.3 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.7.1 through SR 3.1.7.3 are 24 hour Sur-oilaGne verifyiag certain characteristics of the SLC System (e.g., the volume and temperature of the borated solution in the storage tank), thereby ensuring SLC System OPERABILITY without disturbing normal plant operation. These Surveillances ensure that the proper borated solution volume and temperature, including the temperature of the pump suction piping, are maintained (within Region A limits of Figures 3.1.7-1 and 3.1.7-2). Maintaining a minimum specified borated solution temperature is important in ensuring that the boron remains in solution and does not precipitate out in the storage tank or in the pump suction piping. The temperature versus concentration curve of Figure 3.1.7-2 ensures that a 10'F margin will be maintained (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-38 REVISION 66 SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.7.1, SR 3.1.7.2, and SR 3.1.7.3 (continued) above the saturation temperature. The 24 hour Frequ low my no ORi opuI~iuiiy w~eX8eRiu RiU Hasi GHOW. t tiiuwr a[1[ e Ferai vely slei thG mneasured parameters of ,,o!'me and temR '-".SInsert 2 SR 3.1.7.4 and SR 3.1.7.6 SR 3.1.7.4 verifies the continuity of the explosive charges in the injection valves to ensure that proper operation will occur if required.Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day FcF.qU...Y is based on operating exeiec 1 nd has demonstrated the reliability of Insert 2 .6 verifies that each valve in the system is in its correct position, but does not apply to the squib (i.e., explosive) valves.Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the SLC System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for system operation. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position from the control room, or locally by a dedicated operator at the valve control. This is acceptable since the SLC System is a manually initiated system. This Surveillance also does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This verification of valve alignment does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The 31 day Frequon..Y is based On enierig judgment and is cons~istent with the procGedural controls This Surveillance requires an examination of the sodium pentaborate solution by using chemical analysis to ensure that the proper concentration of boron exists in the storage tank (within Region A limits of Figures 3.1.7-1 and 3.1.7-2). SR 3.1.7.5 must be performed anytime sodium pentaborate or water is added to the storage tank solution to determine that the boron solution concentration is within the specified limits. SR 3.1.7.5 must also be performed any time the temperature is restored to within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2, (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-39 SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.7.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS to ensure that no significant boron precipitation occurred. The day..Frouency of thiS SurveWilance is appropriate because of the relatively I'nser 2 t R 3 ...Demonstrating that each SLC System pump develops a flow rate 41.2 gpm at a discharge pressure 1232 psig ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the fuel cycle. This minimum pump flow rate requirement ensures that, when combined with the sodium pentaborate solution concentration requirements, the rate of negative reactivity insertion from the SLC System will adequately compensate for the positive reactivity effects encountered during power reduction, cooldown of the moderator, and xenon decay.This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this Surveillance is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.SR 3.1.7.8 and SR 3.1.7.9 These Surveillances ensure that there is a functioning flow path from the sodium pentaborate solution storage tank to the RPV, including the firing of an explosive valve. The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of that batch successfully fired. The pump and explosive Valve tes,.ted should be alternated such that both comF"plete flow paths are tested ever..' 18 meths at alternating 24 month i*teFVals. The Surveillance may be performed in separate steps to prevent injecting boron into the RPV. An acceptable method for verifying flow from the pump to the RPV is to pump demineralized water from a test tank through one SLC subsystem and into the RPV. The 24 month FrequencY is based on the need to perform this gurvcillance under the cnditi(ons that apply during a plant ouitage and the potential Rfo an unplanne transfient if the Surveillance were performe~d with the reactor at power.The 21 mon9th FrFequlency Of SR 3178is bhased- on a re-view of the surveillance test histe'an Refrene 4.Insert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-40 SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.7.8 and SR 3.1.7.9 (continued) Demonstrating that all heat traced piping between the sodium pentaborate solution storage tank and the suction inlet to the injection pumps is unblocked ensures that there is a functioning flow path for injecting the sodium pentaborate solution. An acceptable method for verifying that the suction piping is unblocked is to pump from the storage tank to the test tank.The 2'2 moFnth Frequ i- -cceptable Since thc, e is a loW proEbability, that the subject pipin- bkd due to of the beron fGroe, 6 utf , *, the , tt e.This is especially true in light of the temperature verificas piping required by SR 3.1.7.3.However, if, in peg SR 3.1.7.3, it is determined that theothis piping has fallen below the specified'minimum, Insert 2 .1..7.9 must be performed once within 24 hours after the piping temperature is restored to within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2.The 24 menth of SR 3.1.7.9 Oi, based on a review of the surveillanc-e test historyr and- Rofiarone 4.SR 3.1.7.10 Enriched sodium pentaborate solution is made by mixing granular, enriched sodium pentaborate with water. Isotopic tests on the granular sodium pentaborate to verify the actual B-10 enrichment must be performed prior to addition to the SLC tank in order to ensure that the proper B-10 atom percentage is being used.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.62.2. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.4.3.
3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NRC Safety Evyaluation Report for Amendmnent 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-41 REVISION 66 SDV Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.8.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS position ensures that the SDV vent and drain valves will perform their intended functions during normal operation. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that the valves are in the correct position.The 31 day Frequency is based on egnrig judgment andi consistent With the procedural controls goVerning valve operation, which ensure corr2ct R-le 'position. During a scram, the SDV vent and drain valves should close to contain the reactor water discharged to the SDV piping. Cycling each valve through its complete range of motion (closed and open) ensures that the valve will function properly during a scram. The 92-day Frequency s bas.ed .n operating experience

a. d take, into account the level of redundancy in the system de Insert 2 SR 3.1.8.3 is an integrated test of the SDV vent and drain valves to verify total system performance.

After receipt of a simulated or actual scram signal, the closure of the SDV vent and drain valves is verified.The closure time of 60 seconds after receipt of a scram signal is based on the bounding leakage case evaluated in the accident analysis (Ref. 1). Similarly, after receipt of a simulated or actual scram reset signal, the opening of the SDV vent and drain valves is verified. Although not explicitly stated in the SR, the valves are required to open prior to receipt of a control rod block on high SDV level. This criterion ensures the valves can open in time to preclude a scram on SDV high level and maintain sufficient volume in the SDV to receive and contain the water discharged by the control rod drives during a scram per the requirements of the applicable safety analysis (Ref.1). The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1 and the scram time testing of control rods in LCO 3.1.3 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 24 moneth Fr.equency is based on *th Reed te perfoFm this Surveillance un~der the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were peFor.med with the reactFr at power. The 24 mnfth Fr.equenc is Insert 2 (continued) REVISION 66 HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-45 SDV Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1.8 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.2.2.3.
2. 10 CFR 100.3. NUREG-0803, "Generic Safety Evaluation Report Regarding Integrity of BWR Scram System Piping," August 1981.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety EV ,uatin Report AmeRndment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-46 REIS ' l tIO 66 APLHGR B 3.2.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 If the APLHGR cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to< 24% RTP within 4 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 24% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.1.1 periodically REQUIREMENTS \l\\APLHGRs are required to be initially calculat within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is > 24% RTP and then evory 24 hurs thereafter. They are compared to the specified limits-in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis.The 24 Freque.cy is based on both enginRecing judgme't and recognition of the SloWneG6 Of changcs in power diStribution duFrig norm.al operatiRn. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER__ 24% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels, Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. NEDE-2401 1-P-A "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel," (revision specified in the COLR).2. (Not used)3. FSAR, Chapter 6.4. FSAR, Chapter 15.5. (Not used)6. NEDC-32749P, "Extended Power Uprate Safety Analysis Report for Edwin I. Hatch Units 1 and 2," July 1997.7. NEDC-30474-P "Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Monitor and Technical Specification Improvements (ARTS)Program for E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2," December 1983.8. (Not used)(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.2-3 REVISION 4-3 MCPR B 3.2.2 BASES (continued) ACTIONS A.1 If any MCPR is outside the required limits, an assumption regarding an initial condition of the design basis transient analyses may not be met. Therefore, prompt action should be taken to restore the MCPR(s) to within the required limits such that the plant remains operating within analyzed conditions. The 2 hour Completion Time is normally sufficient to restore the MCPR(s) to within its limits and is acceptable based on the low probability of a transient or DBA occurring simultaneously with the MCPR out of specification. B.1 If the MCPR cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 24% RTP within 4 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL, POWER to < 24% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.2.2.1 1 periodically 'The MCPR is required to be initially calcu within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is > 24% RTP and then 24 hu-rs thereafter. It is compared to the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. The 24 hour Frequency is based 9R both oeginccring judgment and recogngitin of the ownes. o changes in power distr0iUbu1t norm.al operation. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER _> 24% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels,[Insert2 -SR 3.2.2.2 Because the transient analysis takes credit for conservatism in the scram speed performance, it must be demonstrated that the specific scram speed distribution is consistent with that used in the transient analysis. SR 3.2.2.2 determines the value oft, which is a measure of the actual scram speed distribution compared with the assumed distribution. The MCPR operating limit is then determined based on an interpolation between the applicable limits for Option A (scram (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.2-7 REVISION 42 LHGR B 3.2.3 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.2.3.1 1 periodically The LHGR is required to be initially calcula d within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is > 24% RTP and -houre thereafter. It is compared to the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis.The 24 hour FrFequency is; based on both engineering judgment and recognition of the 6loW changes in poWor distribution durinRg normnal epe.atie." The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER> 24% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at lower power levels.IInsert 2 ?1. NEDE-2401 1-P-A, "General Electric Standard Application for REFERENCES

1. NEDE-2401 1-P-A, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel." 2. FSAR, Chapter 15 (Unit 2).3. NUREG-0800, Section II.A.2(g), Revision 2, July 1981.4. NEDC-32749P, "Extended Power Uprate Safety Analysis Report for Edwin I. Hatch Units 1 and 2," July 1997.5. NEDC-30474-P, "Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Monitor and Technical Specification Improvements (ARTS)Program for E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2," December 1983.6. NRC approval of "Amendment 26 to GE Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A, "GESTAR 11"-Implementing Improved GE Steady-State Methods (TAC No. MA6481)," November 10, 1999.7. NEDO-24154-A, "Qualification of the One-Dimensional Core Transient Model (ODYN) for Boiling Water Reactors," August 1986, and NEDE-24154-P-A, Supplement 1, Volume 4, Revision 1, February 2000.8. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.9. Letter from Global Nuclear Fuel, M. E. Harding to E. B. Gibson, January 22, 2004, "Plant Hatch Technical Specification Modification to include LHGR." HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.2-12

,4"3 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued) 1.2 The alternate method to detect and suppress oscillations implemented in accordance with Required Action 1.1 was evaluated based on use up to 120 days (Ref. 13). The evaluation, based on engineering judgment, concluded that the likelihood of an instability event that could not be adequately handled by the alternate method during this 120 day period is negligibly small. The 120 day period is intended to be an outside limit to allow for the case where design changes or extensive analysis may be required to understand or correct some unanticipated characteristic of the instability detection algorithms or equipment. This action is not intended to be, and was not evaluated as, a routine alternative to returning failed or inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status. Correction of routine equipment failure or inoperability is expected to normally be accomplished within the Completion Times allowed for Required Actions for Conditions A and B.SURVILLANCE REQUIREMENTS As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 9) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary. SR 3.3.1.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once ovarY 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-23 REV IS' /IO 2 "fl"4 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The Fro.quonc.y ir based upon .pei.at.g .XPGri.nc. that demonstrates channel fa'ilure is rare,.. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.\SR 3.3.1.1.2 To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are calibrated to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance. The F=r.quc..y Of once per 7 days is based onA miinor: changes in L=PRM sensitiVity, which coul-d affect the APRM rcading betwccn pe"formances of SR. 3.3.1.1.8.Isr A restriction to satisfying this SR when < 24% RTP is provided that requires the SR to be met only at > 24% RTP because it is difficult to accurately maintain APRM indication of core THERMAL POWER consistent with a heat balance when < 24% RTP. At low power levels, a high degree of accuracy is unnecessary because of the large, inherent margin to thermal limits (MCPR and APLHGR). At> 24% RTP, the Surveillance is required to have been satisfactorily performed within the last 7 days, in accordance with SR 3.0.2. A Note is provided which allows an increase in THERMAL POWER above 24% if the 7-day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours after reaching or exceeding 24% RTP. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-24 REVISION 4-2 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.1.3 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.4 is not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1, since testing of the MODE 2 required IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODE 2 if the 7-day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours after entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.A Frequency of 7- days providos an acceptablc level of systonavailability the l anRd is based oR reliability analysis (Ref. 9)-.SR 3.3.1.1.5 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A Frequenc y. f 7 days provides an acceptable level at system average availability ever the FrFequeRny aRd is baed ORn the reliability analysis of Referenc~e

9. (The Manual Scrami F=unction's C-H.ANNELI FUNCTIONAL TEST FrFequency was credited in h analysis to extend m~any automatic scramn Func~tfions' FreqUeRci-1)

EInsert 2 SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 These Surveillances are established to ensure that no gaps in neutron flux indication exist from subcritical to power operation for monitoring core reactivity status.The overlap between SRMs and IRMs is required to be demonstrated to ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. This is required prior to (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-25 REVISION 24 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs.The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range. On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block, or IRM upscale rod block.Overlap between the SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to withdrawing an SRM from its fully inserted position, its associated IRMs have cleared their downscale rod block Allowable Values, prior to the SRM having reached its upscale rod block Allowable Value.Plant procedures should be consulted to determine the associated detectors. As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.7 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable. A FrequencGY of 7 days i19eonbl basedI on engineeFrig judgment and the roliability of the IRMs and APRMs,...w SR 3.3.1.1.8 Iner Z LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) System. This establishes the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System. The 1000 offecti-e full power hu-rs FrequencRy is based on ensrin!g the nodal powor un~ertainty is within the licensing basis analysis..(oteInsert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-26 RE=V!$!OHN 32 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.12 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day On an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Fequency Of SR3 bamsed- on a; review o-f the sunioillance toSt histor-y, drift analyGis of the aGGociated trip units (if applicable), and Reference 22..'. I....... .... ...... -1 .....L ]L -.....-n...... .. ... .. ..........Frequ y of up a sed Sr 33et R1 ti v alurP4911iARG WeJU MeRxur eH Wt[irru .14ri the rU:]aG+r a[ iin). -I-R --f4Q'test histoey and Referen c Insert 2 SR 3.3.1.1.10 ri an fl in, ~ifl1A? fl~ tIm Olifl ~Oi I IC~ flflm dou wri cl ruv vvr " ý nur-rý ariv-, A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. For the APRM Functions, this test supplements the automatic self-test functions that operate continuously in the APRM and voter channels. The APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST covers the APRM channels (including recirculation flow processing applicable to Function 2.b only), the two-out-of-four voter channels, and the interface connections to the RPS trip systems from the voter channels. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. T-he 181 day FrFequiency of SR 3.1.1.1.10 is based on the reliability aRalyhis Of Referrenes 13 and 17. (NOTE: The actual Yoting logi Gtf the tw- out of feur veter channels is tested as part of SR 3.3.1.1.15.) FoInsert 2 h__r Eunction-2--ara-Note-th-atrequires this SR to be performed within Ir 12 hours of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 is provided. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM Function cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers or lifted leads. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.SR 3.3.1.1.11 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-27 REVISION 38 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.11 (continued) REQUIREMENTS POWER is > 27.6% RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER > 27.6% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid.If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at > 27.6% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valve(s) or other reasons), then the affected Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition (Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are enabled), this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.The 24 2n-,th FrequieRY is based On a review of the s,, h eillaR-e test Insrt2S 73sc3.31.1.13 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. For MSIV -Closure, SDV Water Level -High (Float Switch), and TSV -Closure Functions, this SR also includes a physical inspection and actuation of the switches. For the APRM Simulated Thermal Power -High Function, this SR also includes calibrating the associated recirculation loop flow channel.Note 1 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7-day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the 1000 effective full power hour. LPRM calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3.1.1.8). A second Note is provided that requires the IRM SRs (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-28 REVISION 4-2 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.13 (continued) REQUIREMENTS to be performed within 12 hours of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.Testing of the MODE 2 IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.The 24 mon~th FrFequiency is based on a review of the suvei!allane test histor,', drift analysis of the associated instrum~entation (if applicablo), aRnd Reference 20.,, Insert 2 SR 3.3.1.1.14 (Not used.)SR 3.3.1.1.15 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDV vent and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8), overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.The 21 month Fr.equecy is based 9n the need to perform this Su.veillance under the conditions that apply during a plaRt outage and the potential for a-n u nrplanred l if thAe performcd with the reactorF at power. The 21 mon~th FrFequency i based OR a review of the cur.'eillaRce test histor'an efy2 Insert 2 TheiOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for APRM Function 2.e Oil simulates APRM and OPRM trip conditions at the two-out-of-four voter channel inputs to check all combinations of two tripped inputs to the two-out-of-four logic in the voter channels and APRM related redundant RPS relays.SR 3.3.1.1.16 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-29 REVISION 38 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.16 (continued) analysis. This test may be performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 10.RPS RESPONSE TIME for APRM two-out-of-four Voter Function 2.e includes the output relays of the voter and the associated RPS relays and contactors. (The digital portions of the APRM and two-out-of-four voter channels are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because self-testing and calibration check the time base of the digital electronics.) Confirmation of the time base is adequate to assure required response times are met. Neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time.Note 1-allows neutron detectors to be excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually SThe ensure an instantaneous response time.RPS RE=SPONSE= TIME te-sts arc coend-ucted-on a;n 24 month4 STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Note 3 STAGGERED TEST BASIS FrFequency to be determined based On fourF channols per trip oyn m , ri "I" tv 81 t G en F1 N E; 0 6 P -L., 0 i ; 1 4-: %/ I r1l Frequency is based on the logic interrelatiorships eof the variou channous Fequired to produce an RPS escam signal. This Frcequensy IS conoistent With the Oupital iodustF' Fefueling cycle and is baoed upoi nR ent opeating pri hich htows that random failures o instrumentation components causig, seriousresose time doFgadation2., bt not channoi failure, are infreouent occurre The 24 monGth FrFequency, On a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, is also based POn ew of the suinedilance test history and Refermene 20s Note: SR 3.3.1.1.16 for Function 2.e confirms the response time of that function, and also confirms the response time of loop components common to APRM -Two Out of Four Voter logic and other RPS loops.S R 3.3.1.1.17 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from OPRM Upscale Function 2.f will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER, as indicated by APRM Simulated Thermal Power, is! 25% RTP and core flow, as indicated by recirculation drive flow, is< 60% rated core flow. This normally involves confirming the bypass (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-30 REVISION 38 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.17 (continued) REQUIREMENTS setpoints. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. The actual Surveillance ensures that the OPRM Upscale Function is enabled (not bypassed) for the correct values of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow. Other Surveillances ensure that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation flow properly correlate with THERMAL POWER and, core flow, respectively. If any bypass setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the OPRM Upscale Function is bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power is > 25%and recirculation drive flow is < 60% rated), then the affected channel is considered inoperable for the OPRM Upscale Function.Alternatively, the bypass setpoint may be adjusted to place the channel in a conservative condition (unbypass). If placed in the unbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.The 24 month Froequoncy ibared on; a rc':iew of the survoil1;;nee test hiry and Refcron csert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.2.2. FSAR, Chapter 15.3. FSAR, Subsection 6.3.3.4. FSAR, Supplement 5A.5. FSAR, Subsection 15.1.12.6. NEDO-23842, "Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal in the Startup Range," April 18, 1978.7. FSAR, Subsection 15.1.38.8. P. Check (NRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC), "BWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.9. NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," March 1988.10. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T5.0-1.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-31 REVISIGN 4r RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES REFERENCES

11. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical (continued)

Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.12. NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994.13. NEDC-3241OP-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," October 1995.14. NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.15. NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.16. NEDO-32465-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology and Reload Applications," March 1996.17. NEDO-3241 OP-A, Supplement 1, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," November 1997.18. Letter, L.A. England (BWROG) to M.J. Virgilio, "BWR Owners'Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action," June 6, 1994.19. NEDO-32291 -A, Supplement 1, "System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.20. ... Not used 21. GE Letter NSA 02-250, "Plant Hatch IRM Technical Specifications," April 19, 2002.22.iNRC Safoty Evaluation R.po~ for Amendmont 176, Quaterly 2. Survo*iancoExtnin HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-32 REVIqSION-8 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.1 and SR 3.3.1.2.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The FrFequencY of oncc ever,' 12 hours for SR 3.3.1.2.1 isbased on operating expericncc that demoenstrates channel failure iF are. While inR MOIDES 3 and 1, reactiVitY changes are not expected; therefore, the 12 hour FrFequiency 26 rclaxed to 24 hours for SR 3.3.1.2.4 The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more fre ent, checks of channels during normal operational use oft displays associated with the channelIs required by the LCO/S R 3.3.1.2.2 To provide adequate coverage of potential reactivity changes in the core when the fueled region encompasses more than one SRM, one SRM is required to be OPERABLE in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, and the other OPERABLE SRM must be in an adjacent quadrant containing fuel. Note 1 states that the SR is required to be met only during CORE ALTERATIONS. It is not required to be met at other times in MODE 5 since core reactivity changes are not occurring. This Surveillance consists of a review of plant logs to ensure that SRMs required to be OPERABLE for given CORE ALTERATIONS are, in fact, OPERABLE. In the event that only one SRM is required to be OPERABLE (when the fueled region encompasses only one SRM), per Table 3.3.1.2-1, footnote (b), only the a. portion of this SR is required. Note 2 clarifies that more than one of the three requirements can be met by the same OPERABLE SRM. The 12 hour Fr.equency is based upon operating exp.e i and s .pplement .operational con.trls over refu lgti that inculue steps, to ensure that the SRMs eurdb the LCGO are in the SIR Isr This Surveillance consists of a verification of the SRM instrument readout to ensure that the SRM reading is greater than a specified minimum count rate, which ensures that the detectors are indicating count rates indicative of neutron flux levels within the core. This surveillance also requires the signal to noise ratio to be verified to be> 2:1. A signal to noise ratio that meets this requirement ensures the detectors are inserted to an acceptable operating level. Therefore, to meet this portion of the surveillance, it is necessary only to verify the (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-38 REVISION 2-2 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS detectors are inserted to the same operating level as they were when SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 were performed satisfactorily. SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 require the actual ratio (and hence, an acceptable operating level) to be determined periodically while the detectors are required to be OPERABLE. With few fuel assemblies loaded, the SRMs will not have a high enough count rate to satisfy the SR. Therefore, allowances are made for loading sufficient "source" material, in the form of irradiated fuel assemblies, to establish the minimum count rate. To accomplish this, the SR is modified by a Note (Note 1) that states that the count rate is not required to be met on an SRM that has less than or equal to four fuel assemblies adjacent to the SRM and no other fuel assemblies are in the associated core quadrant. With four or fewer fuel assemblies loaded around each SRM and no other fuel assemblies in the associated core quadrant, even with a control rod withdrawn, the configuration will not be critical. In addition, Note 2 states that this requirement does not have to be met during spiral unloading. If the core is being unloaded in this manner, the various core configurations encountered will not be critical.The Frequeny is based upon channel redundancy aRnd other information available in the control room, and that the requirod channelc are frequently Monitorod While core reactivity changes ar ocurn. W~hen no reactivity changos aro in progress, the FrFequency is relaxed forom 12 hours to 24 hours SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 Insert 2 Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the associated channel will function properly. SR 3.3.1.2.5 is required in MODE 5, and the 7 day Frequency ensures that the channels are OPERABLE while core reactivity changes could be in progress. This Frequency is reasonable, based on operating experience and on other Surveillances (such as a CHANNEL CHECK), that ensure proper functioning between CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.SR 3.3.1.2.6 is required in MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below, and in MODES 3 and 4. Since core reactivity changes doG net nOFRmally tako place in MODES 3 and 4, and core reactvity changes are due nlRy to c ol ro- Fed movement in MODE 2, the F-requency has been extended from 7- days to 31 days. The 31 day FrFequenyi based on operating experience and on other Surveillances (Guch as C-HANNE4L CHEC=K) that ensure properfunctioning hbeWeen CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS. Inse 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-39 REVISION 22 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Determination of the signal to noise ratio also ensures that the detectors are inserted to an acceptable operating level. In a fully withdrawn condition, the detectors are sufficiently removed from the fueled region of the core to essentially eliminate neutrons from reaching the detector. Any count rate obtained while the detectors are fully withdrawn is assumed to be "noise" only.The Note to the SR 3.3.1.2.6 allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability (THERMAL POWER decreased to IRM Range 2 or below). The SR must be performed within 12 hours after IRMs are on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the 3-1 day Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels.Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e., satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances. SR 3.3.1.2.7 Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at a Fr.equoncY of 24 mepths verifies the performance of the SRM detectors and associated circuitry. The Frequency considers the plant conditions required to perform the test, the ease of performing the test, and the likelihood of a change in the system or component status. The 24 moenth FrFequonG isbsde eiew of the surveillance test ,histe,,qd ,R-ef',e ," The neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CA TION (Note 1) because they cannot readily be adjusted. e detectors are fission chambers that are designed to have a atively constant sensitivity over the range and with an 2a racy specified for a fixed useful life.Note 2 to the Surveillance allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability. The SR must be performed in MODE 2 within 12 hours of entering MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the 24, menth Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-40 REVISION 35 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e., satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances. REFERENCES

1. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 125, April 30, 1993.2. NRC Safety Evaluati-n for 17-4.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-41 REVISION 3 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 18 4 days is based on rcliability analyscs (Ref. 11 ).SR 3.3.2.1.2 and SR 3.3.2.1.3 Insert 2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for the RWM to ensure that the entire system will perform the intended function. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the RWM is performed by attempting to withdraw a control rod not in compliance with the prescribed sequence and verifying a control rod block occurs. This test is performed as soon as possible after the applicable conditions are entered. As noted in the SRs, SR 3.3.2.1.2 is not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn at< 10% RTP in MODE 2, and SR 3.3.2.1.3 is not required to be performed until 1 hour after THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP in MODE 1. This allows entry into MODE 2 (and if entered during a shutdown, concurrent power reduction to < 10% RTP) for SR 3.3.2.1.2 and THERMAL POWER reduction to < 10% RTP in MODE 1 for SR 3.3.2.1.3 to perform the required Surveillances if the 92 day o. an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SRs. The 92 day OR an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Frequency is based o .a review of the .u..eillan. test histey and S R 3.3.2.1.4 The RBM setpoints are automatically varied as a function of power.Three Allowable Values are specified in Table 3.3.2.1-1, each within a specific power range. The power at which the control rod block Allowable Values automatically change are based on the APRM signal's input to each RBM channel. Below the minimum power setpoint, the RBM is automatically bypassed. These power Allowable Values must be verified periodically to be less than or equal to the specified values. If any power range setpoint is nonconservative, then the affected RBM channel is considered inoperable. Alternatively, the power range channel can be placed in the conservative condition (i.e., enabling the proper RBM setpoint). If placed in this condition, the SR is met and the RBM channel is not considered inoperable. As noted, neutron detectors are excluded from the Surveillance because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Neutron detectors are adequately (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-49 REVISION 669 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS tested in SR 3.3.1.1.2 and SR 3.3.1.1.8. The 241 month FrequenRcy is based on a reviewýA~ of the surveillanco test history and Roferene 2!The RWM is automatically bypassed when power is above a specified value. The power level is determined from APRM power signals. The automatic bypass setpoint must be verified periodically to be> 10% RTP. If the RWM low power setpoint is nonconservative, then the RWM is considered inoperable. Alternately, the low power setpoint channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypassed condition, the SR is met and the RWM is not considered inoperable. The 24 menth FroeG'u-ncy is based On Referonce12-. Insert 2 SR 3.3.2.1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for the Reactor Mode Switch -Shutdown Position Function to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the Reactor Mode Switch -Shutdown Position Function is performed by attempting to withdraw any control rod with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position and verifying a control rod block occurs.As noted in the SR, the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 1 hour after the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, since testing of this interlock with the reactor mode switch in any other position cannot be performed without using jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODES 3 and 4 if the !8 MGnth Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.The 21 month Frequenc~y is based on tho need to performthi Su..eillane uder the .conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potenti-al for an uRplaRnRed transient if the wre.performed with the reactor at power. The 24 moneFth Frequlency is based On a review of the supvellance test history and Refe~erene1 SR 3.32.11.7 Insert 2 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-50 REVISION 6r Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. As noted, neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.Neutron detectors are adequately tested in SR 3.3.1.1.8. The 24 moenth FrFequency is based en a review of the 6ur~cillancc test hiStor,' and RefeFrene 1-2.Insert 2 SR 3.3.2.1.8 The RWM will only enforce the proper control rod sequence if the rod sequence is properly input into the RWM computer. This SR ensures that the proper sequence is loaded into the RWM so that it can perform its intended function. The Surveillance is performed once prior to declaring RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM, since this is when rod sequence input errors are possible.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.6.2.2.5.
2. FSAR, Section 7.6.8.2.6.
3. NEDC-30474-P, "Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Monitor, and Technical Specification Improvements (ARTS)Program for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plants," December 1983.4. NEDE-2401 1-P-A-US, "General Electrical Standard Application for Reload Fuel," Supplement for United States, (revision specified in the COLR).5. Letter from T.A. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas (NRC),"Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," BWROG-8644, August 15, 1986.6. NEDO-21231, "Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence," January 1977.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-51 REVISION 665 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

7. NRC SER, "Acceptance of Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDE-2401 1-P-A," "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Revision 8, Amendment 17," December 27, 1987.8. NEDC-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," October 1988.9. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals And Allowed Out-Of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.10. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.Not used Not used Ii. NEEDC 32411 OP A, "Nuclear Moacurement Analysis and ontFrol Range (NUMAC PRNM)Retrofit PlUs Option I1" Stability Trip Function," Octobor 1995.W2 RC Safety E~valuation Roport for AmendImont 1714.Not used -, 13.NRC Safety Evaluation i-enort fr lxmongment 17C lb.uartedi
  • -vr ......I ....., 14. NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, "Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process," July 2004.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-52 REVISION 66 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation B 3.3.2.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly REQUIREMENTS reduce the probability that the feedwater pump turbines and main (continued) turbine will trip when necessary.

SR 3.3.2.2.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function.Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. Due to the high turbine trip and reactor scram potential incurred when valving reactor water level differential pressure transmitters into and out of service, it is acceptable to perform the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for this logic from the input of the alarm unit.This is consistent with the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST definition requiring the signal to be injected "as close to the sensor as practicable." Additionally, due to the physical location of the turbine trip relays and their close proximity to other sensitive equipment, accessibility is extremely limited. Verification of relay actuation and associated relay contact status by accessing the relay introduces a high potential for turbine trip and reactor scram. One contact from each turbine trip relay energizes an amber light indicating relay actuation. Therefore, it is acceptable to terminate the test at the turbine trip relay, utilizing light indication for relay status. These allowances are only acceptable if the CHANNEL CALIBRATION and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST overlap both the initiation and termination point of this CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST such that the entire trip logic is tested.The 92 day on an TEST B-ASIS FGroquency i6 b;ao;Rd OR a eieof the supeilliance test histor,', drift analysis of the associatod trip units, and .Reference & In et.7 Insert 2 SR 3.3.2.2.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-57 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation B 3.3.2.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.2.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Tho 24 month Fro.quon.y is basod on a review of tho sur.oillanco test history, drift analysis of the associated instrumentation, andInsert 2 SR 3.3.2.2.3 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the feedwater and main turbine valves is included as part of this Surveillance and overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. Therefore, if a valve is incapable of operating, the associated instrumentation channels would also be inoperable. The-21 monAth F..R.Gn.y is based on the need to pefofrm this Sureillance under the conditions that apply during a plant eutag-and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Survefillance woee pertormod with the reactor at power. The 21 month Froequee Is based on a re.iew of the su..e.ilance test history and Referenee 4.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 15.1.7. Insert 2 2. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-Of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Not used Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 177.5. NRi Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 1.76, Surveillanee Extension.

HATCH UNIT 2 B] 3.3-58 REiVISION 38 PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. The Note is based upon a NRC Safety Evaluation Report (Ref. 2) which concluded that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability of properly monitoring post accident parameters, when necessary. SR 3.3.3.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK onco overy 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel against a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure;thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including isolation, indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.The Frequency Of 31 days is based upon plant operating cxerino with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that f-ail-ure of moroe than one channel of a given Function in any'31 day inter.. i rar.. The CHANNE.L, CHECK ...pplemcnt., less formal. buJt more free Jont, checks of during normal operational use, of those displays associated with the ch rcquired by the LCO.S- R.Insert 2 SR 3.3.3.1.2 ann6 A C ,HANNEL CALIBRATION is ever 24 months.CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies the channel responds to measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy.The 2 monRth Frqefency is based on a rcview of the sur,,'illance 4eet....... a d .... .... ....Insert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-68 PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," Revision 2, December 1980.2. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97," dated July 30, 1985.3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4.A J d NK"-( SaTtev 4 -uti n A- Drl torF Am Aendmg nent 1 17 HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-69 35 Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when an instrument channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours.Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. The Note is based upon a NRC Safety Evaluation Report (Reference

1) which concluded that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability of monitoring required parameters, when necessary.

SR 3.3.3.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK onco over,' 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. As specified in the Surveillance, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those channels that are normally energized.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-73 REVISION ! Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.3.2.1 (continued) The FFrequenY is based upon plant operating eXpori.nce that demonstrates channeI failure is rFare. Insert 2 SR 3.3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.3.2.2 verifies each required Remote Shutdown System transfer switch and control circuit performs the intended function. This verification is performed from the remote shutdown panel and locally, as appropriate. Operation of equipment from the remote shutdown panel is not necessary. The Surveillance can be satisfied by performance of a continuity check, or in the case of the DG controls, the routine Surveillances of LCO 3.8.1 (since local control is utilized during the performance of some of the Surveillances of LCO 3.8.1).This will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 from the remote shutdown panel and the local control stations. The 24 month FrFequencY is based OR the need to per~form this Surveillance under the conditions that apply durin a plant outage and the potential fcr an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed witht reactor at power. The 24 mon9th FrFequency is based On a review oe al the survelllance test fliste~' and Reterence 4 Insert 2 SR 3.3.3.2.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. The test verifies the channel responds to measured parameter values with the necessary range and accuracy.A nop 24 montfl i=;reaencV 1s nASed An A reVIAIN oT thPsrellnets history and Reference .,.Insert 2 ]REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.2. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T6.0-1.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 171.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3,-74 REVISION 46a EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SUREVILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Frequency is based On G-falA t hia GU test nnfd Ref---n-- 0 S R 3.3.4.1.2 Insr This SR ensures that an EOC-RPT initiated from the TSV -Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 27.6% RTP.This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure) the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER > 27.6% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid. If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at > 27.6% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TSV -Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition (Turbine Stop Valve -Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are enabled), this SR is met with the channel considered OPERABLE.The 21 mon~th FrFequency is based- on a rovieow of the sur~oeill;;PAR test histoy, dFrift of the asocOiated instFrumetation, and Refe erenc SR 3.3.4.1.3 Insert 2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. For the TSV -Closure Function, this SR also includes a physical inspection and actuation of the switches.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-81 REIS::\ IO 4-2( .IA EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The 24 monRth is based en a review of the suveillaRGe tes histor,', drift of the associated instrumentation (if applicable),-.and Refe~eRee-7-4 Insert 2 SR 3.3.4.1.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, to provide complete testing of the associated safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would also be inoperable. The 21 month Frequency is based on the need to perfoFrmti the potential for an uInplanRed t-ranient if the Sureillance wore performned with the reactor at power. The 21 month FrFequency i SR 3.3.4.1 15 Isr This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 5.A Note to the Surveillance states that breaker interruption (i.e., trip)time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.6. This is allowed since the time to open the contacts after energization of the trip coil and the arc suppression time are short and do not appreciably change, due to the design of the breaker opening device and the fact that the breaker is not routinely cycled.FE=rO RPT- SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME: tests a.e conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST B.ASS. Response times cannot be determined at power because operation of final actuated devices is required. Therefore, this Frequency is consistent With the typiced 0ndustr,' refueling cycle- and- is based upon plant operating epein, which sho~ws that random failures Of inStrumentation comRponents that cause seiu respose time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent. occruirr~einces. The 24 moneth FrFequency, on a (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-82 REVISION 35 EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS STAGGERED TEST BASIS, is also based on a review of the surVeillance teSt historY and Reference

7. V- ns r.... .... ... ....... .] ... .... .... .. Insert 2 ]SR 3.3.4.1.6 This SR ensures that the RPT breaker interruption time is provided to the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME test. Breaker interruption (i.e., trip) time is defined as breaker response time plus arc suppression time. Breaker response time is the time from application of voltage to the trip coil until the main contacts separate.

Arc suppression time is the time from main contact separation until the complete suppression of the electrical arc across the open contacts.Breaker response shall be verified by testing and added to the manufacturer's design arc suppression time to determine breaker interruption time. The breaker arc suppression time shall be validated by the performance of periodic contact gap measurements in accordance with plant procedures. The 60 month Frequency of the testing is based on the d~iffiulty of performing the test and th reliability of the circuit breakers. wIsr REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Subsection 7.6.10.2. FSAR, Subsections 15.1.1, 15.1.2, and 15.1.3.3. FSAR, Paragraph 5.5.16.1 and Subsection 7.6.10.4. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases For Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals And Allowed Out-Of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.5. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T5.0-1.6. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.7. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.8. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for AmcdMent 176,u Surveillance EXtension.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-83 ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued) The description of a Function maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability is discussed in the Bases for Required Action B.1 above.The 1 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the operator to take corrective action and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the ATWS-RPT instrumentation during this period.D.1 and D.2 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 2 within 6 hours (Required Action D.2).Alternately, the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation (Required Action D.1). The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, both-to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions and to remove a recirculation pump from service in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 2) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the recirculation pumps will trip when necessary. SR 3.3.4.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK e-eeFy hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-89 REVISION I. I ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The F..equccy is based upn o.peratiRg cxpcrience that doMOnstratoc channol failu--ro iis rare- The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more fre uent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the dis lays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.4.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on an ALTIERNIATE-TES-T BA.SIS2 FrFequency is based on reiewof the suellanRc test his nc,', drift analysis of the associated trips units, and Reference 5 -.,,,, SR 3.3.4.2.3 Insert 2 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-90 REVISION 39 ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.4.2.3 (continued) The 24 month FrFequnc Is.I on a r e v iew o-f- t-he -Au--r. pi 11ai B le i4mat historFy, drift analysi6 of the aSSOciated instrum~entationR, and R efie~re nGe-4-7 S RInsert 2 SR 3.3.4.2.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as part of this Surveillance and overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would be inoperable. The 21 mRnth is b a sed on the need to pertorm hi nas that apply during a plant outage and eut-VE, EIRGO WREIRIF I E-1 GGA-.-[~IL2 UUIeI1LI:iI ur Jr UI IUiJi1iIuu trirriierit U uiu ~ur~'uiii:iriue 'xere peseormod with the feactor at power. The 24 month FReqfency I.based on a reVieW of the surveillance test history and Referonce 4.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.6.10.7.EI Inet2i 2. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.1. rm~.Safety F-valuaileR I-eperr Wo ikmenoment A I 5.NK( Safety LEvaluat'OR Report tor Amendment 176 , Quar-tedly Surve*ilance Etnin HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-91 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours as follows: (a) for Functions 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains initiation capability.

Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 5)assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.5.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The FrcequencY is based uponR operating experience that demonctrateG channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more fre uent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the dis lays associated with the channels required by the LCO.Insert 2 SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-122 REVISION ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The 92 day On an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS is based on review of the sur'-eollance test history, drift analysis of the S R 3.3.5.1.4-Isr2 I A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 24 mORth is based On a review of the suveillan e te" t history, drift aRalysis of the associated instrumentation, and SInsert 2 SR 3.3.5.1.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.1, LCO 3.5.2, LCO 3.7.2, LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function.The 24 month FequeRn y is ba6;ed n the Reed to pefomhi Surve*ilance under the conditions that apply during a Dlant ou1tauc and the poteftial fror an unplanned tranioert if the Su1rveillance were perfoFrmed with the reactor at power. The 21 mon~th FrFequec is based OR a review ef the sur.'cmance test nistory n cenc REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2. II nsert 2 2. FSAR, Section 6.3.3. FSAR, Chapter 15.4. NEDC-31376-P, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant, SAFER/GESTR-LOCA, Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," December 1986.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-123 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

5. NEDC-30936-P-A, "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2," December 1988.6. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.7. NR(C Safety Evaluation for AmenRdmeRt 4 7-4.& A A r I U.NRG~ Safety Fi3vuaionw Ropert fer AmenGd mont 1 6, Uua~terly SuR'eillancc ExtcnS*on.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-124 REVISION 39 RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued) suppression pool). Alternatively, Required Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended function. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the RCIC suction piping), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.E.1 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable immediately. SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC System REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Function 2; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1, 3, and 4, provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 1) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 heour ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a parameter on other similar channels. It is based on the (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-132 REVISION I RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The FrcequencY is based u1pon opcrating experience that demenstrates channel flure s rar.F I iThe CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more fre uent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the dis lays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.5.2.2 and SR 3.3.5.2.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The A-2 day oRn an AILTERNATE TEST BASIS is based Rn a eieof the suR4eilance test histor,', drift analysis of the associ-ated trip units, and Roferenco 1-.SR 3.3.5.2.4 Insert 2 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-133 REVISION 3 RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.2.4 (continued) The 92 day On an ALTERNATE: TEST BASIS F traeency of SR 3.3.5.2.3 is based On a review of the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated tip urnits, and Refeornce 4.The 24 smonth Frequeny Of SR 3.3.5.2.4 is based On a review of the Surveillance test history, drift analysis of the a ftociated instrumentation, and R.fhen.e 3 IInsert 2 S R 3.3.5.2.5 Isr The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.The 21 mon~th Fre~quency is basod on the need to perform ti Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance Were performed with the reco atpoe. The 21 moenth FrFequenyi Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. GENE-770-06-2, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.3. NRC Safety Evaluatio n Repor for 1714... ...... A ..4. NRG Safety Evaluation Repo~t for Amendment 176U, Quarterly Surveillance E~xtension.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-134 REVISION 3 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 4 and 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary. SR 3.3.6.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once evey 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The Fr.equencY i based on pe.rating oxperience that demonstrates chaRqel failure !rarc.The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequen , hecks of channels during normal operational use of the displa associated with the channels required by the LCO. "1~Insert 2 SIR 3.3.6.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-158 REVISION 3 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1.2 (continued) function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST B3ASIS FrFeguoncy is based on a eieof the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated trip units (if applicable), and Reference 40.SR 3.3.6.1.3, SR 3.3.6.1.4, and SR 3.3.6.1.5 Insert 2 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on a Al I~kIATr *rrc'T r~At'Ir' r......£Wi a ALTRNATE TES BASc;IS rieuenuriy ef SR 3.3.6.1.3 is, barsed o4arviwo the surveillance test historY, drif analysis of the as..ociated (or Vacuum) switches (if applicable), and Reference

10. The 184 day Frequency ot SR 3.3.6.1.4 and the 21 month Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.5 are based on a eiw of the sur'emillance test history, drift analysis of th a ssoci nated instru mentation (if applicable), and Reference 9.SR 3.3.6.1.6 Insert2 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LCO 3.6.1.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 21 MoRth F=requ.ency is based on the need to perform thiS Su..eillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an; unplanned taranient ifth Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based OR a review of the su...eillance test history Ref~eFeR~e4-SR 3.3.6.1.7 Insert 2 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-159 REVISION 39 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued) analysis. The instrument response times must be added to the PCIV closure times to obtain the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference

6. This test may be performed in one measurement, or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested.A Note to the Surveillance states that channel sensors are excluded from ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing. The exclusion of the channel sensors is supported by Reference 8 which indicates that the sensors' response times are a small fraction of the total response time. Even if the sensors experienced response time degradation, they would be expected to respond in the microsecond to millisecond range until complete failure.ISOLATIlN SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on) a 24 month ST-AGGERED72 TEST BASIS. Thfir, Freqec scnitn With the typical industr,'

refueling cycle and isbad upnpln operating opo.enc that shows that random falre-f inqtru MentatiGn componentEs causin erosesponse time degradation, but no~t channel failure r ifequet occurrences,. The 21 month Frequency, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, is also based on a review of the suroillanco test hiStory and Reference 9 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.Insert 2 2. FSAR, Chapter 15.3. FSAR, Paragraph 4.2.3.4.2.
4. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.5. NEDC-30851 P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.6. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T5.0-1.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-160 REVISION 46 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES REFERENCES

8. NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected (continued)

Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994.9. NRC Safety Evaluation Repet for Amendment 174.10. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 176, Quartely Surveillance ExteRsion. HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-161 REVISION 3 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered REQUIREMENTS and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability (continued) analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the SCIVs will isolate the associated penetration flow paths and that the SGT System will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.6.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The FrequencGyi based OR operatingq experience that demons)Rtrates, chaR~qel ,!ris~e r. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more freque checks of channel status during normal operational use of the disp ys associated with channels required by the LCO.Inser 2 S R 3.3.6.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day On an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS Frequencyis based on a reie, the -u,.eillaRne test histeFy, drift analysis of the associated tri p units, and Reference-9-. Insert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-169 REVISION 39 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.6.2.3 and SR 3.3.6.2.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS FrFequency of SR 3.3.6.2.3 is based On a review of the suR4eillane test history and Reference

9. The 24 month FrFequency of SR 3.3.6.2.4 is based on a review of the suR'eilance test histor;, drift analysi6 of the arGociated insrtr-menPta;tion, and Rof4omnee R Insert 2 SR 3.3.6.2.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed on SCIVs and the SGT System in LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3, respectively, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.This. S aRn be peTformed with the at power fo some of the Functions.

The 21 month FrFequency is based on a review of the Esurveillance test history ahd Reference REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.Insert 2 2. FSAR, Section 15.3. FSAR, Section 15.1.40.4. FSAR, Sections 15.1.39 and 15.1.41.5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-170 REVISION 3I Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

6. NEDC-30851 P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.J ..... A A 0. Ni-~. aaTet'; y3IU-) tOla lG (operETor
\mona m lnI('.SrNRC Safety Evauatinon.

Repo for AmondR8ot 176, QuateFly Surveillance E~xtenSion. HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-171 REVISION 39 LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) The Surveillances are also modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains LLS initiation capability. LLS initiationcapability is maintained provided three LLS valves are maintaining initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 3) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the LLS valves will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.6.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK Ge eve-Fy12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on another channel. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.Tho FroequoncY is basod upon operating expFerienc thet dem~strates channe! fai,-re is Far...The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more fre uent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the dis lays associated with channels required by the LCO. p m oeac r S362S363adR 3.SR 3.3.6.3.2, SR 3.3.6.3.3, and SR 3.3.6.3.4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-177 REVISION 3 LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.3.2, SR 3.3.6.3.3. and SR 3.3.6.3.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The -92 day on an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS FrFequency i based on a review of the survefillancc test history, drift analysis of the aSSOciated trip units (if applicablc), and Insert 2 of the S/RV tailpipe pressure switch instrument channels are located inside the primary containment. The Note for SR 3.3.6.3.3,"Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 during each scheduled outage > 72 hours when entry is made into primary Containment," is based on the location of these instruments, ALARA considerations, and compatibility with the Completion Time of the associated Required Action (Required Action B.1).For this Note, a scheduled outage is a refueling outage or an outage for which at least a 72 hour period exists between discovery of an off-normal condition and a corresponding change in power level.Outage duration is measured from the time the generator is removed from the grid to the time the generator is tied to the grid, i.e.,"breaker-to-breaker." SR 3.3.6.3.5 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 24 month FrFequenc is b1e on9 a review of the sur.'eillanco_, tes~t histor,', drift analysis of the a6sociatod instrumentto (i"ppiable),.... ........ .""' "'--.. Insert 2 SR 3.3.6.3.6 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specified channel.The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.4.3, "Safety/Relief Valves(S/RVs) and LCO 3.6.1.8, "Low-Low Set (LLS) Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)," for S/RVs overlaps this test to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-178 3 LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.3.6 (continued) The Fr.equencY Of Goce every 24 for SR 3.3.6.3.6 is based on the need to Pe-f,-,- thi. Suweillane under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potontial for an unplanned transient if the Surwefillancc wore pertoFrmed With the reactor at power.Th 24. moen-th FrFequency as based OR a review of the suirveillancc test hiStorY and- Refe~ren-e 5._ ..... .. .... oIn s r 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.4.4.2. FSAR, Section 5.5.17.3. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Repo-t for Amendment 17-4.6. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 176, Quarterly Survleillance Extension.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-17938 MCREC System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the REQUIREMENTS applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note (continued) is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the MCREC System will initiate when necessary. SR 3.3.7.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The Fr.equency is based upon operat!ng experience that demcnGtr~tes channe! fa!!'-re is Far. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more fre ent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the dis t~ys associated with channels required by the LCO.,['Inser 2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The FrFequency Of 31 days is based on operating exeiec 4wt regard to channel OPERABILITY and-4 drift, ,,,hi-ch d.emo...nstrates that failure of mnere than one channel in any 31 day inteR'al is a rare- eveAt Insert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-184 MCREC System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.7.1.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day On an ALTERNATE TEST BASIS FrogueRcy it based on a re-'-w of the test histery' ad Referepnre Q Insert 2 SR 3.3.7.1.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System," overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.This Sup,1RGelnc can be performned with the reactor at power. The 24 monGth FrFequency is based on a review of the surefoillance test history and Reference-8. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.3.5 2. FSAR, Chapter 6.3. FSAR, Section 6.4.1.2.2.
4. FSAR, Chapter 15.5. FSAR, Table 15.1-28.6. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.8. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendmnent 174.9. NRC Safety Evaluation Sure'ellance Extension.

Reet fr Amendmenet 176 , Qua~terl!J HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-185 REVISION 38 LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) Since the intended function is to alert personnel to a lowering voltage condition and the voltage reading is available for each bus on the control room front panels, the Required Action is verification of the voltage to be above the annunciator setpoint (nominal) hourly.C.1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the associated Function does not maintain initiation capability for the associated emergency bus. Therefore, the associated DG(s) is declared inoperable immediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, which provide appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s).SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains initiation capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3).Functions 1 and 2 maintain initiation capability provided that, for 2 of the 3 emergency buses, the following can be initiated by the Function: DG start, disconnect from the offsite power source, DG output breaker closure, load shed, and activation of the ECCS pump power permissive. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.SR 3.3.8.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK oncc ovFry 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation or a failure of annunciation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is defined for Function 3 to be a comparison of the annunciator status to the bus voltage and an annunciator test confirming the annunciator is capable of lighting and sounding. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure or an annunciator failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-191 REVISION 345 LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS SR 3.3.8.1.1 (continued) continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.The frequencY i based upon operating oxperience that dcmRonStrates channel failure iF .are. Thus, pe.formanco of tho CHANNIEIL CHECK enSur.es that undetected outright channel or failu lfimited to 12 hours. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, ch ks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associate ith channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.8.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The FrFequency of 31 days is based OR operatin exeiec With regard to channel OPERABILITY-anid drift, which doe~nnstrates that failure of mere than one channel of a given Functio in any 31 day S R 3.3.8.1.3 Isr2 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The Frnequency based upon the assumrlption of the magnitude of equlipment drift inthe setpeint analysis.SR 3.3.8.1.4' Insert 2 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific channel.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-192 RE\/ISION 35: LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1.4 (continued) REQUIRE MENTS The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety functions. The 24 moenth FrFequency i6 based on the need to perfoFrmti SuNWrvellne under the codtosthat apply during a plant outage and thc potential for an unplanned transicnt if the Survoillance worc perfored with the reactor at power. The 24 month froquonyi furtheF based OR a review of surveillance test his~tor;REFERENCES 1 .FSAR, Section 8.3.1. F Insert 2 2. FSAR, Section 5.2.3. FSAR, Section 6.3.4. FSAR, Chapter 15.5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-193 REVISION 50 RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.2.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS As noted in the Surveillance, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is only required to be performed while the plant is in a condition in which the loss of the RPS bus will not jeopardize steady state power operation (the design of the system is such that the power source must be removed from service to conduct the Surveillance). The 24 hours is intended to indicate an outage of sufficient duration to allow for scheduling and proper performance of the Surveillan i The 184 day Fr=equency and the Note in the Surveillance are based on guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-09 (Ref. 2).SR 3.3.8.2.2 1Insert 2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 181 day F=requency

i. baed o.

4.SR 3.3.8.2.3 Insert 2 Performance of a system functional test demonstrates that, with a required system actuation (simulated or actual) signal, the logic of the system will automatically trip open the associated power monitoring assembly. Only one signal per power monitoring assembly is required to be tested. This Surveillance overlaps with the CHANNEL CALIBRATION to provide complete testing of the safety function. The system functional test of the Class 1 E circuit breakers is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function. If the breakers are incapable of operating, the associated electric power monitoring assembly would be inoperable. The 184 day FrFequcncy is based On Reference 4-.Insert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-199 REVISION 35 RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.4.B.
2. NRC Generic Letter 91-09, "Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electrical Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor Protection System." 3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NRC Safoty Evaluation Report for Amendment 171.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-200 REVISION 3 Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.1.1 This SR ensures the recirculation loops are within the allowable limits for mismatch. At low core flow (i.e., < 70% of rated core flow), the MCPR requirements provide larger margins to the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit such that the potential adverse effect of early boiling transition during a LOCA is reduced. A larger flow mismatch can therefore be allowed when core flow is < 70% of rated core flow.The recirculation loop jet pump flow, as used in this Surveillance, is the summation of the flows from all of the jet pumps associated with a single recirculation loop.The mismatch is measured in terms of percent of rated core flow. If the flow mismatch exceeds the specified limits, the loop with the lower flow is considered not in operation. The SR is not required when both loops are not in operation since the mismatch limits are meaningless during single loop or natural circulation operation. The Surveillance must be performed within 24 hours after both loops are in operation. The 21 hour FrequencGY is consistont With tho Surveillance FroequencY WAJetuLUII p;rrpv-DiLi i -T-vori~i~aicOi aifl Has~ DUet] sflUwf operating nl perionce to be adequate to detect nof n omal jet p Ioop flows in a timely manner SR 3.4.1.2 Insert2 (Not used.)wn]REFERENCES

1. NEDC-32720P, "E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," March 1997.2. FSAR, Section 5.5.1.4.3. NEDO-24205, "E. I. Hatch Nuclear" Plant Units 1 and 2 Single-Loop Operation," August 1979.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-5 REVISION 43 Jet Pumps B 3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The deviations from normal are considered indicative of a potential problem in the recirculation drive flow or jet pump system (Ref. 2).Normal flow ranges and established jet pump flow and differential pressure patterns are established by plotting historical data as discussed in Reference 2.The 24 hour Frequency ha bccn by opcrating to be timely for detecting jet PUMP degradation Rad iF consistent With the4 SuR4eilance FrFequency for recircu1lation loop OPERABILITY Insert 2 his SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows this Surveillance not to be performed until 4 hours after the associated recirculation loop is in operation, since these checks can only be performed during jet pump operation. The 4 hours is an acceptable time to establish conditions appropriate for data collection and evaluation. Note 2 allows this SR not to be performed when THERMAL POWER is < 25% of RTP and not until 24 hours after exceeding 25% RTP.During low flow conditions, jet pump noise approaches the threshold response of the associated flow instrumentation and precludes the collection of repeatable and meaningful data. The 24 hours is an acceptable time to establish conditions appropriate to perform this SR.REFERENCES

1. NEDC-31376P, "E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," December 1986.2. GE Service Information Letter No. 330, "Jet Pump Beam Cracks," June 9, 1990.3. NUREG/CR-3052, "Closeout of IE Bulletin 80-07: BWR Jet Pump Assembly Failure," November 1984.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-9 REVISION GO RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE; however, the total LEAKAGE would remain unchanged.

The total LEAKAGE must be averaged over the previous 24 hours for comparison to the limit.B.1 An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time.The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase before the reactor must be shut down without unduly jeopardizing plant safety.C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.4.1 REQUIREMENTS The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates; however, any method may be used to quantify LEAKAGE within the guidelines of Reference

7. In conjunction with alarms and other administrative (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-16 REVISION -0 RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.4.1 (continued) contFrol, a 12 hour FroquoncY for this !,:iato fr, Insertl2re--o-h-i portion of the total LEAKAGE is usually determined by L] Jthe drywell equipment drain sump monitoring system which collects expected leakage, not indicative of a degraded RCS boundary. The system equipment and operation is identical to that of the drywell floor drain monitoring system described in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." If a contributor to the unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.2.2. 10 CFR 50.55a(c).
3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.4. GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.5. NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors," October 1975.6. FSAR, Section 5.2.7.5.2.
7. Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.8. GenReic L~etter 88 01, SupplemRnot 1, "NRC Position On IGSCC 9. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993. Not used HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-17 DREVISION l -0ll RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.5 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

With all required monitors inoperable, no required automatic means of monitoring LEAKAGE are available, and immediate plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 is required.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the other required instrumentation (either the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system or the primary containment atmospheric monitoring channel, as applicable) is OPERABLE. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. The Note is based upon a NRC Safety Evaluation Report (Ref. 6) which concluded that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability of detecting an unidentified LEAKAGE when necessary. SR 3.4.5.1 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK of the required primary containment atmospheric monitoring system. The check gives reasonable confidence that the channel is operating properly.The FrequonRy Of 12 is based OR intrumornt reliability anRd rao-nabhle for dor-totinn off nUrmal conns.Insert 2 SR 3.4.5.2 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the required RCS leakage detection instrumentation. The test ensures that the monitors can perform their function in the desired manner. The test also verifies the alarm setpoint and relative accuracy of the instrument string. The Fr-equencY of 31 days considors instrument reliability, and operating 8expeience haS shoWn i ,( dInsert 2)(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-22 REVISION 2-2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.4.5.3 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside containment. The 21 month FrequencY 'is REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30.2. FSAR, Section 5.2.7.2.1.
3. GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.4. NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors," October 1975.5. FSAR, Section 5.2.7.5.2.
6. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 125, April 30, 1993.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.8. NRC Safety E ,valuatio Roeort A^m ,ndmnt 171.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-23 REVISION 35 RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.6 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit, and the ability to restore transient specific activity excursions while the plant remains at, or proceeds to power operation.

B.1, B.2.1, B.2.2.1, and B.2.2.2 If the DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 cannot be restored to < 0.2 ýiCi/gm within 48 hours, or if at any time it is > 4.0 VtCi/gm, it must be determined at least once every 4 hours and all the main steam lines must be isolated within 12 hours. Isolating the main steam lines precludes the possibility of releasing radioactive material to the environment in an amount that is not well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100 during a postulated MSLB accident. Alternatively, the plant can be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. This option is provided for those instances when isolation of main steam lines is not desired (e.g., due to the decay heat loads).In MODE 4, the requirements of the LCO are no longer applicable. The Completion Time of once every 4 hours is the time needed to take and analyze a sample. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to isolate the main steam lines in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.Also, the allowed Completion Times for Required Actions B.2.2.1 and B.2.2.2 for placing the unit in MODES 3 and 4 are reasonable, based on operating experience, to achieve the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance is performed to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation. The 7 day Fr jequate tW tred changes in the iodine actiVi'le. Insert 2 This SR is modified by a Note that requires this Surveillance to be performed only in MODE 1 because the level of fission products generated in other MODES is much less.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-26 REVISIONH5 RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Hot Shutdown B 3.4.7 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued) However, due to the potentially reduced reliability of the alternate methods of decay heat removal, it is also required to reduce the reactor coolant temperature to the point where MODE 4 is entered.B.1, B.2, and B.3 With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem and no recirculation pump in operation, except as permitted by LCO Note 1, reactor coolant circulation by the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump must be restored without delay.Until RHR or recirculation pump operation is re-established, an alternate method of reactor coolant circulation must be placed into service. This will provide the necessary circulation for monitoring coolant temperature. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the coolant circulation function and is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. Furthermore, verification of the functioning of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 12 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued temperature monitoring capability. During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant.The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. Tho FrequeRGy .4 12 ho'-r is sufficient in view of theFr visual and audible indications available to the opcrator for monGitoring the RHR subsystem in the (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-32 REVIS:\IONI "l~ RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Cold Shutdown B 3.4.8 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) function and is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. Furthermore, verification of the functioning of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 12 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued temperature monitoring capability. During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant.The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frc-uu"Y-of 12 hou-rS is sufficicnt in viow of othor visual and audible indications available to the eoprator f9or montorg the RHR *ubsytem inthe I'nsert 2 REFERENCES

1. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-38 REVISION 1 RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) be completed before approaching criticality or heating up to > 212 0 F.Several methods may be used, including comparison with pre-analyzed transients, new analyses, or inspection of the components.

ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), may be used to support the evaluation; however, its use is restricted to evaluation of the beltline.Condition C is modified by a Note requiring Required Action C.2 be completed whenever the Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits.Restoration alone per Required Action C.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.9.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that operation is within limits is required every 30 minutes when RCS pressure and temperature conditions are undergoing planned changes. This Froquoncy !s considorod reasonablo in vi-W.AV Of the control roomF indicationR available to monRitor RCS status. Also, since tomperaturo changc limitr, aro spocificd in ho)urly inrGements, 30 mninutes pormnits a roasonablo time for assessment and correctfion Insert 2 -Surveillance for heatup, cooldown, or inservice leakage and hydrostatic testing may be discontinued when the criteria given in the relevant plant procedure for ending the activity are satisfied. Verification of Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2 is required during non-nuclear heatups and cooldowns, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. Verification of the < 100OF change in any 1 hour period is required during any heatup or cooldown.SR 3.4.9.2 A separate figure is used when the reactor is critical. Consequently, the RCS pressure and temperature must be verified within the appropriate limits before withdrawing control rods that will make the reactor critical.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-44 REVISION1 28 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure B 3.4.10 BASES APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the limit is not applicable because the reactor is shut down. In these MODES, the reactor pressure is well below the required limit, and no anticipated events will challenge the overpressure limits.ACTIONS A._1 With the reactor steam dome pressure greater than the limit, prompt action should be taken to reduce pressure to below the limit and return the reactor to operation within the bounds of the analyses. The 15 minute Completion Time is reasonable considering the importance of maintaining the pressure within limits. This Completion Time also ensures that the probability of an accident occurring while pressure is greater than the limit is minimized. B.1 If the reactor steam dome pressure cannot be restored to within the limit within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that reactor steam dome pressure is < 1058 psig ensures that the initial conditions of the vessel overpressure protection analysis is met. Operating .xporionc. ha. thch9 12 hour.FrFequency to be su1fficient for identifying trends and vorifying operation within safety analyses assumptions. Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Supplement 5A.2. FSAR, Section 15.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-50 REVISION 2-9 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.1 REQUIREMENTS The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI System, CS System, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. In addition, when HPCI is aligned to the suppression pool (instead of the CST), one acceptable method is to monitor pump suction pressure. The 31 day Frequency i s based on the gradual nature of void buildup in the ECGS pipfing, the procedur~al controls governing system operation, and operating exper en~ee Insert 2 SR 3.5.1.2 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.For the HPCI System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.The 31 day Fr.equency of this SR ...as derived from the In;ser'-ce Testing Programn requiremfents for performing valve testing at least once ever,' 92 days. The FrFequency of 31 days ir, further justified because the valves are operated under procedural control and because improeper: valve position would only affect a single subsystem. This Frequiency has been shown to be acceptal through opertating experience. Isr This SR is modified by a Note that allows LPCI subsystems to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the RHR low pressure permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-8 RF=/lVISIlkl ... .... ...v ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS manually realigned (remote or local) to the ILPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. This allows operation in the RHR shutdown cooling mode during MODE 3, if necessary. SR 3.5.1.3 Verification every 31 days that ADS air supply header pressure is-> 90 psig ensures adequate air pressure for reliable ADS operation. The accumulator on each ADS valve provides pneumatic pressure for valve actuation. The design pneumatic supply pressure requirements for the accumulator are such that, following a failure of the pneumatic supply to the accumulator, at least two valve actuations can occur with the drywell at 70% of design pressure (Ref. 12). The ECCS safety analysis assumes only one actuation to achieve the depressurization required for operation of the low pressure ECCS.This minimum required pressure of > 90 psig for one actuation is provided by the ADS instrument air supply. The 31 day y taker, into conRsiderationA addministratiVe conrols6 oorF oporation Of the air system and alarms for low air proesuro.SR 3.5.1.4" Insert 2 Verification evey,31-,4days that the RHR System cross tie valve is closed and power to its operator is disconnected ensures that each LPCI subsystem remains independent and a failure of the flow path in one subsystem will not affect the flow path of the other LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of removing power to the operator include de-energizing breaker control power or racking out or removing the breaker. If the RHR System cross tie valve is open or power has not been removed from the valve operator, both LPCI subsystems must be considered inoperable. The 31 day has been foeud acceptable, ,considerng that these valves are under strict administratiVe' centro-l that will ensure the valVes continue to rmiclosed with either control or motive power, removed.SR 3.5.1.5 (Not used.) s (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-9 REVISION ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.6 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Cycling the recirculation pump discharge valves through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will close when required. Upon initiation of an automatic LPCI subsystem injection signal, these valves are required to be closed to ensure full LPCI subsystem flow injection in the reactor via the recirculation jet pumps. De-energizing the valve in the closed position will also ensure the proper flow path for the LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of de-energizing the valve include de-energizing breaker control power, racking out the breake~r or removing the breaker., Insert 2-The .....ie : =F,,,4 a ..... ... ., Howeve r, this SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, when in MODE 4 > 48 hours. Verification during or following MODE 4> 48 hours and prior to entering MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4 is an exception to the normal Inservice Testing Program generic valve cycling Frequency ef-92-days, but is considered acceptable due to the demonstrated reliability of these valves. The 48 hours is intended to indicate an outage of sufficient duration to allow for scheduling and proper performance of the Surveillance. If the valve is inoperable and in the open position, the associated LPCI subsystem must be declared inoperable. SR 3.5.1.7, SR 3.5.1.8, and SR 3.5.1.9 The performance requirements of the low pressure ECCS pumps are determined through application of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix K criteria (Ref. 8). This periodic Surveillance is performed (in accordance with the ASME Code, Section XI, requirements for the ECCS pumps) to verify that the ECCS pumps will develop the flow rates required by the respective analyses. The low pressure ECCS pump flow rates ensure that adequate core cooling is provided to satisfy the acceptance criteria of Reference

10. The pump flow rates are verified against a system head equivalent to the RPV pressure expected during a LOCA. The total system pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure present during a LOCA. These Values may be established during preoperational testing.The flow tests for the HPCI System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow is (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-10 REVISION 5 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.7. SR 3.5.1.8, and SR 3.5.1.9 (continued) REQUIREMENTS tested at both the higher and lower operating ranges of the system. The pump flow rates are verified against a system head corresponding to the RPV pressure. The total system pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure.Additionally, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the HPCI System diverts steam flow.The reactor steam pressure must be > 920 psig to perform SR 3.5.1.8 and > 150 psig to perform SR 3.5.1.9. Adequate steam flow for SR 3.5.1.8 is represented by at least two turbine bypass valves open, or 2! 200 MWE from the main turbine-generator; and for SR 3.5.1.9 adequate steam flow is represented by at least 1.25 turbine bypass valves open, or total steam flow 1 E6 lb/hour. Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure and flow are achieved to perform these tests. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveillance test because the reactor pressure is low and the time allowed to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance test is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure test has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that HPCI is inoperable. Therefore, SR 3.5.1.8 and SR 3.5.1.9 are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours after the reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. The 12 hours allowed is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR.The Frequency for SR 3.5.1.7. and SR 3.58 is consistent with the Inservice Testing Program pump testing requirements. The 24 moRth -Fr.quencY for SR 3.5.1.9 is based on. the need to the Su'....lan... undc" the conditions that apply just porie to or duFrig a startup from a plant eutago. Tho 24 month FroequencY Of SR 3.5.1.9 is basod onar- e of the.ur.eillance test history and RferenGo 18. "The Frequencies for SR 3.5.1.8 and SR 3.5.1.9 are based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk, and are controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Proqram.SR 3.5.1.10 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-18 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.1.10 (continued) throughout its emergency operating sequence, automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This SR also ensures that the HPCI System will automatically restart on an RPV low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTperformed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function..-~---~..-'--~-t.,-.~-...- Surve..illance under the conditions that apply a plant outage for aRn uprlaRRed tFaRnSiRt if the Suwheillarn-wer;porformcd with the reactorF at power. The 24 month FrFequec Is.ba e na review: of the suw-oi!!anco test histo l/an 2 -eTferen e 18, This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance. SR 3.5.1.11 The ADS designated S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to demonstrate that the mechanical portions of the ADS function (i.e., solenoids) operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated initiation signal, causing proper actuation of all the required components. SR 3.5.1.12 and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.Tho 21 month Freoiic~nr~'i hn~ed on thc~ ncc~d to norform tho Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an un~planned transient if the Surveillane were performed-w.ith the reactor at power. The 24 mon~th Fre~quency is This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents an RPV pressure blowdown.(continued)(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-12 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.5.1.12 The pneumatic actuator of each ADS valve is stroked to verify that the pilot disc rod lifts when the actuator strokes. Pilot rod lift is determined by measurement of rod travel. The total amount of lift of the pilot rod from the valve closed position to the open position shall meet criteria established by the S/RV supplier. SRs 3.5.1.11 and 3.3.5.1.5 overlap this SR to provide testing of the S/RV relief mode function. Additional functional testing is performed by tests required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 17).The 24 month Frequency is based on histepy and Insert 2 SR 3.5.1.13 a review of the surVeillaRnce test This SR ensures that the ECCS RESPONSE TIMES are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.Response time testing acceptance criteria are included in Reference

14. A Note to the Surveillance states that the instrumentation portion of the response time may be assumed from established limits. The exclusion of the instrumentation from the response time surveillance is supported by Reference 15, which concludes that instrumentation will continue to respond in the microsecond to millisecond range prior to complete failure.The 24 month Fr.equencY is based on the Reed to perform the Sur.eillance un.deFr the. condit-ios that apply during a plarnt outage and tho potential for an unplnIned traSient if the SuFVeillance we performed-wi.th the reactor at power. The :21 month FrFequecyi based on a review of the 5uvilnetest histery and Reference IInsert 2 REFERENCES
1. FSAR, Paragraph,6.3.2.2.3.
2. FSAR, Paragraph 6.3.2.2.4.
3. FSAR, Paragraph 6.3.2.2.1.
4. FSAR, Paragraph 6.3.2.2.2.
5. FSAR, Subsection 15.1.39.6. FSAR, Subsection 15.1.40.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-13 REVISION 35 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES REFERENCES

7. FSAR, Subsection 15.1.33.(continued)
8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.9. FSAR, Subsection 6.3.3.10. NEDC-31376P, "E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 SAFERIGESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Analysis," December 1986.11. 10 CFR 50.46.12. Memorandum from R. L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC),"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.13. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.14. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T5.0-1.15. NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994.16. NEDC-32041 P, "Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief Valve Performance Requirements," April 1996.17. ASME, OM Code -1995, "Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants," Appendix I.18. NRC Safety Eivaluation Ropeot for Amc~dndent 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-14 ECCS -Shutdown B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued) controls to assure isolation capability.

The administrative controls can consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.). OPERABILITY may be verified by an administrative check, or by examining logs or other information, to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 REQUIREMENTS The minimum water level of 146 inches required for the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the CS System and LPCI subsystem pumps, recirculation volume, and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit, all ECCS injection/spray subsystems are inoperable unless they are aligned to an OPERABLE CST.When suppression pool level is < 146 inches, the CS System is considered OPERABLE only if it can take suction from the CST, and the CST water level is sufficient to provide the required NPSH for the CS pump. Therefore, a verification that either the suppression pool water level is _ 146 inches or that CS is aligned to take suction from the CST and the CST contains > 150,000 gallons of water, equivalent to 15 ft, ensures that the CS System can supply at least 50,000 gallons of makeup water to the RPV. The CS suction is uncovered at the 100,000 gallon level. However, as noted, only one required CS subsystem may take credit for the CST option during OPDRVs. During OPDRVs, the volume in the CST may not provide adequate makeup if the RPV were completely drained. Therefore, only one CS subsystem is allowed to use the CST. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.The 12 hour .Fr.quncY Of theo SRc was doveloped considering operating vprince rlelated to suppereion po o watoFr leel aRd GRST (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-18 REVISION!! ECCS -Shutdown B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS water level variations6 and instrumenRt drift during the applicable MODES. F~urthermoreF , the 12 hour FrFequoncy i- considered adequate in view of othor indications available in the control room, incl'udfing alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormnal suppression pool orF CST water level conditionR. Insert 2 SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6 The Bases provided for SR 3.5.1.1, SR 3.5.1.7, and SR 3.5.1.10 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6, respectively. However, the LPCI flow rate requirement for SR 3.5.2.5 is based on a single pump, not the two pump flow rate requirement of SR 3.5.1.7.SR 3.5.2.4 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The 31 day Fr.equencis.apprp rate because the valves are.operted nde proedual cntrl and the probability of their being In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System may operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that allows one LPCI subsystem of the RHR System to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the RPV, and the system is not otherwise inoperable. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent RPV draindown should occur.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-19 REVISIGNI I RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.1 REQUIREMENTS The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge line of the RCIC System full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the Reactor Coolant System upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring the line is full when aligned to the CST is to vent at the high points and, when aligned to the suppression pool, by monitoring pump suction pressure. T-he 31 day FrFequcncy is based On the gradual nature of void buildup i the RCIC piPing, the procedural controlG goerning systemr .peration, and operating experiene SR 3.5.3.2 Insert 2 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RCIC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for RCIC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.For the RCIC System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.The 31 FrFeGuency-of this SR was, derived from the Insr"!co Testing Program requirom.en. t;for peform'ing valve tcsting at least GRwte every t1. uayt.. 4nuIFe~eG OTgunu 64 Uiyt. it. +uRuu jwutmeui because the valves are operated under procedural control an because improper valve position would affect onRly the RCIC System.This FrFequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating e-x- .Insert 2 SR 3.5.3.3 and SR 3.5.3.4 The RCIC pump flow rates ensure that the system can maintain reactor coolant inventory during pressurized conditions with the RPV (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-25 REVISION RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.3 and SR 3.5.3.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS isolated. The required flow rate (400 gpm) is the pump design flow rate. Analysis has demonstrated that RCIC can fulfill its design function at a system flow rate of 360 gpm (Ref. 4). The pump flow rates are verified against a system head equivalent to the RPV pressure. The total system pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure.The flow tests for the RCIC System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow is tested both at the higher and lower operating ranges of the system.Additionally, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the RCIC System diverts steam flow. Reactor steam pressure must be > 920 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.3 and > 150 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.4. Adequate steam flow is represented by at least one turbine bypass valve open, or for SR 3.5.3.3 > 200 MWE from the main turbine-generator and for SR 3.5.3.4 total steam flow> 1 E6 lb/hour. Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure and flow are achieved to perform these SRs. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveillance because the reactor pressure is low and the time allowed to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure Surveillance has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that RCIC is inoperable. Therefore, these SRs are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours after the reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.The 12 hours allowed is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR. A 92 day FrFequncGy for SR 3.5.3.3 is cROnSitcnt With the IncerV!ce Testing Program requirements. The 24 month FrFequencY for SR 2.53. is4 based on the need to peFferm the Su'veillance under conditions that apply just pioFr to or during a startup from a plart outage. The 24 monGth Fre~quency Of SR 3.5.3.4 is basod on a Fev'iew of the s'-',we!nllRO test histery aid Refeergne

6. ,.S R 3.5.3.5 The RCIC System is required to actuate automatically in order to verify its design function satisfactorily.

This Surveillance verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of the RCIC System will cause the system to operate as designed, including actuation of the system throughout its (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-26 RF=V\/I RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS emergency operating sequence; that is, automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This test also ensures the RCIC System will automatically restart on an RPV low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.The 24 monGth Fprquerny is based on the need to erform tho Surveillance undor the conditions that apply duFrin a plant outage and the potential for an rnplanRned f the were performo6d-with the r-eactor at power. The 24 month =FrequencYi. IeThis SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 33.2. FSAR, Section 5.5.6.3. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC),"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.4. GE Report AES-41-0688, "Safety Evaluation for Relaxation of RCIC Performance Requirements for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2," July 1988.5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.6. NRC Safety Report for Amendment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-27 REVWSROQN5 Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.1.1.2 Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage tost is every 24 months. The 21 month Frequency was developed considoring it is prudcnt that this Sunveillance be porfo~rmod duringR a unit outage and also in view of tho fact ta component failures that might have a#fcted this test aFr idctified by othor prim.aY cOntai-.nmt SRs. The 24 month F=Froqunc.Y is based on a .revi of the s...ei.a.e test history and Refcecc 9.Tw censecUt*' ivc test failur-es, however, would indicate unexpected primnary containmenRt degradation; in this evont, aS the Note indicatos, inceaing the Frequoncy to oncc ovary 9 months is requirod until the REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.2. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.6. Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," September 1995.7. NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," Revision 0, July 26, 1995.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-4 REIS)\IIONI"l~ Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES REFERENCES

8. ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994, "American National Standard for (continued)

Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements," 1994.9. NRC Safety Evaluation Ropo)F for Amcndment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-5 REVISION 35 Primary Containment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.6.1.2.2 The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the pur.ely mechanica nature ef this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challongod whon the primar-' containmont air lock door) is opened, this test Gis ony equired to be peoformed uipon entering or exiting the ,riar; containment air lock, but is Rot rFeqi...d mo... fequently than 184 days when prima-y containm-ent Is do inerted. The 184 day Frequ ecIs ba"ed on .ngineerig. g judgmeRnt and is considered '-Aan +at in ; %Ai,. ^f 0- k Ar i-,rlnhn 4 i-4~ +~n I e, ik ; A inrr +'d;n Of i;nterlFk mnchanism stat-11111 1-rd vv buri r" b man do 11 x7ca wrin us, available to oporationS personnel Insert 2-'REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 3.8.2.8.2.2.
2. FSAR, Section 6.2.3. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-12 R-\/ISION "7-PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS stating that the SR is not required to be met when the 18 inch purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The 18 inch purge valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA.Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. Tho 31 day Froquony is .on.. sis.. ten. t ÷ ,ith o-thor PCI\rc uie ents diScussed in SR 3.6.1.3.2. I s r2 S R 3.6.1.3.2I This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verificationthat those isolation devices outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. Sinco verification of' valve position for isolation devicos outsidc primary containm~ent ir, relativoly easy, the 31 day FrFequency waS chosen to provide added assur~anco that the isolation devices are in the correct positions. Insert 2 Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons.Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.SR 3.6.1.3.3 This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and is (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-22 RE\VISIONM PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or.gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For these isolation devices inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as "Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these isolation devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA and personnel safety reasons.Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low.A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.SR 3.6.1.3.4 The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Actuation and monitoring circuitry is provided in the main control room. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. The circuitry is such that a light illuminates upon loss of explosive charge continuity. Ensuring that the light illuminates when voltage is applied and that it is extinguished when installed in the circuit provides assurance of explosive valve continuity. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. Tho 31 day Frequ-oncy is barsd on operating experience that has dcmon~stratcd the reliability of the explocivo charge continut Insert 2 SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-23 REVISION 35 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.6. The isolation time test ensures that each valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that listed in the FSAR and that no degradation affecting valve closure since the performance of the last surveillance has occurred. (EFCVs are not required to be tested because they have no specified time limit). The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY, The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within 10 CFR 100 limits. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.SR 3.6.1.3.7 Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.6 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.The 24 mFnth F=requency was developed conSidering it is prudont that this Surweillance be porformed only during a unit outage since-i solation of penotrations would elMimiate cooling water flow and disru..pt the nmal operatio. of many critical compone.nt. .The 21 month FrFequencY is; basjed An 'a review of the sur.'oillancc test history and Reference

9. *..SR 3.6.1.3.8 Insert 2 This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) (of a representative sample) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve reduces flow to within limits on an actual or simulated instrument line break condition. (The representative sample consists of an approximately equal number of EFCVs, such that each EFCV is tested at least once every 10 years (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-24 REVISION 3-5 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.3.8 (continued) [nominal]. In addition, the EFCVs in the sample are representative of the various plant configurations, models, sizes, and operating environments. This ensures that any potentially common problem with a specific type of application of EFCV is detected at the earliest possible time.) This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform as designed. The 24 mo.nth Fr.equency is based On the need to porform. this Suv...illanc under the cnrditions that apply during a plant outage and the potntial for an unplannedI transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.The 24 month F=equerny is based on a review of the suneillaRnce test histo",' aRd Reference

9. (The 10 year inteval is based On porforManco testing as discussed in NEDO 32977 A, "Excess Flew Check Valve Testing Relaxation" (Ref. 8). FurthermoeF, any =FCGV failures will be evaluated to determine if additional testing in that test inRteral is to enGsFe overa reliability is maintained Operatingeprec has demonGstrated that these components are highly reliable anAd- th-at failures to isolate are ver,' infrequent.

TherefoFr, tIng -of a representative sample was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.) Any V that fails to flow during its surveillance test will be documented ir the Hatch corr~ective action) Droaram as a suvilnetest f-ailure. The- failu--rep will be evaluated and corrected and, if the valve is repaired and net replaced, it will be added to the next cycle's survilne\ Insert 2 SR 3.6.1.3.9 The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Fr.equency of 21 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the adiisrtvecnrols On replacement charges and the frequent checks of circu1it continuifty (SR 36131.The 24 month FrFequency is based en a review of the surveillance test hister,' and Reference 9-.(cInsert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-25 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.6.1.3.13 This SR provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the cu'oillanse test histot' and Roferenco 9.IInsert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 15.2. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T7.0-1.3. FSAR, Subsection 15.1.39.4. FSAR, Section 6.2.5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.6. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.7. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.8. NED- 32977 A, "EXcess Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxaio.9. NRC Safety EValulation Report for Amcndmont 17-4.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-27 REVISION 465 Drywell Pressure B 3.6.1.4 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1 With drywell pressure not within the limit of the LCO, drywell pressure must be restored within 1 hour. The Required Action is necessary to return operation to within the bounds of the primary containment analysis. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.B.1 and B.2 If drywell pressure cannot be restored to within limit within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.a SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.4.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that drywell pressure is within limit ensures that unit operation remains within the limit assumed in the primary containment analysis. The 12 hour Fr.equency of this SR was developed, based OR operatingexeiec related to trending of drywell pressure variations during the applicGable MODES. Furthermore, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of etheFr available in the conrol! room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal dpyw.ell pressGure condition Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-29 REVISION 1 Drywell Air Temperature B 3.6.1.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.5.1 (continued)

For the situation in which some or all of the normal temperature channels are inoperable, plant procedures contain instructions on how to determine the volumetric average to determine an accurate representation of the actual average temperature using the remaining OPERABLE instruments. Depending upon the location and number of inoperable temperature channels and the plant condition, a correction factor may have to be added to the volumetric average temperature calculated from the remaining OPERABLE temperature channels. The correction factor accounts for the inoperable channels and ensures a reasonable value for the average volumetric temperature is calculated. Thez 24 hour FroqueRy of the SR war, developed based Rn perfatinrg exeine related to drywell average air tomperature variations and tempertr inStFrument drift during the applicable MODES and the low probability o~f a DBA occurring between cuR'eillances. Fwuthe~rnere, the 24 hour Frequency Is considered adequate in view of other in dications available iR the control rooM, including alarms, to ale~t the epeater te aR anbROnall tdryAll air tavraemp eratu rn-nc-lit~nn I Inser 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.2. FSAR, Section 6.2.1.4.1.
3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-32 REVISION 53 LLS Valves B 3.6.1.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.6.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS mode function. Additional functional testing is performed by tests required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2). Theo,4 2month Freq.ency is based~~~~~~ env a re*-0 th swpeillam% tethseryadRf S R 3.6.1.6.2 {Insert 2 The LLS designated S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions (i.e., solenoids) of the LLS function operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.3.6 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.The 241 month Froequoncy is based On the need to pe0Fom ti 96urvo*ilanco under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned trcansient if the Surveillance wr performned-with the reactor at powerc. The 24 mon~th FrFequ1encyi insert SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuati'on. Thi~s prevents a reactor pressure vessel pressure blowdown.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.5.17.2. ASME, OM Code -1995, "Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants," Appendix I.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.4. NEDC-32041P, "Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief Valve Performance Requirements," April 1996.5.NRC Safety E~valuationR Report for Amendment 171.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-35 REVISION 35 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.7 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)

With one line with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the leak tight primary containment boundary is intact. The ability to mitigate an event that causes a containment depressurization is threatened, however, if both vacuum breakers in at least one vacuum breaker penetration are not OPERABLE. Therefore, the inoperable vacuum breaker must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. This is consistent with the Completion Time for Condition A and the fact that the leak tight primary containment boundary is being maintained. D.1 With two lines with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the primary containment boundary is intact. However, in the event of a containment depressurization, the function of the vacuum breakers is lost. Therefore, all vacuum breakers in one line must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.E.1 and E.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least-MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.7.1 REQUIREMENTS Each vacuum breaker is verified to be closed to ensure that a potential breach in the primary containment boundary is not present.This Surveillance is performed by observing local or control room indications of vacuum breaker position or by verifying a differential pressure of 0.5 psid is maintained between the reactor building and suppression chamber. The 14 day F.c.quen.yi. baed on ngino..ing 'judgment, is considored adequate inview of other (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-39 REIS: ::\ION 1 ' ~ Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.7.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS inRdications of vacuu.m bhreake-r istatus available to operations pcrSO~nnl, and has becn shoWn to be acceptable throu1gh o~perating t '~~ nser 2 Two Notes are added to this SR. The first Note allows reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers. The second Note is included to clarify that vacuum breakers, which are open due to an actual differential pressure, are not considered as failing this SR.S R 3.6.1.7.2 Each vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens properly to perform its design function and returns to its fully closed position.This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 92 day Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.SR 3.6.1.7.3 Demonstration of vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of < 0.5 psid is valid. The 24 month Fr.quency is based on the need to porform this Sur-villancoe Undr the conditions that apply duFrig a plant outage and the potontial for an urplan.-ed tr.ansent if the Su.eillaRe we.re performed with the reactor 'at po -r e ý21 month FrFequency is based 9R a review cf the sur-ei!lance test history and Reference 3.Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.1.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.3. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for AmenRdment 171.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-40 REVISION 3 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.8.1 (continued)

Vacuum Breaker Position Indication," as ACTIONS for inoperable closed position indicator channels. In this case the vacuum breaker is assumed open until otherwise proved to satisfy the leakage test, and this confirmation must be performed within the Technical Specification 3.6.1.8, Required Action B.1 Completion Time of 2 hours.The 4A-day F=F.U..cY i* based a -..ginaing judgn et.on 4i Orriuuereu adequate i-A Vinw Gi uriu.!enr irniu~orIP -nl iuuum ArT. ur status available to operatfionS personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating exprinc..Insert 2 A Note is added to this SR which allows suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers.SR 3.6.1.8.2 Each required (i.e., required to be OPERABLE for opening) vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens adequately to perform its design function and returns to the fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 34-day FrFequency of this SR was developed, based on InseR'wce Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once ever,'92 days. A 31 day F=requency wa. chosen to prvide additio.assurance that the vacu1um broakers aroQ OPERA.BLE, since they are located in a harsh enviFroment (the sp Reso chamber airspac ).In addition, this functional test is required within 12 hours after discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the sa Ify/relief valves.[Insert 2 SR 3.6.1.8.3 Verification of the vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of 0.5 psid is valid. The 24 month FrFequency is based en the need to perform this Sur- lac u nder the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transiont if the Surveillanoe were performed with the reacGtr at power. The 24 month Fr'eq6ueny is based on a review ,.a -ýOrlrty ct"tpcy On ft " I-V C2 H " 1-"""W .N Ut-t "r Uot " (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-45 R EV/ISIO 35 I.1" Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.8.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS becauco of other sup,4oilancos performcd at chortor =Frequoncios6 that convey the proper fwnctioning status of each vacuum bhea Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.1.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.3. Technical Requirements Manual.4. NRC Safety Evaluation Repot for Amendment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-46 REVISION 35 Suppression Pool Average Temperature B 3.6.2.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1.1 REQUIREMENTS The suppression pool average temperature (torus average bulk temperature) is regularly monitored to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The average temperature is determined by using a weighted average of functional suppression pool water temperature channels. The channels in the lower half of the suppression pool are averaged and the channels in the upper half of the suppression pool are averaged. The suppression pool average temperature is the average of the upper and lower average temperatures. For the situation in which some or all of either the upper half or the lower half temperature channels are inoperable, plant procedures contain instructions on how to determine the suppression pool average temperature using the remaining OPERABLE instruments. Depending upon the location and number of inoperable channels and the plant condition, a correction factor may have to be added to the average temperature calculated from the remaining OPERABLE temperature channels. The correction factor accounts for the inoperable channels and ensures a reasonable value for the average bulk temperature is calculated. The 24 heur has boon shwRn, based on operati'ng-expe. r e. , t be accGeptable. When heat is being to the suppression pool by teSting, however, it is necoss6ar; to moneitor su1ppreEsion pool temperature moree frogucntlyý. The 5 minute Frequency during testing is justified by the rates at Insert 2 heat up the suppression pool, has been shown to be acceptable 2 based on operating experience, and provides assurance that allowable pool temperatures are not exceeded. The further justified in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool average temperature condition. I Frequency is]REFERENCES

1. GE Report EAS-19-0388, "Elimination of the Suppression Pool Temperature Limit for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2," March 1988.2. NUREG-0783.
3. FSAR, Section 6.2.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-51 RE=V1SOh1 1-2 Suppression Pool Water Level B 3.6.2.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2 If suppression pool water level cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.2.2.1 Verification of the suppression pool water level is to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The 24 hour Fr.equency of this SR was.developed considcring operating excinc eatod to teRnding ariationsi Rsupreon *9Rpool wat; leVel water loVel drift durig h apicble MODES and to aSsessing the proximity to tho specified LCO level limits. Furthermore, the 24 h Frequenc. is c.niderod adequate in VicW of other indications available in the control roomn, inldn lrs oalert the operator to an abnormal SUPPreSSion pool wate-r leelconitin, , , .. Insert 2 J REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.1.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-54 REVISION I RHR Suppression Pool Cooling B 3.6.2.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

With two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable, one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. In this condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment pressure and temperature mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to remove heat from primary containment are available. C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR suppression pool cooling mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Of 31 days is justified boc;uor-,- the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve pesition would affect only a singl. subsystem, the probability of an "evet requiFrig initiation of the system i6 low, and the subsystem is a manually initiated system. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operatinfg"c'eInsert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-57 REVIS\IO 22-t ,I 0 RHR Suppression Pool Spray B 3.6.2.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.2.4.1 (continued) cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Froequcncy of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural contrel, improper valve po.itio..n MAoNUld enly a Single subsystecm, th prombability of an eVrst toqvrifng iitiation ef the system is low, and the subsystem is a manually nritiated system. This Fr.equency has bee rshqWn to be acceptable based On operating Insert 2 SRR 3.6.2.4.2 This Surveillance is performed every 10 years to verify that the spray nozzles are not obstructed and that flow will be provided when required. The 10 year FrFequency is adequate to detect degradation i performancc duo to the passive nozzle design and its nrGmally dr,'state and has been shown to be acceptable through operating REFERENCES 1 .FSAR, Section 6.2.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-62 REVISION 22 I Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration B 3.6.3.2 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.3.2.1 The primary containment (drywell and suppression chamber) must be determined to be inert by verifying that oxygen concentration is< 4.0 v/o. The 7 day Frc.q.eRcy is based Rn the slow Fate at which oxygen concorvntration can chango and On other indicationRo abnremal conditionS (which would lead to moroe frequent chocking by.o~perators in accordance with plant procedures). Also, this Frequiency REFERENCES

1. Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plants Units 1 and 2 Plant Hatch Individual Plant Examination (IPE), December 1992.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-66--VS.- 54 Drywell Cooling System Fans B 3.6.3.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

With two Drywell Cooling System fans inoperable, one fan must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two Drywell Cooling System fans to be inoperable because the hydrogen mixing function is maintained via natural circulation and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit.C.. 1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each required Drywell Cooling System fan for > 15 minutes ensures that each subsystem is OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action.Tho 92 day FroquoncY GOrnsistnt With the Programn Frcqucnciec, operating experience, the known reliability of Insert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B-3.6-70 REVISION 55 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES ACTIONS C.A, C.2, and C.3 (continued) inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches and one access door in each access opening are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the'desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. SR 3.6.4.1.1 also requires equipment hatches to be sealed. In this application, the term"sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed. An access opening contains one inner and one outer door. The intent is not to breach the secondary containment at any time when secondary containment is required. This is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. When the secondary containment configuration excludes Zone I and/or Zone II, these SRs also include verifying the hatches and doors separating the common refueling floor zone from the reactor building(s). The 31 day F..quc..Y for these SRs ha.bcen shoWn to be adequate, based on operatingeprine and is conideedadequatein view of the other iniainfdoor adhac status that aFe available to the operator.Insert 2 SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.3 verifies that the appropriate SGT System(s) will rapidly establish and maintain a negative pressure in the secondary containment. This is confirmed by demonstrating that the required SGT subsystem(s) will draw down the secondary containment to> 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in < 120 seconds (13 seconds of diesel generator startup and breaker closing time is included in the 120 second drawdown time). This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.4 demonstrates that the required SGT subsystem(s) can (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-76 REVISION 5 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS maintain > 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour at a flow rate< 4000 cfm for each SGT subsystem. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. Therefore, these two tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, each SGT subsystem or combination of subsystems will perform this test. The number of SGT subsystems and the required combinations are dependent on the configuration of the secondary containment and are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3). The Note to SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 specifies that the number of required SGT subsystems be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. The 24 month Frequency, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, of SR6 3.6.1.1.3 and 3.6.4.1.4 is also based On a rovicw of the sur.'oillanco tost hisGtory and Rofo~ronc 5.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.2. FSAR, Section 15.1.41.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8:0.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety E~valuation Report for Amcnedment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-77 REVISION 5-1 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1, and C.2 (continued) reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.D.1, D.2, and D.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action D.1 has beenmodified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those isolation devices in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.Snc these iotin cAron roadily acceneible to pesonl during nremal operation -And 9eiiato f thoir position is, rolativoly (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-82 REVISION 51 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.4.2.1 (continued) easy, the 31 day Frequoncy wa's chosen to provide added assurFanc Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open.SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic SCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The Fr.equency of this SR was developed based upon eRnginReeing judgmet and the similarFity to' PCI'Vs.Insert 2 SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verifying that each automatic SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.The 2, 4 menth Frequency is based on the need to pe-Fe this 8Sur~eillance under the conRditions; that apply durFing a plant ouitage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Survleillance were pe~feFmed with the reactor at power. The 21 mnonth FrFequenyi Clow tirl cl t-ov, --VV " ". Oul"rW citit7w Insert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-83 REVRISON 541 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.2. FSAR, Section 15.1.41.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety EvlutiOn; Repeo for A~endmonet 171.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-84 REVISION 54-SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES ACTIONS F.1, F.2, and F.3 (continued)

When two or more required SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action F.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT subsystem for> 15 continuous minutes ensures that they are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. The 31 day FroqeInc.Y was doveloped in considorftion of tho known reliability of fan motors and controls and th9 available in the system.Insert 2 SR 3.6.4.3.2 This SR verifies that the required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-90 REI S -\ IO T SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that each required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. This Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power. The 21 month Fr.equency Is REFERENCES 1 .10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41. Insert 2 2. Unit 1 FSAR, Section 5.3.2.3.3. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 6.2.4.4. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 15.2.5. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 15.3.6. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.8. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-91 REVISION 7-0 RHRSW System B 3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for RHRSW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be realigned to its accident position. This is acceptable because the RHRSW System is a manually initiated system. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The 31 day F"equency is based on cng judgment, consnste nt With the procedural controls govcring valve operation, and REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Subsection 9.2.7.2. FSAR, Subsection 7.4.5.3. FSAR, Chapter 15.4. FSAR, Paragraph 6.2.1.4.3.
5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical.

Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.6. General Electric, "RHR Heat Exchanger K-Value Study for Hatch Unit 1 and 2", GE-NE-0000-0037-9449-RO, April 2005.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-6 PSW System and UHS B 3.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS margin to the minimum level requirement (60.7 ft MSL), so the Surveillance is only required to be performed evey-4 day&, However, if the level is < 61.7 ft, the Surveillance must be erformed more frequently (every 12 hours), since the conditions ar closer to the minimum level limit.Insert 2 /SR 3.7.2.2 Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each PSW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for PSW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position within the required time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.This SR is modified by a Note indicating that isolation of the PSW System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the PSW System. As such, when all PSW pumps, valves, and piping are OPERABLE, but a branch connection off the main header is isolated, the PSW System is still OPERABLE.The 31 day is based on engineering judgmoent i.conRsistont With the procedural controlS governing valve operation, and ensu Fres corroct valv e posi tions. * ýI s r..... .. .. .... .... ........Insert 2 SR 3.7.2.3 This SR verifies that the automatic isolation valves of the PSW System will automatically switch to the safety or emergency position to provide cooling water exclusively to the safety related equipment during an accident event. This is demonstrated by the use of an actual or simulated initiation signal. This SR also verifies the automatic start capability (on a LOCAor LOSP signal) of one of the two PSW pumps in each subsystem.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-12 REVARSION 0 PSW System and UHS B 3.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Tho- 24 mon)th FrFequlency is based On a review of the surweillancc test history nd Refcrence 5.Ie REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 9.2.1.2. FSAR, Chapter 6.3. FSAR, Chapter 15.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Eva!uation Report for Amendment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-13 REVISION 3 DG 1 B SSW System B 3.7.3 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the DG 1 B SSW System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for DG 1 B SSW System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet be considered in the correct position provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position, within the required time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The 31 day FrFequency iG based on engieerig judgMcnt, i c..onitent with the proo-edural controls goVerning valve operation, and Insert 2 S R 3.7.3.2 This SR ensures that the DG 1 B SSW System pump will automatically start to provide required cooling to the DG 1 B when the DG 1 B starts and the respective bus is energized. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the sueilla,,e tes history and Reference 5.Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 9.2.1.2. FSAR, Chapter 6.3. FSAR, Chapter 15.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evý.aluatio-n ReporFt for Amendment 171.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-16 R EVISI-O1GN 3 254 MCREC System B 3.7.4 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly.As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem once every 31 days provides an adequate check on this system. Since the MCREC System does not have heaters, each subsystem need only be operated for-> 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the subsystem. Fur-thermore, the 31 day Frequ1eRcy is based on the known Feliability of the eqUiPment and the two subsystem redundancy SR 3.7.4.2 Insert 2 This SR verifies that the required MCREC testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.SR 3.7.4.3 This SR verifies that on an actual or simulated initiation signal, each MCREC subsystem starts and operates. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.7.1.4 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. This Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power. The- 2,4 menth Frequ.ncy is based on a review of the suR'oillance test history and Referec 9.SR 3.7.4.4 Insert 2 This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas (the turbine building), is periodically tested to verify proper function of the MCREC System. During the pressurization mode of operation, the MCREC System is designed to slightly pressurize the control room > 0.1 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to the turbine building to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The MCREC System is designed to maintain this positive (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-23 REVISION 35 MCREC System B 3.7.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.4.4 (continued) pressure at a flow rate of < 2750 cfm through the control room in the pressurization mode. This SR ensures the total flow rate meets the design analysis value of 2500 cfm +/- 10% and ensures the outside air flow rate is 400 cfm. Tho 24 mFnth Frequency, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, ffis based on 3 raview of the sur-cillancc test histor' and Ref-eenoe-. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.4.2. FSAR, Section 9.4.1.3. FSAR, Chapter 6.4. FSAR, Chapter 15.5. FSAR, Section 6.4.1.2.2.
6. FSAR, Table 15.1-28.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.8. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T2.1-1.9. NRC Safety Report for Amendment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-24 REVISION 46 Control Room AC System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS G.1, G.2, and G.3 (continued)

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with three control room AC subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.5.1 This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The 24 month FrFequency I apprpiate Since significant degradation of the Control Room AC System is not expected over this time period.The 24 month FrFequency is basod On a review of the sur.'eillance test history and Reference 1.Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Sections 6.4 and 9.4.1.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T2.1-1.4. NRC Safety E ,valuation Report for Amendment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-30 Main Condenser Offgas B 3.7.6 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR, on a 31 day Fr.quncy, requires an isotopic analysis of an offgas sample to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-1 33, Xe-1 35, Xe-1 38, Kr-85m, Kr-87, and Kr-88. If the measured rate of radioactivity increases significantly (by > 50% after correcting for expected increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is also performed within 4 hours after the increase is noted, to ensure that the increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate. The 31 day Fr.q....y is adequate in view of other instrumetation that GontinuouSly monitor the and is acceptable, based On operating .Insert 2 This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolated and the SJAE is in operation. Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Sections 11.3 and 15.1.35.2. 10 CFR 100.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-33 Main Turbine Bypass System B 3.7.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

< 24% RTP. As discussed in the Applicability section, operation at< 24% RTP results in sufficient margin to the required limits, and the Main Turbine Bypass System is not required to protect fuel integrity during the turbine generator load rejection transient. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.7.1 Cycling each main turbine bypass valve through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will function when required. The 31 day i-s based on egine.ring iS roSi.stent With tho proccdural coentrols-g9eveRnin ValVe operation, and onsuros corrFecAt ValVe positions;. Operating expericncc has Sho)Wn that those comRponents usually pass the SR whon performed-at the 321 day FrFequency.the Frequenc i ) acceptable fro a raeliability .tandp-ir. S R 3.7.7.2 Isr The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This SR demonstrates that, with the required system initiation signals, the valves will actuate to their required position. The 21 month F=requ..en i based0 ,-, th n.d to perform this Sup,'e;1anc uRdeFr the co;nditifonhs6 that apply a ur;t outage and because of the poteni~al for an unplanned-transsient if the Su...eilla... were with the reactor at power. The 24 moEnth Fr.equency is based on a review of the su..... laR.e test hister' and SR 3.7.7.3 This SR ensures that the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is in compliance with the assumptions of the appropriate safety analysis. The response time limits are specified in Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3). The 24 month Fr.equency is based on the need to perfbom this ueeieanse unde the cotnt ditios, that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the- uR---PxeIaRco were perfor-me-d with the ratrat power.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-36 REVISION 42 Main Turbine Bypass System B 3.7.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The 24 month FrFequAency is based- on a roio f tho 6ur~eillanco test histe,'; and Referonce 5.Inser 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.7.4.2. FSAR, Section 15.1.7.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T5.0-1.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amnendment 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-37 R E\V~ISION 46 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level B 3.7.8 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY This LCO applies during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool since the potential for a release of fission products exists.ACTIONS A.1 Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.When the initial conditions for an accident cannot be met, action must be taken to preclude the accident from occurring. If the spent fuel storage pool level is less than required, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool is suspended immediately. Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of an irradiated fuel assembly to a safe position. This effectively precludes a spent fuel handling accident from occurring. SURVEILLANCE' SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that sufficient water is available in the event of a fuel handling accident. The water level in the spent fuel storage pool must be checked periodically. The 7 day Frqu.ncy i" based on operating xpoIonce, considering t~ha;t the ato volumo in th pool is normally stable, and all water lovol chaRges arc controlled by Itnsert 2 d REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 9.1.2.2. NRC Safety Evaluation Report related to Unit 1 Amendment 172 and Unit 2 Amendment 112, August 28, 1991.3. 10 CFR 100.4. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Revision 1, July 1981.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-39 REVISION I AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The-7-da Fr.equency is 6ice breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.Insert 2 SR 3.8.1.2 This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition, and verifies that the DGs are capable of proper startup, synchronizing, and accepting a load approximately 50% of the continuous load rating. This demonstrates DG capability while minimizing the, mechanical stress and wear on the engine. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1.0 is an operational limitation. To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, this SR has been modified by a Note, (Note 2) to indicate that all DG starts for this Surveillance may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup prior to loading.For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, the DG manufacturer recommends a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading.These start procedures are the intent of Note 3. Once voltage and frequency requirements are demonstrated, the DG may be tied to its respective 4160 V emergency bus, as directed by SR 3.8.1.2.b.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-19 REVISION 3-9 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS When the DG is tied to its bus, the electrical grid, due to its larger size compared to the DG, will dictate DG voltage and frequency. The DG operator cannot adjust either parameter. Therefore, the voltage and frequency requirements of SR 3.8.1.2.a no longer apply while the DG is tied to its bus and need not be met to satisfy the requirements of SR 3.8.1.2.b. Other SRs, notably SR 3.8.1.9, require that voltage and frequency requirements can be met while the DG is supplying load.SR 3.8.1.5.a requires that, at a 184 day Frequcncy, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis of FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4). The 12 second start requirement is not applicable to SR 3.8.1.2 (see Note 3), when a modified start procedure as described above is used. If a modified start is not used, the 12 second start voltage and frequency requirements of SR 3.8.1.5.a apply.Since SR 3.8.1.5.a does require a 12 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.2. This procedure is the intent of Note 1.To minimize testing of the swing DG, this SR is modified by a note (Note 4) to allow a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit)to satisfy the requirements for both units, using the starting circuitry of one unit for one periodic test and the starting circuitry of the other unit during the next periodic test. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance, to ensure DG OPERABILITY, is still being verified on the proper frequency, the starting circuits historically have a very low failure rate, as compared to the DG itself, and that, while each starting circuit is only being tested every second test (due to the staggering of the tests), some. portions of the starting circuits are common to both units. If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillance, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.Note 5 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 6 modifies the Surveillance by stating that starting transients above the upper voltage limit do not invalidate this test.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-20 REVISION 3-9 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Note 7 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary load transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.Note 8 indicates that this Surveillance is required to be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. The norEmal 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is cnsistont with Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9). This FrFequency provides adequate of IDG OPERABILITY, while mrinimiziRg degradation resulltfing froM testing.Insert 2 SR 3.8.1.3 This volume is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour of DG operation at full load + 10%. The actual amount required to meet the SR (500 gallons) will provide approximately 1.85 hours of DG operation at full load + 10%. Additionally, the volume of fuel in the day tanks is used in the calculation of the 7 day continuous DG run time. (See B 3.8.3.)The 31 day FroequoncY is adequate to onsuro that a cuff iciont supplyýof fuel oil is available, sinco low level alaFrms aro provfided anAd operators would be aware of any us9-ef fuel oil duIring thisInsert 2 SR 3.8.1.4 Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks 9nqc evey 1-9" eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. periodically This is a means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water in the day tank may come from condensation, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria.Checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-22 REVISION AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The Su3VeillancE) FrFequency is based 9R engineerin~g judgment and has sh-Rn to be acceptable through operatiRg riene. This SR is for preventive The presene of does not nocessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that acc'umulated water iS removed during pe~rfbmancc of this Surveillance. SR 3.8.1.5 Insert 2 This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of a "fast cold" start, synchronizing, and accepting a load more closely simulating accident loads. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.SR 3.8.1.5 requires that, at a 181 day Frequenc.y, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis of FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4). Once voltage and frequency requirements are demonstrated, the DG may be tied to its respective 4160 V emergency bus, as directed by SR 3.8.1.2.b. When the DG is tied to its bus, the electrical grid, due to its larger size compared to the DG, will dictate DG voltage and frequency. The DG operator cannot adjust either parameter. Therefore, the voltage and frequency requirements of SR 3.8.1.2.a no longer apply while the DG is tied to its bus and need not be met to satisfy the requirements of SR 3.8.1.2.b. Other SRs, notably SR 3.8.1.9, require that voltage and frequency requirements can be met while the DG is supplying load.For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1.0 is an operational limitation. The 181 day Frequenc.y fo SR 3.8.1.5 is a reduction in cold testing consi.tent With Le#er 84 15 (Ref. 7)-. This Fr.equ.ency (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-22 REVI/SION 3-g AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS provides adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while mnmzn reSUlting fr.tet Insert 2 To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, this SR has been modified by a Note (Note 1) to indicate that all DG starts for this Surveillance may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup prior to loading.Note 2 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 3 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary load transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.Note 4 indicates that this Surveillance is required to be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 5 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units, with the DG started using the starting circuitry of one unit and synchronized to the ESF bus of that unit for one periodic test and started using the starting circuitry of the other unit and synchronized to the ESF bus of that unit during the next periodic test. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance, to ensure DG OPERABILITY, is still being verified on the proper frequency, and each unit's starting circuitry and breaker control circuitry, which is only being tested every second test (due to the staggering of the tests), historically have a very low failure rate. If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.SR 3.8.1.6 Transfer of each 4.16 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The 2,4 month Fr.equencY Of the Su..eillanc i.s intended to b1 consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-23 REVISION 39 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.6 (continued) The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the sur.oi'lance test histo. y n Rcf.......... Insert 2 This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the speeified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not perfor the test while the unit is in MODE 1 or 2 does not have a ability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate t ,the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2.Contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.7 Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. The largest single load for each DG is a residual heat removal service water pump at rated flow (1225 bhp). This Surveillance may be accomplished by: a) tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load while paralleled to offsite power or while solely supplying the bus, or b) tripping its associated single largest post-accident load with the DG solely supplying the bus.Although Plant Hatch Unit 2 is not committed to IEEE-387-1984, (Ref. 11), this SR is consistent with the IEEE-387-1984 requirement that states the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower. For all DGs, this represents 65.5 Hz, (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-24 REVISION 3-9 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS equivalent to 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint.The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the nominal range for the DG. SR 3.8.1.7.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.7.b is the voltage to which the DG must recover following load rejection. The 21 h is conSIStent With the reomndto f Rogulatory Guide 1.108R (Ref. 9). The 24 menth FreqUencY is based on a review of the su-vcillaGne test history and Reference

14. Insert 2 This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing is performed with only the DG providing power to the associated 4160 V ESF bus.The DG is not synchronized with offsite power.To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 2 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.SR 3.8.1.8 This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping.

This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-25 RFWISION 2S9 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.8 (continued) REQUIREMENTS DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event, and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor < 0.88. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience. The 24 mGRnth Fr.equenc is consistent with the recommcndation Gf Regulator,' Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9) and iS intended to be consistent with d fuel IRngths. The 24 month Frequency i6 baed on a review of the suR-ei!lance test histeo ' and Reference

14. '*-- .This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that Insert 2 during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 2 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e., system voltage is high, it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 3 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-26 REVISION 3-9 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.8.1.9 This Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source and is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(1).This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.The DG auto-start time of 12 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis for responding to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved.The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and auto-connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs shall be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The- P.Fre.qu.encY of 24 months co With the9 recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(1), takes into..n.idcration plant conditions required to pc-For- the Sur..eillancc, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency.is based on a reView of the surveillance test hist.ry aRd RefereGnc

14. Ist This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-27 REVISION 239 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.9 (continued) offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the speecfied Frequen for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not ing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does ye applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance sents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should no erformed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.Contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program J SR 3.8.1.10 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (12 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal)and operates for > 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability. The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the loading logic for loading onto offsite power. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, low pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability'of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditionc ..quired to perform the SureillaRnce and is intended to be consisteRt (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-28 REVISION 39 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.10 (continued) REQUIREMENTS with the expoctod fuel cycl9 e lgths. The 24 month Frequenyi based on a .evi.w of the su....,laRc. test history aRd Referenoe 14.This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Insert 2 Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could potentially cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus.Consequently, a test must be performed within the speGifi8d Frequenc for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not'g the test while the unit is in MODE 1 or 2 does not have apP ability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, Contained in the Surveillance Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in Frequency Control Program MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2.SR 3.8.1.11 This Surveillance demonstrates that DG non-critical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ECCS initiation signal and critical protective functions (engine overspeed, generator differential current, and low lubricating oil pressure) are available to trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The non-critical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.The 24 monGth Frequency takes into conideration plant conditiOns required to performS the 9ur'~eillaRG9, and iWitnddt be Gonsistent With expeted fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based on a re -iew- of the su'--rc Ancc test histry aRnd Reference ! 4.The SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that Insert 2 performing the Surveillance would remove a required DG from (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-29 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.11 (continued) service. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the&Peeified Frequenc for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performi he test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have a pcability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separ tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with U i2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test'should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.Contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program I I SR 3.8.1.12 Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(3), requires demonstration onco por 24 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours. The first 22 hours of this test are performed at > 2775 kW and < 2825 kW (which is near the continuous rating of the DG), and the last 2 hours of this test are performed at > 3000 kW. This is in accordance with commitments described in FSAR Section 8:3 (Ref. 2). The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelube and warmup, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, are applicable to this SR.In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor < 0.88. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience. A load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. The 21 month Frequency Is .onistent With thc oe Rcgulatery Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(3);, takes int concidoratiGn plant conditions roquirod to perfor~m the Su1'.'oillanco; and- is intended to be consistent With oXPoctedI fuol cyclo lengthsG. The')A rn+k Cr .;nl C ka~1a a A at a; +11. Hun +all+hist-ry and 14.I "- Insert 2 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-30 REISONtinued AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.12 (continued) REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance has been modified by four Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. However, it is acceptable to perform this SR in MODES 1 and 2 provided the other two DGs are OPERABLE, since a perturbation can only affect one divisional DG. If during the performance of this Surveillance, one of the other DGs becomes operable, this Surveillance is to be suspended. The surveillance may not be performed in MODES 1 and 2 during inclement weather and unstable grid conditions. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 3 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e., system voltage is high), it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 4 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.SR 3.8.1.13 This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA.The 24 month Frcequ I .is coneiot With the recomm~endations o Rogulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(5). The 21 monGth Frequency is based on a Fcvicw of the. sureillan.. test histoy and RefeFeoetn4.d (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-31 3-9 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.13 (continued) REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by three Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at near full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 3 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.SR 3.8.1.14 This Surveillance is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(6) and ensures that the manual synchronization and automatic load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.Tho F=requencY of 24 months iG With the .......mcndations of Regulator; Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(6), and takes into cOnsidoration plant conditionS roquirod to porform the uR, oillance.The 21 moneth FrFequcncy is based on a review of the surveillance test hi.to.. and Refe..ron 14-.. .Insert 2 This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-32 REVISION 39 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.14 (continued) speeified Frequencyfor each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performin ' e test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have appi bility to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate t s, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 i ODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed wit nit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.SR 3.8.1.15 Contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions is not compromised as the result of testing. Interlocks to the LOCA sensing circuits cause the DG to automatically reset to ready-to-load operation if an ECCS initiation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready-to-load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. Although Plant Hatch Unit 2 is not committed to this standard, this SR is consistent with the provisions for automatic switchover required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 12), paragraph 6.2.6(2).The intent in the requirements associated with SR 3.8.1.15.b is to show that the emergency loading is not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.The 24 monGth i ccistont With the recommnFdationGs oG Rcgulator,' Guide 14108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(8); takes int consideration plant conditions required to perform the Sur~veillance; and is intended to be con.istent with expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 mRonth FrFequenG cis based on a review of the surveillance test history and Referenrc e Ir This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-33 REVISION 3-9 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.15 (continued) epee Frequenc or each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performi the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have a icability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separ ests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Uin MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed ith Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.Contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.16 Under accident conditions, loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequence timing devices. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents.The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.The Fr.equency of 24 months is co.istent with the rfocomendati.ns of Regulator',' Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(2); takes into cons~idoration plant conditions rcquired to porformF the Survoillance; and i6 intonRde,4d, to bo consistent With expected fuel cycle lngths. The 21 month FrFequoncy

i. .based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference .Ie This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within theFrequency or each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performin e test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have ap i ability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separat sts, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.Contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program J (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-34 REVISION 39 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.8.1.17 In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.This Surveillance demonstrates DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.9, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ECCS initiation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The Fr.equ..ncY of 24F.month.. takes intO con.ideratioR plant conditions. required to perform the Survcillancc and is intonded to be consistont itanopcdfulccelnt.The 21 month Froequoncy is based on roiewof he urvillnc test history and Roference 14.This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to Insert 2 minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for I Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the speeified Frequencc or each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not ýing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does e applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance sents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should no erformed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.Contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.8.1.18 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously. For the purpose of this testing, (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-35 R..V..... 3 9 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.18 (continued) REQUIREMENTS the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. It is permissible to place all three DGs in test simultaneously, for the performance of this Surveillance. The 10 year Fr.equoncy iS concistcnt With the r..ommendatone. of Regulator; Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9). Thie SR i oiidb oe The r'ea.n f-r the Note is tominimize ear' on the DG during t.ti'SR 3.8.1.19 s With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18) are applied only to the Unit 2 DG and offsite circuits, and swing DG. This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 1 DG and offsite circuit are governed by the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 1 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 1 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 2 SR. Several exceptions are noted to the Unit 1 SRs: SR 3.8.1.6 is excepted since only one Unit 1 circuit is required by the Unit 2 Specification (therefore, there is not necessarily a second circuit to transfer to); SRs 3.8.1.10, 15, and 17 are excepted since they relate to the DG response to a Unit 1 ECCS initiation signal, which is not a necessary function for support of the Unit 2 requirement for an OPERABLE Unit 1 DG.The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 1 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.2. FSAR, Sections 8.2 and 8.3.3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, March 1971.4. FSAR, Chapter 6.5. FSAR, Chapter 15.6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-36 REVISION 39 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

7. Generic Letter 84-15.8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, August 1977.10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979.11. IEEE Standard 387-1984.12. IEEE Standard 308-1980.13. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.1,4. NRC Safety Ehvaluatin Rep.-, for 4 74.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-37 REVISION 3ý9 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS E._1 (continued)

With required starting air receiver pressure < 225 psig, sufficient capacity for five successive DG start attempts does not exist.However, as long as the receiver pressure is -> 170 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start attempt, and the DG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most DG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.F. 1 With a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met, one or more required DG fuel oil transfer subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, one or more required DG fuel oil storage tanks with fuel oil level not within limits for reasons other than Condition B, or the stored diesel lube oil or the required starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Condition C or E, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the Unit 2 and swing DG storage tanks to support the required DGs' operation for 7 days at the assumed load. (See B 3.8.3.)The 31 day Froequency is adequate to onsro6F tha;t; aufcetSupply of fuel oil is available, since low lovell ala~r~m.s are provided and unit operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil duringthis S ... Insert 2 This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lubricating oil inventory (combined inventory in the DG lubricating oil sump and stored in the warehouse) is available to support at least 7 days of full load operation for each required DG. The 400 gal requirement is based on the DG manufacturer's consumption values for the run time of the DG.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-48 3-9 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the DG, since the DG lube oil sump does not hold adequate inventory for 7 days of full load operation without the level reaching the manufacturer's recommended minimum level.A 31 day FrFequoncy is adequate to ensurFe that a sufficient lube oil supply is, onsite, Since DG starts and FRu time are closolY moniRtorod Insert 2 SR 3.8.3.3 This SR verifies that the required Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil testing is performed in a accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. Tests are a means of monitoring the potential degradation related to long term storage and the potential impact to fuel filter plugging as a result of high particulate levels. Specific sampling requirements, frequencies, and additional information are discussed in detail in the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.SR 3.8.3.4 This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each required DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of five engine start cycles without recharging. A start cycle is defined by the DG vendor, but usually is measured in terms of time (seconds of cranking)or engine cranking speed. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest value at which the five starts can be accomplished using one air receiver.The 31 day Fr.equncy takes accoun.t the capacity, capability, rcdundancy, anid divcrsity of the AG sources and other indications available in the control roomn, inclu1ding alaFRrm, to alert the operator to beloW .. n.omal air stat pressu. ense.SR 3.8.3.5 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. It is required to (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-49 "2 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pumps are OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer are OPERABLE.The dcs~ign of the fuel transfer systems6 is SUch that pumps operate automatically in orFder to m~aintain an adequato volume of fuel oil in the day tanks durOig ,r folloWing OIG testiRg. Therefore, a 31 day FrFequency is specified to correspond to the maximumn interval forF DG Insert 2 Periodic rerr S R 3.8.3.6 Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degrad on. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cau fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. of water from the required Unit 2 and swing DG fuel storage tanks ORGe days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water in the storage tank may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Frequency is based on e ..e. ei judgm~ent and has been showni to be acceptable through operating experience. This SR is for mainteRaRne. The preGRene of w.aVte~r do-es not"Rneesrl rerent failur eof this SR, provided the accumnulated water is rmvdduriing pe~fGFrnaRcc of the SuRx*'eillAncP SR 3.8.3.7 Insert 2 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to each required DG's day tank. It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources, since fuel from three storage tanks is needed to supply fuel for two DGs to meet the 7 day supply requirement discussed in the Background section of these Bases. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pumps are OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-50 REVISION 39 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for manual fuel transfer are OPERABLE.Since the fuel oil tra..fer pumps are being tested on a .1 day Frequency inR accordance with SIR 3.-.3.5, the 24 mon+th Fr.equcncy has bon to be accoptable. Tho 24 moRth F=eqen .is based on a" rcviw of the su..eillance test hictery and Reference 5.2. FSAR, Chapter 6.3. FSAR, Chapter 15.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.5. NRC Safety Evaluation Repo-t for 171.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-51 REVISION DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7).E.1 Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the DC electrical power subsystems that causes a required safety function to be lost.When more than one DC source is lost, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.SURVEILLANCE The SRs are modified by a NOTE to indicate that SR 3.8.4.1 through REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.4.8 apply only to the Unit 2 DC sources, and that SR 3.8.4.9 applies only to the Unit 1 DC sources.SR 3.8.4.1 Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in a fully charged state. Voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The voltage requirement for battery terminal voltage is based on the open circuit voltage of a lead-calcium cell of nominal 1.215 specific gravity.Without regard to other battery parameters, this voltage is indicative of a battery that is capable of performing its required safety function.The 7 day FrFequoncY is consistent with mnanufacturer's recommendations aRd !EEE 450 (Ref. 8).SR 3.8.4.2 ý , Insert 2 Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each inter-cell, (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-57 REVISION 3.9 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance. The connection resistance limits are established to maintain connection resistance as low as reasonably possible to minimize the overall voltage drop across the battery and the possibility of battery damage due to heating of connections. The resistance values for each battery connection are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 9).The Frequency forF these inspections, Which can detect conditions that can cause power losses duo to rosistanco heating, is 92 days. This F=FequcncGY; iscosidered acceptablo based on operating experfience r .la t e d t o d e t e c ti n g c o r r o s i o n t r I ns.e r SR 3.8.4.3 Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance. The 224 month Frequency Of the SuR'weillance tAkes intoconsderatfion the desired plant conditions to perform the Srelac.The 24 moneth FrFequencY is ased en A, review of the sveR'cIancc test history and Refe~eren 1~I-fnsert 2 SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5 Visual inspection and resistance measurements of inter-cell, inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connections provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anti-corrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection. The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-58 REVISION 39 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS of this SR, provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of this Surveillance. The connection resistance limits are established to maintain connection resistance as low as reasonably possible to minimize the overall voltage drop across the battery and the possibility of battery damage due to heating of connections. The resistance values for each battery connection are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 9).The 24 mnth F=requenY Of tho Sur-eillances takes into consideration the desired plant conditions to performn the Surveillance. Tho4e 24 month Frequency is based On a review of the surveillance teSt history and Reference I1,,'--'1Insert 2 SR 3.8.4.6 Battery charger capability requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers (Ref. 4). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10), each battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied. The Frncy is aecptable, given the un1it conditions required to perfom the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensurFe adequate charger performnance dur~ing these 21 moenth inRtevals. In addition, this FrFequency is intended to beA consistent With expected fuel Gycle The 24 21nGmoth Frequeny is based on a revie'-of the su'-;ovilanco test histo"y and Reference 14.SR 3.8.4.7 Insert 2 A battery service test is a special test of the battery's capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length corresponds to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-59 REVISIONTM" DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The Fr.equency of 21 months is consistent with the recom-mendation, of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10) aRd Regulatof,' Guide 1.129 (Ref. 11), which state that the batter,' Gcrice test should be perfo~rmed during refu1eling operationpl or at some other outage. The 21 month FrFequencY if; base~d on a review of the suR'eillancc test history and Reference

1. .-.Insert 2 This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test.The modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates: the 1 minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated 1 minute discharge represent a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test.The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.A modified performance discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity.

Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service discharge test.The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance. The swing DG DC battery is exempted from this restriction, since it is required by both units' LCO 3.8.4 and cannot be performed in the manner required by the Note without resulting in a dual unit shutdown.S R 3.8.4.8 A battery performance discharge test is a constant current capacity test to detect any change in the capacity determined by the (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-60 REVISION 3-9 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.4.8 (continued) acceptance test. Initial conditions consistent with IEEE 450 need to be met prior to the performing of a battery performance discharge test. The test results reflect the overall effects of usage and age.A battery modified performance discharge test is described in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.7. Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.8; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.8, while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.7 at the same time.The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 8) 'and IEEE-485 (Ref. 12). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating. Although there may be ample capacity, the battery rate of deterioration is rapidly increasing. The FrcequcncY for this test is normally 60 months. if the battr, shows dgradatIon, or f the battery has reached 85% of its expectcd application serVice life and capacity is 9 100% ofth m~nRiuiautUrcrs rainrg, the SurvciiaRco F=FequleRcY ! FeUuccu t 12months. However, if the battey,' shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected application serice life, the SurveillaGce Fr.equency is only redued to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity: 100% of the manufacGturFer' rating. Degaaini 0 ndicated, according to IEEE 450 (Ref. 8), when1 the bte,' capacity drops by mere than 10% Of rated capacity from itE capacity oRn the previos performaGnce test Or is m.ere than 104 beloW the manu.fatr.er's rFating. All these F reuencies ar consistent ,With the recommendations in IEEE 450 (Ref. 8).'-- Insert 2 This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would, remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance. The swing DG DC battery is exempted from this restriction, since it is required by both units' LCO 3.8.4 and cannot be performed in the manner required by the Note without resulting in a dual unit shutdown.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-61 REVISION 3-9 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.8.4.9 With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8) are applied only to the Unit 2 DC sources. This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 1 DC sources are governed by the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit I Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 1 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 2 SR.The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 1 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.2. Regulatory Guide 1.6.3. IEEE Standard 308-1971.4. FSAR, Paragraphs 8.3.2.1.1 and 8.3.2.1.2.
5. FSAR, Chapter 6.6. FSAR, Chapter 15.7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.8. IEEE Standard 450-1987.9. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 9.0.10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977. Not used 11. Rogulato÷,-

Guide 1.129, December 1971.12. IEEE Standard 485-1983.13. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.14. NRC Safety Evaluat-ion Rep- for A.meRdmeRt 174.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-62 REVISION 466 Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued) verification is repeated at 7 day intervals until the parameters are restored to Category A and B limits. This periodic verification is consistent with the normal Frequency of pilot cell surveillances. Continued operation is only permitted for 31 days before battery cell parameters must be restored to within Category A and B limits.Taking into consideration that, while battery capacity is degraded, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and to allow time to fully restore the battery cell parameters to normal limits, this time is acceptable for operation prior to declaring the associated DC battery inoperable. B.1 When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limit for any connected cell, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not ensured and the corresponding DC electrical power subsystem must be declared inoperable. Additionally, other potentially extreme conditions, such as not completing the Required Actions of Condition A within the required Completion Time or average electrolyte temperature of representative cells falling below the appropriate limit (65 0 F for station service and 40°F for DG batteries), also are cause for immediately declaring the associated DC electrical power subsystem inoperable. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that Category A battery cell parameters are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends regular battery inspections (at least oRn peFr mnth) including voltage, specific gravity, and electrolyte level of pilot cells." Insert 2 SR 3.8.6.2 The 92 day inspection of specific gravity, cell voltage, and level is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 31, In addition, within 24 hours of a battery overcharge > 1§50, e battery must be demonstrated to meet Categogry

s. This inspection is also consistent with IEEE- ef. 3), which recommends special inspections following a Insert 2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-69 REVISION 29 Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.6.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS severe overcharge, to ensure that no significant degradation of the battery occurs as a consequence of such overcharge. SR 3.8.6.3 This Surveillance verification that the average temperature of representative cells is within limits is consistent with a recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) that states that the temperature of electrolyte in representative cells should be determined eR-a Lower than normal temperatures act to inhibit or reduce battery capacity. This SR ensures that the operating temperatures remain within an acceptable operating range. This limit is based on IEEE-450 or the manufacturer's recommendations when provided.Table 3.8.6-1 This table delineates the limits on electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity for three different categories. The meaning of each category is discussed below.Category A defines the normal parameter limit for each designated pilot cell in each battery. The cells selected as pilot cells are those whose temperature, voltage, and electrolyte specific gravity approximate the state of charge of the entire battery.The Category A limits specified for electrolyte level are based on manufacturer's recommendations and are consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), with the extra 1/4 inch allowance above the high water level indication for operating margin to account for temperature and charge effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote a to Table 3.8.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be above the specified maximum level during equalizing charge, provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at float charge for at least 72 hours.The Category A limit specified for float voltage is > 2.13 V per cell.This value is based on the recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-70 REV!S!ON 39 Distribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued) This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition D was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely. E.1 and E.2 If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.F.1 Condition F corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical power distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystem is lost, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical buses are maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Fr=equency takes into account the redundant apability of the AC and DC electrical power distributio subsyte (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-80 REVISION 3-9 Distribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.7.1 (continued) and other available in the control room that alet the operator to subsystem malfunctions. REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 6.2. FSAR, Chapter 15.3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-81 REVISION 3ý9 Distribution Systems -Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.8.1 This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem is functioning properly, with the buses energized. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses.The 7 day Frequency takes into account the t capability of the electrical powor distribution swbsystems, ar, well acs o-the-r !Aindications L .... ] ....avaiiaoic e inc !R8ro Groom Fem at aict RG Eme ocator 10 5UBSYStemR Malfunc9tins.-Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 6.2. FSAR, Chapter 15.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-85 REVISION 3-9 Refueling EquipmentlInterlocks B 3.9.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.The 7 dlay Frequency is based on onginecriRn judgment ard is oRnsidered adequate Jin Oie of other iRdicationo r f efuelinRg inter!ccks and their a6ssciated input status that arc available to unit operations porsonnol.- Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.2. FSAR, Section 7.6.1.3. FSAR, Section 15.1.13.4. FSAR, Section 15.1.14.5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.9-4 DR-\/ISIO 63 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock B 3.9.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.2.1 (continued)

OPERABLE when required. By "locking" the reactor mode switch in the proper position (i.e., removing the reactor mode switch key from the console while the reactor mode switch is positioned in refuel), an additional administrative control is in place to preclude operator errors from resulting in unanalyzed operation. The Froqucncy of F1 hou-s is SUfficicRt iR view of othcr controls utilized during refueling GocrationS to enASure safe onteratioRi I'nser 2 SR 3.9.2.2 Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel demonstrates the associated refuel position one-rod-out interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.The 7 day Frequency is considered adequate b9cause ot dem.nstrated circuit reliability, procedural controls on control rod wfithdrawals, and visual and audible indications available in the control.. .... ...... te .... .... th pmtrW G tG e not fully T perform the required testing, the a ion must be entered (i.e., a centre e withdrawn from its full-in position). Insert 2 Frnatively, the control rod withdrawal, and the attempted withdrawal of the second control rod, may be simulated. In either case, SR 3.9.2.2 has been modified by a Note that states the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.2. FSAR, Section 7.6.1.3. FSAR, Section 15.1.13.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.9-7 REVISION 2-9 Control Rod Position B 3.9.3 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, loading fuel into core cells with control rods withdrawn may result in inadvertent criticality. Therefore, the control rods must be inserted before loading fuel into a core cell. All control rods must be inserted before loading fuel to ensure that a fuel loading error does not result in loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and no fuel loading activities are possible. Therefore, this Specification is not applicable in these MODES.ACTIONS A.1 With all control rods not fully inserted during the applicable conditions, an inadvertent criticality could occur that is not analyzed in the FSAR.All fuel loading operations must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.3.1 During refueling, to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical, all control rods must be fully inserted prior to and during fuel loading.Periodic checks of the control rod position ensure this condition is maintained. The 12 hour Fr.equencY takes t considoration the prccedurl controls on control red movement dU-rin refuelno as well sth redundant func~tions of the refueling interlocks 2 REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.2. FSAR, Section 15.1.13.3. FSAR, Section 15.1.14.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.9-9 REI S \ IO 0 '

Control Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling B 3.9.5 BASES LCO (contiued) rods have already completed their reactivity control function, and therefore, are not required to be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, withdrawn control rods must be OPERABLE to ensure that in a scram the control rods will insert and provide the required negative reactivity to maintain the reactor subcritical. For MODES 1 and 2, control rod requirements are found in LCO 3.1.2,"Reactivity Anomalies," LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators." During MODES 3 and 4, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod OPERABILITY during these conditions. ACTIONS A.1 With one or more withdrawn control rods inoperable, action must be immediately initiated to fully insert the inoperable control rod(s).Inserting the control rod(s) ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. Actions must continue until the inoperable control rod(s) is fully inserted.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2 REQUIREMENTS During MODE 5, the OPERABILITY of control rods is primarily required to ensure a withdrawn control rod will automatically insert if a signal requiring a reactor shutdown occurs. Because no explicit analysis exists for automatic shutdown during refueling, the shutdown function is satisfied if the withdrawn control rod is capable of automatic insertion and the associated CRD scram accumulator pressure is > 940 psig.The 7- day FrFequencGy takes into consideration equipmcnet reliability, procedural control oVer the .cram. a...ccumulators, and roFlrm alarms and indicating lights that indicatc low accumuwlator charge pressuroes. 4 ner SR 3.9.5.1 is modified by a Note that allows 7 days after withdrawal of the control rod to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.9-14 REVISION 0 RPV Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES LCO (continued) radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.The point from which the water level is measured is shown in Figure B 3.5.2-1.APPLICABILITY LCO 3.9.6 is applicable when moving fuel assemblies or handling control rods (i.e., movement with other than the normal control rod drive) within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present within the RPV, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.8,"Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." ACTIONS A.1 If the water level is < 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV, all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The suspension of fuel movement and control rod handling shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.6.1 Verification of a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in containment (Ref. 2).The of 24 horr is based on engineering and is....;idcrcd o R view of the lag. volumc of water and the no"ral procedural control. o valve positions, Which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely. 1 ýIsr (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.9-17 REVISION 28 RHR -High Water Level B 3.9.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued) stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.). This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, a Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.C.1 and C.2 If no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The F=r.quo..Y of 12 hou..i s 6ufciont in view of other visual and audible indications available to (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.9-22 REVISION ! RHR -Low Water Level B 3.9.8 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that one required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is 6SUfficicnt in view o~f other visual and audible indicsations available to the for moni.toing the RHR subsystoms in the contro. Ql room.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 34.Insert 2 2. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.9-28 REVISION 46 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing B 3.10.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2 (continued) component to a safe condition.

Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure that all inserted control rods remain inserted and result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1.Alternatively, if in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch may be placed in the refuel position, which will also result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. A Note is added to Required Action A.3.2 to indicate that this Required Action is not applicable in MODES 3 and 4, since only the shutdown position is allowed in these MODES. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods and place the reactor mode switch in the required position, based on operating experience, and is acceptable given that all operations that could increase core reactivity have been suspended. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.2.1 and SR 3.10.2.2 REQUIREMENTS Meeting the requirements of this Special Operations LCO maintains operation consistent with or conservative to operating with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (or the refuel position for MODE 5). The functions of the reactor mode switch interlocks that are not in effect, due to the testing in progress, are adequately compensated for by the Special Operations LCO requirements. The administrative controls are to be periodically verified to ensure that the operational requirements continue to be met. The Sur-eillances at the 12 hour and 24 hour Froquoncioc are intendod to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware ot and VerifieS com~pliance With theso Special Operations LCO-[Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.2.2.10.5.
2. FSAR, Section 15.1.13.3. FSAR, Section 15.1.14.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.10-9 I R-\VISION I 6-l 2 Single Control Rod Withdrawal

-Hot Shutdown B 3.10.3 BASES ACTIONS A.2.1 and A.2.2 (continued) and restore operation in accordance with Table 1.1-1. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour to place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.3.1, SR 3.10.3.2, and SR 3.10.3.3 REQUIREMENTS The other LCOs made applicable in this Special Operations LCO are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification in accordance with SR 3.10.3.2 is required to preclude the possibility of criticality. SR 3.10.3.2 has been modified by a Note, which clarifies that this SR is not required to be met if SR 3.10.3.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.3.d.1 requirements, since SR 3.10.3.2 demonstrates that the alternative LCO 3.10.3.d.2 requirements are satisfied. Also, SR 3.10.3.3 verifies that all control rods other than the control rod being withdrawn are fully inserted. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because of the adMiRistratiVe conro1rl oR d withdrawal, the protection aeffoded involved, and hardW*ro interlocks6 that precludo additional control red withdrawals. Insert 2 REFERENCES 1 .FSAR, Section 15.1.13.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.10-13 REVISION 6-2 Single Control Rod Withdrawal -Cold Shutdown B 3.10.4 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2 (continued) Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are specified, based on the assumption that the control rod is being withdrawn. If the control rod is still insertable, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods and within 1 hour place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2 If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod not insertable, withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated CRD must be immediately suspended. If the CRD has been removed, such that the control rod is not insertable, the Required Actions require the most expeditious action be taken to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, and SR 3.10.4.4 REQUIREMENTS The other LCOs made applicable by this Special Operations LCO are required to have their associated surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Verification that all the other control rods are fully inserted is required to meet the SDM requirements. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the affected control rod. The 24 he'-Froequency i6 acceptable becauso of the adminiistratiVo controls On control rod withdrawals, the protection afforded by the LGOG involved, and hardWiro intorlockEo to preclude an additional contro~l rod thdInsert 2 SR 3.10.4.2 and SR 3.10.4.4 have been modified by Notes, which clarify that these SRs are not required to be met if the alternative requirements demonstrated by SR 3.10.4.1 are satisfied.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.10-17 REVISION 6-2 Single CRD Removal -Refueling B 3.10.5 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.5.1, SR 3.10.5.2, SR 3.10.5.3, SR 3.10.5.4, and REQUIREMENTS SR 3.10.5.5 Verification that all the control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, are fully inserted is required to ensure the SDM is within limits. Verification that the local five by five array of control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for removal of the associated CRD, is inserted and disarmed, while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the withdrawn control rod. The Surveillance for LCO 3.1.1, which is made applicable by this Special Operations LCO, is required in order to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. Verification that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are being made is required to ensure the assumptions of the safety analysis are satisfied. While not required by this LCO, verification of the core loading may be prudent to ensure that a fuel loading error has not invalidated the assumptions of the safety analysis.Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour.. Fr.equo.cY is ac.ptablo, given the administrtati-e controls on control rod removal and hardwire interlock to bloc~k an additional control rod withdrawal. .. .......... ............... ...Insert 2 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 15.1.13.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.10-22 REVISION 62 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal

-Refueling B 3.10.6 BASES (continued) ACTIONS A.1. A.2. A.3.1. and A.3.2 If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for refueling (i.e., all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies) or with the exceptions granted by this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the affected CRDs and insert their control rods, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.6.1, SR 3.10.6.2, and SR 3.10.6.3 REQUIREMENTS Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour F..eque,,Y us a ccptable, given the administrative controls on fue! assembly and control red removal, aRd takes into accounRt o~thor indications Of control rod status availab!ei the cOntrol roomR.REFERENCE 1.--.--SeciInsert 21 REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 15.1.13.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.10-25 REVISION 62 SDM Test -Refueling B 3.10.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.10.8.4 Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this LCO will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of the safety analysis. Tho 12 hour F.. roGuonc. i ntondd to p .rovide appropiato assurance that each opcrating shift is aware of an verifieG comqpliance with these Special Operations LCO rqiee Insert 2 SR 3.10.8.5 Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the control rod drive mechanism and will perform its intended function when necessary. The verification is required to be performed any time a control rod is withdrawn to the full-out notch position, or prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling. This Frequency is acceptable, considering the low probability that a control rod will become uncoupled when it is not being moved, as well as operating experience related to uncoupling events.SR 3.10.8.6 CRD charging water header pressure verification is performed to ensure the motive force is available to scram the control rods in the event of a scram signal. Since the reactor is depressurized in MODE 5, there is insufficient reactor pressure to scram the .control rods. Verification of charging water header pressure ensures that if a scram were required, capability for rapid control rod insertion would exist. The minimum charging water header pressure of 940 psig, which is below the expected pressure of 1100 psig, still ensures sufficient pressure for rapid control rod insertion. The-7 4da has been to be acceptable through exporionce and takes into accoun~t indications available in the conrol1 REFERENCES

1. NEDE-2401 1-P-A-US, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Supplement for United States (revision specified in the COLR).2. Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas, NRC,"Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-2401 1 -P-A," August 15, 1986.HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.10-34 REVISION 62 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description*

425 1 2 Control Rod Operability 3.1.3 3.1.3 3.1.3 Control rod position 3.1.3.1 3.1.3.1 3.1.3.1 Notch test -fully withdrawn control rod one notch 3.1.3.2 3.1.3.2 3.1.3.2 Notch test -partially withdrawn control rod one notch 3.1.3.3 3.1.3.3 3.1.3.3 Control Rod Scram Times 3.1.4 3.1.4 3.1.4 Scram time testing 3.1.4.2 3.1.4.2 3.1.4.2 Control Rod Scram Accumulators 3.1.5 3.1.5 3.1.5 Control rod scram accumulator pressure 3.1.5.1 3.1.5.1 3.1.5.1 Rod Pattern Control 3.1.6 3.1.6 3.1.6 Verify control rods comply with BPWS 3.1.6.1 3.1.6.1 3.1.6.1 SLC System 3.1.7 3.1.7 3.1.7 Volume of sodium pentaborate 3.1.7.1 3.1.7.1 3.1.7.1 Temperature of sodium pentaborate 3.1.7.2 3.1.7.2 3.1.7.2 Continuity of explosive charge 3.1.7.4 3.1.7.4 3.1.7.4 Concentration of boron solution 3.1.7.5 3.1.7.5 3.1.7.5 Manual/power operated valve position 3.1.7.6 3.1.7.6 3.1.7.6 Pump flow rate 3.1.7.7 3.1.7.7** 3.1.7.7**Flow through one SLC subsystem 3.1.7.8 3.1.7.8 3.1.7.8 Heat traced piping is unblocked 3.1.7.9 3.1.7.9 3.1.7.9 SDV Vent and Drain Valve 3.1.8 3.1.8 3.1.8 Each SDV vent & drain valve open 3.1.8.1 3.1.8.1 3.1.8.1 Cycle each SDV vent & drain valve fully closed/open position 3.1.8.2 3.1.8.2 3.1.8.2 Each SDV vent & drain valve closes on receipt of scram 3.1.8.3 3.1.8.3 3.1.8.3 APLHGR 3.2.1 3.2.1 3.2.1 APLHGR less than or equal to limits 3.2.1.1 3.2.1.1 3.2.1.1 MCPR 3.2.2 3.2.2 3.2.2 MCPR greater than or equal to the limits 3.2.2.1 3.2.2.1 3.2.2.1 LHGR 3.2.3 3.2.3 3.2.3 LHGR less than or equal to limits 3.2.3.1 3.2.3.1 3.2.3.1 APRM Gain and Setpoints

3.2.4 MFLPD

is within limits 3.2.4.1 APRM setpoints or gains are adjusted for calculated MFLPD 3.2.4.2 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 3.3.1.1 3.3.1.1 Channel Check 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.1 Absolute diff. between APRM channels & calculated power 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.2 Adjust channel to conform to calibrated flow 3.3.1.1.3 Channel Functional Test (12 hours after entering Mode 2) 3.3.1.1.4 3.3.1.1.4 3.3.1.1.4 Channel Functional Test 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.5 Verify IRM and APRM 3.3.1.1.7 3.3.1.1.7 Calibrate the local power range monitors. 3.3.1.1.6 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.8 Channel Functional Test 3.3.1.1.7 3.3.1.1.9 3.3.1.1.9 Calibrate the trip Units 3.3.1.1.8 Channel Functional test (12 hours after entering Mode 2) 3.3.1.1.10 3.3.1.1.10 Channel Calibration (for Function 2.a) 3.3.1.1.9 E9-1 Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit I and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description* 425 1 2 Verify Turbine Stop Valve -Closure 3.3.1.1.14 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.11 Perform Channel Functional Test 3.3.1.1.10 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.12 Perform Channel Calibration (for Function 1) 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.13 3.3.1.1.13 Verify the APRM Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power 3.3.1.1.12 Perform Logic System Functional Test 3.3.1.1.13 3.3.1.1.15 3.3.1.1.15 Verify the RPS Response Time is within limits 3.3.1.1.15 3.3.1.1.16 3.3.1.1.16 Verify OPRM is not bypassed 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.17 SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 3.3.1.2 3.3.1.2 Perform Channel Check 3.3.1.2.1 3.3.1.2.1 3.3.1.2.1 Verify an Operable SRM detector is located 3.3.1.2.2 3.3.1.2.2 3.3.1.2.2 Perform Channel Check 3.3.1.2.3 3.3.1.2.3 3.3.1.2.3 Verify count rate 3.3.1.2.4 3.3.1.2.4 3.3.1.2.4 Perform Channel Functional Test 3.3.1.2.5 3.3.1.2.5 3.3.1.2.5 Channel Functional Test (12 hours after IRMs on Range 2) 3.3.1.2.6 3.3.1.2.6 3.3.1.2.6 Perform Channel Calibration 3.3.1.2.7 3.3.1.2.7 3.3.1.2.7 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 3.3.2.1 3.3.2.1 Channel Functional Test 3.3.2.1.1 3.3.2.1.1 3.3.2.1.1 Channel Functional Test (1 hour after in Mode 2) 3.3.2.1.2 3.3.2.1.2 3.3.2.1.2 Channel Functional Test (1 hour after in Mode 1) 3.3.2.1.3 3.3.2.1.3 3.3.2.1.3 Verify the RBM 3.3.2.1.4 3.3.2.1.4 3.3.2.1.4 Verify the RWM 3.3.2.1.5 3.3.1.2.5 3.3.1.2.5 Channel Functional Test (1 hour after shutdown position) 3.3.2.1.6 3.3.2.1.6 3.3.2.1.6 Channel Calibration 3.3.2.1.7 3.3.2.1.7 3.3.2.1.7 Feedwater & Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrument 3.3.2.2 3.3.2.2 3.3.2.2 Perform Channel Check 3.3.2.2.1 Perform Channel Functional Test 3.3.2.2.2 3.3.2.2.1 3.3.2.2.1 Perform Channel Calibration 3.3.2.2.3 3.3.2.2.2 3.3.2.2.2 Perform Logic System Functional Test 3.3.2.2.4 3.3.2.2.3 3.3.2.2.3 PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 3.3.3.1 3.3.3.1 Perform Channel Check 3.3.3.1.1 3.3.3.1.1 3.3.3.1.1 Perform Channel Calibration 3.3.3.1.2 3.3.3.1.2 3.3.3.1.2 Remote Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 3.3.3.2 3.3.3.2 Perform Channel Check 3.3.3.2.1 3.3.3.2.1 3.3.3.2.1 Verify each required control circuit and transfer switch 3.3.3.2.2 3.3.3.2.2 3.3.3.2.2 Perform Channel Calibration 3.3.3.2.3 3.3.3.2.3 3.3.3.2.3 EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 3.3.4.1 3.3.4.1 Perform Channel Functional Test 3.3.4.1.1 3.3.4.1.1 3.3.4.1.1 Calibrate the trip units 3.3.4.1.2 Perform Channel Calibration 3.3.4.1.3 3.3.4.1.3 3.3.4.1.3 Perform logic System Functional Test 3.3.4.1.4 3.3.4.1.4 3.3.4.1.4 Verify TSV, TCV, Trip Oil Pressure are not bypassed 3.3.4.1.5 3.3.4.1.2 3.3.4.1.2 Verify the EOC-RPT System Response Time is within limits 3.3.4.1.6 3.3.4.1.5 3.3.4.1.5 Determine RPT breaker interruption time 3.3.4.1.7 3.3.4.1.6 3.3.4.1.6 E9-2 Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description* 425 1 2 ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 3.3.4.2 3.3.4.2 Perform channel check 3.3.4.2.1 3.3.4.2.1 3.3.4.2.1 Perform channel functional test 3.3.4.2.2 3.3.4.2.2 3.3.4.2.2 Calibrate the trip units 3.3.4.2.3 Perform channel calibration 3.3.4.2.4 3.3.4.2.3 3.3.4.2.3 Perform logic system functional test 3.3.4.2.5 3.3.4.2.4 3.3.4.2.4 ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 3.3.5.1 3.3.5.1 Perform channel check 3.3.5.1.1 3.3.5.1.1 3.3.5.1.1 Perform channel functional test 3.3.5.1.2 3.3.5.1.2 3.3.5.1.2 Calibrate the trip unit 3.3.5.1.3 Perform channel functional test 3.3.5.1.3 3.3.5.1.3 Perform channel calibration 3.3.5.1.4 3.3.5.1.4 3.3.5.1.4 Perform channel calibration 3.3.5.1.5 Perform logic system functional test 3.3.5.1.6 3.3.5.1.5 3.3.5.1.5 Verify the ECCS Response time is within limits 3.3.5.1.7 RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 3.3.5.2 3.3.5.2 Perform channel check 3.3.5.2.1 3.3.5.2.1 3.3.5.2.1 Perform channel functional test 3.3.5.2.2 3.3.5.2.2 3.3.5.2.2 Calibrate the trip units 3.3.5.2.3 Perform channel calibration 3.3.5.2.4 Perform channel functional test 3.3.5.2.3 3.3.5.2.3 Perform channel calibration 3.3.5.2.5 3.3.5.2.4 3.3.5.2.4 Perform logic system functional test 3.3.5.2.6 3.3.5.2.5 3.3.5.2.5 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3.6.1 3.3.6.1 Perform channel check 3.3.6.1.1 3.3.6.1.1 3.3.6.1.1 Perform channel functional test 3.3.6.1.2 3.3.6.1.2 3.3.6.1.2 Calibrate the trip unit 3.3.6.1.3 Perform channel calibration 3.3.6.1.4 3.3.6.1.3 3.3.6.1.3 Perform channel functional test 3.3.6.1.5 Perform channel calibration 3.3.6.1.6 3.3.6.1.4 3.3.6.1.4 Perform channel calibration 3.3.6.1.5 3.3.6.1.5 Perform logic system functional test 3.3.6.1.7 3.3.6.1.6 3.3.6.1.6 Verify isolation system response time is within limits 3.3.6.1.8


3.3.6.1.7 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 3.3.6.2 3.3.6.2 Perform channel check 3.3.6.2.1 3.3.6.2.1 3.3.6.2.1 Perform channel functional test 3.3.6.2.2 3.3.6.2.2 3.3.6.2.2 Calibrate the trip unit 3.3.6.2.3 Perform channel calibration 3.3.6.2.4 3.3.6.2.3 3.3.6.2.3 Perform channel calibration 3.3.6.2.5 3.3.6.2.4 3.3.6.2.4 Perform logic system functional test 3.3.6.2.6 3.3.6.2.5 3.3.6.2.5 Verify the isolation system response time is within limits 3.3.6.2.7 LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 3.3.6.3 3.3.6.3 Perform channel check 3.3.6.3.1 3.3.6.3.1 3.3.6.3.1 Perform channel functional test for portion (outside) 3.3.6.3.2 3.3.6.3.2 3.3.6.3.2 E9-3 Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups'Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description* 425 1 2 Perform channel functional test for portion (inside) 3.3.6.3.3 3.3.6.3.3 3.3.6.3.3 Perform channel functional test 3.3.6.3.4 3.3.6.3.4 3.3.6.3.4 Calibrate the trip unit 3.3.6.3.5 Perform channel calibration 3.3.6.3.6 3.3.6.3.5 3.3.6.3.5 Perform logic system functional test 3.3.6.3.7 3.3.6.3.6 3.3.6.3.6 MCREC System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 3.3.7.1 3.3.7.1 Perform channel check 3.3.7.1.1 3.3.7.1.1 3.3.7.1.1 Perform channel functional test 3.3.7.1.2 3.3.7.1.2 3.3.7.1.2 Calibrate the trip units 3.3.7.1.3 Perform channel calibration 3.3.7.1.4 3.3.7.1.3 3.3.7.1.3 Perform logic system functional test 3.3.7.1.5 3.3.7.1.4 3.3.7.1.4 LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 3.3.8.1 3.3.8.1 Perform channel check 3.3.8.1.1 3.3.8.1.1 3.3.8.1.1 Perform channel functional test 3.3.8.1.2 3.3.8.1.2 3.3.8.1.2 Perform channel calibration 3.3.8.1.3 3.3.8.1.3 3.3.8.1.3 Perform logic system functional test 3.3.8.1.4 3.3.8.1.4 3.3.8.1.4 RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 3.3.8.2 3.3.8.2 Perform channel functional test 3.3.8.2.1 3.3.8.2.1 3.3.8.2.1 Perform channel calibration 3.3.8.2.2 3.3.8.2.2 3.3.8.2.2 Perform a system functional test 3.3.8.2.3 3.3.8.2.3 3.3.8.2.3 Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 3.4.1 3.4.1 Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch 3.4.1.1 3.4.1.1 3.4.1.1 Jet Pumps 3.4.2 3.4.2 3.4.2 Verify for each circulation loop 3.4.2.1 3.4.2.1 3.4.2.1 S/RVs 3.4.3 3.4.3 3.4.3 Verify the function safety function lift setpoints of the S/RVs 3.4.3.1 3.4.3.1 ** 3.4.3.1"*Verify each required S/RV opens when manually actuated 3.4.3.2 RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 3.4.4 3.4.4 Verify RCS unidentified and total/unidentified LEKAGE 3.4.4.1 3.4.4.1 3.4.4.1 RCS PIV Leakage 3.4.5 Verify equivalent leakage of each RCS PIV 3.4.5.1 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 3.4.6 3.4.5 3.4.5 Perform a channel check 3.4.6.1 3.4.5.1 3.4.5.1 Perform a channel functional test 3.4.6.2 3.4.5.2 3.4.5.2 Perform a channel calibration 3.4.6.3 3.4.5.3 3.4.5.3 RCS Specific Activity 3.4.7 3.4.6 3.4.6 Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 3.4.7.1 3.4.6.1 3.4.6.1 RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Hot Shutdown 3.4.8 3.4.7 3.4.7 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem 3.4.8.1 3.4.7.1 3.4.7.1 RHR Shutdown Cooling System -Cold Shutdown 3.4.9 3.4.8 3.4.8 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem 3.4.9.1 3.4.8.1 3.4.8.1 RCS P/T Limits 3.4.10 3.4.9 3.4.9 Verify RCS pressure, temperature, heatup/cooldown (PTLR) 3.4.10.1 Verify reactor vessel flange and head flange (PTLR)(tensioning) 3.4.10.7 Verify reactor vessel flange and head flange (PTLR)(30 min.) 3.4.10.8 E9-4 Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit I and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description* 425 1 2 Verify reactor vessel flange and head flange (PTLR)(30 min.) 3.4.10.8 Verify reactor vessel flange and head flange (PTLR)(MODE

4) 3.4.10.9 Verify RCS pressure, temperature, heatup/cooldown (spec) 3.4.9.1 3.4.9.1 Verify reactor vessel flange and head flange 3.4.9.5 3.4.9.5 Verify reactor vessel flange and head flange temperatures 3.4.9.6 3.4.9.6 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure 3.4.11 3.4.10 3.4.10 Verify reactor steam dome pressure 3.4.11.1 3.4.10.1 3.4.10.1 ECCS -Operating 3.5.1 3.5.1 3.5.1 Verify for each ECCS injection/spray subsystem the piping 3.5.1.1 3.5.1.1 3.5.1.1 Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power 3.5.1.2 3.5.1.2 3.5.1.2 Verify ADS air supply header pressure 3.5.1.3 3.5.1.3 3.5.1.3 Verify the RHR System cross tie value is closed 3.5.1.4 3.5.1.4 3.5.1.4 Verify each LPCI Inverter output voltage 3.5.1.5 Verify each recirculation pump discharge valve 3.5.1.6 3.5.1.6 3.5.1.6 Verify the following ECCS pumps develop specified flow rate 3.5.1.7 3.5.1.7**

3.5.1.7**Verify reactor pressure and HPCI pump can develop flow rate 3.5.1.8 3.5.1.8 3.5.1.8 Verify reactor pressure and HPCI pump can develop flow rate 3.5.1.9 3.5.1.9 3.5.1.9 Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates 3.5.1.10 3.5.1.10 3.5.1.10 Verify the ADS actuates on an actual or simulated signal 3.5.1.11 3.5.1.11 3.5.1.11 Verify each ADS valve relief mode actuator strokes 3.5.1.12 3.5.1.12 Verify each ADS valve opens when manually actuated 3.5.1.12 Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem ECCS response -------------------- 3.5.1.13 ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.2 3.5.2 3.5.2 Verify the suppression pool water level 3.5.2.1 3.5.2.1 3.5.2.1 Verify for each require core spray (CS) subsystem 3.5.2.2 3.5.2.2 3.5.2.2 Verify the piping is filled with water 3.5.2.3 3.5.2.3 3.5.2.3 Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem position 3.5.2.4 3.5.2.4 3.5.2.4 Verify each required ECCS pump develops flow rate 3.5.2.5 3.5.2.5** 3.5.2.5**Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates 3.5.2.6 3.5.2.6 3.5.2.6 RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5.3 3.5.3 Verify the RCIC System piping is filled with water 3.5.3.1 3.5.3.1 3.5.3.1 Verify each RCIC System manual, power, automatic 3.5.3.2 3.5.3.2 3.5.3.2 Verify the RCIC pump can develop a flow rate 3.5.3.3 3.5.3.3 3.5.3.3 Verify the RCIC pump can develop a flow rate 3.5.3.4 3.5.3.4 3.5.3.4 Verify the RCIC System actuates on signal 3.5.3.5 3.5.3.5 3.5.3.5 Primary Containment 3.6.1.1 3.6.1.1 3.6.1.1 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure 3.6.1.1.2 3.6.1.1.2 3.6.1.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 3.6.1.2 3.6.1.2 Verify only one door in the primary containment air lock 3.6.1.2.2 3.6.1.2.2 3.6.1.2.2 PCIVs 3.6.1.3 3.6.1.3 3.6.1.3 Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge valve is sealed 3.6.1.3.1 Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge valve is closed 3.6.1.3.2 3.6.1.3.1 3.6.1.3.1 Verify primary containment isolation manual valve (outside) 3.6.1.3.3 3.6.1.3.2 3.6.1.3.2 Verify continuity of TIP shear isolation valve explosive charge 3.6.1.3.5 3.6.1.3.4 3.6.1.3.4 Verify isolation time of each power operated automatic PCIV 3.6.1.3.6 3.6.1.3.5** 3.6.1.3.5** E9-5 Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description* 425 1 2 Perform leakage rate testing for primary containment purges 3.6.1.3.7 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV 3.6.1.3.8 3.6.1.3.6** 3.6.1.3.6** Verify each automatic PCIV actuates to isolation position 3.6.1.3.9 3.6.1.3.7 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFC 3.6.1.3.10 3.6.1.3.8 3.6.1.3.8 Remove and test the explosive squib 3.6.1.3.11 3.6.1.3.9 3.6.1.3.9 Verify each [ ] inch primary containment purge valve is blocked 3.6.1.3.15 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper 3.6.1.3.13 Drywell Pressure 3.6.1.4 3.6.1.4 3.6.1.4 Verify drywell pressure is within limit 3.6.1.4.1 3.6.1.4.1 3.6.1.4.1 Drywell Air Temperature 3.6.1.5 3.6.1.5 3.6.1.5 Verify drywell average air temperature is within limit 3.6.1.5.1 3.6.1.5.1 3.6.1.5.1 LLS Valves 3.6.1.6 3.6.1.6 3.6.1.6 Verify each LLS valve opens when manually actuated 3.6.1.6.1 3.6.1.6.1 3.6.1.6.1 Verify the LLS System actuates on a signal 3.6.1.6.2 3.6.1.6.2 3.6.1.6.2 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.7 3.6.1.7 3.6.1.7 Verify each vacuum breaker is closed 3.6.1.7.1 3.6.1.7.1 3.6.1.7.1 Perform a functional test of each vacuum breaker 3.6.1.7.2 3.6.1.7.2** 3.6.1.7.2** Verify the opening setpoint of each vacuum breaker 3.6.1.7.3 3.6.1.7.3 3.6.1.7.3 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.8 3.6.1.8 3.6.1.8 Verify each vacuum breaker is closed 3.6.1.8.1 3.6.1.8.1 3.6.1.8.1 Perform a functional test of each required vacuum breaker 3.6.1.8.2 3.6.1.8.2 3.6.1.8.2 Verify the opening setpoint of each required vacuum breaker 3.6.1.8.3 3.6.1.8.3 3.6.1.8.3 MSIV LCS 3.6.1.9 3.6.1.9 3.6.1.9 Operate each MSIV LCS blower 3.6.1.9.1 Verify electrical continuity of each inboard MSIV LCS 3.6.1.9.2 subsystem Perform a system functional test of each MSIV LCS subsystem 3.6.1.9.3 Suppression Pool Average Temperature 3.6.2.1 3.6.2.1 3.6.2.1 Verify suppression pool average temperature is within limits 3.6.2.1.1 3.6.2.1.1 3.6.2.1.1 Suppression Pool Water Level 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.2 Verify suppression pool water level is within limits 3.6.2.2.1 3.6.2.2.1 3.6.2.2.1 RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 3.6.2.3 3.6.2.3 Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem 3.6.2.3.1 3.6.2.3.1 3.6.2.3.1 Verify each RHR pump develops a flow rate 3.6.2.3.2 RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 3.6.2.4 3.6.2.4 Verify each RHR suppression pool spray subsystem 3.6.2.4.1 3.6.2.4.1 3.6.2.4.1 Verify each RHR pump develops a flow rate 3.6.2.4.2 Verify each suppression pool spray nozzle is unobstructed 3.6.2.4.2 3.6.2.4.2 Drywell-to-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure 3.6.2.5 Verify drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure 3.6.2.5.1 Drywell Cooling System Fans 3.6.3.1 3.6.3.3 3.6.3.3 Operate each required drywell cooling system fan 3.6.3.1.1 3.6.3.3.1 3.6.3.3.1 Verify each required drywell cooling system fan flow rate 3.6.3.1.2 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration 3.6.3.2 3.6.3.2 3.6.3.2 Verify primary containment oxygen concentration is within limits 3.6.3.2.1 3.6.3.2.1 3.6.3.2.1 E9-6 Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description* 425 1 2 CAD System 3.6.3.3 3.6.3.1 Verify liquid nitrogen is contained in the CAD System 3.6.3.3.1 Verify each CAD subsystem manual, power, and automatic 3.6.3.3.2 3.6.3.1.2 Verify > 2000 gal of liquid nitrogen are contained 3.6.3.1.1 Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 3.6.4.1 3.6.4.1 Verify secondary containment vacuum 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed 3.6.4.1.2 3.6.4.1.1 3.6.4.1.1 Verify one secondary containment access door 3.6.4.1.3 3.6.4.1.2 3.6.4.1.2 Verify secondary containment can be drawn down 3.6.4.1.4 Verify the secondary containment can be maintained 3.6.4.1.5 Verify required SGT subsystems can be drawn down 3.6.4.1.3 3.6.4.1.3 Verify required SGT subsystems can be maintained 3.6.4.1.4 3.6.4.1.4 SCIVs 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.2 Verify each secondary containment isolation manual valve 3.6.4.2.1 3.6.4.2.1 3.6.4.2.1 Verify the isolation time of each power operated, auto SCIV 3.6.4.2.2 3.6.4.2.2 3.6.4.2.2 Verify each automatic SCIV actuates to the isolation position 3.6.4.2.3 3.6.4.2.3 3.6.4.2.3 SGT System 3.6.4.3 3.6.4.3 3.6.4.3 Operate each SGT subsystem with heaters operating 3.6.4.3.1 3.6.4.3.1 3.6.4.3.1 Verify each SGT subsystem actuates 3.6.4.3.3 3.6.4.3.3 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each SGT fiber cooler bypass damper can be opened 3.6.4.3.4 RHRSW System 3.7.1 3.7.1 3.7.1 Verify each RHRSW manual, power, and automatic valve 3.7.1.1 3.7.1.1 3.7.1.1 PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 3.7.2 3.7.2 Verify the water level of each PSW cooling tower basin 3.7.2.1 Verify the water level of each PSW pump well of the intake 3.7.2.2 3.7.2.1 3.7.2.1 Verify the average water temperature of UHS 3.7.2.3 Operate each PSW cooling tower fan 3.7.2.4 Verify each PSW subsystem manual, power, and automatic 3.7.2.5 3.7.2.2 3.7.2.2 Verify each PSW subsystem actuates 3.7.2.3 3.7.2.3 DG 1B SSW System 3.7.3 3.7.3 3.7.3 Verify each DG 1B SSW System manual, power, automatic 3.7.3.1 3.7.3.1 3.7.3.1 Verify the DG 1 B SSW System pump starts automatically 3.7.3.2 3.7.3.2 3.7.3.2 MCREC System 3.7.4 3.7.4 3.7.4 Operate each MCREC subsystem 3.7.4.1 3.7.4.1 3.7.4.1 Verify each MCREC subsystem actuates 3.7.4.3 3.7.4.3 3.7.4.3 Verify MCREC subsystem can maintain a positive pressure 3.7.4.4 3.7.4.4 3.7.4.4 Control Room AC System 3.7.5 3.7.5 3.7.5 Verify each control room AC subsystem can remove heat load 3.7.5.1 3.7.5.1 3.7.5.1 Main Condenser Offgas 3.7.6 3.7.6 3.7.6 Verify the gross gamma activity rate of the noble gasses 3.7.6.1 3.7.6.1 3.7.6.1 Main Turbine Bypass System 3.7.7 3.7.7 3.7.7 Verify one complete cycle of each main turbine bypass valve 3.7.7.1 3.7.7.1 3.7.7.1 Perform a system functional test 3.7.7.2 3.7.7.2 3.7.7.2 Verify the turbine bypass system response time 3.7.7.3 3.7.7.3 3.7.7.3 E9-7 Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit I and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description* 425 1 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.8 3.7.8 3.7.8 Verify the spent fuel storage pool water level 3.7.8.1 3.7.8.1 3.7.8.1 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 3.8.1 3.8.1 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power 3.8.1.1 3.8.1.1 3.8.1.1 availability Verify each DG starts from standby conditions 3.8.1.2 3.8.1.2 3.8.1.2 Verify each DG is synchronized and loaded and operates 3.8.1.3 3.8.1.5 3.8.1.5 Verify each day tank contains fuel oil 3.8.1.4 3.8.1.3 3.8.1.3 Check for and remove accumulated water from each day tank 3.8.1.5 3.8.1.4 3.8.1.4 Verify the fuel oil transfer system operates to transfer fuel oil 3.8.1.6 Verify each DG starts from standby conditions 3.8.1.7 Verify automatic and manual transfer of unit power supply 3.8.1.8 3.8.1.6 3.8.1.6 Verify each DG rejects a load 3.8.1.9 3.8.1.7 3.8.1.7 Verify each DG does not trip and voltage is maintained 3.8.1.10 3.8.1.8 3.8.1.8 Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal 3.8.1.11 3.8.1.9 3.8.1.9 Verify on actual or simulated ECCS signal each DG auto-start 3.8.1.12 3.8.1.10 3.8.1.10 Verify each DG's automatic trips are bypassed 3.8.1.13 3.8.1.11 3.8.1.11 Verify each DG operates 3.8.1.14 3.8.1.12 3.8.1.12 Verify each DG starts and achieves steady state voltage 3.8.1.15 3.8.1.13 3.8.1.13 Verify each DG synchronizes, transfers, runs to ready-to-load 3.8.1.16 3.8.1.14 3.8.1.14 Verify a DG operating in test mode an ECCS signal overrides 3.8.1.17 3.8.1.15 3.8.1.15 Verify interval between each sequences load block 3.8.1.18 3.8.1.16 3.8.1.16 Verify de-energization, load shedding, and DG auto-start 3.8.1.19 3.8.1.17 3.8.1.17 Verify DG achieves voltage and frequency 3.8.1.20 3.8.1.18 3.8.1.18 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 3.8.3 3.8.3 Verify each fuel oil storage tank contains fuel 3.8.3.1 3.8.3.1 3.8.3.1 Verify lube oil inventory 3.8.3.2 3.8.3.2 3.8.3.2 Verify each Dg air start receiver pressure 3.8.3.4 3.8.3.4 3.8.3.4 Check for and remove accumulated water from each fuel tank 3.8.3.5 3.8.3.6 3.8.3.6 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer (automatic) 3.8.3.5 3.8.3.5 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer (manual) 3.8.3.7 3.8.3.7 DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 3.8.4 3.8.4 Verify battery terminal voltage 3.8.4.1 3.8.4.1 3.8.4.1 Verify each required battery charger 3.8.4.2 3.8.4.6 3.8.4.6 Verify battery capacity is adequate 3.8.4.3 3.8.4.7 3.8.4.7 Verify no visible corrosion at battery terminals and connecters


3.8.4.2 3.8.4.2 Verify battery cells, cell plates, and racks show no damage 3.4.8.3 3.4.8.3 Remove visible corrosion and verify anti-corrosion material 3.8.4.4 3.8.4.4 Verify battery connection resistance 3.8.4.5 3.8.4.5 Verify Battery capacity 3.8.4.8 3.8.4.8 Battery Parameters 3.8.6 ............ Verify each battery float current 3.8.6.1 Verify each battery pilot cell voltage 3.8.6.2 Verify each battery connected cell electrolyte level 3.8.6.3 Verify each battery pilot cell temperature 3.8.6.4 E9-8 Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit I and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description* 425 1 2 Verify each battery connected cell voltage 3.8.6.5 Verify battery capacity 3.8.6.6 Inverters -Operating

3.8.7 Verify

correct inverter voltage, frequency, and alignment 3.8.7.1 Inverters -Shutdown 3.8.8 Verify correct inverter voltage, frequency, and alignment 3.8.8.1 Battery Cell Parameters 3.8.6 3.8.6 Verify battery cell parameters (Category A) 3.8.6.1 3.8.6.1 Verify battery cell parameters (Category B) 3.8.6.2 3.8.6.2 Verify average electrolyte temperature 3.8.6.3 3.8.6.3 Distribution Systems -Operating 3.8.9 3.8.7 3.8.7 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage 3.8.9.1 3.8.7.1 3.8.7.1 Distribution Systems -Shutdown 3.8.10 3.8.8 3.8.8 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage 3.8.10.1 3.8.8.1 3.8.8.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks 3.9.1 3.9.1 3.9.1 Perform channel functional test 3.9.1.1 3.9.1.1 3.9.1.1 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock 3.9.2 3.9.2 3.9.2 Verify reactor mode switch locked in refuel position 3.9.2.1 3.9.2.1 3.9.2.1 Perform channel functional test 3.9.2.2 3.9.2.2 3.9.2.2 Control Rod Position 3.9.3 3.9.3 3.9.3 Verify all control rods are fully inserted 3.9.3.1 3.9.3.1 3.9.3.1 Control Rod OPERABILITY -Refueling 3.9.5 3.9.5 3.9.5 Insert each withdrawn control rod at least one notch 3.9.5.1 3.9.5.1 3.9.5.1 Verify each withdrawn control rod scram accumulator pressure 3.9.5.2 3.9.5.2 3.9.5.2 RPV Water Level -Irradiated Fuel 3.9.6 3.9.6 3.9.6 Verify RPV water level 3.9.6.1 3.9.6.1 3.9.6.1 RPV Water Level -New Fuel or Control Rods 3.9.7 3.9.6 3.9.6 Verify RPV water level 3.9.6.1 3.9.6.1 3.9.6.1 RHR -High Water Level 3.9.8 3.9.7 3.9.7 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating 3.9.8.1 3.9.7.1 3.9.7.1 RHR -Low Water Level 3.9.9 3.9.8 3.9.8 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating 3.9.9.1 3.9.8.1 3.9.8.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing 3.10.2 3.10.2 3.10.2 Verify all control rods are fully inserted 3.10.2.1 3.10.2.1 3.10.2.1 Verify no CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress 3.10.2.2 3.10.2.2 3.10.2.2 Single Control Rod Withdrawal -Hot Shutdown 3.10.3 3.10.3 3.10.3 Verify all control rods are disarmed 3.10.3.2 3.10.3.2 3.10.3.2 Verify all control rods are fully inserted 3.10.3.3 3.10.3.3 3.10.3.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal -Cold Shutdown 3.10.4 3.10.4 3.10.4 Verify all control rods are disarmed 3.10.4.2 3.10.4.2 3.10.4.2 Verify all control rods are fully inserted 3.10.4.3 3.10.4.3 3.10.4.3 Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted 3.10.4.4 3.10.4.4 3.10.4.4 Single CRD Removal -Refueling 3.10.5 3.10.5 3.10.5 Verify all control rods are fully inserted 3.10.5.1 3.10.5.1 3.10.5.1 E9-9 Enclosure 9 Technical Specification Cross Reference for HNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 and TSTF 425 Mark ups Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF- HNP Unit HNP Unit Description* 425 1 2 Verify all control rods are disarmed 3.10.5.2 3.10.5.2 3.10.5.2 Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted 3.10.5.3 3.10.5.3 3.10.5.3 Verify no CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress 3.10.5.5 3.10.5.5 3.10.5.5 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal -Refueling 3.10.6 3.10.6 3.10.6 Verify the four fuel assemblies are removed 3.10.6.1 3.10.6.1 3.10.6.1 Verify all other control rods in core cells are inserted 3.10.6.2 3.10.6.2 3.10.6.2 Verify fuel assemblies being loaded are in compliance 3.10.6.3 3.10.6.3 3.10.6.3 SDM Test -Refueling 3.10.8 3.10.8 3.10.8 Verify no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress 3.10.8.4 3.10.8.4 3.10.8.4 Verify CRD charging water header pressure 3.10.8.6 3.10.8.6 3.10.8.6 Recirculation Loops -Testing 3.10.9 Verify LCO requirements 3.10.9.1 Verify thermal power during physics test 3.10.9.2 Training Startups 3.10.10 Verify all operable IRM channels 3.10.10.1 Verify average reactor coolant temperature 3.10.10.2* The Technical Specification (TS) Section Title/Surveillance Description portion of this Enclosure is a summary description of the referenced TSTF 425/ HNP TS Surveillances which is provided for information purposes only and is not intended to be a verbatim description of the TS Surveillances.

    • This HNP Surveillance Frequency is provided in the HNP Inservice Testing Porgram. This HNP Surveillance Frequency is not proposed for inclusion in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.E9-10}}