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The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Reactor type::GE-2]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.0369 seconds.


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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 531536 January 2018 06:05:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

Oyster Creek Declared an Unusual Event HU 6 Hazardous Event for an Abnormal Intake Structure Level Less than or equal to -3.0 feet MSL (Mean Sea Level) on points 23 and 24 in the Main Control Room at time 0524 (EST). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 1/6/18 AT 2325 EST FROM JAMES RITCHIE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Oyster Creek Terminated Unusual Event HU 6 Hazardous Event for an Abnormal Intake Structure Level at time 2308 (EST). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Werkheiser), NRR EO (King), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 529548 September 2017 12:49:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a prohibited substance during a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The individual's unescorted access to the plant has been removed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 529506 September 2017 15:41:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On September 6, 2017 at 1157 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram with a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and Containment isolation. The scram was due to reactor vessel low water level. The cause of the reactor vessel low water level is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser (EC) system. At 1205, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through the turbine bypass valves. All plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A): 1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 1157 and was reset at 1158 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. 2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1216. 3. Containment and MSIV isolation on reactor vessel low-low water level signal. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor vessel water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The main steam isolation valves were opened after the isolation signal cleared to facilitate decay heat removal. Offsite power is supplying all plant loads. There was no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified New York State Department of Environmental Protection and will be issuing a press release.
ENS 5286114 July 2017 21:44:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

Oyster Creek Generating Station has experienced a loss of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system due to an electrical perturbation. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the time TSC ventilation is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0537 EDT ON 07/15/17 FROM JIM RITCHIE TO S. SANDIN * * *

TSC ventilation was restored at 0128 EDT on 07/15/17. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

ENS 528393 July 2017 12:32:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2At 1015 (EDT) a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. All rods inserted into the core as expected and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' At 1033 (EDT) an automatic reactor scram occurred on low reactor water level. Due to the previous manual reactor scram, all rods were (already) inserted. This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation. (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including : Reactor scram and reactor trip.' Decay heat is being removed using main feedwater and the turbine bypass valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. This event was characterized as a "configuration control event" where a valve misposition allowed the offgas line to flood.
ENS 5274711 May 2017 13:21:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2Pursuant to 50.73(a)(1) the following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC. This notification, reported under 50.73(a)(2)(iv), is being provided in lieu of the submittal of a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system. On March 20, 2017 at 0216 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 reactor shutdown was in progress. The Unit 1 generator was off line, the 100 percent capacity 13 feedwater pump (13 FW) was removed from service, and the Unit 1 main turbine had been tripped appropriately per procedure while entering a planned refueling outage. At approximately 4 percent reactor power, a clearance tagging evolution was in progress to support shutdown activities. During this evolution a tag was applied that caused an unanticipated activation of a lock out (86) relay due to the failure to bypass this relay prior to the tag application. This 86 relay activation in turn resulted in a generator trip signal followed by a turbine trip signal. With the generator off line and the turbine already tripped there was no actual change in any plant parameter or condition that would have created a valid turbine trip signal and the associated HPCI initiation. The plant configuration at the time of the main turbine trip signal had one motor operated feedwater pump, 12 Feedwater Pump (12 FW), in service and providing normal reactor level control. HPCI did initiate as designed upon receiving the generator and main turbine trip signals caused by the activation of the 86 relay. The 12 FW pump, which was providing normal reactor level control, transitioned the level control from automatic mode into HPCI mode of operation. Per design, the 11 FW pump automatically started but was not required to and did not flow water since 12 FW pump was in operation. The 11 FW pump was subsequently secured by operations. At no point in time did the HPCI system receive a valid initiation signal (due to high DW pressure, low reactor water level, or a valid turbine trip with loss of the turbine driven 13 FW pump). Operators reset HPCI and returned water level to Automatic Control at 0218. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5267412 April 2017 21:06:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

Oyster Creek Generating Station has experienced a loss of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system due to charcoal filter test failure. A charcoal filter replacement is planned. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the time TSC ventilation is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedure unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 4/20/17 AT 1447 EDT FROM JIM RITCHIE TO DONG PARK * * *

This is a retraction of ENS notification 52674. After further testing and evaluation, the station concluded that the TSC Ventilation Charcoal filter met the acceptance criteria, and the TSC Ventilation was not inoperable at the moment the original ENS notification was performed. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Arner).

ENS 5262420 March 2017 04:40:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On March 20, 2017 at 0227, Nine Mile Point Unit1 was manually scrammed due to pressure oscillations. The Unit was offline and reactor shutdown was in-progress at the time of the scram. The scram was inserted at approximately 4% reactor power when pressure oscillations occurred exceeding the procedurally required limit for pressure oscillations. The cause of the scram was due to Operators manually inserting the scram. The cause of the pressure oscillations is being investigated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Gray).
ENS 5246529 December 2016 09:25:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

Oyster Creek Generating Station has experienced a loss of the TSC (Technical Support Center) ventilation system. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the time TSC ventilation is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedure unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a potential loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATED FROM JOSH MCGUIRE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1521 EST ON 12/30/16 * * *

At 1410 EST on 12/30/16, maintenance is complete and the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl).

ENS 5242510 December 2016 12:31:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On December 10, 2016 at 0848 EST, (operators at) Nine Mile Point Unit 1 manually scrammed the reactor due to high vibrations on the Main Turbine. Cause of the high vibrations is being investigated. Following the scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI system actuation signal on low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system. At 0849, RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point and the HPCI system initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the turbine bypass valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic relief valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the state of New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5238120 November 2016 06:01:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2At 0342 EST, an automatic reactor scram was processed during turbine valve testing. All rods inserted into the core as expected and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. The event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The plant response to the reactor scram was uncomplicated. The main feedwater system is maintaining reactor water level and decay heat is being removed by the main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. The unit is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. No SRVs lifted during the scram. The licensee was testing the main turbine trip function just prior to the scram. The cause is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 522309 September 2016 12:55:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2Oyster Creek Nuclear Station made notifications to local authorities that a sewage radiation monitor was out of service due to an equipment deficiency for greater than 24 hours. Alternate sampling methods are being utilized. The licensee notified Ocean County Utilities Commission, Lacey Municipal Utilities, and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5213329 July 2016 06:51:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On 7/28/2016 at 2357 EDT, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 experienced a fault in the in-service 11 RPS UPS (Reactor Protective System Ultimate Power Supply), resulting in an isolation of both emergency condensers. Emergency condenser 12 was returned to standby on 7/29/2016 at 0041 EDT and emergency condenser 11 was returned to standby on 7/29/2016 at 0045 EDT. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) which states, 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (B) Remove residual heat.' The state of New York and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector were informed.
ENS 5209618 July 2016 14:48:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5

This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which states, 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' On 07-18-2016 at 0730 (EDT), both Control Rooms were notified by the Emergency Preparedness Manager, that the Everbridge Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification System may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. This constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability. The Everbridge vendor is working to resolve the issue. Compensatory measures are in place. All ERO personnel received the page but not all received the notification within the required ten minutes. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1728 EDT ON 7/20/2016 FROM CLARK WILLETT TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Everbridge System was restored and retested at 1930 EDT on 7-19-2016 to provide offsite communications capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state. Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco).

ENS 5203021 June 2016 18:12:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2Today at 1646 EDT a reportable spill of approximately 1 liter of Sodium Hypochlorite 15 percent solution reached the soils of New Jersey. The leak was able to be isolated and the area is being cleaned up. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi) any event or situation related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The licensee notified the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 519691 June 2016 14:33:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) experienced a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building (RB) airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1046 (EDT) on 06/01/16, both RB airlock doors were opened simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This resulted in Secondary Containment being declared Inoperable (TS 3.4.3). The airlock doors were closed and Secondary Containment was restored to Operable. The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the State of New York.
ENS 518961 May 2016 12:25:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5
On May 1, 2016, at 0847 (EDT), an individual experienced a personal medical emergency during a break. The onsite fire brigade and emergency medical technicians administered first aid, but the individual was unresponsive. The individual was transported to the local hospital. The station was notified at 1008 that the hospital has declared the individual deceased. The individual was outside of the radiological controlled area and not contaminated. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is shut down for the scheduled refueling outage. The individual was a contractor employee. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The State of New York will be notified.
ENS 5189530 April 2016 19:14:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2Today at 1804 EDT, a manual scram was processed during startup due to rising unidentified leak rate. The rise in unidentified leak rate was identified to be coming from the D Reactor Recirc Pump seal cavity. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. The event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The reactor is stable in hot shutdown. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5172310 February 2016 06:29:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5
At approximately 0354 (EST) on 2/10/2016, the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Control Room was notified by Exelon Emergency Preparedness of the inadvertent actuation of one Oswego County Notification Siren at approximately 0247 on 2/10/2016. It is unknown at this time why the inadvertent alarm occurred. Siren repair personnel (ANS Services) have been dispatched to isolate the siren and begin repair work. The siren has been silenced. Alternate notification of the public in the area is through Hyper Reach. The Oswego County Emergency Management Office has issued a news release identifying the inadvertent actuation of the emergency siren. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5167723 January 2016 08:26:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

Oyster Creek Generating Station has experienced a loss of power to the Site Emergency Building, which renders the TSC ventilation system non-functional until power is restored. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the time TSC ventilation is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedure unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii) due to potential loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW KRUKOWSKI TO JEFF HERRERA AT 1121 EST ON 1/23/16 * * *

Due to a loss of power to the Site Emergency Building the Plant Process Computer needed to be secured. Due to the loss of the Plant Process Computer the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions are not available for communications to the NRC.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW KRUKOWSKI TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1446 EST ON 1/23/16 * * *

Power was restored to the Site Emergency Building. TSC Ventilation and the ERDS systems were returned to service at 1440 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray).

ENS 516344 January 2016 08:14:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2The NJ DEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) was contacted due to a coolant leak from our Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) that reached the waters of New Jersey. The coolant contains a hazardous substance per NJAC 7:1 E. The EDG has been removed from service for repairs. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 514453 October 2015 14:46:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2A non-licensed supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been restricted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 513694 September 2015 12:58:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On September 4, 2015, at 0916 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram following Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure and isolation of both main steam lines. The cause of the MSIV closure is not known at this time. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser system. At 0950, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) 01-02 and 01-04. MSIV 01-03 would not reopen. All other plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)." The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). 1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 0916 and reset at 0917 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI initiated and was reset a second time at 0922. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. 2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1033. 3. The Emergency Condenser (EC) system actuated to control pressure. EC-11 was secured at 0917. EC-12 was secured at 0921 . The maximum shell temperature of EC system was 193 degrees Fahrenheit. 4. Containment Isolation actuation. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Since the scram, there have been no anomalies observed with feedwater system operation. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The Reactor is being supplied by the normal feedwater system and there was indication of a partial lift/reset on one Electrometric Relief Valve (ERV). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 512895 August 2015 16:22:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) experienced a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building (RB) airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1252 (EDT) on 08/05/15, both RB airlock doors were opened simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This resulted in Secondary Containment being declared inoperable (TS 3.4.3). Secondary Containment was restored to operable when the doors were closed. The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee also notified the State of New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 511081 June 2015 06:57:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

A planned maintenance evolution at the Oyster Creek Generating Station has removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system from service. The TSC ventilation system will be rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be out of service for approximately sixteen hours and will return to service at approximately 2200 (EDT) June 1, 2015. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to potential loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOSHUA MCGUIRE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2324 EDT ON 6/1/15 * * *

At 2240 EDT on 6/1/15, the TSC ventilation system was restored. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Powell).

ENS 510557 May 2015 18:55:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2Today at 1727 EDT, an automatic scram from a turbine trip occurred. The cause of the turbine trip is currently under investigation. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. The event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. Plant response to the scram was uncomplicated and the plant is stable in Mode 3. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5091622 March 2015 15:17:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2RPS Actuation (scram) on a Hi-Hi APRM (average power range monitor) signal (which) occurred due to a pressure spike following a failure of the EPR (Electric Pressure Regulator). All Rods Inserted. All systems responded normally. No other safety system actuations occurred. Plant will proceed to a cold shut down condition. The plant is in a normal electrical lineup. Core cooling is being maintained by the bypass valves to the condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local and state governments. A press release is planned by the licensee.
ENS 5090919 March 2015 22:45:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves. On January 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) received a partial primary containment isolation signal which resulted in the closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in the following systems: Containment Monitoring System Drywell floor drain sump and Drywell equipment drain sump All affected PCIVs responded as designed. The containment isolation signal was generated due to the failure of a relay for Hi Drywell Pressure on Channel 11 during surveillance testing of the same relay on Channel 12. Drywell pressure was reading normal at the time of the relay failure. Since the isolation signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid. The event was entered into the corrective action program as Issue Report 02440213. The moveable contacts on the failed relay were replaced and retested satisfactorily. There were no safety consequences and no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 508603 March 2015 15:18:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 0837 (EST) on 03/03/2015, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for approximately 2 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified. The licensee notified the State of New York.
ENS 5081311 February 2015 23:15:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1941 EST on 02/11/2015, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for approximately 1 second. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified.
ENS 5060612 November 2014 14:42:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5
A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. His access to the facility was terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5055320 October 2014 16:32:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2At 1353 EDT on 10/20/2014, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for a few seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10CFR50.73(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5054216 October 2014 13:14:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1042 EDT on 10/16/2014, both Reactor Building airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. The licensee will be notifying the State of New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 5052412 October 2014 05:22:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

Today at approximately 0250 (EDT) (on 10/12/14), during a planned reactor power ascension with reactor power at approximately 1% of rated thermal power, reactor water level began lowering. Operators inserted a manual SCRAM at 0251 (EDT) in accordance with station procedures. The cause of the lowering reactor level is currently under investigation. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. No electromatic (EMRVs) or safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The plant is currently shutdown and plant parameters are stable. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' Decay heat is being released to the main condenser and normal offsite power is being maintained. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JOSH MCGUIRE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1520 EDT ON 10/17/2014 * * *

An automatic SCRAM occurred at 0251 EDT, moments before operators inserted a manual SCRAM in accordance with station procedures. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook).

ENS 5049525 September 2014 16:35:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2The following report was received via e-mail: This is a non-emergency notification from Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) required under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators. On June 20, 2014, during as-found bench (stroke) testing of the EMRV actuators removed from the plant during refueling outage 1R24 (October 2012), two of five EMRV actuators failed to operate. Subsequent inspection of these actuators found unexpected wear of the posts (grooves approximately 1/2 inch from the top), springs (thinned and broken at the top), and guides (grooves inside), with one spring having a piece axially wedged between the post and the guide. The root cause of this failure was determined to be the inadequate design of the EMRV actuators in that when placed in an environment where the actuator is subject to the vibration associated with plant operation, the allowed installation tolerances between posts and guides can create a condition where the springs can jam the actuator plunger assembly by wedging between the guides and the posts. If the EMRV actuators are set up in a condition where the posts are not optimally aligned, preferential wear of the post is observed due to interaction of the post, spring, and guide. Additionally, the vendor guidance for refurbishment of the EMRV actuator does not provide the necessary acceptance criteria for alignment of the posts to guides to ensure that the springs, posts, and guides do not interact in a way that causes preferential wear of the post allowing the jamming mechanism to exist. By OCNGS process, the EMRV actuators are refurbished with new springs, posts, guides, and microswitches every 24 months during refueling outages due to the known wear of these parts. The actuator inspection/refurbishment frequency of 24 months exceeds the manufacturer's (i.e., Dresser Industries) recommended frequency of 36 months (per Vendor Manual VM-OC-0030, Installation and Maintenance Manual for Electromatic Relief Valves, Revision 1, Section VII, Ref. 4.5). In addition, in 2008, the station implemented the manufacturer's recommended material changes intended to minimize part wear, and prevent potential actuator failures. Identification of Facility and Component: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station / Electromatic Relief Valve Actuator, Dresser Valve Type 6 inches Model 1525-VX Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier: Dresser Industries. Nature of Defect: Inadequate design of the EMRV actuators in that when placed in an environment where the actuator is subject to the vibration associated with plant operation, the allowed installation tolerances between posts and guides can create a condition where the springs can jam the actuator plunger assembly by wedging between the guides and the posts. Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause EMRV to be inoperable, which could result in a loss of safety function. Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/20/14 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation): 09/22/14 Recommended Actions: Change the design to mitigate the cause of the actuator parts (i.e., springs, guides and posts) interacting which results in unexpected wear due to vibration induced fretting. Number and Locations of All Defective Components: Two EMRVs located in the Drywell on the Main Steam piping. Any Advice Related to the Defect: Consider actuator design change if vibration conditions at the valve location results in unexpected wear of the EMRV actuators. Perform actuator as-found stroke testing before removal for refurbishment to determine in situ operability of the component. With current design, ensure posts are aligned such that preferential wear does not occur. Spring should be optimally centered on the guide and the post and guide should be equidistant around the full circumference of the bushing. Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc.): Sylvain L. Schwartz, Senior Staff Engineer, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Phone: (609) 971-4558, Email: sylvain.schwartz@exeloncorp.com The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Plants with similar Dresser EMRVs: Nine Mile Point, Quad Cities, and Dresden.
ENS 5047620 September 2014 07:42:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2At approximately 2359 EDT a temporary modification plug was found to be removed from a floor drain in the Outboard MSIV Room (Trunnion Room). The purpose of the temporary modification plug is to ensure that secondary containment remains intact during outages where the trunnion room door is required to be open. The trunnion room door was open when the plug was found to be removed. The plug was immediately reinstalled, restoring the safety function of the secondary containment. Per (10 CFR) 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Oyster Creek is reporting an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5039021 August 2014 12:04:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2

One of the 37 Prompt Notification System sirens surrounding the James A Fitzpatrick (JAF) / Nine Mile Point (NMP) sites spuriously activated at 0850 EDT. The Oswego County Emergency Operations Center notified Nine Mile Point via RECS (Radiological Emergency Communications System) that siren #13 had inadvertently activated. Repair technicians have de-activated and silenced the faulty siren as of 0943 EDT. Siren #13 is currently out of service and the backup method for siren #13 has been verified to be functional. The cause of the inadvertent siren activation is believed to be a lightning strike. The issue has been entered into the site's Corrective Action Program. The Oswego County Emergency Management Office issued a News Release identifying the inadvertent actuation of the emergency siren. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1247 EDT ON 8/23/14 FROM MARK GREER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

As of 0928 EDT on 08/23/2014, siren #13 has been repaired and returned to service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (McKinley).

ENS 5036314 August 2014 01:16:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 2318 (EDT) on 8/13/2014, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were open simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5027011 July 2014 05:17:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2Today at approximately 0312 (EDT on 7/11/14), during a planned reactor power ascension with reactor power at approximately 55 percent of rated thermal power, main condenser vacuum began to lower. In accordance with the abnormal operating procedure for degrading vacuum, Operators inserted a manual scram of the reactor at 0314 (EDT). The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. No electromatic (EMRVs) or safety relief valves lifted during the transient. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The scram was uncomplicated, normal offsite power is available, and plant is being cooled down to cold shutdown. The cause of the degraded condenser vacuum is suspected condenser boot degradation. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 502617 July 2014 22:12:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

On July 7, 2014 at approximately (2040 EDT), an issue was discovered with currently removed Electromatic Relief Valves (EMRVs) that calls the operability of the currently installed EMRVs into question. Based on this new information, all 5 of the currently installed EMRVs were conservatively declared inoperable. With the potential of 5 EMRVs inoperable a Technical Specification shutdown is required under Technical Specification 3.4.b, whereby reactor pressure shall be reduced to 110 psig or less within 24 hours. This event is immediately reportable under: 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.' 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'" The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the State of New Jersey and issue a press release.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1745 EDT ON 7/11/2014 FROM CHARLES SPAGNUOLO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The original concern and July 7, 2014 EN (report) was caused by abnormal wear found on removed Electromatic Relief Valve actuators. However, on July 8, 2014, upon completion of in situ testing as well as visual examination of the installed EMRV actuators, it was determined that the 5 currently installed EMRVs were fully operable and capable of performing their safety function. Therefore, Oyster Creek is retracting the notifications made under 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State will be notified. The licensee will be issuing a press release. Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco).

ENS 5022023 June 2014 09:20:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

A planned maintenance evolution at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station has removed the dedicated phone line between Emergency Response Facilities and the NARS (Nuclear Accident Reporting System) line from service and will be rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. Expected out of service time is approximately 82 hours from 0900 (EDT) 6/23/14 to 1900 (EDT) 6/26/14. If an emergency is declared requiring the use of emergency communication phone circuits a proceduralized alternative method will be used. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for planned maintenance that impacts the emergency communications capability. An update will be provided when the dedicated phone line between Emergency Response Facilities and the NARS line has been restored to normal operation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JOHN DEVENNEY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1738 EDT ON 06/25/2014 * * *

At 1700 EDT on 6/25/14 planned maintenance is complete and the dedicated phone line between Emergency Response Facilities and the NARS line has been restored to normal operation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Bickett)

ENS 5014528 May 2014 11:26:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

At 1037 EDT on May 28, 2014 an Unusual Event (EAL HU5) was declared due to a release of toxic gas that could have adversely affected plant operations. The leak was due to a leak in pipe containing water and chlorine. The pipe has been isolated and the leak has stopped. The chlorine smell was initially noticed at approximately 1008 EDT. The leak was coming from a buried underground pipe. There were no personnel injuries or medical response needed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities. The licensee plans on issuing a press release. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT SALES TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1202 EDT ON 5/28/14 * * *

At 1140 EDT on 5/28/14 Oyster Creek has exited the Unusual Event. The leak has been isolated and is not affecting normal plant operations. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities. The licensee plans on issuing a press release. Notified R1DO (Rogge), NRR EO (Chernoff), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS ASWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 500988 May 2014 20:57:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2A review of industry operating experience regarding the potential for secondary fires being caused by DC Motor control circuit wiring has determined the described condition to be applicable to Nine Mile Point Unit 1 resulting in a potentially unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design and configuration for the containment isolation valve IV-33-04 does not include separate over current protection for the power and control wiring. The only protection for the control circuit wiring is provided by the power circuit fuses. In the postulated event, a fire in the reactor building at the DC MOV could cause one of the control circuit wires to short and potentially over heat creating a secondary fire in the raceway system in a different fire zone. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. This event entered into the Nine Mile Point corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 2014-004630. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire zone inspections) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant. The licensee has notified the State and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 498694 March 2014 06:04:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

A planned maintenance evolution at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station has removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system from service. The TSC ventilation system will be rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be out of service for approximately twenty hours from 0500 (EST) to 2400, today, March 4, 2014. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to potential loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

 *  *  *  UPDATE AT 1532 ON 3/6/14 FROM SPAGNUOLO TO SNYDER  *  *  *

On 3/6/14 at 1532 EST the Technical Support Center was returned to service. Notified R1DO (Bower).

ENS 4985022 February 2014 19:32:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2

(The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) and Ocean County Health (Department were) notified of a spill of approximately 1 cup of hydraulic fluid (oil) that leaked from a vehicle and entered a storm drain at approximately 1615 (EST). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JEREMY SHARKEY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1954 EST ON 2/27/14 * * *

Upon subsequent review of the Material Safety Data Sheet associated with the fluid that leaked from the vehicle, it was determined that the fluid was not a hazardous substance as defined by the State of New Jersey (Appendix A of N.J.A.C. 7:1E). Additionally, it was determined that the fluid did not reach surface water. Based on this information, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) was notified that the fluid that leaked from the vehicle did not reach surface water and was not a hazardous substance. The NJDEP notification was updated for the record. For the above reasons, the 4 hour non-emergency ENS notification made under EN # 49850 is hereby retracted The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco).

ENS 497955 February 2014 15:28:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014, at 1130 EST, Oswego County notified Nine Mile Point (NMP) of a loss of the tone alert system at approximately 1000. The loss of the tone alert was identified by the National Weather Service - Binghamton forecast office when it was determined that the phone line to the site was out of service. Site Emergency Procedures define a loss of the tone alert system for greater than one hour as a significant loss of emergency communications. This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population for the NMP and JAF (James A. FitzPatrick) nuclear power plants. This failure meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures were verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper-reach system, which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. The county alert sirens, which also function as part of the public prompt notification system, remain operable. At 1328 on February 5, 2014, Nine Mile Point was notified by Oswego County that the tone alert system was returned to service, effective as of 1325. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.
ENS 4967726 December 2013 16:29:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On December 26, 2013 at 1301 EST, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) commenced a reactor shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.2.7.c as a result of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) 111 being declared inoperable due to a surveillance test failure when power was lost to the control circuit. The cause of the power loss was a blown fuse due to a short in the test circuitry. TS 3.2.7.c requires that a normal orderly shutdown be initiated within one hour and have the reactor in cold shutdown condition within ten hours. The blown fuse was replaced, test circuit isolated, power to the control circuit restored and MSIV 111 was declared operable at 1549 EST. Power ascension is in progress. Post maintenance operability test have been completed and the surveillance will be completed at a later time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.
ENS 4964818 December 2013 03:41:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2Pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), notifications are being performed for a valid actuation of the reactor protection system resulting in a full scram. The actuation was a result of the reactor mode switch being placed from the refuel position to the shutdown position without the scram bypass jumpers installed. The reactor was subcritical with all rods inserted at the time of the actuation. All systems functioned as designed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4963314 December 2013 06:57:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1GE-2Today at approximately 0337 (EST), during quarterly turbine valve testing with reactor power at 100% of rated thermal power, the plant experienced reactor pressure control abnormalities. Reactor pressure rose to 1042 psig (at which point) the Operators inserted a manual SCRAM. The cause of the rise in reactor pressure is currently under investigation. All control rods inserted into the core. Main steam isolation valves remained open, (however), bypass valves did not open as expected. The plant is in its normal electrical lineup and decay heat is being removed via isolation condensers. No electronic (EMRVs) or safety valves lifted during the transient. The plant is currently shutdown and all parameters are stable. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State.
ENS 495962 December 2013 16:52:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.