ENS 52419
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
03:37 Dec 9, 2016 | |
| Title | Hpci Surveillance Failure |
| Event Description | On 12/08/16 at approximately 2237 [EST], the Unit 2 HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] system failed to meet surveillance testing requirements for achieving rated flow at greater than or equal to a minimum test pressure established per the surveillance. Operations declared the HPCI system inoperable and entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition C for HPCI being inoperable. Other standby systems (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and low pressure emergency core cooling systems) are operable.
HPCI is a single train system. Therefore, per NUREG-1022, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system required to mitigate the consequences of a design event. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action program (IR 3951006). Investigation of the exact failure condition is in progress so that repairs can be made. At the surveillance flow of 5,000 gpm, the system was approximately 80 psi below the required pressure of 1,278 psi. Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition C, is a 14-day Limiting Condition of Operation. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The licensee provided the following information as the basis for retracting this report: This is a retraction of an event notification made on 12/09/16 at 0529 EST (EN #52419). This event was initially reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that, at the time of discovery, was believed to have prevented the fulfillment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system safety function. On 12/08/16 at 2237 EST, the Unit 2 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to failing to meet surveillance testing requirements for achieving rated flow at greater than or equal to a minimum test pressure established per the surveillance. Prompt troubleshooting was performed and it was determined that an adjustment to the HPCI turbine governor control system was required. This adjustment was performed and HPCI was returned to an operable status on 12/09/16. Subsequent to this occurrence, Engineering has completed an evaluation that concluded that HPCI was capable of fulfilling its safety function and that the associated Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.1.8 was met. The evaluation concluded that HPCI was degraded, but met the threshold for TS operability. The NRC Senior Resident has been informed of this retraction." Notified R1DO (Kennedy). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Peach Bottom  Pennsylvania (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.87 h0.0779 days <br />0.0111 weeks <br />0.00256 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Craig Taulman 05:29 Dec 9, 2016 |
| NRC Officer: | Karl Diederich |
| Last Updated: | Jan 19, 2017 |
| 52419 - NRC Website | |
Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |