ENS 40973
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
00:00 Aug 22, 2004 | |
| Title | Accident Mitigation - High Pressure Coolant Injection System Flow Controller Malfunction |
| Event Description | The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
[The] High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) flow controller malfunctioned resulting in the inability of the HPCI to perform its safety function as a single train system under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). The failure mode for the flow controller is suspected to be a power supply issue, however, the cause has not been confirmed at this time. Unit 2 is in a 14 day technical specification [T.S.] limitation which if exceed results in a unit shutdown ( T.S. 3.5.1 Condition C). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 8/22/04 at 0112 hours0.0013 days <br />0.0311 hours <br />1.851852e-4 weeks <br />4.2616e-5 months <br /> (EN 40973). Notification of the event to the NRC on 8/22/04 was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine control board checks of HPCI. Specifically, it was observed by the Reactor Operator that the HPCI flow controller would not properly respond to faceplate manipulations. Initially, it was believed that the flow controller power supply may have failed and therefore, the flow controller could not perform its intended function. The HPCI system was not operating at the time of the discovery. Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that the HPCI system was capable of performing its safety function. Although it was determined that the HPCI flow controller faceplate was defective, the set point of the flow controller and the flow controller's ability to automatically control system flow for a design basis event was not affected. A failure analysis of the faceplate was performed. It was determined that keypad contacts on the faceplate were the cause of the degraded faceplate function, but these keypad Contacts did not prevent the flow controller from performing its design function. The flow controller faceplate was replaced by 1410 hours0.0163 days <br />0.392 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.36505e-4 months <br /> on 8/22/04 (CR 246290). The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction. Notified the Reg 2 RDO (Ogle) |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Peach Bottom  Pennsylvania (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.2 h0.05 days <br />0.00714 weeks <br />0.00164 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | William Dalton 01:12 Aug 22, 2004 |
| NRC Officer: | Gerry Waig |
| Last Updated: | Oct 12, 2004 |
| 40973 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (90 %) |
| After | Power Operation (90 %) |