05000255/FIN-2015004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Dye Penetrant Examination of Pipe Lug Welds |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green), and an associated NCV of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes, for the licensees failure to perform a dye penetrant (PT) examination of the Safety Injection System (SIS) pipe lug welds in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section XI requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as CR-PLP-2015-04191, repeated the PT examination of the affected SIS lug welds to meet the full extent of coverage required by the ASME Code, repeated examinations of other welds conducted by the PT examiner during the outage, and removed the PT examiner from further weld examination activities. This performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to perform a PT examination in accordance with the ASME Code requirements could result in acceptance and return to service of a component with an undetected crack that would increase the possibility of pipe leakage or failure. In addition, the failure to perform a PT examination in accordance with the ASME Code adversely affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, because it could result in failure to detect cracks in pipe welds, which would reduce the availability and reliability of the SIS mitigating system. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, and answered yes to screening question number 1. Although this finding adversely affected the design or qualification of the SIS pipe lugs, the finding screened as very-low safety significance (Green), because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of the affected SIS pipe segment. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Field Presence component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, licensee leaders were not observed in the work areas of the plant to coach and reinforce standards or expectations for the licensees vendor staff to ensure deviation from standards and expectations were promptly corrected [H.2]. |
| Site: | Palisades  |
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| Report | IR 05000255/2015004 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Armstrong A Nguyen C Hunt G Hansen G O 'Dwyer J Boettcher J Cassidy J Coroju-Sandin J Jandovitz J Lennartz J Rutkowski L Rodriguez M Domke M Holmberg M Keefe T Taylor V Myer |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion IX |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Palisades - IR 05000255/2015004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palisades) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Palisades)
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