05000298/FIN-2015007-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Perform an Operability Review of a Condition Report |
| Description | The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which states, in part, Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. Specifically, prior to April 6, 2015, the licensee failed to follow Procedure .05.OPS, Operations Review of Condition Reports/Operability Determination, to ensure that an operability review was performed for Condition Report CR-CNS-2015-01268, which was initiated during the self-audit for the Component Design Bases Inspection to document that Cooper Nuclear Station has under-voltage relays that could be affected by harmonics. In response to this issue, the licensee performed an operability review and an operability evaluation for the under-voltage relays. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-CNS-2015-02337. The team determined that failure to perform an operability review associated with Condition Report CR-CNS-2015-01268 was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform the required operability review for the identified condition. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 1, Initiating Event Screening Questions, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and it did not involve the loss of mitigation equipment. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with teamwork because individuals and work groups failed to communicate and coordinate their activities across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained [H.4]. |
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2015007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Latta S Kobylarz T Farnholtz C Barron N Okonkwo |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2015007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
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