05000298/FIN-2014004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Operability Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, Drawings, associated with the licensees failure to assess and document the basis for operability when a degraded or nonconforming condition was identified in accordance with Station Procedure 0.5OPS, Operations Review of Condition Reports/Operability Determination. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate and document the basis for operability when opening the inner railroad airlock door, which serves as a tornado missile barrier for safety-related equipment inside the reactor building. To correct this issue, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and designated compensatory actions. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as Condition Reports CR-CNS-2014-05207 and CR-CNS-2014-05366. The failure to properly assess and document the basis for operability when a degraded or nonconforming condition was identified was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensees failure to properly assess and document the basis for operability resulted in a condition of unknown operability for a degraded nonconforming condition. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At- Power, dated June 19, 2012, inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with avoiding complacency because individuals did not recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent problems, or inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. |
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2014004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Elkmann S Garchow W Sifre B Larson C Henderson G George G Guerra J Josey M Langelier |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2014004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
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