05000298/FIN-2015008-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Evaluate a Valve Degraded Condition before Returning the Valve to Service |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a regarding implementation of maintenance procedures for work on safety-related motor-operated valves (MOVs). Specifically, a degraded component within the actuator was not evaluated as acceptable to use as is before returning the valve to service. The Division 2 low-pressure coolant injection (LPCI) Throttle valve, RHR-MOV-MO27B, failed in the closed position during a surveillance test. The licensees investigation revealed that the helical motor pinion gear in the Limitorque valve actuator broke in three parts. This failed pinion gear additionally caused damage to part of the motor shaft where the setscrew engaged the shaft to attach the pinion gear. The licensees corrective action was to drill the setscrew hole slightly deeper, and reuse the motor shaft when reassembling the Limitorque motor actuator and returning the valve to an operable status. The licensee failed to document this process through an engineering evaluation to accept the setscrew and motor shaft repair use-as-is per their engineering change procedure. The evaluation was performed after the valve was returned to service and determined that the setscrew configuration was acceptable. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-CNS-2015-00880 The licensees failure to perform an evaluation for a degraded condition when performing safety-related MOV maintenance in violation of Procedure 3-EN-DC-115, Engineering Change Process, is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in the reuse of the motor shaft in the actuator to Valve RHR-MOV-MO27B, as acceptable to use-as-is even though a degraded condition existed, returning the valve to operable status without performing the required engineering evaluation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, issued June 19, 2012, the Significance Determination Process for Findings At Power, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of a function of a single train for greater than the technical specification (TS) allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of a function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform an evaluation of the setscrew location to ensure that that location was properly drilled and tapped. This was due to a lack of coordination between the maintenance and engineering groups [H.4] |
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2015008 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson E Ruesch J Melfi P Jayroe |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2015008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
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