ML17279A285

LER 87-007-00:on 870427,source Range Monitor Channel a Inoperable During Core Alterations.Caused by Personnel Error During Coordination.Core Alterations Immediately Stopped. Functional Surveillance completed.W/870527 Ltr

ML17279A285
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	05/27/1987
From:	POWERS C M, WASHINGTON S L WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-007, LER-87-7, NUDOCS 8706050170
Download: ML17279A285 (7)

Text

R EGUL>TORY NFQRMATION DISTRIBUTŽ8 S TEM (R IDS>, ACCESSION NBR: 8706050170 DOC.DATh: 87/05/27 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET¹FACIL 50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Progecti UIiit 2i Washington Public Poue 05000397 AUTH.NAHE AUTHOR AFFILI AT I OH WASHINGTQNI S.L.Washing ton Public Pouer Supply SMstem POWERS>C.M.Washing ton Public Pouer Supply SystemREC IP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-007-00:

on 870427'ource range monitor Channel A inoperable during core altera+ions.

Caused bM personnel error during coordination.

Core alter ations immediately s+opped.Functional surveillance completed.

W/870527 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RFCEI VE!)'TR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Repor+(LFN)I Incident Rpti etc.NOTES: REC IP I ENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA SAMWORTH, R INTERNAL: ACRS MI CHELSQN AEQD/DOA AEQD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/ADE NRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ICSB NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEST/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/PMAS/PTSB RES DEPY GI EXTERNAL: EGhG GROHi M LPDR NSIC HARRIS, J COPlES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS MOELLER ALOD/DSP/ROAB DEDRO hRR/DEST/*DS NRR/DEST/ELB I"!RR/DEST/MEB I'!RR/DEST/PSB NHR/DEST/SGB t!RR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DREP/RAB PMAS/ILRB R FI 02 FILE Oj H ST LOBB Y WARD h!RC PDR i~!SIC MAYSI G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1, 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 42 ENCL'40

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N<tC Penn~($4$)UCENSEE EVENT REPORT{LER)US.NUCLEAR RKOULATOhY COe&llSSION APPROVKO OMS NO.$1gh410e EXPIRKS: SISIISS f ACIUTY NAME II I Washinqton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCXKT NUMSKh (2)0 6 0 0 0 39 710FO TITLE te)SRM Channel A Ino erable during Core Alterations caused by Personnel Error EVENT DATE (SI OAY YEAR YEAR LKR NUN%Eh (S)KN: SSQVSNTIAL NVMSSR REPORT DATE (7)MONTH OAY YEAR PACIUTY NAMCS DOCXKT NUMSER($)0 6 0 0 0 OTHEh fACIUTIKS INVOLVED (SI 2 7 8 8 7 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 7 0 6 0 0 0 OPKRATINO NOOK (9)~OIIEh LEYEL 0 0 rt'v<'~op>e., 4p., 20AO2(1)SOAts)l1)(4 20AOS(s)Hl(I)20AOS4)(1)(Nl 20AOSle)(1)(I 20AOS4N)ltl 20AOS(el~OM(e)(I)SOM(e)(2)00.7$4)(2)(4$0.7$4)(2)(I)00.72 le)(2)(44 LICENSEE CONTACT f Oh THIS LKh l12)~0.7$4)(2)tlt)s0.7$4)(2)(t)O0.7$lsl(2)tsS)S0.7$4)(2)(t44 IAI 00.7$4)(2)t t(S)(S)S0.7$ts)(2)(s)THIS hEPORT IS S(I ITTEO PURSUANT T 0 THK RKOUIRKMKNTS Of 10 Cfh f: (Cence one or mere ol'le~l11 7$.71 (S)722f lel DTHER Jspectfy In AectnNt eeV>>remt In Tent, HIIC Form OSSA)NAME Steven L.Washington, Compliance Engineer TELEPHONE NUMSKR AREA COOK 50 3 7-08 COMPLETE ONE'LINE fOR EACH~NKNT fAILURK DESCRISEO IN THIS hEPORT (1$)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUP AC.TURER EPORTASLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUPAC.TUR Eh EPORTASL TO NPRDS????V'V?A?e..., SUPPLEMENTAL RKPOhT EXPECTED (Ie)YKS III tw, conV>>sts EXPECTED S(ISIJISSIDH DATE)NO ASSTRACT RJmlt te ICCI)s>>tet, I a, eppreseneteIT Ilhsen vnenrepece type>>rinse Irnest (I 0)EXPKCTKO SU OMISSION OATS (1$)MONTH OAY YEAR On April 27, 1987 at approximately 0345 hours0.00399 days <br />0.0958 hours <br />5.704365e-4 weeks <br />1.312725e-4 months <br /> Washington Nuclear Plant Unit-2'(WNP-2)was in Operational Condition 5, Refueling, and core alterations (fuel shuffle)were in progress.The Plant Shift Manager reviewed and approved performance of the weekly SRM Channel Functional Surveillance during the time periods when core alterations were not being perforated.

Plant Operators and Plant Instrument and Control (I8C)Technicians were coordinating core alterations (fuel shuffle)and performance of the SRM Channel A Function'al Surveillance.

Due to an error in the coordination of the two activities, SRM Channel A was inoperable while a fuel bundle was being loaded into the reactor core quadrant monitored by that Channel.When Plant Operators recognized SRM Channel A,was inoperable, core alterations were suspended.

All three remaining SRM channels were operable during the event.The cause of the event was personnel error during the coordination of SRM testing and core alterations.

V There is no safety significance associated with this event because during core refueling operations the SRM System is only for indication while, Reactor protection is provided by the Intermdiate Range Monitoring (IRM)and the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)Systems.870b050170 870527 PDR ADOCK 050003'7)7 NRC form Oeo (943)

NRC Form SSEA, AHRI UCENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION UA.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.SIEOW104 EXPIRES: Sfll/85 FACILITY NAME III Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT Igmao epoof Hrfqrnlaf, NM o4&onellVlIC Frfm JFII'el IITI Plant Conditions DOCKET NUMSER LT)o s o o o.9 LER NUMEER ISI'":x~55QVENTIAL NVM EII 0 0 7-IS ION NVM 002 PACE ISI oF 0 3 a)Power Level-OX b)Plant Mode-5 (Refueling)

Event On April 27, 1987 at approximately 0345 hours0.00399 days <br />0.0958 hours <br />5.704365e-4 weeks <br />1.312725e-4 months <br /> the plant was in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), and Plant Operators were coordinating two activities; Core Alterations (fuel shuffle)and the weekly Source Range Monitor Channel Functional Surveillance.

For a short period of time during this process, Source Range Monitor"A" was inoperable while a fuel bundle was being loaded in the reactor core quadrant monitored by SRM RA".However, neither SRM"BR or"0", which oonitor the ad,iacent quadrants, showed an.y increase in core reactivity.

WNP-2 Plant Technical Specification 3/4.9.2 requires at least two SRM channels to be operable and located in the quadrant the core alteration is being made and in an adiacent quadrant.This ensures that any changes in core reactivity are readily detected.Prior to the event it was determined and approved by the Plant Shift Manager that the SRM Channel Functional Surveillance could be performed between core alterations w'ith proper communications between the Plant Operator and the Plant I8C Technicians performing the surveillance.

The root cause of this event is insufficient coordination of the SRM testing and core alterations.

Immediate Corrective Action Core alterations were immediately stopped.The four SRM Channel Functional Surveillances were completed later that day while core alterations were stopped.Further Corrective Action Each SRM Channel Functional Surveillance Procedure was deviated (revised)to require the Shift Manager to delay core alterations until the SRM Channel Functional Surveillances are completed.

An Operations Night Order describes the procedure deviation of the SRM Channel Functional Surveillances which prohibits these surveillances from being done between core alteration steps.Written feedback was provided to all licensed reactor operators describing the procedure dev iations.NRC fOIIM 555A IMQ I NRC Form ESSA~ISSS I.~0 UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION UA NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO.SI SOMI04 EXPIRES: SISI/SS FACIUTY NAME 111 OOCKET NUMSER ISI YEAII LER NLSNER (Sl 5COVSHTIAL HVM ER.6P rl5VISIOH rrl HVM 5R PACE ISI Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT 11t moro N>>oo 15 RRRr5or4 ooo~tt5toort tttlC Anrr SEAS I I ITI o s o o o 39 787 0 0 7 000 OF 0 3 Safety Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event.During core alterations the Source Range Monitoring System provides the operator indication of reactivity changes only and is not required to provide a protective RPS function.The IRM and APRM Systems which were operable at the time of the event provide reactor protection trip functions.

In addition the two SRM channels in adjacent quadrants were also operable during the event.This event results in consequences no different than if an SRM channel were to fail during core alterations.

All required Technical Specification actions were successfully completed once it was recognized that the SRM was inoperable.

This event caused no threat to the safety of the public or plant personnel.

HIIC FORM 555A tO F91 0~

~e gw~~~WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No.50-397 Hay 27, 1987 Document Control Desk U.ST Nuclear.Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO.2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.87-007

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.87-007 for WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours, uM~C.M.owers (M/D 927M)WNP-Plant Manager CHP:db

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.87-007 cc: Mr.John B.Martin, NRC-Region V Hr.R.T.Dodds, NRC-Site (M/D 901A)Mr.W.E.Hilbrot, BPA (M/D 399)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA Ms.Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr.C.E.Revell, BPA (H/D 399)g1/