ML17292A286

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LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr
ML17292A286
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 05/24/1996
From: BEMIS P R, PFITZER B
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GO2-96-110, LER-96-001, LER-96-1, NUDOCS 9606040015
Download: ML17292A286 (9)


Text

CATEGORYREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9606040015 DOC.DATE:

96/05/24NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETFACIL:50-397 WPPSS.NuclearProject,Unit2,Washington PublicPowe05000397AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION PFITZER,B.

Washington PublicPowerSupplySystemBEMIS,P.R.

Washington PublicPowerSupplySystemRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESFactuations occurredduetotrippingoftemporary powersupplytoIN-3.Caused bypersonnel error.Operations restoredtoIN-3loads&resetESFactuations.W/960524 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR IENCL)SIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:ERECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD4-2PDINTERNAL:

ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL:

LSTLOBBYWARDNOACMURPHYIG.A NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME COLBURN,T AEODSPDRABCENTNRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN4FILE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACPOORE,W.NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111111111112211110DUN4'0IDS"RECPE~VPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWAS~TE!CONTACTHEOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROONOWEN5D-5(EXT.4i5-2083:

TOELLi>ENATE OURNATEFROi~!DSTREBUTTON LTSTSFORDOCUNENTS YOUDON'TNEED.'ULL TEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR26ENCL26

WASHliVGTOiV PUBLICPOWERSUPPLYSYSTEMPO.Box968~3000George1Visshingtott 1Vn)'Richlnrut, 1Vashington 99352.0968

~(S09)372-SOOOMay24,1996G02-96-110 DocketNo.50-397DocumentControlDeskU,S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:

Subject:

NUCLEARPLANTWNP-2,OPERATING LICENSENPF-21,LICENSEEEVENTREPORTNO.96-001-00 Transmitted herewithisLicenseeEventReportNo.96-001-00 forWNP-2.Thisreportissubmitted inresponsetothereporting requirements of10CFR73anddiscusses theitemsofreportability, corrective actiontaken,andactiontakentoprecluderecurrence.

Shouldyouhaveanyquestions ordesireadditional information regarding thismatter,pleasecallmeorMs.LourdesFernandez at(509)377-4147.

tfully,y.R.emtsatropE20)VicePresident, NuclearOperations Enclosure cc:LJCallan,NRCRIVJWClifford, NRCKEPerkins,Jr.,NRCRIV,WCFONSReynolds, Winston&StrawnNRCSr.ResidentInspector, MD927N(2)INPORecordsCenter-Atlanta,GADLWilliams, BPA,MD39996060tI0015 960524PDRADQCK05000397Pl3fttg-,

~jhl' LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)FAcs(TYNAMEll(DOCXETN(AIS(R(atACE(%Washington NuclearPlant-Unit2050003971A4m(E(>>INADVERTENT ESFACTUATIONS DUETOTRIPPINGOFTEMPORARY POWERSUPPLYTOIN-3BYOUTAGEELECTRICIANS EV(NTDAVE(SIR(tORTDATE(11FACE(TVNAM(SN/AOTN(RFACLITI(S t(VOLVTDle(OOCXETIMIS(R(SI000042596960010005249600opERATSIQ MODE(SITHSR(PORTISSVOM(TTED PVRSVANI'O TIIEREOVTI(M(NTS OF10(TILl(11POW(RLLV(L00100020.402(bl 20.405(e)(l)b)

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)(50.73(e)(2)(vl J50.73(s)(2)(vi) 50.73(e)(2)(vM)A J50.73(s)(2)(vsr)B (50.73(s)(2)(xl 73.71(b)(73.71(c))OTHER(SpecifyinAbstractbelowendinText.NRCForm388A)Uc(NS(ECONTACTFORTHSL(R(INBillPfitzer,Licensing EngineerCOMPLETEOICLs(ETO(IEACNCOMPO(CRT FASIMED(SCRN(Ot(THSR(PORT(ISIAR(ACODE509377-2419SVST(MMAIAFACTVRERR(PORTA(XE TOM%05R(PORTA(LE TOI@ROESVPtLEM(NTAL R(to(ITExt(CTEDIHIYES(ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE)ABSTRACr()6)IXINOEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15)MON(I(V(A(IOnThursday, April25,1996,at0835,withtheplantdefueled, twotemporary plantelectricians inadvertently openedthefuseddisconnect supplying theUninterruptible PowerSupply(UPS)inverterIN-3loads,causingalossofpowertotheloads.Deenergization ofIN-3loadsresultedinEngineered SafetyFeature(ESF)actuations andcontainment isolations whichwereresetwithoutfurtherincidentbycontrolroompersonnel.

Atthetime,theIN-3loadswerebeingtemporarily suppliedthroughadisconnect switchlocatedonPowerPanelPP-7Athatwaslabeledasasparedisconnect.

Thedisconnect handlehadacautiontagwhichidentified thedisconnect asONandsupplying temporary powertotheIN-3loads.Alsowrittenonthecautiontagwereinstructions tocontactthecontrolroompriortooperating thedisconnect.

Thetwoelectricians statedtheydidnotreadandunderstand thecautiontag.Theyhavebeenrestricted fromworkinthepowerblockfortheremainder oftheoutage,andtheimportance oftheadministrative barriersreiterated tomaintenance personnel.

EventNotification wasmadetotheNRCpursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.72(b)(2).

~H LICENSVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCOUATIONTEXT(l7)Washington NuclearPlant-Unit20500039796SEOVCNTIAL NUM80l-001002o"4EvenDescritionOnThursday, April25,1996,at0835,withtheplantdefueled, twotemporary plantelectricians inadvertently openedthefuseddisconnect supplying theUninterruptible PowerSupplyinverter[UJX,INVT]

IN-3loads,causingalossofpowertotheloads.Atthetime,theIN-3loadswerebeingtemporarily suppliedthroughadisconnect switchlocatedonPowerPanel[PL]PP-7A,andlabeledasasparedisconnect.

Deenergization ofIN-3loadsresultedinthefollowing ESFactuations:

StartofControlRoomEmergency Filtration systemStartofStandbyGasTreatment system[BH]Isolation ofReactorBuildingVentilation system[VA]Isolation ofthefollowing containment valves:~CSP-V-1[VB,V]andCEP-V-1A[VB,V](containment purgeandexhaust)~RCC-V-5andRCC-V-21[CC,V](containment coolingsupplyandreturn)~EDR-V-395

[V]andFDR-V-220

[V](reactorbuildingsumpdischarges toradwaste)

Atthetimeoftheincident, thepersonnel involvedwerewalkingdownWorkOrderTaskDS34-01inpreparation forreplacing thedisconnect switch.Theirintentwastotakephotographs ofthedisconnect fuseclips,andwhileattempting toopenthecabinetdoortotakethephotostheyinadvertently openedthedisconnect.

Immediate orrective ActionOperations restoredpowertoIN-3loadsandresettheESFactuations withoutfurtherincident.

'EventNotification wasmadetotheNRCpursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.72(b)(2).

Thetemporary electricians involvedwererestricted fromperforming workinthepowerblock.'IManagement expectations concerning equipment cle'arance requirements andtheappropriate approvals neededpriortoenteringpanels,components orsystems,werereiterated duringbriefings withplantandcontractor maintenance personnel regarding thisevent.

LICENSVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCOUATlONTEXT(17)Washington NuclearPlant-Unit20500039796SKIIIIIHTIAI HVMIOI001003o"4FrtherEvaluinThetwoelectricians statedtheyassumedthedisconnect wasopenbecausetheworkinstructions identified thedisconnect asaspare,andtheinstructions madenomentionofthedisconnect beingthetemporary powersupplytoIN-3.Furthermore, theyfoundthebreakerhandleinthemid-positionbetweenOPENandCLOSED.Theelectricians didnotquestionthiscondition becausetheworkinstructions described theproblemas,"cubiclewillnotcloseproperlyandhasmissingparts.Themainbarrierinplacetopreventthisoccurrence wasacautionorderonthedisconnect handlewhichstatedthestatusasON.Thebacksideofthecardread,"Cautiontagthetemporary powersupplybreakertoPP-7A-Aper10.25.1step6.1.14.DonotoperatewithoutCRS/Shift Managerpermission."

Theelectricians statedtheyfailedtonoticethestatusONindication onthefrontofthecard,anddidnotreadtheinformation onthebackofthecard.Anadditional barrierwasprovidedbydirection giveninprocedure PPM1.3.7Gwhichspecifically disallows openingofpanelsbycraftsmen performing walkdownofworkinstructions.

RootauseTheprimaryrootcauseofthiseventwaspersonnel error.Theelectricians involveddidnotreadandfollowtheinstructions onthecautiontag.Additionally, theelectricians didnotfollowtherequirements ofPPM1.3.7Gwhichspecifically disallows openingofpanelsbycraftsmen performing walkdownofworkinstructions.

Contributing causeswerelackofaquestioning attitudeandinexperience usingSupplySystemprocedures.

Furtherorrective AcinRevisePPM10.25.1toincludetherequirement toprovidefieldidentification ofsparedisconnects whichareproviding temporary power.Reviseapplicable maintenance lessonplansregarding clearance orders(PPM1.3.8)andopeningofpanelsbymaintenance personnel (PPM1.3.7G)toincludelessonslearnedfromthisevent.AsementofSafensuenceThesafetyconsequences ofthiseventareminimalbecausetheplantwasdefueledinMode5.Allexpectedactuations andisolations

occurred, andtheaffectedsystemswererestoredbycontrol'oompersonnel withoutfurtherincident.

LICENSVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCO,UATIONTEXTu7)Washington NuclearPlant-Unit20500039796001004o"4PreviousimilarEventsPreviousLERsdocumenting personnel errorresulting inESForRPSactuation areasfollows:~LER95-002involvedOperations personnel operating thewrongleverduringamainturbinetestresulting inturbinetripandreactorscram.~LER93-024involvedpersonnel errorandfailuretoselfcheckduringrestoration oftheContainment Instrument Air(CIA)system.Improperrestoration resultedinactuation oftheCIAbackupnitrogenbottleprogrammer.

~LER93-002-01 involvedpaintersinadvertently actuating ReactorFeedwater PumpRoom"A"fireprotection delugesystemwhichultimately ledtothetripofReactorFeedwater Pump"A"tripandreactorscram.