ML15076A548

Exh a - State of Vermont'S Petition for Leave to Intervene, and Hearing Request - Exh 1

ML15076A548
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	02/09/2015
From:	Recchia C State of VT, Dept of Public Service
To:	NRC/OCM
SECY RAS
References
50-271-LA-2, RAS 27382, TBD
Download: ML15076A548 (37)

Text

EXHIBIT 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter ofENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONTYANKEE, LLC AND ENTERGYNUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.Docket No. 50-271-LA-2 February 9,2015(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)STATE OF VERMONT'S PETITION FOR LEAVP TO INTERVENE.

AND HEARING REQUESTI. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 CFR $ 2.309, the State of Vermont ("State"),

through the VermontDepartment of Public Service, submits the following Petition for Leave to Intervene, andHearing Request in response to Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy NuclearOperations, Inc.'s (together, "Entergy")

license amendment request ("LAR") related to theVermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ("VY") Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan andEmergency Action Level Scheme. The State opposes Nuclear Regulatory Commission

('NRC")issuance of the LAR. The State seeks to participate as a party in this proceeding, and it requeststhat the NRC and/or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("ASLB")

hold an evidentiary hearing in order to develop a full evidentiary record for the NRC and/or ASLB to consider whenreviewing the LAR.On June 12,2014, Entergy filed its LAR seeking to revise the VY site emergency plan("SEP") and Emergency Action Level ("EAL") scheme to reflect a perlnanently defueled)))))))

condition.r The LAR is based on exemptions from certain portions of 10 CFR $$ 50.47(b),

O.a7G)Q),

and Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV requested by Entergy, but not yet granted bythe NRC.2 The State filed comments in response to the LAR, outlining its concerns andobjections to the proposed license amendments on February 9,2015.3II. PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE The State meets all standing requirements outlined in 10 CFR $ 2.309(d).

The State, asrepresented by the Vermont Department of Public Service, 112 State Street, Montpelier, VT05620, has a significant interest in the proposed license amendments contained in the LARpresently at issue. The VY station is located within the state of Vermont.

As explained in theState's February g,2015 Comments and Declarations, and in the contentions below, the LAR, ifgranted, would significantly hinder the State's ability to coordinate and execute an effective response to an emergency situation at the station.

This hindrance poses a safety risk to Vermont1 See Letter from Christopher'Wamser, Entergy Site Vice President, to NRC Document Control Desk, June 12,2014(BVY 14-033XNRC Agencywide Document Access Management System IADAMS] Accession No.MLl4l68A302).

2 SeeLetter from Christopher'Wamser, Entergy Site Vice President, to NRC Document Control Desk, March 14,2014 (BVy 14-009XNRC ADAMS AccessionNo.

ML140804141);

Biweekly Notice; Applications andAmendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant HazardsConsiderations, (79 FR ZátOe;lOicember 9,2014).

The December 9,2014 Federal Register notice notes that "[t]heCommission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-day period provided that its finaldetermination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration."

Such issuance of theamendment prior to the expiration ofthe 60-day period to file a hearing request does not, however, precludecommissioneview of this request for hearing.

The Federal Register makes clear that any hearing will take placeafter issuance of an amendment should the NRC make a No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination priorto review ofthis request.' The LAR was noticed in the December 9,2014 edition of the Federal Register (79 FR 73109). The noticerequested the submission of public comments on or before January 8, 2015. On January 8,2015, the NRC issued a30 day extension of the public comment period to February 9,2015. See Notice fiom James Kim, Plant Licensing IV-2 ánd Decommissioning Transition Branch, January 8, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. MLI50084098).

2 residents.

The State therefore petitions the NRC for leave to intervene as a full party in thisproceeding.a ilI. REQUEST FOR HEARINGThe State requests that a hearing be held to develop a full evidentiary record related to thecontentions stated below and any later amendments to the contentions pursuant to 10 CFR $2)09. It also requests that the State be granted the opportunity to engage in limited discovery toaid in the development of the evidentiary record, either as a matter of right in the event that theASLB andlor NRC grants a hearing pursuant to 10 CFR Part2, Subpart G, or, altematively, atthe discretion of the ASLB and/or NRC under Subpart L.CONTENTION ONEEntergy's license amendment request is not ready for review, as the amendment request ispredicated upon and assumes approval of an exemption request that has not been ruledupon by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and/or Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.BASESEntergy's instant LAR is not ready for review by the NRC and/or the ASLB. Entergyreadily concedes in the LAR that "[t]he proposed PDEP and Permanently Defueled EAL schemeare predicated on approval of requests for exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50.470),

10 CFR50.a7@)(2) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section fV, previously submitted."5 The requested exemptions would remove the planning, notice and protective action requirements in the event ofa See In lhe Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations,l¿c.

Docket No. 50-271-L^,Memorandum and Order(Ruling on Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene)(January 28,2015) at7('Vermont has standing because Vermont Yankee is "located within the boundaries of the State" and, accordingly,

'no further demonstration of standing is required."').

t gvyt4-033 at z.J an emergency,6 reduce the emergency plannin g zone to the footprint of the plant,T eliminate hostile action scenario planning,s and eliminate State participation in emergency responseexercises.e The LAR seeks approval of a Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan andPermanently Defueled Emergency Action Level scheme that would reduce the scope ofemergency planning at the VY site, and increase notification time of an emergency declaration tothe State from l5 minutes to 60.10The LAR, as presented, assumes actions by the NRC that have not yet occurred, and,more importantly, may never occur in the future. Approval of the LAR without NRC review ofthe predicate exemptions request - which would allow the State to comment on that request andrequest a hearing - is inappropriate, both as a matter of law and public policy. The exemptions request and the LAR effectively constitute a complete request by Entergy for changes to itsapproach to emergency planning and response.

The two filings cannot be reviewed separately asthey are dependent on one another.

However, the State has not been afforded an opportunity torespond in a meaningful way to the exemptions request.In addition, the NRC has options at its disposal beyond simple approval or denial therequested exemptions.

It could, for example, impose conditions for approval.

Neither the Statenor the NRC is able to evaluate the full extent to which the proposed license amendment will orwill not meet NRC safety and environmental requirements until the final decision on theu BVy l4-00g,Attach.

I at 4-7, addressing changes to l0 CFR $ 50.a7@);

1 l, addressing changes to Part 50, AppE.IV; 16, addressing changes to Part 50 App. E.IV.A; 19-22, addressing changes to E.IV.D; 25-28, addressing changes to Part 50, App. E.IV.E.' Id. alS,addressing changes to l0 CFR $ 50.a7(cX2)'

t Id. at 10, addressing changes to 10 CFR 50, App. E IV.1; 15, addressing changes to Part 50, App. E.IV.A; 17'addressing changes to Part 50 App. E.IV.B; 26, addressing changes to Part 50, App. E. IV.E.n td. at3Z-36, addressing changes to Part 50, App. E'IV.F.to BVY 14-033 at2 App.l at 4; App 2 al.35.4 exemption requests is made. The State is materially and unfairly disadvantaged when it isforced, as it is here, to challenge the LAR when the exact terms of the request are not known.This issue is within the scope of the proceeding.

NRC approval of exemptions requestserves as the foundation on which the LAR is built. In this instance, Entergy seeks approval ofthe LAR prior to the necessary foundation being laid. Unless and untíl the State is given anopportunity to at least comment on the exemptions request and the NRC makes a ruling on thesame, the issue of whether the NRC and/or ASLB is in an appropriate position to even review theLAR is within the scope of this proceeding.

Likewise, this issue is material to core hndings thatthe NRC must make - namely that the predicate exemptions are approved

- to support thechanges Entergy seeks in the LAR. The ASLB and/or NRC should, ata minimum, hold thisproceeding and the deadline for fling contentions and a hearing request in abeyance until at least30 days after NRC has taken frnal action on Entergy's exemptions request.

The NRC shouldlikewise provide a meaningful opportunity for the State to provide comments and request ahearing with respect to the exemptions request.SUPPORTING EVIDENCEThis issue poses a genuine dispute between Entergy and the State with respect to theappropriateness of LAR review now. A significant porlion of the State's February 9, 2015 LARComments and Declarations speak to significant concerns it has with the LAR that flow from theunderlying exemptions

request, and are incorporated into this Petition by reference.tt TheComments and Declarations detail the deficiencies and problems of the requested exemptions, 1r See Vermont Department of Public Service LAR Comments and Declarations (February 9,2015),

attached asAttachment A; Vermont Division of Emergency Management LAR Comments and Declarations (February 9,2015),attached as Attachment B; and Vermont Department of Health LAR Comments and Declarations (February 9,2015), attached as Attachment C.5 and illustrate the interaction between the LAR and the exemptions request.

This interaction, asdetailed by the Declarations, cuts to the core of the findings the ASLB andlot NRC must make inreviewing the LAR here. As discussed below, the State disputes Entergy's claim that theproposed PDEP and Permanently Defueled EAL scheme continues to "preserve theeffectiveness of the emergency plan," particularly when evaluated in conjunction with therequested exemptions.

l2CONTENTION T\ilOEntergy's license amendment

request, if approved along with the predicate requested exemptions, fails to account for all credible emergency scenarios, undermines theeffectiveness of the site emergency plan and off-site emergency

planning, and poses anincreased risk to the heatth and safety of Vermont citizens in violation of NRC regulatory requirements 10 CFR $ 50.5a($(4) and Appendix E to Part 50.BASESThe LAR, if approved in conjunction with Entergy's requested exemptions, wouldincrease the threat to public health and safety in the event of a credible accident scenario at theVY plant. First, the requested exemptions outlined above would eliminate Entergy's obligations to keep the State emergency response organizations and the general public informed in the eventof an emergency.t3 The exemptions would fi,rther reduce the State's abilityto adequately andeffectively respond to an emergency by discontinuing the federal requirement for suppott toState planning and monitoring activities, placing the health and safety of Vermont citizens injeopardy in the event of aplant emergency.

The exemptions would hamper the State's ability to BVY-033 at 2.tt BVY 14-009, Attach. I at 79-22, addressing changes to Part 50, App. E'IV.D.6 implement the Vermont Radiological Emergency Response

Program, and any additional off-siteresponse to an emergency.la The exemptions request effectively treats the VY plant, with radioactive material storedin a spent fuel pool, as if it were a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation

("ISFSI")

and/or monitored retrievable storage ("MRS") facility, which is clearly not the case now or forthe next several years. Entergy's exemptions request does not even contain implementing procedures, preventing.

the State from understanding what changes it would need to make to itsemergency response protocols if the exemptions and LAR are approved.

The State would beunable to effectively execute its own Radiological Emergency Response Plan in harmony withthe VY Emergency Plan without such implementing procedures in the event of an emergency atthe plant. In sum, the requested exemptions would eliminate substantial emergency planrequirements contained in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, which in turn would necessarily reducethe effectiveness of any VY emergency plan going forward, including the PDEP and EALschemes proposed in the instant LAR. The requested exemptions would significantly reduce, ifnot eliminate, notification procedures currently required by l0 CFR Part 50, Appendix E' Forinstance, the exemptions request proposes that the procedures requiring notification andinteraction with State and local agencies be eliminated almost in their entirety, based on theerroneous assumption that the VY station (in its present state with spent fuel in the cooling pool)be viewed as an ISFSI and/or MRS facility.

This would result in no effective means for Entergyto communicate critical information to the State in the event of an emergency, as required byPart 50, Appendix E.lsra See DEMHS LAR Comments and Declarations at 1-3, 5-9; and VDH LAR Comments and Declarations at 5-715 See BVY l4-009, Attach. I at 79-22, addressing changes to Part 50, App. E.IV'D'7 Second, the LAR fails to adequately analyze a number of credible scenarios wherebypublic health and safety may be put at risk. The LAR does not provide analysis of multiplecredible Beyond Design Basis scenarios that coitinue to pose a health risk while fuel rodsremain in the VY spent fuel cooling pool. The exemptions

request, if granted, would eliminate the federal requirement that Entergy take responsibility for planning a response to a spent fuelpool emergency that may last more than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.16 This problem would be compounded by thelack of clear notification procedures to the State otherwise required by Part 50, Appendix E.Likewise, Entergy has relied upon stale NRC guidance issued prior to the September l1 , 2001attacks in developing the PDEP I EAL scheme that does not consider post-9/11 securityconcerns.

The PDEP /EAL scheme should address all safety concerns present in today's threatenvironment.

The LAR fails to do so. The LAR also fails to address heightened safety concernsat Vermont Yankee due to the existence of high-burnup fuel at the site, even though the NRC hasrecognized that the use of high-burnup fuel causes special problems, including a greater chanceof accidents and an increased chance of structural failure of the fuel rods suchthattransferto drycasks is more difficult, more dangerous, and more expensive.lT When viewed together, the exemptions request and LAR create a circular logic thatresults in a clear reduction in emergency plan effectiveness that cannot meet the requirements of10 CFR $ 50.5a(q)(4) and companion Part 50, Appendix E emergency plan requirements.

Entergy has filed the LAR pursuant to $ 50.54(q)(4),

which requires a request to change anemergency plan that would reduce the effectiveness of the plan to include "the basis forconcluding that the licensee's emergency plan, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements 16 See, for instance, DPS LAR Comments and Declarations at l-2, addressing the possibility of fuel pool accidentscenarios involving accelerants.

r7 See DPS LAR Comments and Declarations at 3.8 in appendix E to this part." The exemptions request seeks to strike significant portions of 50App. E.IV.B and D related to actions outside the plant boundary and emergency notihcation tostate and local response organizations.

The LAR meets the requirements of $ 50.54(fl(a) only inthe event Entergy is exempted from material requirements of Part 50, Appendix E. Section50.5a(fl(a),

however, rhandates that all Appendix E requirements are met. The l.AR therefore fails to satisfy $'50.5a((a).

The contention is within the scope of this proceeding.

The LAR must show that itconforms to the requirements of Part 50, Appendix E given that Entergy'readily admits itsrequest would reduce the effectiveness of the VY emergency plan. On its face, the LAR doesnot meet all the Appendix E requirements as mandated by $ 50.54(qX4).

Furthermore, thecontention is material to the finding the NRC must make that the LAR satisfies all requirements of g 50.54(fl(a) and Appendix E of Part 50. The State has submitted comments from experts inits Division of Emergency Management and Homeland

Security, the Department of Health, andthe Department of Public Service, all of which raise concerns about the LAR and companion exemptions request's adverse impact on the State's ability to execute monitoring and emergency response programs in the event of an emergency.

The exemptions and LAR fail to adequately analyze credible Beyond Design Basis scenarios while spent fuel is present in the VY coolingpool, eliminate critical State notification, monitoring and planning activities, and fail to adoptdose radiation monitoring standards that would best protect public health and safety, as spelledout in the State's Comments and Declarations.ls 18 See DPS LAR Comments and Delarations at l-2; DEMHS Comments and Declarations at 1-2, 5,7-9;YDH Comments and Declarations at3-919 SUPPORTING EVIDENCEA genuine dispute exists between the State and Entergy with respect to whethr the LARmeets all Part 50, Appendix E requirements aimed at ensuring protection of the public health andsafety of Vermont citizens.

The State has submitted extensive evidence in the form ofDeclarations sponsored by experts in their respective felds. The details spelled out in theDeclarations strongly support the bases by which this contention is set forth, and areincorporated into this Petition by reference.

The LAR provides insufficient analysis of credibleBeyond Design Basis emergency scenarios and is based on inadequate NRC guidance.

Therequested exemptions fail to meet the requirements of l0 CFR $ 50.5a(fl(a) and companion Appendix E to Part 50 by eliminating the federal requirement for notification protocols, andplanning and monitoring resources to the State required to ensure public health and safety.l0 TV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing the State of Vermont, through the Vermont Department of PublicService, respectfully requests the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and/or Atomic Safetyand Licensing Board to grant its request for intervention, admit the State's two contentions offered above, and hold a hearing on Entergy's LAR related to the VY Permanently DefueledEmergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme with the opportunity for the State toengage in discovery to develop a full evidentiary record for review when considering the LARand associated exemptions request.Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this 9th of February,2015 Respectfully submitted,

/slChristopher RecchiaCommissioner Vermont Department of Public Service1 12 State StreetMontpelier, VT 05620(802) 828-281 l11 COMMENTS AND DECLARATIONS OF THE VERMONT DEPARTMENT OFPUBLIC SERVICE REGARDING VERMONT YANKEE PERMANENTLY DEFUELEDEMERGENCY PLAN AND EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEMELICENSE AMENDMENT REOUEST BVY 14-033FebruarY 9,2015The Vermont Department of Public Service (Department or DPS), by and throughAnthony Leshinskie, Vermont State Nuclear Engineer and Decommissioning Coordinator, (curriculum vitae attached) submits the following comments and declarations with respect to thelicense amendment request filed by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) regarding theVermont Yankee Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Schemeon June 12,2014.

See Letterfrom Chris Wamser, Entergy Site Vice President, to NRCDocument Control Desk, June 12, 2014 (BVY 14-033) (NRC Agencyvide Document AccessManagement System IADAMS] Accession No. MLl41684302).

The License Amendment Request (LAR) generally raises significant concerns to theDepartment, both because of the flawed assumptions used by Entergy in assessing threatscenarios, and because of Entergy's reliance on outdated NRC guidance as support for the LAR.The representations made by Entergy in the LAR do not contemplate the full scope ofpossible threat scenarios impacted by the proposed license amendments.

Analysis of certaincredible Beyond Design Basis events is not properly presented, preventing the Department (andthe NRC) from adequately evaluating the impact of the proposed license amendments.

For example, the LAR fails to analyze Potential Hostile Actions such as aircraft assault.Entergy states throughout the Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) / Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme filing that the remaining Design Basis Accidents and credibleBeyond Design Basis events will progress slowly. This assertion is used to justiff extending therequired emergency level notification time from 15 to 60 minutes, and inpart to justiflr the elimination of Site Area Emergency and General Emergency EALs currently used in VermontYankee Emergency Planning.

The PDEP and its EALs rely on a definition of Hostile Actiondescribed in NEI-99, Rev. 6 Sections 3.1.3 8¿ 3.1.4. Potential Hostile Actions include aircraftassault, which-based on the discussion in the PDEP-can occur with little or no advancedwarning.

The lack of advanced warning for this type of Hostile Action contradicts the slowprogression assumption.

Additionally, the Fuel Assembly Heat Up I Zirconium Fire probability event discussed inthe PDEP IEAL scheme (but submitted as part of a separate License Exemption

Request, seeEntergy Requestr Exemptionsfrom Portions of I0 CFR 50.47 and l0 CFR 50, Appendix E,March 14,2Ol4 (BVY 14-009) (ADAMS Accession No. MLl40804141))

lacks adequateanalysis.

It ignores the conclusion of the U.S. GeneralAccounting Office in August 2012that"it is difficult to quantiff the probability" of a spent fuel pool fire. ,See GAO 12-797 at27 ' Whtle itattempts to work around the conclusion by assuming that a fire will occur once a 900 'C fueltemperature is reached, there is no NRC dehned criteria to determine whether this is anacceptable evaluation method. It also does not discuss the possibility of chemical accelerants being used to reduce the time to reach the 900'C fuel temperature defined as the onset of aZirconium Fire, even though such an accelerant was considered in a recent Vermont YankeeHostile Action Emergency Drill. One potential accelerant would be jet fuel from an aircraftintention.ally crashed into the spent fuel pool (which could conceivably fuel a fre regardless ofthe water level in the Spent Fuel Pool) causing a fuel assembly fire well before the l0 hour"heat-up time" determined by the Zirconium Fire analysis.

The possibility of a much more rapidheat-up time contradicts the slow progression assumption of the PDEP IEAL scheme, and couldrequire an EAL beyond Alert to properly address.2 The Department also has significant concems about the quality of the NRC guidanceEntergy used in developing the PDEP IEAL scheme. A significant portion of the guidance usedto develop the PDEP I EAL scheme is derived from plant decommissioning information that theNRC has compiled in SECY-OO-145, well before the September I l, 2001 attacks.

By the NRC'sown admission, the SECY-OO-145 guidance has not been updated since then because plantsecurity concerns raised by the September ll,2O0l attacks were given higher priority.

As such,the SECY-gg-145 guidance has not been reevaluated while considering post-9/l1 plant securityconcerns.

The Department believes that, once the SECY-OO-145 guidance has been considered, ideas such as reducing the Emergency PlanningZone (EPZ) to the Vermont Yankee fence lineand relying on "ad hoc" offsite emergency planning (rather than continued offsite radiological emergency planning support) will be found to be imprudent and unwarranted.

The LAR is also deficient because it fails to properly analyze the risks of an accidentwhile transferring fuel from the spent fuel pool to dry casks. This risk is heightened at Vermontyankee because of the existence of high-burnup fuel at the site. The NRC has recognizedthat the use of high-burnup fuel causes special problems, including a greater chance of accidents andan increased chance of structural failure of the fuel rods such that transfer to dry casks is moredifficult, more dangerous, and more expensive.

See NUREG-I738 at ix, 3-l; see also, e.g',National Research

Council, Board on Radioactive Waste Management, Committee on the Safetyand Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, National Academies Press (2006) atl0T,availabteathttp:llwww.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id:11263&page:101 (notingthat high-burnup fuel "results in an increase in the decay-heat power of the spent fuel'assembly bythe time it is put into the spent fuel pool"); R. Alvarez, The Storage and Disposal Challenges ofHigh Burnup Spent Power Reactor Fuel (Jan.3,2Ol4) at9-17 (noting that new evidence showsJ that when high-burnup fuels are placed in the spent fuel pools at certain reactors, it can createspecial problems that interfere with Spent Fuel Pool systems integrity);

NRC Division of SpentFuel Storage and Transportation Interim Staff Guidance-2{,

Revision 0 (Issue: The Use of aDemonstration Program as Confirmation of Integrity for Continued Storage of High Burnup FuelBeyond 20 Years) (ADAMS Accession No. ML130564516)

(recognizing that further studies areneeded on the long-term structural integrity and safety of storing and transferring high-burnup fuel).In addition5.1.2: The Fuel Assembly Heat IJp I Zirconium Fire event discussed as part ofthe PDEP IEAL scheme has been submitted as part of a separate License Exemption Request(BVY l4-009),

but that exemption has not been granted or even noticed for public comment yet.Further, Entergy's zirconium fire analysis ignores the NRC's conclusion in NUREG-1738 that"fuel assembly geometry and rack configuration

. . . are subject to unpredictable changes after anearthquake or cask drop that drains the pool." NUREG-1738 at x, 5-2 (emphasis added).Section 5. 1 .3 . I : Additional information supporting the discussion of the Loss of SpentFuel Pool Cooling event is required, but the submittal does not provide a reference supporting the stated results.

Please indicate where the analysis supporting the stated results can be found.Section 5.5.3: While it is stated that Entergy will discuss the implementation of thepDEP IEAL scheme with Vermont State and Local offrcials subsequent to NRC approval, suchdiscussions should occur prior to NRC approval to allow for modification of Entergy's actionprior to regulatory approval.

Section 6.2: The cited examples of decommissioning plants extending their requiredemergency level notification time from 15 to 60 minutes \/ere all granted prior to the September 4

11,2001 attacks.

Once post-9/l 1 plant security concerns are considered, the Department believes that permitting this increase in emergency level notification time will be found to beimprudent and unwarranted.

Section 6.3: The Department disagrees with the conclusion that no reduction in safetymargin would occur with the implementation of the proposed PDEP I EAL scheme. Elimination of the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency EALs indicates that significant changes inplant operations during emergency conditions will occur, which bears on safety.Attachment

1. Sections 3.3 & 7.7: These sections discuss notiffing the NRC ofEmergency Conditions via a system called the Emergency Notification System (ENS). Underthe terms of the Site Access MOU between Entergy and DPS, Entergy is required to send theDepartment Designee all notifications made to the NRC. The LAR should reflect thisarrangement.

Attachment

l. Section 6.1 : This section notes that the safety of on-site Vermont Yankeestaff during an on-going security event or Hostile Action could result in the suspension ofEmergency Response Organization activation.

The Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) in theproposed PDEP IEAL scheme is the on-site Vermont Yankee Control Room. In the currentemergency plan, the EOF is located off-site.

The LAR contains no assurances that EOFactivation will be restored in sufficient time for the Emergency Response Organization torespond within the emergency response times discussed throughout the proposed PDEP I EALscheme. The Department believes that Entergy should include an alternate, off-site EOF, such asthe current Vermont Yankee EOF, in the proposed PDEP IEAL scheme.Attachment

1. Section 7.0: The proposed PDEP IEAL scheme makes no mention of theEntergy / State of Vermont communication channel via the DPS Designee (typically the State5 Nuclear Engineer) that exists during emergency conditions.

This communication means shouldbe described as part of the proposed PDEP IEAL scheme.Attachment

l. Section 9.9.2: The noted evacuation of on-site plant contractors during anAlert condition could impede the DPS Designee (typically the State Nuclear Engineer) fromreaching the EOF (the Vermont Yankee Control Room) in the proposed PDEP IEAL scheme.Measures to mitigate this potential impediment should be made either in the PDEP IEALscheme or in a related implementation procedure.

Conclusion Based on these and other reasons, the LAR lacks the requisite analysis and supporting evidence and should be denied. The Department respectfully recommends that the NRC conducta thorough examination of the LAR's impacts on a full range of Beyond Design Basis events, aswell as the PDEP IEAL scheme assumptions in the post-9/11 world.6 COMMENTS AND DECLARATIONS OF THE VERMONT DIVISION OFEMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY ONBVY 14-033 VERMONT YANKEE PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PLANAND EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEMEFebruary 9,2015INTRODUCTION The Vermont Division of Emergency Management and Homeland

Security, by andthrough Erica Bornemann, Chief of Staff, (curriculum vitae attached) submits the following comments and declarations with respect to the license amendment request filed by EntergyNuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) regarding the Vermont Yankee Permanently DefueledEmergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme on June 12,2014.

See Letter from ChrisWamser, Entergt Site Vice President, to NRC Document Control Desk, June 12,2014 (BVY 14-033) OfRC Agencywide Document Access Management System IADAMS] Accession No.ML141684302).

The Vermont Yankee Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (VY PDEP) andEmergency Action Level Scheme (EAL) proposed in Entergy's license amendment requestpresents a number of concerns for the State of Vermont (the State) regarding the status of off-siteemergency preparedness if the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) receives exemption from portions of 10 CFR $ 50.47(b),

10 CFR $ 50.a7(c)(2) and 10 CFR $ 50' Appendix E.Through the requested exemptions, VY seeks to alter the emergency planning requirements imposed by its license and subsequently revise the current VY Emergency Plan after the plantenters an anticipated permanently defueled condition.

If those license exemptions are granted,Entergy intends to essentially cease its off-site emergency preparedness and response functions beyond the statutorily mandated all-hazards approach required of each Vermont town today. If the requested exemptions are granted, the license would no longer require the licensee to suppottactivities such as planning, exercises, and traini4g even though the proposed plan continues torely upon supplemental emergency response organizations and agencies for incidents on-site.Under the proposed exemptions, Entergy also intends to signifrcantly reduce the numberof personnel in the Emergency Response Organization which has historically been tasked withmanaging a declared incident on-site.

Entergy intends to make these reductions even whilenuclear fuel remains in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) before being moved to Dry Cask Storage.

Thelicensee has proposed to be given a series of exemptions to a relatively robust set of safetymeasures for which there is not a comparable substitute commensurate with the hazardspresented until the fuel is housed in dry casks.The State continues to bear alarge responsibility for response to a Vermont Yankeeincident (industrial or radiological).

Although the spectrum of possible incidents is reduced, thereare still significant risks posed by the plant that require planning and preparedness.

Off-siteresponse organizations (ORO) and government entities cannot just dismiss hazards such as thoseposed by Vermont Yankee in its permanently defueled status.Vermont law identifies the Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security(DEMHS) as the delegated lead entity to coordinate all emergency management functions

• itiinthe State. As such, DEMHS is responsible for maintaining a robust set of preparedness standards for local jurisdictions, public and private sector partners, and governmental partners to uphold.DEMHS is also the steward of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) whichcoordinates all state level response to incidents such as those which could potentially occur atVermont Yankee at any time. The Radiological Emergency Response Program (RERP) is housedin DEMHS and includes the state- and local-level plans to respond to an incident at VY.2 Licensee funding for the RERP program supports Emergency Management Directors (EMD) andtheir staff in the six Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) towns to train and exercise on a regularbasis in order to sustain their level of readiness.

It supports agencies such as the Depaltment ofHealth (VDH) and the Division of Fire Safety (DFS) to train Radiological Plume Tracking andRadiological Sampling Teams. The funding also supports the equipment and training needs offrre, rescue, and law enforcement organizations in theEPZ specific to the hazatds presented atVermont Yankee. Regular training and exercises, as well as the periodic planning

meetings, enSures that local and state personnel have solid relationships ahead ofcatastrophic events thatstress systems beyond their capabilities.

The State has historically followed the robust set ofstandards in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual to ensure the public safety of the citizens who live outsideof plant boundaries through the evaluation of exercises and the maintenance of plans, facilities and equipment.

THE VY PDEP PROPOSES INSUFF'ICIENT STANDARDS FOR THE FACILITYWHILE SPENT FUEL REMAINS IN THE FUEL POOLTitle 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) outlines the regulations nuclear powerplants are required to follow to ensure "there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency."

l0 CFR. $$50.a7(a)(1)(i) in 10 CFR $ 50.47 and 10 CFR $ 50 Appendix E. If a licensee is exempted fromthe applicable portions of these regulations, its license no longer imposes needed standards untilthe license is amended once more and the site is classihed as an Independent Spent FuelInstallation (ISFSD and required to adhere to 10 CFR ç 72.32. The set of regulations in l0 CFR $72.32 specihcally pertain to ISFSIs or Monitored Retrieval Storage (MRS) and as such are notJ written to support the inherently different hazards presented while fuel is stored in a spent fuelpool and not in dry cask storage.

While the spent fuel remains in pool storage, the facility poses ahigher. risk than an ISFSI. The standards applied at VY should reflect and respond to thecircumstances at the site.VY VDEP SUBMISSION IS INCOMPLETE l0 CFR ç 72.32 requires licensee emergency plans to "promptly notify offsite responseorganizations and request offsite assistance, including medical assistance for the treatment ofcontaminated injured onsite workers when appropriate."

l0 C.F.R. $ 72.32(a)(8).

The proposedVY PDEP refers to the need for supplemental assistance in several places including thefollowing:

Arrangements have been made for the extension of the ERO'scapability to address emergencies.

The following arrangements arein place through letters of agreement for ambulance

services, treatment of contaminated and injured patients, fire supportservices, and law enforcement response as requested by the station;1 . Transportation of injured personnel using an ambulance service;2. Treatment of radioactively contaminated and injured personnel at a local support hospital (Brattleboro Memorial) as specified inthe local support hospital plans; and3. Fire support services by the Vernon and Brattleboro FireDepartments and the Tri-State and Southwestern Fire Mutual AidNetworks.

4.Law enforcement support services provided by local, county,state, and federal law enforcement authorities as appropriate andresponse capabilities are documented in the letters of agreement maintained by Security.

4 Evidence of agreements with participating local services isaddressed in Appendix E;the Vermont Yankee Fire Protection Program; and the Annual Law Enforcement Letters of Agreement (Safeguards Information) maintained by Security.

LAR, Attachment 2, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan,Rev.0, af 2lThe agreements referred to in this section of the plan were not included in the submission.

Ratherthe reader is directed to the Vermont Yankee Emergency Preparedness Department where thedocuments are said to be on file. LAR, Attachment 2 at 50. Among those agreements said to beon file is one with the State of Vermont.

The current agreement Vermont Yankee maintains withthe State pertains to Emergency Plan activation under the current regulatory guidelines andoutlines response based on the current Emergency Response Organization structure.

Before theState could adequately prepare for the implementation of the proposed VY PDEP, the agreement would need to be updated and reflect the conditions as they will exist if the VY PDEP isapplicable.

Without this piece of documentation in place, the VY PDEP does not comply with10 cFR ç72.32.Appendix E of the VY PDEP submission references an Index of Emergency PlanImplementing Procedures and Support Plans, yet none of these pieces of documentation isavailable for review. Implementing Procedures are meant to provide depth and detail notcontained in the main plan. Without the Implementing Procedures and Support Plans, theproposed VY PDEP does not adequately describe how the Emergency Response Organization will respond to an emergency.

Without this level of depth it is impossible for those agencies andgovernmental entities identified to provide supplemental support to the licensee to understand how and when that support will be needed. In these circumstances, the NRC should not approvethe exemptions since it cannot f,rnd that no signif,rcanthazards consideration is needed.5 THE VY PDEP FAILS TO ADEQUATELY EVALUATE AND SUPPORT OFF-SITERESPONSE RT,SOURCES Exercises are a cofferstone of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)evaluation that OROs can provide reasonable assurance they can respond to an incident at anuclear power plant. "FEMA bases its reasonable assurance determination that OROs can protectthe health and safety of the public in the event of an incident at an NPP on both adequateplans/procedures and the demonstrated ability to implement them. OROs use exercises, drills,seminars,

training, SAVs, and actual events to practice and fine-tune plan implementation."

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual Radiological Emergency preparedne.ss, June 2013 at III-1. The VY PDEP describes the exercise activities the licenseewill maintain:

Biennial exercises shall be conducted to test the timing and content ofimplementing procedures and methods; to test emergency equipment andcommunication networks; and to ensure that emergency personnel arefamiliar with their duties. VY offers the following otganizations theopportunity to participate to the extent assistance would be expectedduring an emergency declaration;

however, participation is not required:

State of VermontBrattleboro Memorial HosPitalBrattleboro Fire Department Law Enforcement Rescue, Inc. Ambulance ServiceAt least one drill involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas of emergency response shall be conducted in the intervalbetween biennial exercises.

I2.J.4.5.6 Vermont Yankee will continue to be evaluated by the NRC to assess their on-site responsecapabilities yet several areas of the plan reference the assistance provided by OROs tosupplement their own capabilities.

Without the requirement to evaluate OROs, the assessment ofthe licensee's ability to address significant issues is inherently incomplete.

The NRC should, at aminimum, require the evaluation of OROs by FEMA to respond as outlined in the PDEP andsubsequent Letters of Agreement.

Instituting this requirement would lead to a more holisticapproach to evaluation instead of the compartmentalized framework that currently exists inregulation.

Without this requirement, the NRC and the licensee have no basis in which to enforceimprovement actions for those areas that rely on ORO assistance.

Furtherrnore, without aspecifrc requirement to train and evaluate OROs in exercise there is potential risk agencies willnot have the knowledge needed to ensure proficiency in responding to a very specialized type ofresponse such as a nuclear power plant incident.

The institution of regimented

planning, trainingand exercise requirements for OROs consequently requires the licensee to support them throughfinancial means in order to facilitate the compliance with said measures.

The licensee should berequired, rather than encouraged, to continue coordination efforts in order to ensure planningstandards continue to be upheld.THE NRC STAFF HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ABILITY OF'OFF-SITE R.ESOURCES TO PROVIDE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO VERMONT YANKEEOn Novemb er 74,201{ the NRC Executive Director for Operations issued amemorandum to NRC Commissioners outlining NRC Staff analysis and recommendations related to Entergy's pending request for exemption from certain emergency planningrequirements.

In that memorandum, the Staff analysis and recommendations speak, in part,directly to the substance of the LAR. The State therefore includes comments on the7 memorandum on the basis and to the extent that the memorandum encompasses issues that areintimately tied to the LAR under review.The NRC Staff s recommendations included in the November 14 memorandum assertthat the analysis conducted by ENO "provides reasonable assurance that in granting therequested exemptions to ENO: (1) an offsite radiological release will not exceed the EPA PAGsat the site boundary for a DBA; and (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond DBA resulting in a lossof all SFP cooling, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions and, if arelease is projected to occur, there is sufficiçnt time for offsite agencies to take protective actionsusing a CEMP to protect the health and safety of the public."

Memorandum from Mark Satorius, NRC Executive Director of Operations to NRC Commissioners, November 14,2014 (SECY-l4-0125) (ADAMS Accession No. ML14227A711).

These assertions assume that Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans (Emergency Operations Plans or EOPs) at the State and locallevel specifically account for an incident involving a radiological release from a fixed facilitysuch as Vermont Yankee. While the all hazards emergency management concept is widelyadopted and implemented in Vermont as outlined in the National Response Framework, incidents such as a radiological release are extremely specialized in nature. Even if a release didnot exceed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) off-site, the burden remains with local and State government to validate what has or has notoccurred.

The health and economic viability of the areas surrounding Vermont Yankee dependon the assurances provided by governmental entities that impacted areas are safe as is the case inany other disaster.

Those assurances can only be provided by training, exercising and equipping personnel to assess the impacts to health and the environment outside of site boundaries.

Withoutthe ongoing license requirement to maintain accident assessment capabilities off-site and the8 subsequent provision of support, as is now the case, the State might have to rely on resources ofsurrounding states and the federal government.

Unfortunately that reliance could delay responsetimes as resources are mobilized and assigned.

This is time that cannot be wasted once a releasehas occurred even if it below EPA PAGs.The NRC Staff appears to have come to a number of conclusions regarding the status ofoff-sitp EOPs without conducting any sort of formal review of those documents to assure theirreadiness to address the changing circumstances at the plant. Coupled with the fact thatsignificant portions of the proposed VY PDEP are not available for review by State and localentities, it is impossible for the EOPs of OROs to be revised to reflect the specific response andrecovery actions at the plant. Again, the State contends that the NRC Staff should not make a nosignificant hazards consideration determination as long as plans on-site call for the supplemental assistance of OROs without reviewing the associated plans for such instances and providing theopportunity for revision as applicable.

9 COMMENTS AND DECLARATIONS OF THE VERMONT DEPARTMENT OFHEALTH ONENTERGY VERMONT YANKEE'S LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUESTFOR THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE IN LETTERFebruary 9,2015Introduction to Comments from the Vermont Department of HealthThe Vermont Department of Health (VDH or Department),

by and'through Dr. WilliamIrwin, Sc.D, CHP, Vermont Radiological and Toxicology Sciences Program Chief (curriculum vitae attached),

focuses its comments and declarations on the NRC staff analysis andrecommendations contained in a November 14,2014 Policy Issue memorandum addressing certain exemption requests made by Energy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO) . See Memorandum from Mark Satorius, NRC Executive Director of Operations to NR'C Commissioners,November 14,2074 (Satorius Memorandum)(SECY-14-0125)O{RC Agencywide Document AccessManagement System IADAMS] Accession No. MLl4227A7l1).

Specif,rcally, the SatoriusMemorandum seeks "Commission approval for the staff to grant [ENO's] request for exemptions from certain emergency planning (EP) requirements of Part 50 . . . of Title l0 ofthe Code ofFederal Regulations.-

Id., af 1. ENO's request for the referenced exemptions was filed on March14,2014, prior to this License Amendment Request (LAR). See Entergy Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and l0 CFR 50, Appendix E,March 14,2014 (BVY l4-OO9XADAMS Accession No. MLl40804141

).While the SECY-I 4-0125 Satorius Memorandum is not necessarily under review by thecommission here, the memorandum's contents are highly relevant to any Commission consideration of the instant LAR. The BVY 14-009 exemption request acts foundational requirement for the operation of this LAR. As a result, the Commission's review of the LAR is necessarily predicated upon consideration of SECY-14-0125, and comment on the memorandum is appropriate and within the scope of relevant commentary.

VDH strongly disagrees with the recommendation of the NRC staff in SECY-14-0125 togrant Entergy Nuclear Operptions' (ENO) requested emergency plan (EP) exemptions fromcertain requirements of 10 CFR $ 50.47 (b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The primaryreasons for this are:1. The exemption approval recommendation of the NRC staff is inappropriately basedsolely upon dose of radioactive contamination and does not include the health impacts ofradioactive contamination from releases that result in doses below the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs);2. The exemption approval recommendation of the NRC staff incorrectly assumes acomprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) appropriate for response andrecovery from radioactive contamination releases can exist and be maintained by offsiteresponse organizations without licensee frnancial support; and3. There has been no rulemaking and public comment appropriate to the proposedexemptions to the EP requirements of 10 CFR 50 .47 (b) and Appendix E to l0 CFR Part50.2 The Recommendation for Exemption Approval Is Based Only on Doses In Excess Of EPAPAGs Which Ignores Other Possible Public Health Consequences Entergy and the NRC staff has determined that accidents at Entergy Vermont Yankeepower Station after April 2016 are unlikely to result in whole body doses in excess of one rem orthyroid doses in excess of five rem beyond the site boundary.

The Department has not had thopportunity to assess the evidence to support that conclusion.

Beyond that, those dosage levelsare not the only thresholds for potential detriment to public health. Should a fire, a leakingcontainer, or a transportation or industrial accident result in the release of radioactive materials that contaminate the environment around Vermont Yankee, numerous other consequences thatare a detriment to public health will occur.Radioactive contamination in solid, liquid or gaseous form that leaks from structures, systems or components or is released due to deliberate or accidental container damage ordestruction may contaminate the water, land or air beyond the Vermont Yankee site boundary.

While, according to the NRC staff and ENO, the contamination may not lead to doses thatexceed the EPA PAGs, there still could be adverse health consequences.

Some members of thepublic may inhale or ingest radioactive materials and receive low doses. Nonetheless, these doseswill solely be due to the release from Vermont Yankee, and even though they may be less thanthe EPA PAGs, they still pose a risk of later health effects in those exposed.

While evacuation and medical counter measures like potassium iodide may not be ordered in such circumstances, many of those exposed will self-evacuate and expect medical care'In the case of a release related to Vermont Yankee, the public will look to the Department to explain what occurred, how the exposure affects health and well-being and what should bedone in response to the exposures.

Environmental samples would be collected by Vermont's J

radiological first responders and samples would be analyzed in the VDH radiochemical laboratory.

The analytical results would then be published to provide facts to allow people totrust that the land and water are, or will be at some future time, free of contamination.

Thesecapabilities have been developed over 42 years of Vermont Yankee operation, and should besustained until the large volumes of radioactive materials stored at Vermont Yankee are removedfrom Vermont and properly disposed of at licensed radioactive waste facilities.

The NRC staff is using the EPA PAGs improperly.

They are designed to provideguidance, not regulation, as to when and how protective actions like evacuation, potassium iodide administration, relocation, reentry and return may be appropriate, not when emergency plans are to be written, replaced or exempted.

Emergency Plan requirements for nuclear powerreactors in SAFSTOR must address all sources of radioactive contamination of the environment and not just those that result in doses greater than the EPA PAGs. This inctrudes planning for andfunding of dedicated state radiological health resources to survey the environment outside thesite boundary for contamination of any media, analysis of those media for contamination, even atlow levels, and reporting of the results to the public.The Vermont Department of Health also lacks confidence that Entergy has providedsufficient evidence that all accident scenarios have been considered for its permanently defueledemergency plan. In particular, the accident and dose assessment software used by Entergy,Unihed RASCAL Interface 2.0.1.0 of October 2014 (URI) does not recognize the widelyaccepted possibilities of hostile action-based scenarios that could severely damage spent nuclearfuel in its spent fuel pool. Such scenarios are described by the NRC in NUREG-1738 and theNational Academies of Science.

Safety And Security Of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage(Pubtic Report),

Committee on the Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel4 Storage Board on Radioactive Waste Management Division on Earth and Life Studies NationalResearch Council Of The National Academies (2006). Lacking consideration of these and otherscenarios in this important Entergy Vermont Yankee emergency preparedness software isevidence that the PDEP does not adequately consider these scenarios as pointed out by theVermont Public Service Department in its comments on the license amendment request.Recent use of the software by the Vermont Department of Health's US Department ofEnergy-trained Assessment Scientists revealed that URI would be useless for spent fuel accidents caused by aircraft

crashes, whether accidental or hostile action-based or by large explosions caused by missiles or by armed intruders.

Other scenarios that could result in the loss of the sheetmetal structure that is the only secondary containment for the spent fuel pool, such as thoseidentified with the accident at Fukushima, also do not appear to have been provided for in URIand the PDEP. The Health Department recognizes it would require the use of other software tomodel the consequences of these scenarios.

The Department is well-trained in this othersoftware, and in the interpretation of its output for the public and decision-makers.

The elementsof a law enforcement, fire department and emergency medical services based Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan are not.The Assumption That a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) Adequateto Respond to Radiological Releases from a Decommissioning Nuclear Facility Can Existand Be Maintained without Licensee Support is Erroneous SECY-14-0125 states that "elements of the revised emergency plan would facilitate theability of offsite authorities to take protective actions under a CEMP." Satorius Memorandum at5. There are numerous industrial accident scenarios, especially involving the movement ortransportation of radioactive materials, hostile action based scenarios, and natural disasters that5 could lead to the release of radioactive materials being stored in the structures, systems andcomponents used for SAFSTOR for what ENO projects in its PSDAR to be a period of fiftyyears. Assaying these kinds of offsite consequences re{uires much more than law enforcement, fire department and emergency medical service personnel.

It requires personnel trained to surveypeople and the environment for radioactive contamination, personnel trained to interpret radioactive material contamination for dose consequences and decisions about decontamination and disposal as radioactive waste, and personnel to inform decision-makers and the public of thesituation to put risks in perspective and to plan other response actions.

These kinds of peoplemake up the existing offsite response organizations that the ENO exemptions would eliminate.

SECY-14-0125 also notes that precedent for approval of the EP exemption request hasbeen set at Kewaunee Power Station and the Z\on facility.

Id. at 2. This is not evidence, let aloneadequate

evidence, for the NRC staff to recommend approval of the EP exemptions requested byENO in its March l4,2}l4letter.

See BW l4-)}9.Emergency Planning has always been, is now,and always will be a local matter, and what other states or localities may have approved-in processes that Vermont was not a party to----cannot be imposed on Vermont.

There aresignihcant differences between Vermont and other states where decommissioning has occurredthat show the exemption should not be approved here. Most importantly, unlike all other stateswith nuclear reactors in SAFSTOR, Vermont does not have other operating nuclear facilities within its borders and therefore, absent continued support from Vermont Yankee, would lack theinfrastructure required to respond to a radiological

release, including those resulting in doses lessthan the EPA PAGs.SECY-14-0125 describes how the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)concurs with the NRC staff position recommending approval of the ENO EP exemptions.

Should6 there no longer be EP requirements to financially or otherwise support Vermont Yankee offsiteresponse organizations, there is no way these organizations can meet FEMA or any otherauthority's guidance.

It is also likely that, absent the emergency planning requirements for whichENO seeks exemption, any of the FEMA resources described in SECY-I4-0125 (the FederalRadiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, FEMA Headquarters and FEMA RegionalStaff) would actually support Vermont's EP efforts at a level required for the people andenvironment of Vermont.Not only should the decornmissioning EP require plans that include offsite responseorganizations including the Vermont Radiological Tracking Team, the Radiological SamplingTeam, and the Vermont Department of Health and its radiochemistry laboratory, but ENO shouldbe required to financially support them.There Has Been No Rulemaking and Public Comment on Exemptions from EP' Requirements for I)ecommissioning Facilities In its summary, the SECY- I 4-0 125 lettc.r includes the statement that "there are noexplicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that has beenshut down from those for an operating power reactor."

Satorius Memorandum at 7. Thedocument notes that rulemaking for nuclear power plant decommissioning was planned, but putoff with the "higher priority work after the terrorist attacks of September 1 1, 2001 ." Id., at3.With a growing number of nuclear power reactors presently undergoing decommissioning andexpected to begin decommissioning in the next twenty years, this lack of clear regulation andabsence of rulemaking makes circumstances unpredictable for many states who have lacked theoppoftunity to have their concerns for emergency planning addressed properly.

7 The NRC staff inappropriately based its recommendation to approve emergency planexemptions for Vermont Yankee on analyses applicable to an independent spent fuel storageinstallation (ISFSI) or monitored retrieval Site (MRS). This methodology is inappropriate because former nuclear power reactors in SAFSTOR contain very large radioactive materials storage areas, not discrete spent fuel canisters tested and licensed specihcally for the storage ofhigh level waste. The structures, systems and components of a nuclear po\ /er reactor inSAFSTOR present a multitude of pathways for releases of radioactive materials into theenvironment.

While the consequences may not result in doses in excess of EPA PAGs,environmental and public health consequences are possible.

The probability of such releases isclearly greater thanzero as has been documented in the Vermont Yankee PSDAR, including theextensive leak of reactor coolant/condensate from the augmented off gas system discovered in2009.Had there been required rulemaking for decommissioned nuclear power reactors, manystates, including Vermont likely would request that NRC staff require licensees, including ENO,to financially support offsite radiological emergency response.

Funding levels would becommensurate with the appropriate level of offsite response, and not simply eliminate essentially all offsite radiologically appropriate emergency response.

One level might be set for the periodthrough the removal ofall spent fuel from the spent fuel pool (SFP), and another, reduced levelmight be set for the remaining time until decontamination, dismantling, and license termination.

Absent rulemaking with public comment, the opportunity for states to weigh in is lost orsignificantly dim ini shed.It is unfortunate that the NRC staff has reinforced the misleading implication put forth byENO in its Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) that elements of the EP "have been8 established with the review and agreement of responsible State authorities."

BVY l4-033,Attachment 2, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan,Rev. 0, at 35, $ 1 l.l . It is the understanding of the Department that the only review of thedecommissioning EP with State authorities has occurred in briefings by ENO EP personnel inroutine meetings of what is called the Tri-State Directors.

A brief slide presentation before thisaudience is certainly not adequate State review and it should not be construed as Stateagreement.

Absent appropriate regulations for emergency planning during the decades-long phases ofdecommissioning, ENO should be allowed by the NRC staff to work extensively with the Stateof Vermont to identify mutually agreeable conditions for ofite radiological emergency responserather than have that possibility hampered by exemption of offsite responsibilities.

Conclusions of the Vermont Department of HealthAccording to SECY-14-0125, "FEMA acknowledges that individual states and localgovernments have the primary authority and responsibility to protect their citizens and respondto disasters and emergencies."

Id., at 6. This certainly includes radiological emergencies, and itincludes those that contaminate the environment with radioactive materials and lead to doses tomembers of the public both less than and greater than the EPA PAGs. These radiological emergencies require significantly more resources than what the NRC staff describes as acomprehensive emergency management plan using law enforcement, fire departments andemergency medical services.

This includes the capability to survey for contamination, toproperly collect samples with chain of custody, to effciently analyze a wide variety ofenvironmental media for radioactive material concentrations, to precisely interpret field9 measurements and laboratory

results, and to effectively report the situation to the public to allayconcerns and to decision-makers so agencies can take appropriate public health andenvironmental protection response actions.The recommendations of SECY-14-0125 undermine the ability to provide necessary emergency services for a plant in SAFSTOR by unilaterally exempting NRC licensees from mostoffsite emergency planning regulation based on inappropriate analysis applicable to ISFSIs andMRSs and a lack of consideration of hostile action-based scenarios.

The Commission shouldreject the staff recommendations of SECY-14-0125.

Respectfully,

/s/ William IrwinWilliam Irwin, Sc.D., CHPRadiological and Toxicology SciencesProgram ChiefVermont Department of Health108 Cherry StreetBurlington, VT 05401l0