ML17229B004

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Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-389/98-11.Corrective Actions:Addl Procedural Guidance Developed for ECCS Containment Sump Insps for Units 1 & 2. Mode 1 Walkdown of Unit 1 Also Performed
ML17229B004
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/04/1999
From: PLUNKETT T F
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-389-98-11, L-99-028, L-99-28, NUDOCS 9902120166
Download: ML17229B004 (9)


See also: IR 05000389/1998011

Text

CATEGORYj.REGULATORY

INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION

SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION

NBR:9902120166

DOC.DATE:

99/02/04NOTARIZED:

NO~~~~~~~~~~FACIL:50-389

St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower6LightCo.AUTH.NAME.AUTHORAFFILIATION

PLUNKETT,T.F.'lorida

PowerSLightCo.RECIP.NAME'ECIPIENT

AFFILIATION

RecordsManagement

Branch(Document

ControlDesk)SUBJECT:Forwardsresponsetoviolations

notedininsprept50-389/98-11.Corrective

actions:addi

procedural

guidancedeveloped

forECCScontainment

sumpinspsforUnits1&2.Mode1walkdownofUnit1alsoperformed.

DISTRIBUTION

CODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR

ENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp

Rept/Notice

ofViolation

ResponseDOCKET¹05000389NOTES:RECIPIENT

IDCODE/NAME

PD2-3PDCOPIESLTTRENCL11RECIPIENT

IDCODE/NAME

GLEAVES,W

COPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL:

ACRSAEOD/TTCCENTNRR/DRPM/PECB

NUDOCS-ABSTRACT

OGC/HDS3EXTERNAL:

LITCOBRYCE,JHNRCPDR221111111~1111111AEOD/SPD/RAB

DEDRONRR/DRCH/HOHB

NRR/DRPM/PERB

OEDIRRGN2FILE01NOACNUDOCSFULLTEXT111111111111YNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTETHTOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION

REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION

LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,

CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROZDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION

415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR19ENCL19

FloridaPower&LightCompany,P.0.Box14000,Juno

Beach,FL33408.0420

February4,1999L-99-02810CFR2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,

D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolation

NRCInsectionReort98-11FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hasreviewedthesubjectNoticeofViolation

and,pursuantto10CFR$2.201,theresponsetotheviolation

isattached.

Asdiscussed

intheviolation

response,

theUnit2Spring1997refueling

outagesumpscreenrepairanddisposition

activities

failedtoadequately

considerthegenericimplications

oftheidentified

discrepancies.

St.Luciesitepersonnel

arebeingtrainedtoreinforce

therequirements

oftheSt.Luciecorrective

actionprogram.Pleasecontactuswithquestions

ontheenclosedviolation

response.

Verytrulyyours,ThomasF.PlunkettPresident

NuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/E

JWAttachment

cc:RegionalAdministrator,

USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,

USNRC,St.LuciePlant9902120i66

990204PDRADOCK05000389PPDRanFPLGroupcompany

L-99-028Attachment

Page1of5VIOLATION

Part50ofTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations

(10CFR50),AppendixB,Criterion

XVIrequiresthatmeasuresshallbeestablished

toassurethatconditions

adversetoquality,suchasfailures,

malfunctions,

deficiencies,

deviations,

defective

materialandequipment,

andnonconformances

arepromptlyidentified

andcorrected.

Contrarytotheabove,asofNovember15,1998,conditions

adversetoqualitywerenotpromptlyidentified

andcorrected

involving

theUnit2emergency

corecoolingsystems(ECCS)containment

sump.Specifically,

inMay1997,corrective

actionswereimplemented

toaddressgapsandopeningsintheECCScontainment

sumpscreensinexcessofdesignrequirements

described

intheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.However,asevidenced

bytheidentification.

ofapproximately

100additional

discrepancies

inNovember1998,thecorrective

actionsinMay1997werenoteffective

inidentifying

andcorrecting

thedeficiencies,

andthesumpwasnotrestoredtodesignrequirements.

ThisisaSeverityIVLevelviolation

(Supplement

1).RESPONSE1.AreementwithorDenialotheViolation

FPLconcurswiththeviolation.

ReasonfortheViolation

Thefailureofthecorrective

actionsperformed

inMay1997toeffectively

identifyandcorrectdeficiencies,

andtorestoretheECCScontainment

sumptodesignrequirements,

isprimarily

theresultofinadequate

consideration

ofgenericimplications

ofthedocumented

deficiencies

(i.e.,consideration

ofthepotential

fordeficiencies

inallareasoftheUnit2sumpscreens).

InMay1997,neartheendoftheSpring1997Unit2refueling

outage(SL2-10),

theNRCResidentInspector

noteddiscrepancies

intheconstruction

oftheECCScontainment

sumpscreen.Thesediscrepancies

involvedgapsbetweenthedividerscreenandtheouterverticalscreen,andbetweenthedividerscreenandtheconcretewall.Condition

Report97-1102waswrittentodocumentthesediscrepancies,

andPlantChange/Modification

(PC/M)97-037waswrittenfortheimplementation

ofrequiredrepairs.FPLperformed

additional

inspections

ofthedividerscreen,andnotedadditional

discrepancies.

Duringtheimplementation

of

L-99-028Attachment

Page2of5therequiredrepairs,otherminorgapswerenotedinthedividerscreenandinthehorizontal

screenatthetopofthesump;thesegapswerealsodocumented

inCondition

Report97-1102andrepairedpursuanttoPC/M97-037.Duringthisperiod,FPLeffortswerefocusedontherepairofthegapsnotedatthedividerscreenandthehorizontal

screen.TheareasofconcernnotedbytheNRCResidentdealtwithgapsbetweenthedividerscreenandtheouterscreen,andbetweenthedividerscreenandtheconcretewall(i.e.,discrepancies

thatwouldallowthepassageofdebrisfromonesideofthesumptotheotherside,thuspotentially

affecting

bothECCStrains).Additional

inspections

performed

byFPLduringtheSL2-10refueling

outagetoaddressgenericconcernsforUnit2wereoriginally

limitedtothedividerscreen;aAerdiscrepancies

wereobservedinthehorizontal

screens,thescopeofinspections

wasincreased

toincludethehorizontal

screens.Acommitment

wasmade(andfulfilled)

toprepareguidelines

forinspection

ofthesumpscreensforbothUnits1and2duringfutureoutages.However,St.Luciedidnotrecognize

thatthescopeofgenericconcernstobeaddressed

duringtheSL2-10outageshouldhavebeenexpandedtoincludetheverticalouterscreens,toprovidecompleteassurance

(a)thatallsumpscreendeficiencies

wereidentified

andcorrected

and(b)thatthedesignrequirements

for'theECCScontainment

sumpweresatisfied.

Thegapsinthedividerscreenwerediscovered

duringtheSpring1997Mode4containment

closeoutwalkdown.

Theimplicitawareness

bypersonnel

ofthescheduleforunitre-start(inherent

duringrefueling

outages)wasafactorinthe.narrowfocusofcorrective

actionwhichfailedtoidentifytheneedforadditional

inspections

tobeperformed

toaddressgenericconcerns.

Duringthedisposition

ofthesediscrepancies,

genericimplications

forUnit1wereconsidered.

SincethedesignoftheUnit1screenshasacompletely

different

configuration

thanUnit2(withnodividerscreen),FPLdetermined

thatnoimmediate

actionswererequiredforUnitl.Asubsequent

Mode1powerentrywasperformed

asdescribed

belowincorrective

action3.b.Detailedinspections

andrepairsoftheUnit1screenswereperformed

duringthe,Fall1997Unit1refueling

outage(SL1-15).

Basedonthesefacts,FPLhasdetermined

thatthereasonforthisviolation

(ineffective

corrective

actions)wasthefactthatinsufficient

attention

andconsideration

weregiventogenericconcerns(i.e.,thepotential

fordiscrepancies

intheverticalouterscreerisandthehorizontal

screens)subsequent

tothediscovery

ofgapsinthedividerscreen.

L-99-028Attachment

Page3of53.Corrective

StesTakenandResultsAchievedSubsequent

totheSL2-10refueling

outage,additional

procedural

guidancewasdeveloped

forECCScontainment

sumpinspections

forUnits1and2toprovidespecificinspection

requirements

forgapsinthesumpscreenaswellasforverification

ofsumpareacleanliness.

Theprocedural

guidanceisintendedtoensurethatthephysicalcondition

ofthesumpscreensmeetsthedesignrequirements.

TherequiredguidancewasissuedviaMaintenance

Surveillance

Procedure

MSP-68.01

("Containment

SumpInspection"

)andPSLNuclearAssurance

QualityControlTechnique

Sheet10.54("Unit1andUnit2Containment

SumpInspection"

).Subsequent

totheSL2-10refueling

outage,aMode1walkdownofUnit1wasperformed

toinspecttheaccessible

areasoftheUnit1ECCScontainment

sumpscreens.Onlythehorizontal

screenatthetopofthesumpcouldbeinspected

duringthiswalkdown.

Eightminordiscrepant

conditions

werefound;anengineering

evaluation

concluded

thattherewerenooperability

concernsassociated

withtheseconditions.

Twoofthesediscrepancies

wererepairedimmediately.

Theremaining

sixdiscrepancies

wererepairedduringthenextUnit1refueling

outage(SL1-15);seeparagraph

c,below.Thesediscrepancies,

andtheevaluation

oftheas-foundcondition,

weredocumented

inCondition

ReportNo.97-1465,Supplement

1.C.DuringtheSL1-15refueling

outage(thefirstoutagesubsequent

totheissuanceoftheprocedural

guidancediscussed

inparagraph

a,above),theUnit1ECCScontainment

sumpscreenswereinspected

indetailinaccordance

withMSP-68.01

andTechnique

Sheet10.54.No,discrepancies

wereobservedontheinnerscreens.Severaldiscrepancies

weredocumented

withregardtotheouterscreensandthesumpitself.Thesediscrepancies

weredocumented

andevaluated

inCondition

ReportNo.97-2225andPlantManagement

Action-Item

No.97-12-166.

FPLconcluded

thattherewerenooutstanding

operability

concernsorreportability

issues.Requiredrepairstothesumpscreenswereperformed

inaccordance

withPC/M97-058.DuringtheFall1998Unit2refueling

outage(SL2-11),

adetailed,

.comprehensive

inspection

oftheUnit2ECCScontainment

sumpscreenswasperformed

inaccordance

withMSP-68.01

andTechnique

Sheet10.54.ThiswasthefirstUnit2outagesubsequent

totheissuanceofthedetailedprocedural

guidancediscussed

inparagraph

a,above.Atotalof101discrepant

conditions,

alongwithalimitednumberofinaccessible

areas,wereidentified

duringthisinspection.

Theseconditions

weredocumented

~r0

L-99-028Attachment

Page4of5andevaluated

inCondition

ReportNo.98-1766and98-1766(Supplements

1and2).Thesumpscreendiscrepancies

whichrequiredrepairwerecorrected

inaccordance

withPC/M98-029.Allotheridentified

sumpscreendiscrepancies,

including

anypotential

deficiencies

associated

withtheinaccessible

sumpscreenareas,weredispositioned

asanacceptable

configuration.

FPLconcluded

(a)thattherewerenooperability

concernsassociated

withtheas-foundcondition

(withtheunitoffline),and(b)thattheevaluation

forsafetysignificance

providedforthediscrepancies

discovered

duringtheSL2-10refueling

outageboundedthenewlydiscovered

anomalies.

FPLdetermined

thatthediscrepancies

werereportable

under10CFR50.73as"acondition

outsidethedesignbasisoftheplant".FPLissuedarevisiontoLER50-389/97-02,

inwhichthediscrepancies

wereattributed

to(a)afailuretoproperlyimplement

thedesignrequirements

duringoriginalconstruction

and(b)inadequate

inspections.

4.Corrective

StestoAvoidFutureViolations

St.LucieUnit2Technical

Specification

4.5.2.e.2

requiresavisualinspection

ofthecontainment

sumpatleastonceper18monthsforverification

thatthescreensshownoevidenceofstructural

distressorcorrosion.

Asimilarinspection

isrequiredbyUnit1Technical

Specification

4.5.2.d.2.

Asdiscussed

above,Maintenance

Surveillance

Procedure

MSP-68.01

("Containment

SumpInspection"

)andPSLNuclearAssurance

QualityControlTechnique

Sheet10.54("Unit1andUnit2Containment

SumpInspection"

)havebeenissuedtoprovideadditional

procedural

guidanceforECCScontainment

sumpinspections.

Thesedocuments

providespecificinspection

requirements

forgapsinthesumpscreensaswellasforverification

ofsumpareacleanliness.

Satisfactory

completion

oftheseprocedures

willensurethatthephysicalcondition

ofthesumpscreensmeetsthedesignrequirements.

Inspection

personnel

willutilizethesedocuments

duringfuturerefueling

outagestosatisfytheTechnical

Specification

requirements.

Inordertoprovideassurance

thattheproblemnoted(inadequate

consideration

ofgenericconcerns)

willnotrecur,aTechnical

Alertaddressing

thisconcernhasbeenissuedtoEngineering

personnel

Formalized

trainingforre-emphasis

ofexistingprocedural

guidancewillbeprovidedaspartofscheduled

Engineering

SupportPersonnel

(ESP)training;

thistrainingwillbecompleted

byMarch26,1999.Inordertoprovideassurance

thatfuturecondition

reportswillnotbeapprovedwithoutadequateconsideration

ofgenericconcerns,

atraining

L-99-028Attachment

Page5of5bulletinforre-emphasis

ofexistingprocedural

guidancewasissuedtoSt.Luciemanagement

personnel

responsible

forapproving

Condition

Reportdispositions.

d.Futurepre-outage

EmployeeCommunication

meetingswillre-emphasize

management

expectations

concerning

theneedtothoroughly

investigate

outagediscovery

items,including

theconsideration

ofgenericimplications

aspartofthecorrective

actionplan.DateofFullComlianceFullcompliance

wasachievedonDecember2,1998,uponimplementation

ofPC/M98-029whichincludedmodifications

totheECCScontainment

sumpscreensnecessary

tomeetdesignrequirements.

ThisPC/Mwascompleted

priortotheUnit2startupfollowing

theSL2-11refueling

outage.