ML17331B058

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 3/4.6.2, RCS Operational Leakage by Deleting Table 3.4-0, RCS Pressure Isolation Valves, LCO 3.4.6.2f & Action C & SRs 4.4.6.2.2 for Both Units

ML17331B058
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	11/15/1993
From:	FITZPATRICK E INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	MURLEY T E NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17331B059	List: ML17331B058 ML17331B060
References
AEP:NRC:1180, NUDOCS 9311190228
Download: ML17331B058 (22)

Text

A.CCEI.EEBBOCUMENTBISUTIONSYSTEMREGULORYINFORMATION DISTRIBUT SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9311190228 DOC.DATE:

93/11/15NOTARIZED:

YESDOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,XndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana6MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEY,T.E.

DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

Application foramendstolicensesDPR-586DPR-74,revising TS3/4.6.2,"RCSOperational Leakage"bydeletingTable3.4-0,"RCSPressureIsolation Valves,"LCO3.4.6.2f6Actionc&SRs4.4.6.2.2 forbothunits.DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:

GeneralDistribution DNOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LANETZEL,BINTERNAL:

NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OC/LFDCBRE5OlEXTERNAL:

NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111101111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNRR/DORS/OTSB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS2NSICCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111011DDSDSDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.504-2065)

TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!DTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR15ENCL13 indianaMichip~PowerCompaP.O.Box1663Coturnbus, OH43216AEP:NRC:1180 DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGEREQUESTREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMPRESSUREISOLATION VALVESU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555Attn:T.E,MurleyNovember15,1993

Reference:

1)2)3)4)USNRCLettertoallLWRLicensees:

LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves,February25,1980AEP:NRC:0371, ReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves,March24,1980Letter,S.A.Varga,USNRCtoJ.Dolan,IndianaandMichiganElectricCompany,OrderforModification ofLicensesConcerning PrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves,April20,1981WASH1400/NUREG 75/014,ReactorSafetyStudy:AnAssessment ofAccidentRisksinU.S.Commercial NuclearPower-Plants,.USNRC,October19755)6)AEP:NRC1082E,Individual PlantExamination Submittal/Response toGenericLetter88-20,May1,1992AEP:NRC1082F,Individual PlantExamination ResponsetoNRCQuestions, February24,199349311190228 931115FDRADDCXOS000315PPDR Dr.T.E.Murley-2-AEP:NRC:1180 Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication foratechnical specification (T/S)changeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically, weproposetochangeT/S3/4.6.2,"ReactorCoolantSystemOperational Leakage,"

bydeletingTable3.4-0,"ReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves,"LimitingCondition forOperation 3.4.6.2fandActionc.,andSurveillance Requirements 4.4.6.2.2, forbothunits.Wearealsoproposing threeeditorial changesineachunit'sT/S,andthedeletionofthelastparagraph intheBasesforT/S3/4.6.2.TheReactorCoolantSystempressureisolation valvesinTable3.4-0oftheTechnical Specifications wereaddedtotheLimitingCondition forOperation onReactorCoolantSystemOperational LeakagepursuanttoaUSNRClettertoallLWRlicensees, "LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves",datedFebruary25,1980(Reference 1)andfollowing additional plantspecifictransmittals onthissubject(References 2and3).Reference 1wasissuedasaresultofthefindinginReference 4thatanintersystem loss-of-coolant accident(ISLOCA)wasasignificant contributor tocoredamagefrequency (EventV).Recently, theIndividual PlantExamination (IPE)(Reference 5)forCookNuclearPlantfoundthatthecontribution tooverallcoredamagefrequency fromanISLOCAwastheleast(0.08$)ofallinitiating eventcontributors.

Thiswasinlargemeasureduetothedesignofpotential EventV-sequence flowpathsatCookNuclearPlantcomparedtothatusedinWASH-1400.

Thepotential pathsatCookNuclearPlantcontaineitherthreecheckvalves,acombination oftwocheckvalvesandaclosedmotoroperatedvalve,ortwoclosedmotoroperatedvalves,whereasthetypicalWASH-1400 flowpathcontained onlytwocheckvalvesinserieswithalockedopenvalveasshowninFigureV-3ofReference 4.Theresultant IPEEventV-sequence initiating eventfrequency (described inReferences 5and6)wasapproximately anorderofmagnitude lowerthantheWASH-1400 valueof4.00E-6andwasalsoaboutthreeordersofmagnitude lowerthantheaverageaccidentinitiating eventfrequency employedintherestoftheIPE.Additionally, theWASH-1400 analysesusedtheveryconservative assumption that,whenthein-series checkvalvesfail,thepressurized lowpressurepipingalsofailed.Amorerealistic plant-specific scenariowasmodeledintheCookNuclearPlantIPEISLOCAanalyses, whereinexistingplantdesigncapabilities wereusedwhichreducedtheeffectsofthisaccident(seeresponsetoquestion3inReference 6).Thus,theEventVsequencewasfoundtobeaninsignificant contributor, bothtotheCookNuclearPlantcoredamagefrequency andoff-sitedoses.

Dr.T.E.Murley-3-AEP:NRC:1180 Inadditiontotheabove,thisrequestisalsobeingmadebecausestartupoftheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2following refueling outageshasbeendelayedonanumberofoccasions asadirectresultoftheunnecessarily restrictive testingrequirements andacceptance criteriamandatedbytheTechnical Specifications forthevalvesinTable3.4-0.Allofthesubjectvalveswillstillbetestedonarefueling outagefrequency totheleakagelimitsofASMEXIundertheISTprogram..

Thiswillcontinuetoprovideprotection fromthepotential occurrence ofanEventVaccidenttypetoensurethehealthandsafetyofthepublic.Theproposedchangesandoursignificant hazardsconsideration analysisareprovidedinAttachment 1.Theproposedmarked-up revisedT/SpagesareincludedinAttachment 2.Attachment 3containsthetypedproposedrevisedT/Spages.Webelievethattheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andtheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.

Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(l),

copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.Thisletterissubmitted prusuantto10CFR50.30(b)and,assuchanoathstatement isattahced.

Sincerely, E.E.FitzarickVicePresident ehAttachments 4-I COUNTYOFFRANKLINE.E.Fitzpatrick, beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresident oflicenseeIndianaMichiganPowerCompany,thathehasreadtheforgoingTechnical Specification ChangeRequestReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valvesandknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledge andbelief.Subscribed andsworntobeforemethisl~dayof.NOTARYPUBLICD)ANAl:.EADSNotaryPublic,StateofOhioMycommission expires2.2495 Dr.T.E.Murley-4-AEP:NRC:1180 cc:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.Martin-RegionIIINFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector

-BridgmanJ~R.Padgett Dr.T.E.Murley-5-AEP:NRC:1180 bc:S.J.BrewerJ.B.Kingseed/J.

M.Nieto/R.B.BennettD.H.MalinJ.D.Benes/E.V.Gilabert/J.

J.RipakJ.D.Grier/D.F.Powell/J.

G.NogradyM.L.Horvath-BridgmanJ.B.ShinnockW.G.Smith,Jr./S.H.Steinhart B.A.Wetzel,NRC-Washington, DCAEP:NRC:1180 DC-N-6015.1

COUNTY0FRANKLNE.E.Fitzpatrick, beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresident oflicenseeIndianaMichiganPowerCompany,thathehasreadtheforgoingTechnical Specification ChangeRequestReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valvesandknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledge andbelief.Subscribed andsworntobeforemethisdayofOL/~adwc,i9y>Zc-~.NOTARYPUBLICDIA<sAL~QDSNotaryPublic,StateofOhioMycommission expires22495 ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1180 DESCRIPTION OFPROPOSEDCHANGESAND10CFR50.92 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION ANALYSIS ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP'NRC'1180 Page1BCKGROUNDTheReactorSafetyStudy(WASH-1400/NUREG 75/014)(Reference 1)analyzedaso-called EventVSequenceresulting inanintersystem loss-of-coolant accident(ISLOCA).

Itwasconcluded thattheISLOCAwasasignificant contributor tocoredamagefrequency sincethecontainment isbypassedandreactorcoolantisreleaseddirectlytotheAuxiliary Building.

Asaresultoftheabovefinding,theUSNRCissuedaletter,"LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves,"datedFebruary25,1980,(Reference 2)requesting LWRlicensees toprovidethefollowing information:

1.Describethevalveconfiguration atyourplantandindicateifanEventVisolation valveconfiguration existswithintheClassIboundaryofthehighpressurepipingconnection PCSpipingto.lowpressuresystempiping;e.g.,(1)twocheckvalvesinseries,or(2)twocheckvalvesinserieswithaMOV;2.IfeitheroftheaboveEventVconfigurations existsatyourfacility, indicatewhethercontinuous surveillance orperiodictestsarebeingaccomplished onsuchvalvestoensureintegrity.

Alsoindicatewhethervalveshavebeenknown,orfound,tolackintegrity; and3.IfeitheroftheaboveEventVconfigurations existatyourfacility, indicatewhetherplantprocedures shouldberevisedorifplantmodifications shouldbemadetoincreasereliability.

AEPSCresponded totheaboveUSNRCletterwithletterAEP:NRC:0371, "ReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves,"datedMarch24,1980(Reference 3).Inthisletter,theUSNRCwasinformedthatthefollowing valveconfigurations areusedatDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant:1)Aminimumofthreecheckvalvesinseries2)Twocheckvalveswithaminimumofaclosedmotoroperatedvalveinseries ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1180 Page23)Twocheckvalveswithaclosedhandoperatedvalveinseries4)AcheckvalvewithtwoclosedairoperatedvalvesinseriesAEP:NRC:0371 concluded that:"Therefore noEventVconfiguration existsattheCookPlant.Consequently, therequestsinItems2and3ofMr.Eisenhut's letterarenotapplicable totheCookNuclearPlant."OnApril20,1981,theUSNRCissuedan"OrderforModification ofLicensesConcerning PrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves"fortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant(Reference 4).Thisorderstatedthat"Wehaveconcluded thataWASH-1400 EventVvalveconfiguration existsatyourfacilityandthatthecorrective actionasdefinedintheattachedOrderisnecessary."

AttachedtotheOrderweretheTechnical Evaluation Report(TER)supporting theOrderandthenewTechnical Specifications which,according totheOrder,"...willensurepublichealthandsafetyovertheoperating lifeofyourfacility."

ThesenewTechnical Specifications wereincorporated atthattimeintotheOperating LicensesforCookNuclearplant.ThesearethesameTechnical Specifications thatwearenowproposing todelete.In1987,theUSNRCissuedGenericLetter(GL)87-06,"Periodic Verification ofLeakTightIntegrity ofPressureIsolation Valves"(Reference 5).InourresponsetothatGL,AEP:NRC:1041 (Reference 6),westatedthat12-SI-170L2, 12-SI-170L3, 12-RH-133, and12-RH-134 areleaktestedasperthesurveillance requirements intheTechnical Specifications.

Theproposedchangesinthissubmittal, therefore, modifyourresponsetoGL.87-06.Finally,in1992,theUSNRCissuedInformation Notice92-36,"Intersystem LOCAOutsideContainment" (Reference 7).Thisinformation noticelistedeleven"Observed PlantVulnerabilities toISLOCAPrecursors."

Areviewofthisinformation noticeconcluded thattheconcernsraisedareadequately addressed bycontrolscurrently inplaceorplannedattheCookNuclearPlant.TheproposedchangestotheTechnical Specifications willnotalterthisconclusion becauseourresponsetotheinformation noticewasnotbasedonexistingtechnical specifications.

ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1180 Page3COOKNUCLEARPLANTIPEOnMay1,1992,AEPSCresponded toGenericLetter88-20(Reference 8),inAEP:NRC:1082E, Individual PlantExamination (IPE)submittal (Reference 9)andprovidedfurtherinformation ontheanalysisoftheISLOCAinReference 10.(SeetheEnclosure tothis

Attachment:

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlant,PathsConsidered asPossibleEventV-Sequence LOCA,takenfromReference 10).Inthedetermination oftheISLOCAinitiating eventfrequency, leaktestingof12-SI-170L2, 12-SI-170L3, 12-RH-133, and12-RH-134, asrequiredbythesurveillance requirements intheTechnical Specifications, wasaddressed.

TheIPEforCookNuclearPlantconcluded thattheISLOCAwastheaccidentthatcontributed theleasttotheoverallcoredamagefrequency.

Thecalculated ISLOCAinitiating eventfrequency wasapproximately 6.70E-07, andthecalculated probability ofISLOCAcoredamagewasapproximately 5.4E-08.Thecontribution tooverallcoredamagefrequency fromanISLOCAislessthan0.18ofthe6.26E-05IPEcalculated coredamagefrequency perreactoryear.Itisseen,therefore, thatthecontribution fromanISLOCAeventatCookNuclearPlantisnegligible.

COMPARISON OFWASH-1400 VSCOONUCLEARPLANTWITHRESPEC~TOSLOGTheISLOCAaccidentisdescribed inSection5.3.2.5ofWASH-1400, andthequantification ofitscoredamagefrequency isfoundinAppendixV,Section4.4ofWASH-1400.

Thecoredamagefrequency calculated inWASH-1400 is4.00-06/reactor year.WASH-1400 evaluated 3pathwaysof2checkvalvesinseriesandassumedthatthe600psiLowPressureInjection System(LPIS),onceexposedtoRCSpressure, wouldfailandcreateapproximately a6"effective diameterLOCA.Nootheraccidentinitiation featuresormitigating actionsweremodeled.IntheCookNuclearPlantIPE,ninedifferent pathwaysforanISLOCAeventwereanalyzed.

Thesepathways(seeEnclosure tothisAttachment),

consisted ofeitherthreecheckvalvesinseries,twocheckvalvesandaclosedmotoroperatedvalve(MOV)inseries,ortwonormallyclosedMOVsinseries.AlthoughWASH-1400 lookedatcheckvalveleaktestingasasensitivity

analysis, theCookNuclearPlantIPEaccounted forthein-place'eaktestingwhencalculating theprobability ofanISLOCAoccurring.

Inaddition, theCookNuclearPlantIPEmodeledmitigating actionsfortheISLOCAeventintheeventtree.The ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP'NRC'1180 Page4IPEISLOCAinitiating eventfrequency wasapproximately anorderofmagnitude lowerthantheWASH-1400 coredamagefrequency (4.00E-06) andtheIPEISLOCAcoredamagefrequency valuewasapproximately twoordersofmagnitude lowerthantheWASH-1400 values.Finally,toaddresstheimpactofremovingtheT/Srequirements andonlytesting12-SI-170L2, 12-SI-170L3, 12-RH-133, and12-RH-134 atarefueling outagefrequency, asensitivity runwasmadeinsupportofthissubmittal.

ItwasfoundthattheISLOCAinitiating eventfrequency, andISLOCAprobability ofcoredamagewouldalsoincreaseby5.4%tothemid5.00E-08range,andtheoverallcoredamagefrequency wouldremainunchanged.

STPOGThesubjectcheckvalvesofthissubmittal arecurrently beingtestedinMode5,ColdShutdown, asrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications surveillance requirements priortogoingtoMode4,HotShutdown.

Theallowable leakratecannotexceed1gpm.IfthesecheckvalvesareremovedfromtheTechnical Specifications, theywouldcontinuetobetestedundertheISTProgram(ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI),onarefueling outagefrequency, liketheirsistervalvesintheotherloopsintheResidualHeatRemovalSystem.Theacceptance criteriafortheleaktestingofthesevalvesundertheISTProgramis5gpm.DESCRIPTION OFPROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICAT ONCHANGSTheproposedchangesarelistedbel'ow.Theyareidentical forbothunits.T/S3'.6.2d.Add"and"attheendoftheline.2.T/S3.4.6.2e.Delete"and,"andaddaperiodafterIIgpm2II3.T/S3.4.6.2f.Deleteinitsentirety.

4,T/S3.4.6.2APPLICABILITY:

Delete"~"andreplacewitha"*".5.T/S3.4.6.2ACTIONc.Deleteinitsentirety.

T/S3.4.6.2ACTIONc,footnote*.Deletethefootnote.

~~

ATTACHMENT 1TOAEPNRC:1180Page57.T/S3.4.6.2APPLICABILITY, footnote~.Changethen~nton*n~8.T/S4.4.6.2.2.

Deleteinitsentirety.

9.T/S3/4.6.2,Table3.4-0.DeletetheTableandthefootnote(a)initsentirety.

10.T/S3/4.6.2,Bases.Deletethelastparagraph initsentirety.

10CFR509SIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSDERATONANALYSISPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment toanoperating licensewillnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment satisfies thefollowing threecriteria:

1)Doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously

analyzed, 2)Doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or3)Doesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.4CrterionTheISLOCAisnotoneoftheaccidents previously analyzedinChapter14,SafetyAnalysis, oftheCookNuclearPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.Chapter14analyzesthelargebreakLOCAinSection14.3.1,and"lossofreactorcoolantfromsmallrupturedpipesorfromcracksinlargepipeswhichactuatestheECCS",orsmallbreakLOCAinSection14.3.2.Therefore, deletingfromtheTechnical Specifications theReactorCoolantSystempressureisolation valvesinTable3.4-0,willnotincreasetheprobability ortheconsequences ofthelargebreakorthesmallbreakLOCAspreviously analyzedfortheCookNuclearPlant.

I ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1180 Page6Criterion TheReactorCoolantSystempressureisolation valvesinTable3.4-0oftheTechnical Specifications wereaddedbecauseWASH-1400identified theISLOCAasasignificant contributor tocoredamagefrequency.

DeletionofthesubjectvalvesfromtheTechnical Specifications andrelianceonthetestingrequirements mandatedbytheIn>>Service TestingProgramofASMEXIdoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromthelargebreakorthesmallbreakLOCAspreviously analyzedfortheCookNuclearPlant.Criteion3DeletingtheReactorCoolantSystempressureisolation valvesfromthetestingrequirements inTable3.4-0oftheTechnical Specifications willresultinthesevalvesonlybeingtestedonarefueling outagefrequency aspartoftheASMEB&PVCodeSectionXIISTProgram.Thissomewhatreducedtestingfrequency willresultinaslightincreaseintheISLOCAinitiating eventfrequency, andISLOCAcontribution tocoredamagefrequency of5.4S,fromlower5.00E-08/reactor yeartomid5.00E-08/reactor year.Thisinsignificant incxeasewillnotaffecttheoverallcoredamagefrequency of6.26E-05/reactor year.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposeddeletionoftheReactorCoolantSystempressux'e isolation valvesinTable3.4-0oftheTechnical Specifications, aswellastheproposeddeletionoftheportionsoftheTechnical Specifications thatareaffectedbyTable3.4-0,willnotresultinasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafetythatexistsatCookNuclearPlanttopreventanISLOCAortomiti'gate theconsequences ofanISLOCA.REFERENCES WASH-1400/NUREG 75/014,ReactorSafetyStudy:AnAssessment ofAccidentRisksinU.S.Commercial NuclearPlants,USNRC,October1975.2.USNRCLettertoallLWRLicensees:

LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves,February25,1980.3.AEP:NRC:0371, ReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves,March24,1980.

ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP'NRC'1180 Page74.Letter,S.A.Varga,USNRCtoJ.Dolan,IndianaandMichiganElectricCompany,OrderforModification ofLicensesConcerning PrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolation Valves,April20,1981.5.USNRCGenericLetter(GL)87-06,"PeriodicVerification ofLeakTightIntegrity ofPressureIsolation Valves,"March13,1987.6.AEP:NRC:1041, GenericLetter87-06,PeriodicVerification ofLeakTightIntegrity ofPressureIsolation Valves,November12,1987.7.USNRCInformation Notice92-36,"Intersystem LOCAOutsideContainment",

May,7,1992.8.Initiation oftheIndividual PlantExamination forSevereAccidentVulnerabilities

-10CFR50.54(f),

GenericLetterNo.88-20,November23,1988.9.AEP:NRC1082E, Individual PlantExamination Submittal, ResponsetoGenericLetter88-20,May1,1992.10.AEP:NRC1082F,Individual PlantExamination ResponsetoNRCQuestions, February24,1993.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1180 ENCLOSURE Page8DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTPATHSCONSIDERED ASPOSSIBLEV-SEQUENCE LOCASSlL70LLTOLOOPICOL.DLEGroumAI'%%i.~Do 4CCUHIIUITIRS SI-166LI$1L6LLLTOLOOP4COLDLEGSl-170L4SI-166L4ICN-311!SI-LSLETOLOOPIHOTLEGTOLOOP4HOTLEGSl-L58LIIHO-315Sl-158L4LCINO-316SI-152NICN-265rROHNORTH$1PLPLP$1-170L2TOLOOP2COLDL.EGSl-161L2FRIHACCUHULATORS SI-L66L2ICN-111'5%L5""TOLOOP3COLDLEGSl-1701.3 RH-134Sl161L3Sl-166LIHO-326!ICN321$1-LSLVPRDHvEST!RHRPUHPSlL58L2TOLOOP2HOTLEGSl-158L3TOLOOP3HOTLEGrROHLmIHO-L28IHO-325LCICH-L29ICH-265SI"152$SV-L03SETAT450PSITORHRSUCTIONHEADERFIGURE11REFERENCE DRAVINGTOP-1-5143 "20108