ML17328B021
| ML17328B021 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1991 |
| From: | FITZPATRICK E INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | MURLEY T E NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17328B022 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-070, REF-GTECI-094, REF-GTECI-NI, TASK-070, TASK-094, TASK-70, TASK-94, TASK-OR AEP:NRC-1131A, GL-90-06, GL-90-6, NUDOCS 9104220175 | |
| Download: ML17328B021 (17) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
ApplicationforamendstoLicensesDPR-58&DPR-74,changingTStocomplyw/commitmentsreGenericLtr90-06,"ResolutionofGenericIssues70'PORV&BlockValveReliability&GenericIssue94,'AddiOvertemp....'"SDISTRIBUTIONCODE'019DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRfENCL~SIZEiR+25TXTLE:GenericLtr90-06ResolutionofGE70N94PORVs&BlockValveRelxabil/DNOTES:ACCELERATEDDISTRIBUTIONDEMONSTRTIONSYSTEMREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSXONNBR:9104220175DOC.DATE:91/04/16NOTARXZED:NODOCKET'ACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana&0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,Xndiana&05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATXONFXTZPATRICK,E.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAMERECXPIENTAFFILIATIONRMURLEY,T.E.DocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)RECIPXENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1LACOLBURN,T.INTERNALKXRKNOODIRNLS3NBEGFXT'EE701R/RPSIBEXTERNAL:NRCPDRCOPXESLTTRENCL111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDNRR/EMEBPICKETT,D13H15RES/DSXR/EXBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111DDDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:DDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'7NEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR12ENCL12 IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Coiumbus,OH43216AEP:NRC:1131ADonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos,50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74RESOLUTIONOFGENERICISSUE70,"POWER-OPERATEDRELIEFVALVEANDBLOCKVALVERELIABILITY,"ANDGENERICISSUE94,"ADDITIONALLOW-TEMPERATUREOVERPRESSUREPROTECTIONFORLIGHT-WATERREACTORS,"(GENERICLETTER90-06),PROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyApril16,1991
DearDr.Murley:
ThisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationforamendmenttotheTechnicalSpecifications(T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Thisamendmentisrequestedtocomplywithcommitmentsmadeinourprevioussubmittal,AEP;NRC:1131,whichrespondedtoGenericLetter90-06("ResolutionofGenericIssue70,Power-OperatedReliefValveandBlockValveReliability,"andGenericIssue94,"AdditionalLow-TemperatureOverpressureProtectionforLight-WaterReactors").AsnotedinourresponsetotheGenericLetter,wearegenerallyadoptingthepower-operatedreliefvalve(PORV)andoverpressureprotectionT/Ssproposedbythestaffwiththreeexceptionsandalsowithminormodificationsnecessarytoreflecttheplant-specificdesignfeaturesofCookNuclearPlant.ThefirstexceptionconcernstheinapplicabilityoflowtemperatureoverpressureprotectiontoMode4.ThesecondexceptionconcernsourintenttonotlimitplantoperationinModes1,2,and3withanyofthethreePORVsorblockvalvesinoperableforreasonsotherthanexcessiveseatleakagetoperiodsoflessthan72hours.ThethirdexceptioninvolvesourintenttonotincorporatevalvesinthePORVcontrolairsystemintothein-servicetestingprogram.JustificationsforeachoftheseexceptionsarediscussedinAttachment1tothisletter.P10ggg0>75910416,PDRADOCK05000315Pi'DRfQf Dr.T.E.Murley-2-AEP:NRC:1131AThereasonsfortheproposedchangesandouranalysisconcerningsignificanthazardsconsiderationsarealsocontainedinAttachment1tothisletter.TheproposedT/SschangesarecontainedinAttachment2.AcopyoftheexistingT/Sspagesmarked-uptoreflectthechangesbeingproposediscontainedinAttachment3.WebelievethattheproposedT/Sschangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofeffluentsorasignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposuresWerequestthatthissubmittalbeapprovedbytheNRCnolaterthanDecember1,1991inordertoalloworderlyimplementationoftheseT/Sschangesduringappropriatewindowsofeachunit'snextrefuelingoutage'~,TheproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommitteeandbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(10),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtoMr.J.R.PadgettoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.ThisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowingCorporateproceduresthatincorporateareasonablesetofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompletenesspriortosignaturebytheundersigned.Sincerely,E.E.FitzptrickVicePresidentldpAttachmentscc:D.H.Williams,Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanJ.R.PadgettG.CharnoffA.B.Davis-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector-BridgmanNFEMSectionChief Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131ADescriptionofProposedChangesandSignificantHazardsConsiderationAnalysis V4l1~I Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131APage1DescritionofProosedChanesChanestothe"OVERPRESSUREPROTECTIONSYSTEMS"TechnicalSecification3.4.9.3Units1and2ThefollowingT/Sspagesareimpacted:UnitNo.1:Page3/44-31Page3/44-32UnitNo.2:Page3/44-29Page3/44-30AttachmentB-2ofEnclosureBtoGenericLetter(GL)90-06notesthatforplantswithexistingT/SsforPORVsusedforlowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP),theonlyrequiredchangeistorestricttheapplicabilityofthe7-dayallowableoutagetimeforasingleLTOPchanneltoMode4.AnexceptionisbeingtakentothisGLrequirementsincethecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/SslimitapplicabilityoftheLTOPsystemtowhenthetemperatureofoneormoreofthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)coldlegsislessthanorequalto170F(Unit1)or152F(Unit2),exceptwhenthereactorvesselheadisremoved,SincethesetemperaturesrepresentMode5conditions,the7-dayallowableoutagetimeproposedbytheGLforMode4(350F>Tavg>200F)cannotbeappliedtoCookNuclearPlant.0oHowever,theallowableoutagetimeforasingleLTOPchannelinModes5and6(whenLTOPisrequiredtobeoperable)isbeingreducedfrom7daysto24hours,consistentwiththeguidanceoftheGL.Asapointofinformation,T/S3.4.9'forUnit1(Page3/44-31)isthesubjectofaseparateT/Sschangerequest(AEP:NRC:08940datedOctober29,1990),inwhichweproposedarevisedLTOPsetpointof'435psigforthePORVs,withanenabletemperatureof152F(currentlimitsare400psigand170F).Thefollowingvoluntarychangesarebeingmadetogenerallyconformtothe"ModifiedTechnicalSpecificationsforCombustionEngineeringandWestinghousePlants"containedinAttachmentB-1ofEnclosureBtoGenericLetter90-06,"consistentwiththedesignemployedatCookNuclearPlantforoverpressureprotectionsystems.Additionally,afewminoreditorialchangesarebeingmadeforthesakeofclarity.The"LimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)"and"Applicability"sectionsarebeingrevisedtoreflectthatthedepressurizingandventingoftheRCSisnotclassifiedasanoverpressureprotectionsystem.TheapplicabilityoftheLCOisalsobeingrevisedtoexcludeMode6whentheRCSisadequatelyventedbya2-square-inchorlargervent,orthroughanysingleblockedopenPORVandtoclarifyapplicabilityforMode6as"whentheheadisonandfastenedtothereactorvessel."SincetheBasesalreadyreflectthateitherLTOPPORVhasadequaterelievingcapacitytoprotecttheRCSfromacoldoverpressuretransient,anyofthethreePORVs,whichhaveidenticalflowcharacteristics,maybeblockedopentoprovideanacceptableRCSventtoprecludeapplicabilityofthis 44I(
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131APage2specification.Additionally,wehaveevaluatedtheconsequencesofacoldoverpressuretransientwiththereactorheadrestingonbutnotfastenedtothereactorvessel.OurevaluationindicatedthattheRCSwouldbeadequatelyventedthroughthereactorvesselflangeinthisscenario,andwehavethereforeclarifiedthe"Applicability"sectiontonotethattheheadmustbeonandfastenedtothereactorvesselforthespecificationtobeapplicable.ThesechangeswillavoidanyquestiononSpecification3.0.4beingappliedtoprecludefasteningtheheadonthevesselifanypartoftheLCOisnotmetwhentheRCSisvented.The"Action"sectionofeachunitsT/Ssisbeingrevisedasfollows;ACTION(a)isbeingmodifiedtoincorporatethereducedallowableoutagetimeforasingleLTOPchannelorRHRsafetyvalvefrom7daysto24hoursandtonotethattheRCS'maybeventedthroughasingleblockedopenPORV.Editorialchangesarealsobeingmadetobetterdefinetheactionrequirementsforvariousscenarios.ACTION(b)isbeingeditoriallyrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththeT/SscontainedintheGLandtonotethattheRCSmaybeventedthroughasingleblockedopenPORV,asdiscussedabove.ACTION(c)isanewparagraphwhichincorporatestheprovisionsofparagraph(d)oftheT/SscontainedintheGL.Thisrequirementiscontainedinparagraphs4.4.9.3.4(Unit1)and4.4,9.3.3(Unit2)ofthesurveillancerequirementssectionofeachunit'sT/Ssandisbeingdeletedfromthosesections.ACTIONS(d)and(e)correspondtoACTIONS(c)and(d)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ssandremainotherwiseunchanged.ThesearesimilartoACTIONS(e)and(f)oftheT/SscontainedintheGL.Thesurveillancerequirementssectionofeachunit'sT/SsisbeingrevisedtodeletethereferencetotestingofthePORVsasASMECategoryBvalves.ThisreferenceisbeingmovedtothesurveillancerequirementssectionofSpecification3.4.11,consistentwiththeT/SscontainedintheGL.Accordingly,thereferencetothePORVsinparagraph4.4.9.3.3(Unit1)isbeingremovedandinparagraph4.4.9.3.1.d(Unit2)isbeingdeletedinitsentirety,withsubsequentparagraph4.4.9.3.1.erenumberedto4.4.9,3.l.d.ThereferencetotestingoftheRHRsafetyvalve(whichisalsousedforLTOPprotection)asanASMECategoryCvalveisbeingretainedinthisspecification.Paragraphs4.4.9.3.4(Unit1)and4.4.9.3.3(Unit2)arebeingdeletedsincetherequirementsforRCSventverificationarebeingmovedtotheACTIONsectionofT/S3.4.9,3,ACTION(c),asdescribedabove.
3I%4t'I Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131APage3Theotherparagraphsofthissection'containedinthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/SsprovidesurveillancerequirementsthatareconsistentwithorsurpassthosecontainedintheGLandthereforeremainunchanged.Itshouldbenotedthatpage3/44-32(Unit1)isthesubjectofaseparateT/Sschangerequest(AEP:NRC:0433N,datedAugust7,1990),whichproposedmodifiedreferencestothein-servicetestingprogramrequirementsofASMESectionXItopromoteconsistencybetweenUnits1and2.TheresultofthispendingT/SschangewillmakeUnit1T/Spage3/44-32identicaltoUnit2T/Spage3/44-30.Therefore,thechangesdescribedabovefortheUnit2T/SwillbeapplicabletotherevisedUnit1T/Spage.Chanestothe"BASES-PRESSURETEMPERATURELIMITS"TechnicalSecification34.4.9Units1and2ThefollowingT/Spagesareimpacted:Unit1:PageB3/44-7Unit2:PageB3/44-10TheBasesfortheoverpressureprotectionT/Scontainedinparagraph3/4.4.9.3ofeachunit'sT/SsarebeingclarifiedtonotethattheRCSmaybeventedthroughasingleblockedopenPORV,asdiscussedabove,andthatanRCSventopeningofgreaterthanorequalto2squareinchesisnotconsideredanoverpressureprotectionsystem.Finally,AttachmentB-3ofEnclosureBtotheGLwasreviewedagainsttheCookNuclearPlantT/SstoensurethattheT/Sscontainthedesignbasisrestrictionsforsafetyinjection/centrifugalchargingpumpoperabilityanddifferentialtemperaturerestrictionsforreactorcoolantpumprestart.OurreviewhasdeterminedthattheserestrictionshavealreadybeenappropriatelyimplementedwithintheCookNuclearPlantT/Ssandnofurtheractionsarerequired.Chanestothe"RELIEFVALVES-OPERATING"TechnicalSecification3.4.11Units1and2ThefollowingT/Spagesareimpacted:UnitNo.1:Page3/44-35Page3/44-36UnitNo.2:Page3/44-32Page3/44-33AttachmentA-2ofEnclosureAtoGenericLetter90-06providesguidancetomodifythelimitingconditionsforoperationofPORVsandblockvalvesintheT/SsforModes1,2,and3.TheCookNuclearPlantT/Ssarebeingrevisedtocomplywiththosecontainedinthatattachmentwithoneexception,AttachmentA-2isintendedforapplicationtoWestinghouseplantswiththreePORVs.WhileeachCookNuclearPlantunithasthreepressurizerPORVs,theoriginalWestinghousedesigncontainedonlytwoPORVs,Westinghousewas 1Ilg.
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131APage4requestedtoprovideplantmodificationstoachievethecapabilitytocarryplantauxiliariesunderallloadrejectionconditions,includingfullloadrejection.AthirdpressurizerPORVwasspecificallyaddedasaresult.Thecapacityofthesecondarysidesteamdumpsystemwasoriginallydesignedconsistentwiththisintent.Theoriginaldesigncapacityofthesteamdumpsystemwas85'toffullloadsteamflow,whichwouldallowtheturbinegeneratortotakealoadreductionfrom100'ttotheplantauxiliariesloadwithoutareactortrip.Therefore,theavailabilityofathirdPORVshouldbeviewedasanenhancementtotheoriginaldesignwhichwasaddedonavoluntarybasis,ratherthanasanessentialinitialdesignfeature.InordertoachieveconsistencywiththeassumptionsinitiallycontainedinthegenericATWSmitigatingsystemactuationcircuitry(AMSAC)designdevelopedbytheWestinghouseOwnersGroup,andalsotoreduceexcessiveoperationalexpenseandmaintenanceproblemswiththesteamdumpvalves,adesignchangehasbeenimplementedonbothCookNuclearPlantunitstoreducethesteamdumpsystemloadrejectioncapabilityfrom85%to40't.ThisisinlinewiththeWestinghousestandardplantdesign,whichalsoprovides40%steamdumpcapacity.Sincethesecondarysideoftheplantisnolongerdesignedtosustainalargeloadrejectionwithoutareactortrip,theavailabilityofthethirdPORVeffectivelyassumestheroleofaninstalledspareformanagementofloadreductiontransients.WithregardtotheUnit1UFSARChapter14safetyanalysis,Section14.2',"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture,"statesthatduringtherecoveryprocessforthecasewithoutoffsitepower,theoperatorwillopenthePORVsasrequiredtoreduceRCSpressuretolessthan1000psia.Theseactionswillautomaticallyreducethepressureinthefaultedsteamgeneratorbelow1100psia.TherecoveryprocessisperformedinaccordancewiththeEmergencyOperatingProceduresdevelopedbasedontheWestinghouseOwnersGroupEmergencyResponseGuidelines.OnePORVissufficientforthispurposeasindicatedintheWestinghouseEmergencyResponseGuidelineE-3,Step18.ThisappliestoUnit2aswell.ThecurrentT/SsreflectthisbyrequiringtwoofthreePORVstobeoperable,withonevalveassumedtofailandtheotherbeingavailabletodepressurizetheRCS.NRCacceptanceofthecurrentT/SsandtheroleofthePORVswasconveyedintheSafetyEvaluationReportsrelatedtoAmendmentNos.120(Unit1)and82(Unit2)forFacilityOperatingLicensesDPR-58andDPR-74,respectively.Basedontheseconsiderations,wearerequestinganexceptiontothestaffpositionthatplantoperationinModes1,2,and3withanyofthethreePORVsorblockvalvesinoperableforreasonsotherthanseatleakagebelimitedtoperiodsofnomorethan72hours,InsteadweareproposingtocontinuethecurrentpracticeofpermittingoperationinthesemodeswithonePORVorblockvalveinoperable.ThisconstitutesthesecondexceptiontotheGLrequirements.ThefollowingspecificT/Sschangesareproposed.
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131APage5The"Action"sectionofeachunit'sT/Ssisbeingrevisedasfollows:AlloftheapplicableactionstatementshavebeenchangedtoterminatetheforcedshutdownwiththeplantbeinginhotshutdownratherthancoldshutdownbecausetheapplicabilityrequirementsoftheLCOdonotextendpastthehotstandbymode,aspermittedbytheGL,ACTION(a)isanewparagraphwhichdistinguishesPORVinoperabilityduetoseatleakage,andrequiresthatpowerbemaintainedtoclosedblockvalvestoisolateleakingPORVs.ThecurrentT/SscontainfootnotesstatingthatPORVsisolatedtolimitRCSleakagethroughtheirseats,withtheblockvalvesshuttoisolatethisleakage,arenotconsideredinoperable.ConsistentwiththeT/SscontainedintheGL,powerwillbemaintainedtoblockvalvesthatareclosedtolimitseatleakagesothattheyremainoperableandmaybesubsequentlyopenedtoallowtheassociatedPORVstobeusedtocontrolRCSpressure.ACTION(b)reflectsthesecondexceptiontotheT/SscontainedintheGLdescribedabovebyallowingcontinuedoperationinModes1,2,and3withasinglePORVinoperableduetocausesotherthanexcessiveseatleakageprovideditsblockvalvecanbeclosedandpowerremovedwithinonehour.Ifthiscannotbeaccomplished,theunitmustbetakentohotstandbywithin6hoursandhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hours.Thisisgenerallyconsistentwithaction(a.l)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.ACTION(c)isgenerallyconsistentwithAction(b)oftheT/SscontainedintheGL,exceptitonlyappliestotwoPORVs,inoperable,ratherthanoneortwoPORVs,asaresultoftheexceptionproposedinparagraph(b)above.Therefore,Action(c)alsoallowsrestorationofonlyonePORVinsteadofboth(foratotaloftwooperable)asanacceptableconditionfor,exitingtheactionstatement.ThisparagrapheffectivelycorrespondstoAction(a.2)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.ACTION(d)isgenerallyconsistentwithAction(c)oftheT/SscontainedintheGLandcorrespondstoAction(a.3)oftheCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.ACTION(e)continuesthesecondexceptiontotheT/SscontainedintheGLbyallowingcontinuedoperationinModes1,2,and3withasingleinoperableblockvalveprovideditsassociatedPORVisplacedinmanualcontrolortheblockvalveisclosedwithpowerremovedwithinonehour.Ifthiscannotbeaccomplished,theunitmustbetakentohotstandbywithin6 Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131APage6hoursandtohotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hours.ThisisgenerallyconsistentwithAction(b.l)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/SsexceptthattheassociatedPORVistobeplacedinmanualcontrolratherthanclosedwithpowerremovedfromtheassociatedsolenoidvalve,ClosingtheassociatedPORVandremovingpowerfromtheassociatedsolenoidvalveisnotspecifiedsincethePORVwouldnotlikelybeopenandremovalofpowerfromthesolenoidvalvewouldprecludeusingthePORVforRCSpressurecontrol.Whentheblockvalveisinoperable,placingthePORVinmanualcontrolissufficienttoprecludethepotentialforhavingastuck-openPORVthatcouldnotbeisolatedbecauseofaninoperableblockvalve.AlthoughnotidentifiedasanoptionintheT/SscontainedintheGL,theabilitytocloseandremovepowerfromasingleinoperableblockvalve,whichiscurrentlycontainedintheCookNuclearPlantT/Ss,isbeingretainedsinceaninoperableblockvalvemaystillbefunctionalandcapableofbeingclosed.ClosureofaninoperableblockvalveconstitutesanacceptablemeansofisolatingasinglePORVpath,whichleavestworemainingoperablepaths,consistentwiththeproposedexception.ACTION(f)isgenerallyconsistentwithACTION(d)oftheT/SscontainedintheGL;however,itappliestotwoormoreblockvalvesinoperableratherthanone'rmoreblockvalvesinoperableasaresultofthesecondexceptionproposedinActions(b)and(e)above.Therefore,Action(f)alsoallowsrestorationoftwo(ratherthanthree)blockvalveswithin72hoursasanacceptableconditionforexitingtheactionstatement.ThisparagrapheffectivelycorrespondstoAction(b.2)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.ACTION(g)correspondstoAction(c)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss,andclearlydefinestheactionstobetaken'ifPORVsandblockvalvesnotinthesamelinearesimultaneouslyinoperable.TheneedforthisparagrapharisesasaresultofourproposaltocontinuethecurrentpracticeofpermittingoperationinModes1,2,and3withonePORVorblockvalveinoperable,Thesurveillancerequirementssectionofeachunit'sT/SsisbeingrevisedtogenerallyreflecttheT/SscontainedintheGL.AreferencetotherequirementsofSpecification4.0.5(in-servicetestingprogram)isbeingaddedtoparagraph4.4.11.1toagreewiththeGLT/Ss.ThisreferenceiscurrentlycontainedinandisbeingdeletedfromthesurveillancerequirementssectionoftheCookNuclearPlantoverpressureprotectionsystemsT/S.ItshouldbenotedthatthisreferenceappliesonlytotestingofthePORVs(andblockvalves)withinthein-servicetestingprogramandnottovalvesinthecontrolairsystemasintheGL.ThisconstitutesthethirdexceptiontotheGL.AsnotedinourresponsetotheGL(AEP:NRC:1131datedDecember21,1990),webelievethatcurrent Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131APage7in-servicetestingofthePORVsalreadyindirectlyprovidesassuranceofproperoperationofthecontrolairsystemvalves.IndirecttestingofthecontrolairsystemvalveswillcontinuetobeaccomplishedbytestingthePORVsonacoldshutdownfrequencyunderthein-servicetestingprogram.PlantprocedureswillbeenhancedtoprovidefurtherassurancethatthecontrolairsystemvalvesperformtheirrequiredfunctionswhenthePORVsarestrokedoffboththenormalandbackupairsuppliesevery18monthsduringcoldshutdown.Paragraph4.4.11.1.aisunchangedfromthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/SandrequirestheperformanceofaPORVchannelfunctionaltest,excludingvalveoperation,onceper31days.AlthoughthisrequirementisnotcontainedintheT/SproposedintheGL,thissurveillancerequirementisconsiderednecessarytoperiodicallydemonstratePORVoperabilityandisthereforebeingretained.Revisedparagraph4.'4.11.1,bincorporatesthenewrequirementsinparagraph4.4.4.1ofAttachmentA-2ofGLEnclosureAtocyclethePORVsonceper18monthsinModes3or4.Paragraph.4.4,11',cincludesnewrequirements,pertheGL,tooperatethesolenoidaircontrolvalvesandcheckvalvesinthePORVcontrolsystemsthroughonecompletecycleoffulltravelonceper18months,TheserequirementswillbesatisfiedviatestingwhichensuresthatthePORVsstrokeusingboththenormalandbackupairsupplies(forthosevalveswithabackupairsupply),whichimpliesproperoperationofassociatedsolenoidandcheckvalves.However,itshouldbenotedthatthebackupairsupply,whichisprovidedononlytwoofthethreePORVs,isintendedforuseonlywhenthesevalvesarebeingusedforLTOPservice,ratherthaninModes1,2,and3.ThisproposednewtestingshouldnotbeconstruedasanindicationthatthebackupairsupplyisrequiredtobeoperableinModes1,2,and3,AlthoughachannelcalibrationwaspreviouslyrequiredbytheexistingT/Ssperparagraph4.4.11.1.b,thisre'quirementhasbeeneditoriallyrevisedtoagreewiththe'ordingcontainedintheGL,andrenumberedasparagraph4.4.11,1,d.Paragraph4.4.11.2,whichrequirescyclingoftheblockvalvesinMode5,butnotmorefrequentlythan92days,hasbeenrevisedtomakereferencetorevisedparagraphsinthe"Action",sectionofthespecification,Finally,paragraph4.4.11,3remainsunchangedsincethewordingintheexistingT/SsprovidesmorespecificguidancethanthatproposedintheGL.k Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131APage8Chanestothe"BASES-RELIEFVALVES"TechnicalSecification34.4.11Units1and2ThefollowingT/Spagesareimpacted:UnitNo.1:PageB3/44-13UnitNo.2:PageB3/44-11TheBasesforthereliefvalvesT/Scontainedinparagraph3/4.4.11ofeachunit'sT/SsarebeingenhancedtoreflecttheexpandedroleofthePORVsandblockvalvesasdiscussedintheGLandtonotetheroleofthebackupairsupplywhenthePORVsarebeingusedforLTOPservice.10CFR50.92SinificantHazardsConsiderationAnalsisPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmenttoanoperatinglicensewillnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentsatisfiesthefollowingthreecriteria:1)Doesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed,2)Doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,or3)Doesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1TheproposedT/SschangesinthissubmittalgenerallyadoptthePORVandoverpressureprotectionT/SsproposedbythestaffinGenericLetter90-06withthreeexceptions,andalsowithminormodificationsnecessarytoreflecttheplant-specificdesignfeaturesofCookNuclearPlant,Thestaff'sproposedT/SswillresultinanincreaseinPORVandblockvalvereliabilityaswellasadditionalLTOP.SincetheproposedT/SschangesaugmentorpreservetherequirementscontainedinthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss,andsincethethreeexceptionstoGL90-06retainthecurrentT/Ssrequirements,itisconcludedthattheproposedT/SschangesdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedinChapter14,"SafetyAnalysis,"oftheUpdatedFSARforCookNuclearPlant.Criterion2TheproposedT/SschangeseitherretainorenhancetheLCOs,actionstatements,andsurveillancerequirementsofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.Itisconcluded,therefore,thattheproposed Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1131APage9T/SschangesdonotcreatethepossibilityofanevordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluatedinChapter14,"SafetyAnalysis,"oftheUFSAR.Criterion3TheproposedT/SschangeseitherretainorenhancetheLCOs,actionstatements,andsurveillancerequirementsofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.Itisconcluded,therefore,thattheproposedT/Sschangesdonotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.