ML17331B058

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Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 3/4.6.2, RCS Operational Leakage by Deleting Table 3.4-0, RCS Pressure Isolation Valves, LCO 3.4.6.2f & Action C & SRs 4.4.6.2.2 for Both Units
ML17331B058
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 11/15/1993
From: FITZPATRICK E
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To: MURLEY T E
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17331B059 List:
References
AEP:NRC:1180, NUDOCS 9311190228
Download: ML17331B058 (22)


Text

A.CCEI.EEBBOCUMENTBISUTIONSYSTEMREGULORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9311190228DOC.DATE:93/11/15NOTARIZED:YESDOCKETFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,XndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFITZPATRICK,E.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana6MichiganEleRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONMURLEY,T.E.DocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

ApplicationforamendstolicensesDPR-586DPR-74,revisingTS3/4.6.2,"RCSOperationalLeakage"bydeletingTable3.4-0,"RCSPressureIsolationValves,"LCO3.4.6.2f6Actionc&SRs4.4.6.2.2forbothunits.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionDNOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1LANETZEL,BINTERNAL:NRR/DE/EELBNRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DSSA/SRXBOC/LFDCBRE5OlEXTERNAL:NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111101111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDNRR/DORS/OTSBNRR/DSSA/SPLBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS2NSICCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111011DDSDSDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.504-2065)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!DTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR15ENCL13 indianaMichip~PowerCompaP.O.Box1663Coturnbus,OH43216AEP:NRC:1180DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGEREQUESTREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMPRESSUREISOLATIONVALVESU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555Attn:T.E,MurleyNovember15,1993

DearDr.Murley:

Reference:

1)2)3)4)USNRCLettertoallLWRLicensees:LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,February25,1980AEP:NRC:0371,ReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,March24,1980Letter,S.A.Varga,USNRCtoJ.Dolan,IndianaandMichiganElectricCompany,OrderforModificationofLicensesConcerningPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,April20,1981WASH1400/NUREG75/014,ReactorSafetyStudy:AnAssessmentofAccidentRisksinU.S.CommercialNuclearPower-Plants,.USNRC,October19755)6)AEP:NRC1082E,IndividualPlantExaminationSubmittal/ResponsetoGenericLetter88-20,May1,1992AEP:NRC1082F,IndividualPlantExaminationResponsetoNRCQuestions,February24,199349311190228931115FDRADDCXOS000315PPDR Dr.T.E.Murley-2-AEP:NRC:1180Thisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationforatechnicalspecification(T/S)changeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically,weproposetochangeT/S3/4.6.2,"ReactorCoolantSystemOperationalLeakage,"bydeletingTable3.4-0,"ReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,"LimitingConditionforOperation3.4.6.2fandActionc.,andSurveillanceRequirements4.4.6.2.2,forbothunits.Wearealsoproposingthreeeditorialchangesineachunit'sT/S,andthedeletionofthelastparagraphintheBasesforT/S3/4.6.2.TheReactorCoolantSystempressureisolationvalvesinTable3.4-0oftheTechnicalSpecificationswereaddedtotheLimitingConditionforOperationonReactorCoolantSystemOperationalLeakagepursuanttoaUSNRClettertoallLWRlicensees,"LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves",datedFebruary25,1980(Reference1)andfollowingadditionalplantspecifictransmittalsonthissubject(References2and3).Reference1wasissuedasaresultofthefindinginReference4thatanintersystemloss-of-coolantaccident(ISLOCA)wasasignificantcontributortocoredamagefrequency(EventV).Recently,theIndividualPlantExamination(IPE)(Reference5)forCookNuclearPlantfoundthatthecontributiontooverallcoredamagefrequencyfromanISLOCAwastheleast(0.08$)ofallinitiatingeventcontributors.ThiswasinlargemeasureduetothedesignofpotentialEventV-sequenceflowpathsatCookNuclearPlantcomparedtothatusedinWASH-1400.ThepotentialpathsatCookNuclearPlantcontaineitherthreecheckvalves,acombinationoftwocheckvalvesandaclosedmotoroperatedvalve,ortwoclosedmotoroperatedvalves,whereasthetypicalWASH-1400flowpathcontainedonlytwocheckvalvesinserieswithalockedopenvalveasshowninFigureV-3ofReference4.TheresultantIPEEventV-sequenceinitiatingeventfrequency(describedinReferences5and6)wasapproximatelyanorderofmagnitudelowerthantheWASH-1400valueof4.00E-6andwasalsoaboutthreeordersofmagnitudelowerthantheaverageaccidentinitiatingeventfrequencyemployedintherestoftheIPE.Additionally,theWASH-1400analysesusedtheveryconservativeassumptionthat,whenthein-seriescheckvalvesfail,thepressurizedlowpressurepipingalsofailed.Amorerealisticplant-specificscenariowasmodeledintheCookNuclearPlantIPEISLOCAanalyses,whereinexistingplantdesigncapabilitieswereusedwhichreducedtheeffectsofthisaccident(seeresponsetoquestion3inReference6).Thus,theEventVsequencewasfoundtobeaninsignificantcontributor,bothtotheCookNuclearPlantcoredamagefrequencyandoff-sitedoses.

Dr.T.E.Murley-3-AEP:NRC:1180Inadditiontotheabove,thisrequestisalsobeingmadebecausestartupoftheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2followingrefuelingoutageshasbeendelayedonanumberofoccasionsasadirectresultoftheunnecessarilyrestrictivetestingrequirementsandacceptancecriteriamandatedbytheTechnicalSpecificationsforthevalvesinTable3.4-0.AllofthesubjectvalveswillstillbetestedonarefuelingoutagefrequencytotheleakagelimitsofASMEXIundertheISTprogram..ThiswillcontinuetoprovideprotectionfromthepotentialoccurrenceofanEventVaccidenttypetoensurethehealthandsafetyofthepublic.TheproposedchangesandoursignificanthazardsconsiderationanalysisareprovidedinAttachment1.Theproposedmarked-uprevisedT/SpagesareincludedinAttachment2.Attachment3containsthetypedproposedrevisedT/Spages.Webelievethattheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofeffluentsorasignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommitteeandtheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(l),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtotheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtotheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.Thisletterissubmittedprusuantto10CFR50.30(b)and,assuchanoathstatementisattahced.Sincerely,E.E.FitzarickVicePresidentehAttachments 4-I COUNTYOFFRANKLINE.E.Fitzpatrick,beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresidentoflicenseeIndianaMichiganPowerCompany,thathehasreadtheforgoingTechnicalSpecificationChangeRequestReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValvesandknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledgeandbelief.Subscribedandsworntobeforemethisl~dayof.NOTARYPUBLICD)ANAl:.EADSNotaryPublic,StateofOhioMycommissionexpires2.2495 Dr.T.E.Murley-4-AEP:NRC:1180cc:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.Martin-RegionIIINFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector-BridgmanJ~R.Padgett Dr.T.E.Murley-5-AEP:NRC:1180bc:S.J.BrewerJ.B.Kingseed/J.M.Nieto/R.B.BennettD.H.MalinJ.D.Benes/E.V.Gilabert/J.J.RipakJ.D.Grier/D.F.Powell/J.G.NogradyM.L.Horvath-BridgmanJ.B.ShinnockW.G.Smith,Jr./S.H.SteinhartB.A.Wetzel,NRC-Washington,DCAEP:NRC:1180DC-N-6015.1

COUNTY0FRANKLNE.E.Fitzpatrick,beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresidentoflicenseeIndianaMichiganPowerCompany,thathehasreadtheforgoingTechnicalSpecificationChangeRequestReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValvesandknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledgeandbelief.SubscribedandsworntobeforemethisdayofOL/~adwc,i9y>Zc-~.NOTARYPUBLICDIA<sAL~QDSNotaryPublic,StateofOhioMycommissionexpires22495 ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1180DESCRIPTIONOFPROPOSEDCHANGESAND10CFR50.92SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONANALYSIS ATTACHMENT1TOAEP'NRC'1180Page1BCKGROUNDTheReactorSafetyStudy(WASH-1400/NUREG75/014)(Reference1)analyzedaso-calledEventVSequenceresultinginanintersystemloss-of-coolantaccident(ISLOCA).ItwasconcludedthattheISLOCAwasasignificantcontributortocoredamagefrequencysincethecontainmentisbypassedandreactorcoolantisreleaseddirectlytotheAuxiliaryBuilding.Asaresultoftheabovefinding,theUSNRCissuedaletter,"LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,"datedFebruary25,1980,(Reference2)requestingLWRlicenseestoprovidethefollowinginformation:1.DescribethevalveconfigurationatyourplantandindicateifanEventVisolationvalveconfigurationexistswithintheClassIboundaryofthehighpressurepipingconnectionPCSpipingto.lowpressuresystempiping;e.g.,(1)twocheckvalvesinseries,or(2)twocheckvalvesinserieswithaMOV;2.IfeitheroftheaboveEventVconfigurationsexistsatyourfacility,indicatewhethercontinuoussurveillanceorperiodictestsarebeingaccomplishedonsuchvalvestoensureintegrity.Alsoindicatewhethervalveshavebeenknown,orfound,tolackintegrity;and3.IfeitheroftheaboveEventVconfigurationsexistatyourfacility,indicatewhetherplantproceduresshouldberevisedorifplantmodificationsshouldbemadetoincreasereliability.AEPSCrespondedtotheaboveUSNRCletterwithletterAEP:NRC:0371,"ReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,"datedMarch24,1980(Reference3).Inthisletter,theUSNRCwasinformedthatthefollowingvalveconfigurationsareusedatDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant:1)Aminimumofthreecheckvalvesinseries2)Twocheckvalveswithaminimumofaclosedmotoroperatedvalveinseries ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1180Page23)Twocheckvalveswithaclosedhandoperatedvalveinseries4)AcheckvalvewithtwoclosedairoperatedvalvesinseriesAEP:NRC:0371concludedthat:"ThereforenoEventVconfigurationexistsattheCookPlant.Consequently,therequestsinItems2and3ofMr.Eisenhut'sletterarenotapplicabletotheCookNuclearPlant."OnApril20,1981,theUSNRCissuedan"OrderforModificationofLicensesConcerningPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves"fortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant(Reference4).Thisorderstatedthat"WehaveconcludedthataWASH-1400EventVvalveconfigurationexistsatyourfacilityandthatthecorrectiveactionasdefinedintheattachedOrderisnecessary."AttachedtotheOrderweretheTechnicalEvaluationReport(TER)supportingtheOrderandthenewTechnicalSpecificationswhich,accordingtotheOrder,"...willensurepublichealthandsafetyovertheoperatinglifeofyourfacility."ThesenewTechnicalSpecificationswereincorporatedatthattimeintotheOperatingLicensesforCookNuclearplant.ThesearethesameTechnicalSpecificationsthatwearenowproposingtodelete.In1987,theUSNRCissuedGenericLetter(GL)87-06,"PeriodicVerificationofLeakTightIntegrityofPressureIsolationValves"(Reference5).InourresponsetothatGL,AEP:NRC:1041(Reference6),westatedthat12-SI-170L2,12-SI-170L3,12-RH-133,and12-RH-134areleaktestedasperthesurveillancerequirementsintheTechnicalSpecifications.Theproposedchangesinthissubmittal,therefore,modifyourresponsetoGL.87-06.Finally,in1992,theUSNRCissuedInformationNotice92-36,"IntersystemLOCAOutsideContainment"(Reference7).Thisinformationnoticelistedeleven"ObservedPlantVulnerabilitiestoISLOCAPrecursors."AreviewofthisinformationnoticeconcludedthattheconcernsraisedareadequatelyaddressedbycontrolscurrentlyinplaceorplannedattheCookNuclearPlant.TheproposedchangestotheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotalterthisconclusionbecauseourresponsetotheinformationnoticewasnotbasedonexistingtechnicalspecifications.

ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1180Page3COOKNUCLEARPLANTIPEOnMay1,1992,AEPSCrespondedtoGenericLetter88-20(Reference8),inAEP:NRC:1082E,IndividualPlantExamination(IPE)submittal(Reference9)andprovidedfurtherinformationontheanalysisoftheISLOCAinReference10.(SeetheEnclosuretothis

Attachment:

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlant,PathsConsideredasPossibleEventV-SequenceLOCA,takenfromReference10).InthedeterminationoftheISLOCAinitiatingeventfrequency,leaktestingof12-SI-170L2,12-SI-170L3,12-RH-133,and12-RH-134,asrequiredbythesurveillancerequirementsintheTechnicalSpecifications,wasaddressed.TheIPEforCookNuclearPlantconcludedthattheISLOCAwastheaccidentthatcontributedtheleasttotheoverallcoredamagefrequency.ThecalculatedISLOCAinitiatingeventfrequencywasapproximately6.70E-07,andthecalculatedprobabilityofISLOCAcoredamagewasapproximately5.4E-08.ThecontributiontooverallcoredamagefrequencyfromanISLOCAislessthan0.18ofthe6.26E-05IPEcalculatedcoredamagefrequencyperreactoryear.Itisseen,therefore,thatthecontributionfromanISLOCAeventatCookNuclearPlantisnegligible.COMPARISONOFWASH-1400VSCOONUCLEARPLANTWITHRESPEC~TOSLOGTheISLOCAaccidentisdescribedinSection5.3.2.5ofWASH-1400,andthequantificationofitscoredamagefrequencyisfoundinAppendixV,Section4.4ofWASH-1400.ThecoredamagefrequencycalculatedinWASH-1400is4.00-06/reactoryear.WASH-1400evaluated3pathwaysof2checkvalvesinseriesandassumedthatthe600psiLowPressureInjectionSystem(LPIS),onceexposedtoRCSpressure,wouldfailandcreateapproximatelya6"effectivediameterLOCA.Nootheraccidentinitiationfeaturesormitigatingactionsweremodeled.IntheCookNuclearPlantIPE,ninedifferentpathwaysforanISLOCAeventwereanalyzed.Thesepathways(seeEnclosuretothisAttachment),consistedofeitherthreecheckvalvesinseries,twocheckvalvesandaclosedmotoroperatedvalve(MOV)inseries,ortwonormallyclosedMOVsinseries.AlthoughWASH-1400lookedatcheckvalveleaktestingasasensitivityanalysis,theCookNuclearPlantIPEaccountedforthein-place'eaktestingwhencalculatingtheprobabilityofanISLOCAoccurring.Inaddition,theCookNuclearPlantIPEmodeledmitigatingactionsfortheISLOCAeventintheeventtree.The ATTACHMENT1TOAEP'NRC'1180Page4IPEISLOCAinitiatingeventfrequencywasapproximatelyanorderofmagnitudelowerthantheWASH-1400coredamagefrequency(4.00E-06)andtheIPEISLOCAcoredamagefrequencyvaluewasapproximatelytwoordersofmagnitudelowerthantheWASH-1400values.Finally,toaddresstheimpactofremovingtheT/Srequirementsandonlytesting12-SI-170L2,12-SI-170L3,12-RH-133,and12-RH-134atarefuelingoutagefrequency,asensitivityrunwasmadeinsupportofthissubmittal.ItwasfoundthattheISLOCAinitiatingeventfrequency,andISLOCAprobabilityofcoredamagewouldalsoincreaseby5.4%tothemid5.00E-08range,andtheoverallcoredamagefrequencywouldremainunchanged.STPOGThesubjectcheckvalvesofthissubmittalarecurrentlybeingtestedinMode5,ColdShutdown,asrequiredbytheTechnicalSpecificationssurveillancerequirementspriortogoingtoMode4,HotShutdown.Theallowableleakratecannotexceed1gpm.IfthesecheckvalvesareremovedfromtheTechnicalSpecifications,theywouldcontinuetobetestedundertheISTProgram(ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI),onarefuelingoutagefrequency,liketheirsistervalvesintheotherloopsintheResidualHeatRemovalSystem.TheacceptancecriteriafortheleaktestingofthesevalvesundertheISTProgramis5gpm.DESCRIPTIONOFPROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATONCHANGSTheproposedchangesarelistedbel'ow.Theyareidenticalforbothunits.T/S3'.6.2d.Add"and"attheendoftheline.2.T/S3.4.6.2e.Delete"and,"andaddaperiodafterIIgpm2II3.T/S3.4.6.2f.Deleteinitsentirety.4,T/S3.4.6.2APPLICABILITY:Delete"~"andreplacewitha"*".5.T/S3.4.6.2ACTIONc.Deleteinitsentirety.T/S3.4.6.2ACTIONc,footnote*.Deletethefootnote.

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ATTACHMENT1TOAEPNRC:1180Page57.T/S3.4.6.2APPLICABILITY,footnote~.Changethen~nton*n~8.T/S4.4.6.2.2.Deleteinitsentirety.9.T/S3/4.6.2,Table3.4-0.DeletetheTableandthefootnote(a)initsentirety.10.T/S3/4.6.2,Bases.Deletethelastparagraphinitsentirety.10CFR509SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSDERATONANALYSISPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmenttoanoperatinglicensewillnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentsatisfiesthefollowingthreecriteria:1)Doesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed,2)Doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,or3)Doesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.4CrterionTheISLOCAisnotoneoftheaccidentspreviouslyanalyzedinChapter14,SafetyAnalysis,oftheCookNuclearPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.Chapter14analyzesthelargebreakLOCAinSection14.3.1,and"lossofreactorcoolantfromsmallrupturedpipesorfromcracksinlargepipeswhichactuatestheECCS",orsmallbreakLOCAinSection14.3.2.Therefore,deletingfromtheTechnicalSpecificationstheReactorCoolantSystempressureisolationvalvesinTable3.4-0,willnotincreasetheprobabilityortheconsequencesofthelargebreakorthesmallbreakLOCAspreviouslyanalyzedfortheCookNuclearPlant.

I ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1180Page6CriterionTheReactorCoolantSystempressureisolationvalvesinTable3.4-0oftheTechnicalSpecificationswereaddedbecauseWASH-1400identifiedtheISLOCAasasignificantcontributortocoredamagefrequency.DeletionofthesubjectvalvesfromtheTechnicalSpecificationsandrelianceonthetestingrequirementsmandatedbytheIn>>ServiceTestingProgramofASMEXIdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromthelargebreakorthesmallbreakLOCAspreviouslyanalyzedfortheCookNuclearPlant.Criteion3DeletingtheReactorCoolantSystempressureisolationvalvesfromthetestingrequirementsinTable3.4-0oftheTechnicalSpecificationswillresultinthesevalvesonlybeingtestedonarefuelingoutagefrequencyaspartoftheASMEB&PVCodeSectionXIISTProgram.ThissomewhatreducedtestingfrequencywillresultinaslightincreaseintheISLOCAinitiatingeventfrequency,andISLOCAcontributiontocoredamagefrequencyof5.4S,fromlower5.00E-08/reactoryeartomid5.00E-08/reactoryear.Thisinsignificantincxeasewillnotaffecttheoverallcoredamagefrequencyof6.26E-05/reactoryear.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposeddeletionoftheReactorCoolantSystempressux'eisolationvalvesinTable3.4-0oftheTechnicalSpecifications,aswellastheproposeddeletionoftheportionsoftheTechnicalSpecificationsthatareaffectedbyTable3.4-0,willnotresultinasignificantreductioninthemarginofsafetythatexistsatCookNuclearPlanttopreventanISLOCAortomiti'gatetheconsequencesofanISLOCA.REFERENCESWASH-1400/NUREG75/014,ReactorSafetyStudy:AnAssessmentofAccidentRisksinU.S.CommercialNuclearPlants,USNRC,October1975.2.USNRCLettertoallLWRLicensees:LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,February25,1980.3.AEP:NRC:0371,ReactorCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,March24,1980.

ATTACHMENT1TOAEP'NRC'1180Page74.Letter,S.A.Varga,USNRCtoJ.Dolan,IndianaandMichiganElectricCompany,OrderforModificationofLicensesConcerningPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,April20,1981.5.USNRCGenericLetter(GL)87-06,"PeriodicVerificationofLeakTightIntegrityofPressureIsolationValves,"March13,1987.6.AEP:NRC:1041,GenericLetter87-06,PeriodicVerificationofLeakTightIntegrityofPressureIsolationValves,November12,1987.7.USNRCInformationNotice92-36,"IntersystemLOCAOutsideContainment",May,7,1992.8.InitiationoftheIndividualPlantExaminationforSevereAccidentVulnerabilities-10CFR50.54(f),GenericLetterNo.88-20,November23,1988.9.AEP:NRC1082E,IndividualPlantExaminationSubmittal,ResponsetoGenericLetter88-20,May1,1992.10.AEP:NRC1082F,IndividualPlantExaminationResponsetoNRCQuestions,February24,1993.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1180ENCLOSUREPage8DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTPATHSCONSIDEREDASPOSSIBLEV-SEQUENCELOCASSlL70LLTOLOOPICOL.DLEGroumAI'%%i.~Do4CCUHIIUITIRSSI-166LI$1L6LLLTOLOOP4COLDLEGSl-170L4SI-166L4ICN-311!SI-LSLETOLOOPIHOTLEGTOLOOP4HOTLEGSl-L58LIIHO-315Sl-158L4LCINO-316SI-152NICN-265rROHNORTH$1PLPLP$1-170L2TOLOOP2COLDL.EGSl-161L2FRIHACCUHULATORSSI-L66L2ICN-111'5%L5""TOLOOP3COLDLEGSl-1701.3RH-134Sl161L3Sl-166LIHO-326!ICN321$1-LSLVPRDHvEST!RHRPUHPSlL58L2TOLOOP2HOTLEGSl-158L3TOLOOP3HOTLEGrROHLmIHO-L28IHO-325LCICH-L29ICH-265SI"152$SV-L03SETAT450PSITORHRSUCTIONHEADERFIGURE11REFERENCEDRAVINGTOP-1-5143"20108