05000390/FIN-2016003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification 5.7.1.1.d requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities involved with Fire Protection Program implementation. The Watts Bar Fire Protection Report lists compensatory actions that must be implemented when there are impaired fire protection systems, including, under some circumstances, a continuous fire watch. TVA Corporate Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.6, Control of Fire Protection Impairments, Rev. 0006, is the implementing/controlling process for all Fire Protection impairments, and establishes the process for implementing compensatory actions for fire impairments as directed by the Fire Protection Report. NPG-SPP-18.4.6, Section 3.2.6.A, states that Fire watches are utilized for the surveillance of areas where fire protection systems are impaired. The compensatory fire watch process is described in Attachment 7 of NPG-SPP-18.4.6. Contrary to the above, on April 27, 2015, the licensee failed to perform a continuous fire watch as required for fire protection systems that were impaired. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish the compensatory continuous fire watch required by Fire Protection Impairment Permit C10-0639, which authorized an impairment of fire detection systems to allow for welding work on the 713 elevation of the auxiliary building of Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant. This violation is of very low safety significance (Green). This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the results of the IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase I Screening Approach. The inspectors determined that the fire finding did not affect the Unit 1 reactors ability to reach and maintain safe shutdown (either hot or cold) condition. Therefore, the finding screened as Green. Specifically, the only equipment important to safety in the affected fire area was associated with the construction unit (Unit 2), and would not have impacted the safe shutdown of Unit 1. This violation was documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 1019953. |
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
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| Report | IR 05000390/2016003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2016 (2016Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Blamey A Nielsen A Wilson C Dykes J Hamman J Jandovitz J Nadel J Panfel J Rivera |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Watts Bar - IR 05000390/2016003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Watts Bar) @ 2016Q3
Self-Identified List (Watts Bar)
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