05000416/FIN-2011003-09
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with prescribed procedures. Specifically EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 5, Section 5.3(1), states in part to Confirm the existence of a Degraded or Nonconforming Condition for the Technical Specification System Structure or Component. Contrary to this requirement, on March 18, 2011, the on-shift senior reactor operator failed to perform a proper operability determination for the high pressure core spray pump after minimum flow valve 1E22-F012 cycled approximately 11 times during testing causing the supply breaker to trip open, resulting in high pressure core spray being inoperable. After resetting the breaker for 1E22-F012, ensuring the breaker was not faulted, and performing a one-time stroke test, the system was declared operable. Engineering personnel evaluated the event several hours later and questioned the operability of valve 1E22-F012 and the high pressure core spray system due to repeated cycling of the valve motor, which resulted in the breaker tripping. Based on engineering input, operations performed a second operability determination and determined that the system was operable with evaluation required. The licensee performed testing of the breaker for valve 1E22-F012 and determined its over-current trip setting had drifted to approximately 60 amps when its minimum allowed setting was 85 amps. This confirmed that the high pressure core spray system was inoperable the entire time. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2011-02240. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of a system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
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| Report | IR 05000416/2011003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Drake M Baquera R Kumana R Smith V Gaddy A Fairbanks B Rice E Uribe J Braisted |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2011003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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