05000341/LER-2003-002, Re Automatic Reactor Shutdown Due to Electric Grid Disturbance and Loss of Offsite Power
| ML032890516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/2003 |
| From: | O'Connor W Detroit Edison |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NRC-03-0079 LER 03-002-00 | |
| Download: ML032890516 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
| 3412003002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
William T. O'Connor, Jr.
Vice President, Nuclear Generation Fermi 2 6400 North Dixie Hwy., Newport, Michigan 48166 Tel: 734-586-5201 Fax: 734-586-4172 DTE Energy 10 CFR 50.73 October 10, 2003 NRC-03-0079 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington D C 20555
Reference:
Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43
Subject:
Licensee Event Report No. 2003-002, "Automatic Reactor Shutdown Due to Electric Grid Disturbance and Loss of Offfsite Power" Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Detroit Edison is hereby submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2003-002. This LER documents the automatic reactor shutdown on August 14, 2003 as a result of the regional electric grid disturbance and loss of offsite power.
No commitments are being made in this LER.
Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Norman K. Peterson of my staff at (734) 586-4258.
Sincerely, cc:
H. K. Chernoff M. A. Ring M. V. Yudasz, Jr.
NRC Resident Office Regional Administrator, Region III Wayne County Emergency Management Division
Abstract
On August 14, 2003, at approximately 1610 hours0.0186 days <br />0.447 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.12605e-4 months <br />, the Reactor Protection System initiated an automatic reactor scram from 100% power as a result of a Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure. The TCV closure was caused by a turbine trip signal initiated by the main turbine-generator protective control system upon sensing electrical grid voltage fluctuations. A Loss of Offsite Power occurred as a result of the regional electric grid disturbance that affected several eastern and central states and portions of Canada and that led to blackout conditions in a large portion of the United States.
All safety related systems operated as expected in response to this event. All control rods fully inserted into the reactor core. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level decreased and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system was manually started to restore RPV level; however, the High Pressure Coolant Injection system automatically started when RPV water level reached the setpoint for Level 2. Primary containment penetration isolations associated with RPV Level 3 and 2 setpoints occurred as expected.
All Main Steam Isolation Valves closed and all four Emergency Diesel Generators started and energized their pertinent emergency loads. Nine Safety Relief Valves lifted and reseated.
Offsite power was restored on August 15, 2003, and the plant was restarted on August 18, 2003.
NRC FORM 366 7-2001)
(If more space Is required, use additional copies of (If mom space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Foirn 3664)
Corrective Actions
The reactor was restarted on August 18, 2003, the turbine generator was synchronized to the grid on August 20, 2003 and the plant returned to full power on August 21, 2003.
This event is characterized as a transient that has been evaluated as part of the plant's design basis analysis. All plant safety related systems operated as expected in response to the event. The event and the minor differences between it and the analyzed transients in the UFSAR have been documented in the Fermi 2 corrective action program. Any further actions relating to this event will be developed and implemented commensurate with the established processes of the Fermi 2 corrective action program.
Additional Information
A. Failed Components:
Component:
Function:
Manufacturer:
Model Number:
Failure Cause:
Combustion Turbine Generator 11, Unit 1, Inverter Converts battery DC power to AC power for starting the CTG La Marche Manufacturing Company A31-2K-120V-A6 Pending investigation B. Previous LERs on Similar Problems:
There has been no previous total loss of offsite power events at Fermi 2.