05000341/LER-1988-001, :on 880103,APRM Setdown Trips Found Outside Tech Spec Allowances.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Aprm Setdown Trip Adjusted to Be within Tech Spec Range & Calibr Procedures Being Revised

:on 880103,APRM Setdown Trips Found Outside Tech Spec Allowances.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Aprm Setdown Trip Adjusted to Be within Tech Spec Range & Calibr Procedures Being Revised

ML20149D441
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	02/02/1988
From:	Anthony P, Orser W DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
CON-NRC-88-0016, CON-NRC-88-16 LER-88-001, LER-88-1, NUDOCS 8802090496
Download: ML20149D441 (6)

LER-1988-001, on 880103,APRM Setdown Trips Found Outside Tech Spec Allowances.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Aprm Setdown Trip Adjusted to Be within Tech Spec Range & Calibr Procedures Being Revised

Event date:
Report date:
3411988001R00 - NRC Website

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On January 4 1988, the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) setdown trips were found outside the Technical Spec i f ic a t io n allowances.

This was due to an inadequacy in the calibration procedure of the APRM fixed neutron flux upscale trip.

They were recalibrated upon discovery.

The APRM calibration procedure is being revised.

Additionally, it has been recognized that piscing the mode switch la the refuel position to perform required Source Range (SRMs) and Intermediate Range, Monitors (IRMe) functional cests was in technical violation of Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.7.6.

Also not placing a Reactor Protective System trip system in the trip condition prior to 3 IRM channels per trip system having their testing completed was also a technical violation despite all control rods being fully inserted.

Performance of a full functional test requires the mode switch be in refuel since the rod block function cannot be verified with the mode switch in shutdown.

The SRMs and IRMs are not required to be operable during Operational Condition 1 so this situation becomes a problem following a plant shutdown.

A Technical Specification change will be submitted.

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Initial Plant Conditions

Operational Condition:

4 (Cold Shutdown) l Reactor Power:

0%

Reactor Pressure:

O psig Reactor Temperature:

approximately 150 degrees Fahrenheit Description of Occurrence:

On January 4, 1988 at 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br />, the Average Power Range Monitors (APRM) functional tests were performed.

As a result of these tests, it was determined that the APRM setdown trip was at approximately 34 percent of rated thermal power.

Technical Specification 2.2.1 Table 2.2.1-1 lists the allovable values to be less than or equal to 20 percent of rated thermal power.

Upon completing the functional tests, calibration procedures were issued to correct the setpoints.

While the APRM setdown trip is not required to be o p e r ab l e l

in Operational Condition 4 an investigation of the l

possibility that the trip was out of tolerance vb il e the plant was in Operational Conditions 2 or 3 was made.

The inve s tiga tion d e termined that the out of tolerance condition had existed since December 27, 1987.

At that point in time the plant was in Operational Condition 1.

During the scram and subsequent shutdown, the plant was in Operational Condition 3 from 1852 hours0.0214 days <br />0.514 hours <br />0.00306 weeks <br />7.04686e-4 months <br /> on December 31, 1987 till 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> on January 1, 1988.

Since the condition of the ApRM setdown trip was not known, the action required by the Technical Specification, locking the mode switch in shutdown within one hour, and placing a trip system in the trip condition vere not taken.

The mode switch was placed in the refuel position from 2039 to 2143 on December 31, 1987.

Additionally, it has been determined actions taken in testing the Source Range Monitors ( S RM s ) and Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs) following the December 31, 1987 scram were in technical violation of Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.7.6.

At the time of the December 31, 1987 scram (see Licensee Event Report 87-056), the IRMs, the SRMs and the Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) setdown trips were outside their surveillance frequency since all had expired vbile the plant was in Operational Condition 1.

These monitors are not required to be operable in Operational Condition 1.

At the time of the scram, 1852 hours0.0214 days <br />0.514 hours <br />0.00306 weeks <br />7.04686e-4 months <br />, the plant entered Operational Condition 3.

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==w.mn Since the IRHs and APRHs were outside the surveillance frequency, Specification 3.3.1 technically required a trip system be placed in the trip condition, despite all control rods being fully inserted.

This was not done.

At 2039 hours0.0236 days <br />0.566 hours <br />0.00337 weeks <br />7.758395e-4 months <br />, the mode switch was placed in the refuel position to support the performance of surveillances.

This was in technical violation of Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.7.6 which require the mode switch to be in the shutdown position if the required number of monitor channels are not operable.

The mode switch was returned to the shutdown position and locked at 2143 hours0.0248 days <br />0.595 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.154115e-4 months <br />.

At 2245 hours0.026 days <br />0.624 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.542225e-4 months <br /> the functional test of SRM Channel B was performed excluding the rod block interlocks.

The rod block intetlocks cannot be tested with the mode switch in the shutdown position.

On January 1, 1988 at 0920 bours, the plant entered Operational Condition 4.

Several surveillances were performed on this day to verify the operability of SRH Channel A and the Division II 1RMs exclusive of their rod block interlocks.

On January 2, 1988 the SRM Channel C functional test was performed exclusive of the rod blocks.

The mode switch was placed in the refuel position at 0302 hours0.0035 days <br />0.0839 hours <br />4.993386e-4 weeks <br />1.14911e-4 months <br /> in order to test the rod block interlocks for the SRHs.

The mode switch was left in the refuel position until 0645 hours0.00747 days <br />0.179 hours <br />0.00107 weeks <br />2.454225e-4 months <br /> on January 3, 1988.

During this time, SRM Channel D had been verified to be fully operable.

On January 3,

1988 after the identification of possible noncompliance with the Technical Specifications, the mode switch was placed in the shutdown position at 0645 and at 0715 hours0.00828 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.720575e-4 months <br />, Reactor Protection System Channel A was placed in the tripped condition as required by Technical S pec i f ic a t io n s 3.3.1.

The functional and calibration tests for the Division I IRMs were completed exclusive of the rod block interlocks.

At 1716 hours0.0199 days <br />0.477 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.52938e-4 months <br /> the mode switch was returned to the refuel position to verify the remaining rod block interlocks.

The trip condition was reset as necessary to complete the IRH functional tests.

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Cause of Event

The out of tolerance condition of the APRM setdown trip was due to an inadequate procedure.

Because of the relationship of the fixed neutron flux upscale trip and the setdown trip, adjustment of the neutron flux upscale trip on December 27, 1987 vhile in Operational Condition 1 affected the setdown trip setpoint.

At the time the work was done, the relationship was not recognized.

The technical violation of action statements associated with SRM and IRM operability requirements oc cur r ed as a result of plant personnel attempting to perform required surveillance tests in their entirety, including rod block functions, and lack of practicality in Technical Specification Table 1.2 and Section 3.3.1.

Analysis of Event

None of these deficiencies reduced the safety of the public or the plant.

The plant successfully shut down during the time the violations of the Technical Spec ifica tions occurred.

In the event the scram had not occurred, the APRM setdown trip would have been checked as required by Technical Specification 3.3.1 after entering Operational Condition 2 or actions in compliaace with the Technical Specification would have been required.

Corrective Actions

The APRM setdown trip was adjusted to be within the Technical Specification range.

The APRM calibration procedures are being r ev is ed to verify / adjust the setdown trip when the fixed neutron flux upscale trip is adjusted.

These will be approved by March 1988.

Urgent Required Reading was issued to shift personnel on January 6, 1988 to clarify the requirement to maintain the reactor mode switch in SHUTDOWN until portions of surveillances are completed to allow required SRM and IRM functions to be declared operable upon entry into Operational Condition 3 or 4.

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,w s m4 won A Technical Specification change request is being prepared to add notes to Table 1.2, "0PERATIONAL CONDITIONS".

These notes would define when a mode switch may be moved to the refuel position for performance of surveillance tests.

This change vill be submitted by April 30, 1988.

A Technical Specification change vill also be proposed by June 30, 1988 eliminating the need to place trip systems in the trip condition during plant shutdown.

In the future, channel functional tests vill be perfomed on the SRMs and IRMs while in Operational Conditions 1 and 2, with the exception of the rod block function, which cannot be performed unless the plant is shutdown.

Procedure changes to allow this to be accomplished vill be completed by Ma.ch 31, 1988.

Previous Similar Events

In Licensee Event Report 85-062, inoperability of IRM Channels B and D was reported.

This was due to failure to complete the weekly channel functional test within the required frequency while in Cold Shutdown.

A failure to test the rod block function was described in Licensee Event Report 86-022.

This was due to inadequate procedures.

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February 2, 1988 NRC-88-0016 U.

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555

Reference:

Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Facility Operating License No. NPF-43

Subject:

Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 88-001-00 Please find enclosed LER No. 88-001-00, dated February 2, 1988, for a reportable event that occurred on January 3, 1988.

A copy of this LER is also being sent to the l

Regional Administrator. USNRC Region III.

If you have any questions, please contact Patricia Anthony at (313) 586-1617.

Sincerely, f

W.

S.

Orser Vice President Nuclear Operations Enclosure NRC Forms 366, 366A cci A.

B. Davis J.

R.

Eckert l

l E.

G.

Greenaan W.

G.

Rogers J. J.

Stefano Wayne County Emergency Management Division

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