05000482/LER-2004-001, Regarding Inadequate Verification of Valve Position Following Testing Results in Technical Specifications Violation
| ML040780665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/2004 |
| From: | Jacobs D Wolf Creek |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| WO 04-0012 LER 04-001-00 | |
| Download: ML040780665 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4822004001R00 - NRC Website | |
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'NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Donna Jacobs Plant Manager MAR 1 2 20-WO 04-0012 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 2004-001-00, Inadequate Verification of Valve Position Following Testing Results in Technical Specifications Violation Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2004-001-00 is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) regarding an inoperability of the Containment Spray System at Wolf Creek Generating Station for a period greater than that allowed by Technical Specifications.
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation has made no commitments in the enclosed LER.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please Kevin Moles at (620) 364-4126.
contact me at (620) 364-4246, or Mr.
Very truly yours, Jacobs DJ/pab Enclosure cc: J. N. Donohew (NRC), w/e D. N. Graves (NRC), w/e B. S. Mallett (NRC), wle Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/e RO. Box 411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer M/FIHCNVET
Abstract
On January 15, 2004, at 8:30 PM, central standard time, containment spray system [EIIS: BE] isolation valve [EIIS: ISV] EN-V025 was found locked in the fully open position. The containment spray system was declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.6. Valve EN-V025 was closed and the containment spray system was declared operable at 8:51 PM on January 15, 2004.
This valve was unlocked and opened on December 30, 2003, during the performance of the containment spray pump inservice pump test for train B, which is controlled by procedure STS EN-100B. This procedure requires that after this test has been completed, valve EN-V025 is to be restored to closed and locked, and subsequently verified to be closed and locked.
This condition existed prior to discovery for a period greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the allowed Completion Time associated with Required Action A.1 of TS 3.6.6. As such, this situation represents a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
The root cause for valve EN-V025 being in the incorrect position is lack of information validation or verification. The two nuclear station operators did not adequately validate information, and did not adequately verify the information (i.e., valve position).
NRC FORM 366 (7.2001)
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The NSO who discovered valve EN-V025 in the incorrect position of open, located and observed two related valves, EN-V024 and BN-V001, to be in the correct position of closed. Valve EN-V024 is the A Train isolation valve allowing diversion of the containment spray pump discharge from the containment spray nozzles to the RWST during pump testing. Valve BN-VO01 is a non-safety related valve in series with valve EN-V024 or EN-V025 which also isolates the test line going to the RWST. Even though this closed non-safety related valve can not be credited for containment spray system operability, it would likely have been available to isolate flow to the RWST if a loss of coolant accident or main steam line break inside the containment had occurred.
Corrective Actions
The Shift Manager of the operations crew on shift at the time of the test has conducted coaching and counseling sessions with the two involved NSOs. These sessions focused on the error prevention human performance tools including comparing/contrasting rising stem valves, as well as procedure use and adherence.
The site-wide distribution of human performance tools and lessons learned from this event will be provided to help prevent recurrence of this event (or similar events) in the future. In addition, procedures on the conduct of operations and conduct of pre-job and post-job briefs will be reviewed for potential changes.
Previous Events:
A review of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation LERs submitted over the last 2 years revealed no similar events where failure to validate or verify information resulted in conditions prohibited by Technical Specifications.