05000482/LER-2003-001, Re Manipulation of Component Outside of Procedural Guidance Causes Reactor Trip
| ML030700537 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/2003 |
| From: | Jacobs D Wolf Creek |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| WO 03-0011 LER 03-001-00 | |
| Download: ML030700537 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
| 4822003001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
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W'LF CREEK
'NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Donna Jacobs Plant Manager FED 2 8 2003 WO 03-0011 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 2003-001-00, Manipulation of Component Outside of Procedural Guidance Causes Reactor Trip Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2003-001-00 is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) regarding an actuation of the Reactor Protection System including an automatic reactor trip at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation has made no commitments in the enclosed LER.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4246, or Mr. Karl A. (Tony) Harris at (620) 364-4038.
Very truly yours, Jacobs DJ/rIg Enclosure cc:
J. N. Donohew (NRC), wle D. N. Graves (NRC), w/e E. W. Merschoff (NRC), w/e Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), wle P.O. Box 411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone. (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/HC/VET
Abstract
On January 3, 2003, at 11:01 a.m. Central Daylight Time (CDT), Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) experienced an automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), including an automatic reactor trip, due to power range neutron flux high negative rate. The reactor trip occurred while restoring the number one rod drive motor generator (RDMG) set to service after routine breaker maintenance.
A Reactor Operator (RO) in the plant was simulating how to manually charge the non-operating RDMG set output breaker to two non-licensed operators. The RO manipulated the manual charging handle for the RDMG set number one output breaker outside of procedural guidance and without control room direction.
Concurrent with the actuation of the manual charging handle, the number one output breaker closed, then reopened, and the number two RDMG set output breaker opened. When the number two RDMG set output breaker opened, the control rods lost holding power and started to insert. All control rods fully inserted, and the RPS and the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems performed as expected. The cause of this event was personnel error.
The safety significance of this event is low. All safety related equipment performed as expected. There were no adverse effects on the health and safety of the public.
NRC FORM 366 (72001)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
Additional corrective actions to address this event are being implemented through the WCNOC corrective action program (Performance Improvement Request (PIR) 2003-0010).
Safety Significance
The safety significance of this event is low. All safety related systems, structures, and components performed as required and expected. Nuclear safety was maintained by implementation of emergency operating procedures after the automatic shutdown of the reactor. There were no adverse effects on the health and safety of the public.
Previous Events:
Research into the corrective action program database was conducted for all WCNOC corrective action documents that had been coded as component manipulation control for the past two years. Three events were identified involving behaviors similar to this event. These behavioral issues are being addressed in the corrective actions to PIR 2003-0010.
Research into industry operating experience was conducted on data from the past ten years using the search criteria of Westinghouse plants and events that were associated with the control rod drive system, circuit breaker, contactor, controller, or motor components. Eleven events were identified; none were similar to this event.
A search of LERs submitted over the past three years by WCNOC revealed no similar events.