05000482/LER-1992-001, :on 920113,failure to Follow Procedures Could Have Caused Both Intermediate Range Channels to Be Inoperable During Physics Testing.Caused by Temp Procedure Changes.Procedure Revised

:on 920113,failure to Follow Procedures Could Have Caused Both Intermediate Range Channels to Be Inoperable During Physics Testing.Caused by Temp Procedure Changes.Procedure Revised

ML20092E626
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	02/11/1992
From:	Bailey J, Mike Williams WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-92-001, LER-92-1, NO-92-0044, NO-92-44, NUDOCS 9202180180
Download: ML20092E626 (8)

LER-1992-001, on 920113,failure to Follow Procedures Could Have Caused Both Intermediate Range Channels to Be Inoperable During Physics Testing.Caused by Temp Procedure Changes.Procedure Revised

Event date:
Report date:
4821992001R00 - NRC Website

text

v t.

l WFLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION John A. Bailey V6ce President Operations February 11, 1992 NO 92-0044 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D. C.

20555 Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 92-001-00 Gentlemen:

The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted voluntarily and concerns an event which could have caused both Intbrmediatt Range Channels to be. inoperable during Low Power Physics Testing.

Very truly yours.

/

John A. Bailey Vice President Operations JAB /jra Attachment cc:

.A.

T. Howell (NPC), w/a R. D. Martin (NRC), w/a G. A. Pick (NRC), w/a W. D. Keckley (NRC), w/a 9202180180 920211 T

I

[//

PDR ADOCK 0500048P l

S PDR P.O. Box d11 i Burlington, KS 66839 I Dtione: (316) 364-8831

/

An Equal Opportunity Emple,a M bHC/ VET u-

- -. ~

.c LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) fACILily NAML(1) Wolf Creek Generating Station o i s t o l o l o 14 l 812 l1 lOrlo l7 DULKL1 NuMUL h F) i PAGt Q T'I'*(*) Failure To rollow Procedures Could Have Caused Both Intermediate Range Channels To De Inoperable During Physics Testing EvtNr DATt l$) -

LE R Nl#ASE R f8)

RF PORT DAT E (7) l OTHER F ACILITlE S INVOLVE D (6) 6 AL jp

@ m ag pgy yt4g DUCntWmH(s)

McMt DAY YEAR YEAR q

01s1010101 I I OII 1l2 92 9 l2 0 l0 l1 0 lb 0l 2 1l1 9l2 olslololol l l OPERATra 1 THIS REPORT IS SufMTT ED PURSUANT, TO THE REOJIREMENTS OF 10 CFH : (Checa one or truve of frie Ap#owkW i i1) 2[

{

MODE (9) 20.402(6) 20 406(c).

60.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.7 (n)

{

00) l lO 20.406(al(1){t) 60.36(c)(1) 60.73(a)(2)(v) 73 7t(c) 60.3e(c)ca) 60.73(a)(2)(viij K

cmtR rsy,,,1y to As.,,.c, 2:406(a)O)(ii)

Mw aM b 7est, MC km -

.f

- MNh 20.406(a)(1)(ill) 60.73(a)(2)(i) 60.73(a)(2)(viii)( A) 368A) ww.mMmMg g; 20.406(a)(1)(iv) 60.73(a)(2)(II) 60.73(a)(2)(vtil)(B)

..,xh e

7/

. h \\kk Bry hp M 20.406(a)(1 Hv) 60.73(a)(2)(lii) 60.73(a)(2Hz)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THS LER C2)

G4%E TELIFhCNE MA0ER AREA CODE Merlin G. Williams - Manager Plant Support 3.1 11.6_ MSBJ _ led 1311 COMPLETE ONE LNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRlDED N THIS REFORT (13)

ER O DRD N

1ER h

N kiM h l

l I i 1 l-I I

I I I I I I b un ~

qiks q J

Qu l' l l Am w

l l l l l l l 7W~

SUPPLEMENTAL REFORT EXPECTED 04) -

EXPECTED mJTH DAY YEAR sunuissoN

] YEs (r y.a. cornowe ExercirD sutusssoN:A ro X NO DATE 06) l l

l DBSTRACT (Urrut to 8400 spacne, Le., approstmately Inteen single apn.w typwrmen hnes) Q 8) c On January 13,1992, at approximately 0735 CST, while perfoming low.cwer pnysics testing, Control Room operators v.ere notified that the Ar a Channel Cperatir.inal Tests of the Intwmuilate Ranga Channels had not &a performed pre.per.ty on January ll,1992 resulting in both channels being aeclared inoperable an:1 entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3.

Subsequent evaluation of the setpoint values used on January n,1992, has concluded that the values were within the Technical Specification allowable values and therefore, the Intermediate Range Chanr.als were operable.

Several factors contributed to this event's occurrence including failure to pur:rly reference tarpesary procedure changes at the affected procedure steps prior to guce. hee usage end the assumption by the Instrumentation and Cbntrole (I&C) test performats that the temporary procedure changes had been properly incorporated. To prevent recurrence, an independent verification of the use of the proper setpoints prior to physics testing will be added to the -

Reactor Engineering physics testing procedure. Aaditionally, the detaiis of this event are being issued as I&C requiral reading to anphasize the Inportance of ensuring that all aspects of proper procedure performance have-been ccupleted.

1 9

e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACOlV NAME p) -

QULeM MMutH R)

LtH MAOt H {b)

PAut 0)

"An

Tfgn" (l adjj{7/

Wolf Creek Generating S'tation 015lololo141812 9 l2 0 l0 l1 0 l0 0l2 0 l7

~

~

OF TEXT (W more space 6 requked one eMaianni NRC form 366ke) 07)

_INIHptXCPI(N Cn January 13, 1992, at approximately 0735 CST, Control Rom operators were notifled_that surveillance test procedures STS IC-235, " Analog Channel Operational 7bst Nuclear Instrumentation Systm Intnmviiate Range N-35 Protection Set I," and STS IC-236, " Analog channel Operational 7bst Nuclear Instrumentation Systm Inta=diate Range N-36 Protection Set II," had not been performed properly on January 11, 1992 when Cycle 5 values were used for the setpoints for the 25 percent of rated thermal power (RTP) reactor trips rather than the calculated values for the Cycle 6 care. These surveillance test procedures are required to be performed by Technical Specification (T/S)

Surveillance Requiremnt 4.10.3.2 within twelve hours prior to initiating physics testing which began on January 12, 1992, at approximately 0530 CST.

This discovery resulted in both Intamvliate Range Channels [JC-CHA) being declared inoperable and entry into T/S 3.0.3.

Subsequent evaluation of the setpoint values used on January 11, 1992, has concludM that the values were

- within the T/S allowable values and the Inta - diate Range Channels were

- operable. Although the plant's T/S were not violated, this event is being

'y subnitted as a voluntary report.

ImpCRIPTIGi OF FXENT 7bchnical Specification 3.10.3, Physics Tests, states, in part, that the limitations of T/S 3.1.1.3, Moderator Trsaporature coefficient, T/S 3.1.1.4, Minbuum Tr.superature For Criticality, T/S.3.1.3.1, Movable Control Assmblies Group 11eight, T/S 3.1.3.5, Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit, and T/S 3.1.3.6, Control-Rod-Insertion Limits may be suspended during the performance of physics tests provided the reactor trip setpoints on the operable Inte = Winte i

and Power Range Channels are set at less than or equal to 25-percent of >RTP.

7bchnical Specification Surveillance Requirment 4.10.3.2 requires that each Inta=vilate and Power Range Channel shall be subjected to an analeg channel operational test within twelve hours prior to initiating physics testing.

On November 22, 1991, Reactor Engineering _ personnel issued a memoratrium to Intrumentation and Controls (I&C) which required the Inta=vitate Range Channels setpoints to be adjusted to 69 percent of the Cycle 5 values based on

-.their calculations-of the expected values for the-Cycle 6 core. As a result of-this information, on November 29, 1991, tmmrary procedure changes for surveillance test procedures STS IC-435, " Channel Calibration NIS Intermediate Range N-35," and STS IC-436, " Channel ralibration NIS Intamviiate Range N-36," were approved which included the calculated values for the Cycle 6 L:

. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION P AGLil V NAW, (1)

LAAAL I MEAR H (2)

Li H MJMik H @) _

Faut fJ)

M 4 0 ilt Wolf Creek Generating Station o J 5 lo 1010 !41812 9 !2 0 l0 l1 0 l0 O !3 0 l7

~

~

or un y owe vue a revuoa. no www wic rorm um> era core for the startup alignnents for the Intennilate Range Channels' reactor trip at less than or equal to 25 percent of RTP. Weso calculated values are used for the reactor trip bistable setpoints prior to initial startup following refueling. Because the setpoint values were to be superseded by pernanent values once 100 percent power was reached, the procedum changes wore issued as tanporary. W e temporary procedure changes were written and approved as valid through De. snber 7,1991. On November 30, 1991, x

surveillance test procedures STS IC-435 and SIS IC-436 were perfounod adjusting the Internallate Range Channels to their calculated setpoints.

On-January 6,1992, tauporary procedure changes for surveillance test procedures SIS IC-235 and STS IC-236 were approved which included the calculated values for the Cycle 6 core startup alignments for the Intermodiate Range Channels reactor trip at less than or equal to 25 percent of RTP.

Because the setpoint values were to be superseded by permanent values once 100 percent power was re ched, these procedure changes were issued as tanporary also. W e tamporary procedure changes were written and approved as valid through January 11, 1992.

On January 11, 1992, at approxinutely 2010 CST, I&C personnel comenced STS IC-235 for the calibration of Channel N-35.

Bis calibration of Channel N-35 was caupleted at approxinately 2135 CST. Subsequently, at appeximately 2150 CST, I&C personnel comenced STS IC-236 for the ca'.ibration af channel N-36.

'1his calibration of Channel N-36 was coupleted at 2224 CST.

On January 12, 1992, at approxinntely 0526 CST, procedure RXE 01-002, " Reload 104 Power Physics Testing," was comenced when shutdown rods were pulled and the plant entered Mode 2, Startup.

On January 13, 1992, during the post-test review of surveillance test procedures STS IC-235 and STS IC-236, the I&C Group Supervisor discoveral that the tauporary procedure changes which included the calculated values for the startup alignments for the Intmullate Range Channels' Imetor trip at less than or equal to 25 percent of RTP had not been properly inserted into the surveillance test procedure prior to their performance on January 11, 1992.

Therefore, the values used during the January 11, 1992 calibration of Channels N-35 and N-36 were the values representing the 25 percent of RTP for the Cycle 5 core rcther than the calculated values for the Cycle 6 core.

w LICENSEE EVE'NT REPORT (LER)

~

TEXT CONTINUATION FwCul v Mt(y luAk i P4JMOLH M LLH NUMatH (6)

PAOL p) ten" ' "OIM Wolf Creek Generating Station o15l0lolol4I812 9 l2 0 l0 l1 0 l0 0 l4 0 l7

~

~

m Tui @ noe space a requked. vee addWonal NRC form 364kel (17)

On January 13, 1992, at approxis tely 0735 CST, I&C personnel notified Control Rom operators of the failure to properly perform the. surveillance test s.vculure. At the tim of this discovery, the plant was in Mode 2 with 3

Shutdown Bank "B" partially inserted into the core with low power physics testing in progress. Upon notification frm I&C personnel, Control Room operators halted the low power physics testing. - As a result of the failure to properly perform surveillance test procedures STS IC-235 and STS IC-236, Control Rom operators determined that the limitations of T/S 3.1.1.3, T/S 3.1.1.4,.T/S-3.1.3.1, T/S 3.1.3.5 and T/S 3.1.3.6 could no longer be suspended as allowed by T/S 3.10.3, and therefore, were in effect. For T/S 3.1.1.3, the Moderator 'nsperature coefficient for the new core had not yet been measured but was negative by design. For T/S 3.1.1.4, the Mininum Tmperature For Criticality was greater than or equal to 551 degrees Fahrenheit as required.. For T/S 3.1.3.1, the Movable Control Assemblies Group Height was nrt for rod operability. For T/S 3.1.3.5, the action statment was entered which required Shutdown Bank "B" rods to be withdrawn to the full-out position within one hour ur the rods declared inoperable since Shutdown Bank "B" wns partially inserted into the core. For T/S 3.1.3.6, the physical insertien limits were as required for the Control Rod Insertion Limits.

I&C personnel estimted that the values used in the January 11, 1992 calibration had resulted in the setpoints by ng set at approximtely 36 percent rather than less than or equal to 25 percent of RTP based on the prestart-up estimates. - Technical Specification 2.2.1, applicable in Mode 2 and Mode.1, Power Operations below low setpoint power range-neutron flux

- interlock setpoint, requires the intn=viiate range trip setpoint to be set at less than or equal to 25 percent with an allowable value of less than or equal to 35.3 percent. Technical Specification 2.2.1, action' statement b, requires that with the Reactor Trip System [JC] instrumentation or interlock setpoint less conservative than the allowable value, either adjust the setpoint consistent with the trip setpoint value of less than or equal'to 25 percent of RTP and determine within twelve hours that the as-measured value of the setpoint error of the affected channel is less than.the total allowance provided in Table 2.2-1 when the calculation provided in T/S 2.2.1 is applied,

or' declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable action statement requirement of T/S 3.3.1 until-the channel is restored to operable atatus with its setpoint adjusted consistent with the trip setpoint value. Because it was estimated that the setpoints were set at approximately 36 percent of RTP, thus exceeding the calculated value for the T/S allowable value of 35.3 percent.uf RTP, and nore than twelve hours had already lapsed since the plant had entered l

l

[

l I

l$

m.'

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION f ACUIY e.AMt p)

LAAAt i P4JMut R gj tiH NuMat H Jh)

FASE p; P4 A H 1

Wolf Creek Generating Station ol51010loi4iel2 9 l2 O l0 l1 0 l0 0 l5 0 l7

~

~

M TLKT (M truwe space in requkest une ed&&MI NRC form 366A s) (17)

Mode 2, Control Rom operators declared both Intenmxiiate Range Channels inoperable. 'Ibchnical Specification 3.3.1 requires two operable Intemodiste Range Channels. 'Ihe action ~ statment for T/S 3.3.1 states that with the number of channels operable one less than the minimum channels operable requirment and with the thental pomr level below the intermediate range.

neutron flux interlock setpoint, ruwre the inoperable channel to operable status prior to increasing thental power above the interlock setpoint; or with themal power above the interlock setpoint but below 10 percent of RTP, restore the inoperable channel to operable status prior to increasing thental power above 10 percent of RTP. 'Ibchnical Specification 3.3.1 does not provide an action statment for inoperability of nore than one channel.

Consequently, Control Rom operators _ entered T/S 3.0.3 on January 13, 1992, at 0735 CST, and I&C personnel were instructed to reperfom STS IC-235 and STS IC-236.

On January 13,1992, at 0805 CST, Control Rom operators began to bring Shutdown Bank "L"' to its full-out position, while inserting Control Banks in nontal overlap to compensate for the positive reactivity addition. At 0817 CST, Shutdown Bank "B" rods were positioned in tnelr full-out position in accordance with T/S 3.1.3.5 and the action statement.was exited. At 0835 CST, I&C persunnel cmmenced reperfornance of partial surveillance test procedures

. to properly calibrate the intemediate range trip setpoint at less than or equal to 25 percent of RTP. At 0919 CST, I&C notified Control Rom operators that the partial surveillance test STS IC-235 had been successfully completed, thus restoring Channel N-35 to operable status and T/S 3.0.3 was exited and the appropriate action statment for T/S 3.3.l'was entered. At 0936 CST, the partial surveillance test STS IC-236 was successfully empleted, thus i

restoring Channel N-36 to operable status and the action statement for t

T/S 3.3.1 was exited.

Using actual intamnMate range current data'taken during the perfontence of STS RE-Oll, "RCS 'Ibtal Flow Rate Measurment," on January 24, 1992,-an evaluation of the January 11, 1992 setpoints has concluded that these setpoints did not exceed the actual values for the T/S allowable values.

'1herefore, the Intemodlate Range Channels were operable.

1 HOOT CAUSE AIO ComE0'PIVE ACTIGE Review of this event has identified several factors which contributed to this failure to properly perfom the surveillance test procedures. As allowed by procedure, the tm porary procedure changes to surveillance procedures STS IC-235 and STS IC-236 were not issued as pentanent changes to avoid L

l iI e

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION I AQUIY teAMt (1)

OLLAL I f4AttiL H (2)

LLH NLAut H F)

FAbt (3;

%YfEn"

! "dNN Wolf Creek Generating Station 015101010141812 9 l2 0 l0 l1 O !0 O !6 0 l7

~

~

0F m e ma w. e s.m

.au.w wc ram m wn incorporating the newly calculated setpoint values into the permnent revision process before the new, actual setpoint values were obtained at 100 percent power.

Instead, the tmmmry procedure changes were written and approved as valid through January 11, 1992. On January 11, 1992, at approximtely 1715 CST, copies of S'Is IC-235 and STS IC-236 were issued in anticipation of perfoming the procedums within twelve hours prior to physics testing as required by T/S Surveillance Requirannt 4.10.3.2.

he tmporary procedure changes were issued with the procedures. Rhninistrative procedure AII4 07-100,

" Preparation, Review, Approval And Distribution Of NOGS Procedurus," requires that tmporary changes to be used in the performance of surveillance testing shall be referenced at the applicable procedure step prior to procedure usage. Because it was possible that the surveillance test procedures would not be performed until January 12, 1992, thereby requiring new tmporary procedure changes to be written, approved and incorporated prior to performance due to the tmporary procedure changes expiring on January 11, 1992, the tmporary suculare changes were not referenced at the applicable procedure step at the time the procedures were issued for use. The temporary procedure changes were verified to be valid and attached to the surveillance procedures. @ e Surveillance Test Routing Sheets, which are attached to the front of the surveillance test procedures to be performed arri includes a verification that the procedure is the current revision with all tmporary changes attached, was initialed and dated. D ring the shift turnover at approximately 1900 CST, the on-duty I&C persw discussed with the nightshift I&C crew that the t mporary procedure changes had not been referenced and incorporated at the applicable procedure steps yet. The nightshift I&C Supervisor then instructed the I&C Technician who was expected to perform the surveillance test procedures to reference and incorporate the contents of the temporary procedure changes into the body of the procedures prior to the time of perfornance. %e nightshift I&C Supervisor did not verify that the tmporary changes had been incorporated as had been instructed. Subsequently, when the procedures were comenced at 2010 CST, the I&C Technician who was to incorporate the tmporary procedure changes and who had been expected to perform the surveillance test plu:edures was involved in other activities and the surveillance test procedures were assigned to other qualified I&C personnel. Seeing that the Surveillance Test Routing Sheet verification had been signed, the I&C test perforners assumed that the temporary procedure changes had been properly incorporated. merefore, I&C personnel failed to follow procedures when the temporary procedure changes were not referenced at the applicable procedure step prior to procedure Since the calculated values for the Cycle 6 core had been properly usage.

used during the November 30, 1991 performances of surveillance test procedures STS IC-435 and STS IC-436 to adjust the Intemediate Range Channels' reactor

~

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION P ALILO Y NAML (1)

LLO41 PAJMut H p)

LL H f*DAlt H f4 PAGt (3)

WIi?f

" NEE Wolf Creek Generating Station 0Islololoi41812 9 l2

- 0l0l1 0 l0 0 l7 o l7

~

or Tf XT (W rnare space in regn bed, use aMkonal NRC form X6A s) (17) trip setpointo to their lower values, when surveillance test pmcodures SIS IC-235 and STS IC-236 were perfonned on January 11, 1992 without the tmporary procedure changes incorporated, the trip setpoint values were found low and were adjusted back to the Cycle 5 values indicated in the procedures. The I&C test performers did not question the fact that the as-found setpoints for both Intenrediate Range Channels were low by the sane amount. Additionally, the post-test reviews perfonned by the I&C test perfonmrs and the Shift Supervisor failed to identify that the temporary procedure changes had not been properly incorporated even though the tmporary procedure changes were attached to the procedures.

7b prevent recurrence of this event, a step will be added to RXE 01-002,

" Reload Iow Power Physics Testing," that will require Reactor Engineering pmannel to verify that the surveillance test procedures used to adjust and test the Intamullate and Power Range Channels within twelve hours of physics testing used the setpoint values based on the cmuction factors determined for the current core load. Because this verification will be perfonned by persons not involval in the testing of the Intnrmodlate and Power Range Channels, this independent verification should eliminate this event's recurrence. This revision to RXE 01-002 will be cmpleted by Parch 1,1992.

Additionally, the details of this event will be issuec as I&C required reading to emphasize the importance of ensuring that all aspa.ts of proper procedure performnce have been cmpleted prior to procedure perfonmnce and during the post-test review. This will be issued as I&C required reading by l

February 10, 1992.

ADDI'nmAL INMIDRTION During this event, the plant was in Mode 2, Startup, with low power physics testing in progress. Although the reactor trip setpoints on the Intermediate Range Channels were not set at less than or equal to 25 percent of RTP, the setpoints were within the T/S allowable values. There was no threat to the health and safety of the public. There was no damsge to plant equipent or release of radioactivity as a result of this event.