05000364/LER-2004-001, Unit 2 Re Technical Specification 3.7.8 Violation Due to Operation with One Train of Service Water Inoperable

Unit 2 Re Technical Specification 3.7.8 Violation Due to Operation with One Train of Service Water Inoperable

ML041540359
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	05/28/2004
From:	Stinson L Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-04-0957 LER 04-001-00
Download: ML041540359 (4)

LER-2004-001, Unit 2 Re Technical Specification 3.7.8 Violation Due to Operation with One Train of Service Water Inoperable

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
3642004001R00 - NRC Website

text

L M. Stinson (Mike)

Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Tel 205.992.5181 Fax 205.992.0341 SOUTHERN AM COMPANY Energy to Serve Your World' NL-04-0957 May 28, 2004 Docket No.: 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2004-001-00 Technical Specification 3.7.8 Violation Due to Operation with One Train of Service Water Inoperable Ladies and Gentlemen:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2004-001 -00 is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Sincerely, L. M. Stinson LMS/WVAS/sdl Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2004-001-00 cc:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr., Executive Vice President Mr. D. E. Grissette, General Manager - Plant Farlcy RTYPE: CFAO4.054; LC# 14049 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator Mr. S. E. Peters, NRR Project Manager - Farley Mr. C. A. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley

,-,,

NR OM36US ULA EUAOY APPROVED BY 0MB HO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7.31.2004 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a digilsfcharacters for each block) person Is not required to respond to, the Information conecton.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE (3)

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 05000364 j

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Technical Specification 3.7.8 Violation due to Operation with One Train of Service Water Inoperable EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL RE MO DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO MO DAY YEAR 330 2004 2004 001 00 05 28 2004 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING N

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:(Check all that apply) (11 )

MODE (9) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(3Xii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

_ 50.73(aX2)(ix)(A)

POWER 20.2201 (d) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(aX2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2Xx)

LEVEL (10) 00 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(aX2)(iv)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(cXl )(ii)(A) 50.73(aX2)(vXA)

_ 73.71 (a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(cX2)

_ 50.73(a)(2XvXB)

OTHER

=

20.2203(aX2)(iii)

_ 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

Specify in Abstract below or in 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

_50.73(aX2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Safety Assessment

The manual start function of the pump was unaffected by this failure. Plant procedures direct operator verification of auto start functions. Had an auto start been demanded and failed, the pump would have been promptly recovered by operator action from the control room. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were unaffected by this event.

This event does not represent a Safety System Functional Failure.

Corrective Action

The splice in the affected cable was repaired and the autostart function of the 2E Service Water pump was tested satisfactorily.

The preventive maintenance task for pull box inspection and water removal has been revised to include a visual inspection of insulation sleeves on cable splices in the pull boxes.

This type of degradation is a long term phenomenon; therefore, a sample of cable splices in pull boxes on both units will be disassembled and inspected to identify the onset of degradation prior to failure. If degradation is identified in the sample, appropriate preventive maintenance tasks will be developed and implemented. This action will be completed by the end of the next refueling outage on each unit.

Additional Information

No similar LERs have been submitted in the past two years.