05000354/LER-2004-011, Re Control Room Emergency Filtration Inoperable Longer than Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time
| ML043630377 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/2004 |
| From: | Hutton J Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-NO4-0578 LER 04-011-00 | |
| Download: ML043630377 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat |
| 3542004011R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 DEC 2 0 2004 LR-N04-0578 O PSEG ANuclearLLC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 354/04-011-00 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Control Room Emergency Filtration Inoperable Longer Than Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Sincerely, Plant Manager-Hope Creek Attachment BJT C
Distribution LER File 3.7 I
95-2168 REV. 7/99
S w
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/3012007 6-2004)4
, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to. the
- 3. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Control Room Emergency Filtration Inoperable Longer Than Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILIES INVOLVED SEOUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEUMERTA NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 21 2004 2004 - 011 -
00 12 20 2004
- 9. OPERATING MODE 11.THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check allthatapply) 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3Xi) 0'50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 4 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(aX2)(iiXA) 0 50.73(aX2)(viiiXA) o 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(aX4) 0 50.73(aX2)(iiXB) 0 50.73(aX2)(viii)(B) 0o 20.2203(aX2)(I) 0 50.36(cX1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2Xix)(A)
- 10. POWER LVEL 0 20.2203(a)2)(ii) 0 50.36(cX1)(iiXA) 0 50.73(a)(2XiV)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2Xx) o 20.2203(a)(2Xiii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2XvXA) 0 73.71(a)(4) o 20.2203(a)(2Xiv) 0 50.46(aX3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71 (a)(5) 0 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2XiXA) 0 50.73(aX2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER 0
20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2XiXB) 0 50.73(aX2)(v)(D)
Specify In Abstract below nr In NRf'. Formn qRA
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Brian Thomas, Licensing Engineer 1856-339-2022CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER REPOREPIXLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FATUER TOEPXFACTUJRER TO EPIX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION 10 YES (if yes. complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE 02 28 2005 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On October 21, 2004, the 'A' control room emergency filtration (CREF) train tripped on low flow after receiving a start signal from the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) sequencer during the performance of Loss of Offsite Power (LOP)/LOCA surveillance testing of the 'C' emergency diesel generator (EDG). As a result, the 'A' CREF train was declared inoperable. The CREF train is required to run following a LOCA or a LOCA in conjunction with a LOP (LOP/LOCA). It was determined that the 'A' CREF fan flow controller response upon restoration from a loss of power was extremely slow, which resulted in the demand signal from the controller not driving the flow control damper open fast enough to allow system flow to exceed the low flow setpoint. A review of the 'B' CREF train fan flow controller was performed. Based upon this review, the 'B' CREF train was conservatively declared inoperable.
The cause of the CREF fans not being able to restart after a LOP/LOCA signal is still under investigation. A supplemental LER will be submitted by February 28, 2005, to include the results of the completed cause investigation and associated corrective actions.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as 'a condition which was prohibited by technical specifications."
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
-(1-2001)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
Hope Creek Generating Station TEXT (If more space Is required, use additionaf copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System - EIIS Identifier {VI})
- Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS) codes and.component function identifier codes appear as {SSICCCC}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Discovery Date: October 21, 2004 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Hope Creek was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 (COLD SHUTDOWN) at 0% Reactor Power at the time of discovery.
There was no equipment out of service that contributed to this event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On October 21, 2004, the 'A' control room emergency filtration (CREF) {VII train tripped on low flow after receiving a start signal from the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) sequencer during the performance of Loss of Offsite Power (LOP)/LOCA surveillance testing of the 'C' emergency diesel generator (EDG). As a result, the 'A' CREF train was declared inoperable.
The CREF train is required to run following a LOCA or a LOCA in conjunction with a LOP (LOP/LOCA).
Troubleshooting was conducted which determined that the 'A' CREF train ran normally with no LOP or LOCA signal present. However, during a simulated LOP/LOCA the 'A' CREF fan was not able to clear the low flow fan trip setpoint. It was determined that the fan flow controller response upon restoration from a loss of power was extremely slow, which resulted in the demand signal from the controller not driving the flow control damper open fast enough to allow system flow to exceed the low flow setpoint.
A review of the 'B' CREF train fan flow controller settings was performed. Based upon this review, the 'B' CREF train was conservatively declared inoperable.
A review of the previous fan controller setpoints was performed and determined that the 'A' CREF train had the current as found settings installed between September 2002 and July 2004. The 'B' CREF train has had the current settings installed since April 2003.
This event is being report in accordance with 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as "a condition which was prohibited by technical specifications." Hope Creek Technical Specification 3/4.7.2 states that 'with one control room emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days."
- - I
- ~,
I -U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 YEAR I N3ER NUMBER 3OF3 2004 011 00 CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the CREF fans not being able to restart after a LOP/LOCA signal is still under investigation. Upon completion of the cause investigation, this LER will be supplemented by February 28, 2005.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of LERs for prior similar occurrences will be performed upon completion of the cause investigation.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
There were no safety consequences associated with this event.
The 'A' CREF fan was determined to not be capable of clearing the low flow fan trip setpoint during a LOP/LOCA. As a result of a review of the 'B' CREF train settings, the 'B' CREF train was conservatively declared inoperable. However, testing of the trains with the as-found controller setpoints had demonstrated that the fans would have started during a LOCA without a LOP present. The fans were also capable of being manually started from the Control Room. In accordance with the design basis dose analysis for a LOCA event, control room operator radiological doses as evaluated in the analysis would not be exceeded if the control room envelope (CRE) is initially isolated and a CREF train is started within the first 30 minutes of the LOCA to pressurize the CRE. With the as-found fan controller settings, the CREF train would have isolated the control room envelope, the fan would have tripped on low flow, but the operators were capable of re-starting the CREF train within 30 minutes from the control room.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) has not occurred as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02. Since the CREF trains were capable of mitigating the consequences of a LOP/LOCA in accordance with the design basis dose analysis this event did not impact the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Currently, Hope Creek is in the 12th Refueling Outage. The 'A' and 'B' CREF trains will be restored to operable status prior to entering Operational Conditions 1, 2 or 3 in accordance with the requirements of the Hope Creek Technical Specifications.
Additional corrective actions will be identified upon completion of the cause investigation.
COMMITMENTS
A supplemental LER will be submitted by February 28, 2005.