05000334/LER-2005-002, Re Latent Fire Protection Issue Regarding Possible Loss of Reactor Coolant System Makeup Function

From kanterella
Revision as of 12:18, 15 January 2025 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Re Latent Fire Protection Issue Regarding Possible Loss of Reactor Coolant System Makeup Function
ML060190514
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 01/13/2006
From: Lash J
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-06-001 LER 05-002-00
Download: ML060190514 (7)


LER-2005-002, Re Latent Fire Protection Issue Regarding Possible Loss of Reactor Coolant System Makeup Function
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
3342005002R00 - NRC Website

text

FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company James H. Lash 724-682-5234 Site Vice President Fax: 724-643-8069 January 13, 2006 L-06-001 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 LER 2005-002-00 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 The following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 2005-002-00, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), "Latent Fire Protection Issue Regarding Possible Loss of Reactor Coolant System Makeup Function."

cai James H. Lash Attachment c:

Mr. T. G. Colburn, NRR Senior Project Manager Mr. P. C. Cataldo, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. S. J. Collins, NRC Region I Administrator INPO Records Center (via electronic image)

Mr. L. E. Ryan (BRP/DEP)

Abstract

In response to a corrective action from a previous Latent Issues Review performed in 2004, Engineering identified a new concern where the loss of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1)

Component Cooling Water System (CCR) could potentially result in saturation conditions at the suction of the operating Charging System pumps, leading to pump cavitation. The BVPS-1 Fire Protection Appendix R Report, does not take credit for operation of the CCR system since the original circuit analyses used other systems for its shutdown strategy. However, the BVPS-1 Fire Protection Appendix R Report did credit the Charging System with providing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) make-up during all postulated fire events. Cavitation at an operating Charging Pump suction could lead to subsequent pump damage, preventing this system from performing its credited safety function during certain postulated fire events.

This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) since the make-up function to the RCS, which is credited for maintaining the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, may not be available during certain postulated fire events. The root cause of this event is that wrong assumptions were made in the original basis for not needing CCR for seal water heat exchanger cooling in 1983. The risk is considered to be of very low safety significance. Applicable BVPS Unit 1 procedures were revised to eliminate the identified concern.

NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)

(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Forn 366A)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Continued) when CCR is lost and to place the charging pumps in the Pull-To-Lock position prior to leaving the control room when control room evacuation is needed.

3. A review will be performed to review the BVPS Unit 1 Fire Protection Appendix R Review Report to determine if there are any other scenarios that credit or require CCR system components.
4. An operating experience has been issued to the industry describing this event.
5. In a letter dated December 22, 2005, BVPS stated its intention to pursue implementation of NFPA 805, Performance-based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plant. Implementation of this standard will revise the BVPS fire protection design basis from the previous deterministic-based analyses, where the initial error occurred, to a more risk-based approach.

Completion of the above and other corrective actions are being tracked through the BVPS corrective action program.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

A review found one prior BVPS Unit 1 and no BVPS Unit 2 Licensee Event Reports within the last five years involving a fire protection issue:

BVPS Unit 1 LER 2003-002, "Potential Overpressurization of Unit 1 Cable Vaults if a C02 Discharge were to Occur, Results in an Unanalyzed Condition."

BVPS Unit 1 LER 2003-002 is similar to this LER in that it involved an original design concern that was not recognized during the initial program development. It was, however, different from this LER in that it involves the use and credit for the carbon dioxide suppression system, rather than the lack of use and credit for the Component Cooling Water System.

COMMITMENTS

There are no new commitments made by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) for BVPS Unit No. 1 in this document.