ML16015A052

Univ. of Texas-Austin - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Renewal Request, July 31, 2015 Correspondence

ML16015A052
Person / Time
Site:	University of Texas at Austin
Issue date:	12/22/2015
From:	Whaley P M University of Texas at Austin
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC ME7694
Download: ML16015A052 (65)

Text

of' Mechanical EngineeringTHE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTINNuclear E'ngineering Jbaching Laboratory- 'Austin. Ii'xas 78758512-232-5370" FAX 512-471-4589- httpI/!www, me.utexas.ee'4d-netl/December 22, 2015ATT-N: Document Control Desk,U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Washington, DC 20555-0001M. BalazikProject ManagerResearch and Test Reactors Licensing BranchSUBJECT: Docket No. 50-602, Request for Renewal of Facility Operating License R-129REF: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN -REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE LICENSERENEWAL REQUEST FOR THE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING TEACHING LABORATORY TRIGA MARK II NUCLEARRESEARCH REACTOR (TAC NO. ME7694) --July 31, 2015 correspondenceSir:Attached are responses to request for additional information for 2.4, 4, 5, 12, 16.1, 22.2, 22.4, 22.5, 22.6, 22.7,27.1, 27.2, 27.2, 27.3, 27.4, 27.5, 27.6, 28.1, 29.1, 29.2, 29.3, 32.3, 32.4, 32.5, 33, 34.1, 34.3, 36.1, 36.3, 36.5, 36.6,36.7, 36.8, 36.9, 37.1, 37.2, 37.2, 37.2, 37.2, 37.2, 37.3, 37.4, 37.5, 37.6, 37.6, 37.6, 37.6, 38.1, 38.2, 38.3, 38.4,38.5, 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 40.2, and 40.4.In review, two issues from previous submissions were identified. First, the September 9, 2013, request identified aresponse to RAI 20.2, while the response applied to RA1 20.1. Second, the October 23, 2015 request identifiedML15114A433 as answering RAI 18 but neglected that the document also resolves the related RAI 36.9.We are requesting 90 days to complete the work (RAI 19 and the financial questions are still being addressed). It islikely that these items will be completed before the requested time, and the responses will be submitted on.Please contact me by phone at 512-232-5373 or email whalev@~mail.utexas.edu if you require additionalinformation or there is a problem with this submittal.Thank you,Associate DirectorNuclear Engineering Teaching LaboratoryThe University of Texas at AustinI declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on December 22, 2015Steven R. BiegalskiNETL Directorpot RAI 12UT SAR Section 4.5.4, Subsection B provides Figure 4.22 for the power within a fuel element.the NRC Staff notes that the power distribution in the figure continues to the center of the fuelelement indicating that this curve is not applicable to stainless steel clad fuel that has a zirc rodin the center. Please confirm and revise accordingly.RESPONSENeutronic analysis has been revised, and appropriate figures will replace the original.

RAI 16.1The pooi dimensions of a "tall tank formed by the union of two half-cylinders with a radius of 6% ft.(1.9812 m) with 6% feet separating the half-cylinders," appears to be inconsistent with the stated tanknominal water volume of 40.57 cubic meters. Please confirm and revise accordingly.RESPONSEA sketch of the pool surface area:146R0.9906 (X2lThe surface are of the pool is therefore 5.056 m2POOL VOLUMEElevation Volume aboveLevel (in) Pool Floor (in3)Top of Tank 8.236 41.64Normal water level 8.179 41.35Minimum (TS) water level 6.50 32.86Core Top 0.51 2.58Core Bottom 0.2519 1.27With a reflector height of approximately 0.54 m, a reflector radius of approximately 0.6 m, and thehexagonal core metal to water ratio of approximately 1:3, the volume occupied by the reflector and coreis on the order of 0.5 m and can be neglected in evaluating pool water volume. Therefore during normaloperations pool volume is 41.35 in3, with approximately 38.7 in3over the core elevation.

RAI 16.2The coolant flow rates cited in UT SAR Table 5-1 for the tubes and shell side of the primary coolant heat exchangerappear to be in error. Please confirm and revise accordingly.RESPONSEThe shell and tube flow rate values for Table 5-1 appear to have been inadvertently transposed, and will bechanged to indicate:Flow Rate (shell)Flow Rate (tubes)400 gpm (25.2 Ips)250 gpm (15.8 Ips)

RAI 19.1 The licensee cites a correlation that determines effective release height above thebuilding exhaust stack due to effluent momentum from the purged air system or theventilation system. Please confirm that the correct form of the correlation is AH = D(Vs/p4 1.4 and not as it is stated in the UT SAR.RESPONSE:The correct form of the correlation is AH = D (Vs/i)'"4 RAI 19.2The licensee uses two different stack exit diameter values for the stack (0.4012 m2 on UT SAR,, p. 9-6 and45.72 cm on UT SAR, p. 9-2). Please explain this discrepancy.RESPO NSEThe 45.72 cm value is a diameter, the 0.4012 m2value the area of the flow from the stack.

RAI 19.3Ensure the impact of the above changes on offsite doses for both normal operation andaccident conditions are considered and revised accordingly.RESPONSE:The height of the stack required additional work to account for possible building wake effects. Analysishas been revised as indicated in response to RAI 22.

RAI 2.4UT SAR Section 4.2.1 provides Figures 4.2A and 4.2B. The source of this information is notreferenced nor is their applicability to the particular operating conditions and fuel depletion of UTTRIGA demonstrated. Please demonstrate the applicability of these figures to the UT TRIGA.RESPONSEThe figures will be removed.

RA1 21.2UT SAR Section 9.4.2 states, "A 5-tonne crane is used in conjunction with fuel handling tool and thetransfer cask to allow remote handling of irradiated fuel." Please describe the physical or administrativeprecautions employed to minimize the potential for fuel or core damage due to malfunction, such asloss of electrical power, or dropped loads.RESPONSEA loss of electrical power to the crane engages a mechanical brake. Heavy loads are not lifted over thecontrol rod drives.

RAI 22: The guidance in NUREG-1537 Section 11.1.1, "Radiation Sources," requests that the licenseeinclude airborne dose information for characterization of 41Ar, including providing best estimates of themaximum annual dose and the collective dose for the major radiological activities for the full range ofnormal operations for facility staff and members of the public.RAI 22.2: UT SAR Section 11.1.1.1.1 describes the production of 41Ar and provides very conservativeestimates of the concentration, but does not provide values for the occupational dose. Please providethe 41A occupational exposure including stay times and the effect of ventilation, and how thesecompare to the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and the commitments of the UT TRIGA ALARA program.RAI 22.3 UT SAR Section 11.1.1.1.1 does not describe the whole body dose to facility staff. Pleaseprovide a discussion of facility worker doses, and whether these doses are ALARA.RAI 22.4: UT SAR Section 11.1.1.1.2 provides a conservative estimate of offsite 41Ar air concentrationsusing an equation for ground level concentration at the building center. Please provide a reference forthe equation cited, and a discussion of its suitability for providing dose calculations for members of thepublic and their location.RAI 22.5: UT SAR Section 11.1.1.1.2 provides a discussion of use of the CAP88 PC computer program toestimate the dose to the maximally exposed individual. However, no information is provided regardingthe location of this individual, whether the location represents the nearest residence, or whether thelocation is at a location of special interest. Please provide a complete description of the maximallyexposed individual calculation, including how the estimates compare to the limits in 10 CFR Part 20 andthe commitments of the UT TRIGA ALARA program.RAI 22.6: UT SAR Section 11.1.1.1.2 provides conservative dose estimates for the maximally exposedindividual of 66 mrem per year using the CAP88 PC computer code. UT TRIGA TS 3.5.3(D) indicates thatreleases of 41Ar from the reactor bay to an unrestricted environment SHALL NOT exceed 100 Ci peryear, and provides CAP88 PC model results indicating that 100 Ci per year release of 41Ar would result ina maximally exposed individual dose of 0.142 mrem per year. Please resolve this discrepancy betweenthe maximally exposed individual doses in the UT SAR and those provided in the TS.RAI 22.7: UT SAR Section 11.1.1.1.2 provides a discussion of the maximally exposed offsite individual,but does not provide doses to members of the public. Please provide a discussion of potential publicdoses.RESPONSERAI 22.2 See attached, Section 2RAI 22.3 See attached, Section 2RAI 22.4 See attached, Section 2.4RAI 22.5 See attached, Section 2.3RAI 22.6 There is no discrepancy; limiting a maximum release of 100 Ci per year results in acceptabledose.

RAI 22.7 The predicted dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual in Section 11.1.1.1.2 is actuallythe predicted maximum public dose (see response to question RAI 22.5).

RAI 22 REPONSE: ATTACHMENT 1This analysis is predicated on continuous operation at the maximum licensed power level, while theoperating schedule is virtually never 100% of the available time and a large fraction of the time is lessthan 100% power level.Normal operation with the purge system removes most of the Ar 41 from experiment facilities and thesurface above the pool. Experiments in 2015 demonstrated Ar 41 concentrations on the top deck of thereactor pedestal to be on the order of 0.12% of the concentrations in the space above the pool andbelow the pool grating. At the base of the reactor there was no detectable Ar 41 except for very smallconcentrations near BP3. The Ar 41 HVAC stack effluent (exhaust from reactor bay atmosphere) is asmall fraction (8.2X104) of the purge system effluent, indicating that the argon purge is removing mostof the Ar 41 generated during reactor operation (when both systems are operating).1. PRODUCTION OF ARGON 41 AND SPECIFIC ACTIVITYThere are three production sources for Ar 41, argon 40 dissolved in water flowing through the core, inbeam port air, and air inside the rotary specimen rack (RSR). Beam ports are sealed when notsupporting an experiment and when used generally have equipment installed that displaces air. The RSRis normally unvented during operation. The RSR insertion port is normally sealed during operation, andthe operating shaft has minimal clearance. Therefore the Ar 41 production with the largest potential forintroducing Ar 41 into the reactor bay environment is activation of naturally occurring argon in thewater flowing through the reactor. The contribution from each source, the ventilation of individualcontributions, and the effects of operation of the argon purge system and the HVAC system areconsidered.With no removal other than radioactive decay, the argon 41 production rate at equilibrium (Table 2,taken from the SAR Chapter 11 with pool surface calculated separately) is equal to the decay rate (oractivity):Ni,eq" Zi=ZWhere Ni, eq represents the number density of Ar 41 at equilibrium with k the decay constant (1.05x104s-1), Xr is the macroscopic cross section for neutron absorption of Ar 40, and is the neutron flux.Activity and volume for the pool water and the experiment facilities from the proposed UT SAR areprovided inTable 1.1.1 Production of Argon 41 in the Pool and Transport to AirThe Ar 41 is assumed to be distributed in equilibrium with argon. The air saturation-concentration ofArgon at the surface of fresh water at standard pressure and temperature (STP) is 0.556 mg/L1.For thenormal temperature range of UT TRIGA pool water at full power (approximately 25°C to 30°C), solubilityis slightly less at 0.4841 +/-3% mg/L.Variability forsolubility with small changes in pressure near atmospheric pressure is minimal; however,the weight of water from the surface of the pool to the bottom causes hydrostatic pressure to varySDissolved Gas Concentration in Water, 2nd Ed., J. Colt (J. Colt), ISSBN 978-0-12-415916-7 significantly with depth. Solubility as a function of depth at STP increases 0.55 (mg/L) per meter fromthe surface to the floor of the pooi. Water density at 30°C is 3% lower than at 20°C, so that hydrostaticpressure at depth varies only slightly over a range from the reference temperature to normal pooltemperature at full power.The weight fraction of argon in air is 0.934%. The density of air at sea level is nominally 1.225x10-3g/cm3, so the density of argon in the air above the pool surface is taken as 1.144x10-s g/cm3.The ratioof the argon concentration in air above the pool surface to the argon concentration in pool water at thesurface is:1.144x10-s g/cm3*lxlO3mg/g, lxlO3cm3/L= 23.630.4841 mg/LIf ventilation is not considered, the Ar 41 concertation above the pool is a factor of 23.63 higher than theAr 41 at the surface of the pool. The average concentration of argon in fresh water at STP from 0 to 8meters is 0.776 mg/L, and at the surface is 0.556; the surface concentration is 71.6% of the averageconcentration. Therefore the Ar 41 concentration above the pool surface is '19.92 times the average Ar41 concentration in the pool.1.2 Air Space above the Pool SurfaceThe air above the pool is bounded by the pool surface and Plexiglas on the bottom surfaces of the poolgrating (Fig. 1). A rectangular space is formed above the pool tank, and an oval space is formed by thepool surface and the top of the pool tank. Total volume of the air space is 3.28x105cm3.R0.9906 (X2Jv I .0.4609--..I II.f I ! IIVOLUME:3.2800,58 mA3-0.2.159Figure 1: Geometry of the Air Space above the Pool1.3 Summary of Production Source Terms Information taken from the proposed SAR for source term production and the volumes of experimentalfacilities is summarized in Table 1. Pool surface air calculations are based on information above. Poolsurface air activity is the specific activity at the pooi surface (16.92 times the average poll water activity),and total activity in the air above the pool is the air volume times the specific activity.Table 1: Ar 41 Production Source TermsCmoet Activity Volume Sp. ActivityCo p n nInA ,__3,. ,n_ ..[cmI~q/cmPool water 2.10E+09 5.77E+07 3.64E+01Pool surface air2 1.65E+09 2.68E+06 6.16E+02Beam Port air 9.7OE+09 5.90E+05 1.64E+O4RSR air 3.30E+10 3.30E+04 1.00E+06TOTAL AIR 4.43 E+10 3.80E+06 NA1.3 Ventilation EffectsThe time rate of change in the concentration of Ar 41 (dNt) isclultddNi(t)Where Z is the macroscopic cross section for neutron absorption of neutrons in argon 40, is theneutron flux, 2, is the radioactive decay constant (0.693/110 min-1, or 1.05x10-4 s'), and )Lv is thefractional removal constant. The time dependent concentration is therefore:N1(t) -Where 2, is the radioactive decay constant and 4, is the removal constant from ventilation, calculated bythe flow rate divided by the volume. For convenience, the term with the removal constant will bereferred to as "reduction factor." The equilibrium specific activity when ventilation is used (ar) is relatedto the equilibrium activity with no ventilation (ac) by:ti~ + There are two ventilation systems that create removal constants, the argon purge system and thereactor bay confinement ventilation system (HVAC). These systems are used in three configurations forreactor operation: (1) both systems operating (2) Purge system only, and (3) HVAC system only. Eachconfiguration defines the flow through the reactor bay and experiment facilities. SAR Chapter 9provides flow rates associated with the argon purge and reactor bay ventilation systems. SAR Chapter11 indicates the volumes of the reactor bay and experiment facilities, with the exception of the air space2 Specific activity based on activity of Ar 41 in the pool (A.N41) and ratio of Ar 41 at pool surface to Ar 41 inair above pool surface in 1.1; total activity is specific activity times volume of air above pool. Air ye thepool is based on Fig 1.

above the pool (previously calculated). Ventilation flow rate, component volume, transport coefficient,and reduction factor are compiled in Table 2 for the two ventilation systems.Table 2: Physical Parameters Reducing ConcentrationVetiato FowRaeComponent Removal ReductionVenilaionFlwnRte Volume Constant FactorCfm cm3/s cm3 sDilution 525 2.48E+05 NA NA NABay (HVAC) 7200 3.40E+06 4.12E+09 8.25E-4 1.13E-1Pool surface3 525 2.48E+05 2.68E+06 9.26E-02 1.13E-03Beam Ports 20 9.44E+03 5.90E+05 1.60E-2 6.52E-3RSR 4 1.89E+03 3.30E+04 5.72E-2 1.83E-31.4 Specific Activity (Ar 41) in Reactor BayFor the cases where the purge system is operating, the Ar 41 in the reactor bay atmosphere isinsignificant. For the case where only the HVAC system is operating, all of the activity enters the reactorbay atmosphere and is removed through the stack by HVAC flow, so that the Ar 41 concentration in thereactor bay is calculated as the sum of the activities (Ar, where A is the activity for thecontribUting component x) divided by the total volume of the reactor bay (Vx where x is the volume ofthe reactor bay, air above the pool, in the beam port and in the RSR) modified by the reduction factorassociated with HVAC flow rate (-P-VAc):Apoo1 +/- ABp +/- ARSRasy=VBay + Vpooi air +/- VBP +/- VRSR RFHvAcCalculations of specific activity in the reactor bay with only the HVAC system is operating is provided inTable 3 for conditions with individual purge system components contributing to the source term.Table 3: Ar 41 in Reactor Bay (HVAC, Bq/cm3)Pool surface air YES YES YESBeam Port air YES YES NORSR air YES NO NOActivity (Bq/cm3) 1.21 0.31 0.051.5 Specific Activity (Ar 41) in Stack EffluentThe configurations that use the purge system (purge only, and purge in conjunction with the HVACsystem) have contributions to purge system flow from dilution flow (from the reactor bay), flow fromthe pool surface, flow from the beam ports, and flow from the RSR exhausted as purge flow. Theconfiguration that uses only the HVAC system discharges reactor bay air from HVAC flow.SCalculated in Table 1, with remaining volumes are taken from the SAR 1.5.1 Purge System (Only) OperatingWhere aeff,purge is the contribution of argon 41 from the purge system to the stack effluent ae,x is theequilibrium specific activity with no ventilation for component x, and v= is the ventilation flow rate forcomponent x:aepoZ Voo *RF~a +/- aeBp *VBp.*Fp+aSR"RR"RFsaeff,purge -a Fp+aRRV= FsVdizution ¢ V2Poot +} VBp +] 12RSR1.5.1 Purge System and HVAC OperatingFor the case where the HVAC and the purge system are both operating, stack effluent is weightedaverage of the HVAC flow and the purge system flow:_aeff ,purge .Veff,purgeaejjf stack~ Yeff,purge -+/- 12HVAC1.5.2 HVAC (Only) OperatingFor the case where only the HVAC system is operating, effluent activity is the reactor bay specific activitypreviously calculated (aBe,).1.5.3 Summary of Effluent Concentration CalculationsCalculations of specific activity in the reactor bay with only the HVAC system is operating is provided inTable 3 for conditions with individual purge system components contributing to the source term.Table 4, Ar 41 in Stack Effluent (Bq/m3)Pool surface air YES YES YESBeam Port air YES YES NORSR air YES NO NOPurge System (Only) 9.16 2.35 0.35Purge System & HVAC 6.5E-01 1.7E-01 2.5E-02HVAC (Only) 1.2 0.31 0.052. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS2.1 Worker DosesOnly the configuration with the HVAC system operating (and purge secured) contributes significantconcentrations of Ar 41 to the reactor bay atmosphere. The 1OCFR20 Derived Air Concentration for Ar41 is 3xlOY6pCi/ml (1.11xlO-2Bq/ml, 1.11xlO4Bq/m3). Exposure to a DAC for 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> will result in a 5 rem dose. Full power, steady state reactor operations with the purge system operating areunrestricted with respect to radiation exposure to Ar 41. Table 5 indicates the dose rates that will occurwith the equilibrium Ar 41 concentrations calculated to occur at full power for each experiment useconfiguration (indicated by YES in Table 5).Table 5: Impact on Worker Doses, 1.1 MW Operation, HVAC OnlyPool surface air YES YES YESBeam Port air YES YES NORSR air YES NO NODose Rate 274 mrem/h 70 mrem/h 10 mrem/hStay Time 18.3 h 71.4 h 491.3 hWith dose rates in the reactor bay associated with only the HVAC system operating, a Radiation WorkPermit would be required to control worker exposure if all beam ports are being used in a completelyopen condition and the RSR is open to reactor bay atmosphere (extremely unlikely, as previously noted).If beam ports are completely open but the RSR is closed, routine personnel monitoring is adequate tocontrol worker doses. In both these cases, Area radiation monitors would alert workers to radiationdose rates. With beam port and RSR secured, routine personnel monitoring is adequate to controlworker doses.2.2 Effluent ActivityThe effluent limit is 1x108 (3.70x10-4 Bq/ml). The effluent limit is based on an annual dose of 50mrem, 1/ of the maximum permitted dose to the general public. A constraint is imposed by 1OCFR20 forno more than 10 mrem/year exposure from effluents.2.3 Offsite Exposure to Ar 41 EffluentActual releases are a small fraction of the possible values calculated under the extremely conservativeassumptions. Applying CAP88- PC to actual 4lAr release rates measured over the past several yearspredicts an annual dose to the maximally exposed individual of less than 0.02 mrem which is well withinthe 10 CFR Part 20 limits and the NETL ALARA goals.CAP88-PC uses a modified Gaussian plume model to estimate the average dispersion of releasedradionuclides and appropriate dose conversion factors to calculate expected doses from these releases.One option the computer program offers is to determine the location and the dose to a hypotheticalmaximally exposed individual. Individuals present at any other locations would receive a dose nogreater than that of the maximally exposed individual. A CAP88-PC calculation was performed thatindicates a dose response to effluent activity of 5.95 mrem/(Bq/cm3) for the maximally exposedindividual. CAP88- PC determined that the maximally exposed individual was located 200 meters north-northwest of NETL. This location corresponds to the parking lot of a bank and is not a location of specialinterest (i.e., continual occupancy). For reference, the nearest residence is approximately 500 metersnorth-northwest of NETL. Table 5 summarizes the effluent concentration, annual exposure forcontinuous 1.1 MW operations, the dose rate at that exposure level, the ratio of the dose to the 10mrem constraint and the 100 mrem limit, and the number of hours of operation that reaches theconstraint and limit for each configuration.

Table 6, Dose/Dose Rates based on CAP88-PC from EffluentsEffl. Exposure Dose Rate Constraint-Based Limit-BasedConfiguration Bq/cm3 Mrem mrem/h Ratio Hours Ratio HoursPurge, all sources 9.16 54.5 6.22E-03 0.18 1608 0.5451 NAPurge, Pool & BP 2.35 14.0 1.59E-03 0.72 6279 0.1396 NAPool, Pool only 0.349 2.1 2.37E-04 4.81 NA 0.0208 NAHVAC, all sources 0.65 3.9 4.41E-04 2.59 NA 0.0386 NAHVAC, Pool & BP 0.17 1.0 1.13E-04 10.11 NA 0.0099 NAHVAC, Pool only 0.02 0.1 1.68E-05 67.94 NA 0.0015 NAHVAC, all sources 1.2 7.2 8.24E-04 1.38 NA 0.0723 NAHVAC, Pool & BP 0.31 1.8 2.11E-04 5.41 NA 0.0185 NAHVAC, Pool Only 0.05 0.3 3.07E-05 37.20 NA 0.0027 NAWhere the constraint-based ratio exceeds 1.0, the receptor dose limits can be met either by limitinghours of operation in the configuration or limiting the total annual effluent release. Where R is the totalactivity released, aeff is the effluent activity concentration, Veff is the effluent flow rate, and T'S is thenumber of seconds in a year, thetotal annual release can be calculated as:R = aeff *Veff

• 7'In Table 7, total annual release is calculated for each configuration based on effluent concentration andflow rate. The limiting release is the calculated annual release divided by the limit based ratio of Table5. There are 2 abnormal configurations identified where continuous operations at 1.1 MW have thepotential to cause more than 10 mrem in a year, and none will cause more than 100 mrem.Table 7, Annual Ar 41 ReleaseBq/cm3 B q CiPurge, all sources 9.16 7.49E+13 2.02E+03Purge, Pool & BP 2.35 1.92E+13 5.19E+02Pool, Pool only 0.35 2.85E+12 7.72E+0lHVAC & Purge, all sources 0.65 1.04E+13 2.81E+02HVAC & Purge, Pool & BP 0.17 2.66E+12 7.19E+01HVAC & Purge, Pool only 0.02 3.96E+11 1.07E+01HVAC, all sources 1.21 9.50E+12 2.57E+02HVAC, Pool & BP 0.31 2.43 E+12 6.57E+01HVAC, Pool Only 0.05 3.53E+11 9.55E+002.4 Building Wake EffectsBuilding wake effects can limit atmospheric dispersion of effluent at the building perimeter. Thebuilding wake equation as used in the original UT-Austin TRIGA Safety Analysis Report (May 1991) andthe U.S. Geological Survey TRIGA Safety Analysis Report (May 2008, Section 11.1.1.4) as presented in DOE/TI C-27601, Flow and Diffusion Near Obstacles Cheater 7, "Atmospheric Science and PowerProduction" (D. Rnaderson, U.S. Department of Energy; 1984). At a wind speed of 1 rn/s the reductionin Ar 41 concentration in a building wake condition will be reduced by 35.11 (effluent compared toexposure), and with at 4 rn/s (UT TRIGA site annual average wind speed) the reduction will be 140. Thedose rate (DR) associated with the effluent AR 41 specific activity is calculated:50torero/(364.25.24) Seii tvtDRmrem = Seii tvth 3.70xlO-4Bq/cm3Table 8: Effluent Concentrations and Building Wake Dose Rates, 1.1 MWSak1 rn/s 4 m/sEffl. Dose DoseWake Rate Wake RateBq/cm3 Bq/cm3 mrem/h Bq/cm3 mrem/hPurge, all sources 9.16 2.61E-01 4.02 6.54E-02 1.01Purge, Pool & BP 2.35 6.68E-02 1.03 1.68E-02 0.26Purge, Pool only 0.35 9.94E-03 0.15 2.49E-03 0.04HVAC & Purge, all sources 0.65 1.85E-02 0.28 4.64E-03 0.07HVAC & Purge, Pool & BP 0.17 4.73E-03 0.07 1.19E-03 0.02HVAC & Purge, Pool only 0.02 7.05E-04 0.01 1.77E-04 0.00HVAC, all sources 1.21 3.46E-02 0.53 8.68E-03 0.13HVAC, Pool & BP 0.31 8.85E-03 0.14 2.22E-03 0.03HVAC, Pool Only 0.05 1.29E-03 0.02 3.23E-04 0.00In the normal configuration (HVAC and purge systems, purge venting pool surface) operations at 24hours a day, 7 days a week at full power do not have the potential to exceed exposure limits consideringmaximum building wake effects. Normal operational schedule, limits on operation with only one systemoperating, normal weather conditions, and routine radiological monitoring are adequate to assureoperations in abnormal conditions are controlled to meet exposure limits.2.5 Comparison with MeasurementsThe argon purge system is instrumented to measure Ar 41 effluent. The Argon monitor is calibratedannually, the total argon activity and average argon effluent activity (normalized to energy generation).From 2007 to 2014 the Ar 41 activity per kW-h was an average 20.17 iiCi/kW-h (2.69x106 Bq/MW-s) witha standard deviation of 3.69. For the typical flow rate noted in the SAR (0.52 m3/s, or 5.2x105 cm3/s) at0.95 MW the effluent concentration of AR 41 is therefore 4.91 Bq/cm3.Normal configuration is 1 beamport and the pool surface vented, with the purge and HVAC systems operating. Table 4 indicates whenthe purge system and the HVAC are operating with the pool surface and 4 beam ports vented, stackeffluent is 0.17 Bq/cm3.The calculated value of stack effluent for the configuration using both the HVACand argon purge systems 35% of the measured effluent concentration.

RAI 27The guidance in NUREG-1537 Section 13.1.1, "Maximum Hypothetical Accident," requests that thelicensee provide a maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) and demonstrate that it bounds all potentialcredible accidents at the facility. Under this guidance the MHA for TRIGA reactors is the failure of onefuel element in the air with the release of gaseous fission products. The purpose of this analysis is toensure that this accident would not lead to unacceptable radiological consequences to the occupationaland non-occupational workers and the environment.RAI 27.1 UT SAR Section 13.3 analyzes a fuel element failure in the open air of the reactor bay. Theanalysis provides fission product inventory for a rod power of 3.5 kW which is not consistent with usinga saturated inventory in the hottest rod for 1.1 MW operation. Please provide an analysis of the MHAfor the UT TRIGA including doses to the workers and to the individuals in the non-restricted areas thatbounds all other accident analyses. Please describe all assumptions, the operating conditions of theHVAC system, and the sequence of events used in calculating the potential radiological consequencesand discuss how those consequences are less than the applicable limits in 10 CFR Part 20. Pleaseprovide sufficient detail to allow independent confirmation of these results.27.2 UT SAR, Section 13.3 provides a discussion of the atmospheric dispersion employed and identifiesthe various parameters and assumptions used to determine the concentrations of nuclides at thenearest site boundary. For the case when the reactor bay ventilation is secured and the auxiliary purgesystem is used to discharge the reactor bay effluent, the UT SAR describes an elevated release throughthe building stack.27.2.1 UT SAR, Section 13.3 (p. 13-19), the building stack is located on the roof of the reactor buildingand its exit is at about 14 feet above the roof leading to a total height of about 63 feet above the groundlevel that surrounds the facility. The calculations are then performed for distances from 10 to 100meters from the building. Because, the reactor building is both tall and wide, any release from the stackcould be accumulated in the building wake. Therefore, the applicability of the assumption of elevatedrelease is appears inaccurate. Please justify the use of the elevated release values for dose estimates atnearby distances from the facility.27.2.2 In addition, if there is an error in the correlation used for the plume rise (see RAI 0), theestimated plume rise above the stack height may be inaccurate. Please confirm and revise accordingly.27.3 For the determination of effluent leakage around doors and HVAC duct vents the licensee employscomplicated discussions and assumptions that are not supported or justified. Please revise thediscussion and calculations using applicable assumptions for building overpressure.27.4 For the dispersion calculations of ground releases using RG 1.145, "Atmospheric Dispersion Modelsfor Potential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants," Regulatory Position 1.3.1,the licensee uses a building wall cross section area, which appears to be 432 m2. UT SAR page 3-7 statesthat the reactor bay is about 18.3 m on each side, with a total of 4575 m3 of volume. This leads to awall cross section area of about 250 m2, which is in-line with the value of 234 m2 given in the originalapplication for licensing safety analysis report in 1991 (1991 SAR). Please confirm the building wall crosssection area and revise accordingly.

RESPONSE27.1 -See Analysis following;(a) New fission product inventory assumption based on maximum burnup of 50% 235U(b) Doses to workers and individuals in unrestricted areas calculated(c) Airborne activity within DAC in the reactor bay, and effluent limits off site. Therefore maximumdoses within 10CFR20 limits.27.2.1/2 -New analysis does require atmospheric dispersion.27.3 -New analysis does not require analysis of building overpressure.27.4 -New analysis does not require atmospheric dispersion modelingANALYSISThe maximum hypothetical accident is a release of radioactive noble gas and halogen fission productsfrom a TRGIA fuel elements following discharge. The maximum fission product inventory will occur in afuel element with the maximum burnup. The maximum burnup is taken to be the burnup that results ina loss of 50% of the initial uranium 235 mass (from 38 grams to 19 grams). This is extremelyconservative as the TRIGA fuel temperature reactivity deficit associated with operation at power doesnot allow support under these conditions.Depletion calculations using the SCALE T-6 sequence was used to determine burnup and the fissionproduct inventory. A SCALE model of the TRIGA core was configured with a two fuel materialcomposition sets, one representative of a single element to be depleted and the other representing theremaining elements in the core.A set of SCALE (T-6 depletion) calculations was performed to deplete all elements in the core, generatinga fission product inventory for the larger set of elements. A 50% burn interval at 1.5 MW was evaluated,reducing the u235 mass in the single element from 38 grams to approximately 19 grams. In determiningthe 50% burn, the number of fuel elements was adjusted to result in a calculated flux similar to thenominal UIT TRIGA full power flux. The uranium, transuranic, and fission product concentration wereused to develop a material composition simulating the core average at the end of the interval for the50% single element burn.The SCALE model was configured to a single fresh fuel element and the remainder of elements at thecore average at the end of the 50% burn interval. Radioactive noble gas and halogen activity wascalculated for the 50% burn. A similar calculation was performed except that the constant flux optionwas used. The maximum value for the activity of the isotopes from the two calculations (constantpower and constant flux) was taken as the source term for the radioactive noble gas and halogeninventory for a single fuel element at the maximum burnup.

Using a release fraction of lX10-4, and the free volume of the rector bay (4120 in3), the concentration ofthe activity of each isotope (A,, in IICi/ml) in reactor bay atmosphere based on the source term for eachisotope (C, ,in Curies) is calculated as:Ai-4.12x10_9The average activity of isotopic concentration (A,,(t)), where Ai is the isotope decay constant, over sometime interval (t) following the release of isotopes from a fuel element into the reactor bay is calculated:At)=4.12x10-9 ' i tEach isotope has limits (based on continuous activity concentrations over one year) on activityconcentration for exposure of workers (Derived Air Concentration, DAC) and the general public (EffluentLimit). For mixtures of isotopes, compliance with the limits is demonstrated if the sum of the ratio ofeach activity concentration to its individual limit is less than unity. Since the hypothetical accident is nota continuous process, the concentration of each isotope is normalized over a year following the release.The ratio of the average activity ( <A1>) for the year following release of the source term from a fuelelement into the reactor bay for occupational exposure (2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />) to the isotopic DAC (DACI) iscalculated as:(At) _ C'.10- (1 -e-iYears) 2000DACi 4.12x10-9 Ati Years YearhtThe fraction of average activity over a year to the effluent limit (EL) is calculated:(A1) _C1

• 10- (1_-e-illYears)ELi 4.12x10-9 2*YearsThe sum of the ratios of concentration to limit is 7.52x10-5 for occupational exposure, and 3.30x10-2 foreffluents. Since a exposure to a DAC for a year results in 5 rem, if the releases is completely contained inthe reactor bay and an individual works 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> in the bay then a dose of 0.4 mnrem will result. Sinceexposure to an effluent limit for a year will result in 50 mnrem exposure, an individual exposed at the exitof the reactor bay ventilation for a year following the hypothetical release will receive a dose of 1.65mrem.Table X, Summary of MHA DataFuel Eff release reactor 1 year DAC *Eff LimitIsotope A s1 DAC from bay ave Frcin rato(s)Lmt fuel Ci IICi/ml IICi/mlbr83 1342 8.02E-05 3E-05 9E-08 1.34E-1 3.26E-11 1.29E-14 9.79E-11 1.43E-07br84m 51 1.93E-03 1E-07 1E-09 5.13E-3 1.24E-12 2.05E-17 4.67E-11 2.05E-08br84 2344 3.64E-04 2E-05 8E-OS 2.34E-1 5.69E-11 4.96E-15 5.66E-11 6.20E-08br85 3373 3.98E-03 1E-07 1E-09 3.37E-1 8.19E-11 6.51E-16 1.49E-09 6.51E-07 Table X, Summary of MHA DataFulEt release reactor 1 year DAC Eft LimitIsotope Fue (sA DAC Ef from bay ave Frcin rato~Limit fuel Ci ~id/ml iidi/mlI rcin Fatoi13 1i132mi132i133i134mi134i135i136mi136kr85mkr85kr87kr88kr89kr90kr9 1xe131mxe133mxe133xe135mxe135xe137xe138xe139xel408167 9.99E-07 2E-0856 1.39E-04 4E-0612130 8.39E-05 3E-0617440 9.24E-06 1E-071157 3.12E-03 1E-0720200 2.20E-04 2E-0516420 2.93E-05 7E-073366 1.47E-02 1E-076740 8.31E-03 1E-073254 4.30E-05 2E-059 2.22E-10' 1E-046275 1.51E-04 5E-068489 6.78E-05 2E-0610820 3.67E-03 1E-0711580 2.15E-02 1E-077940 8.09E-02 1E-0780 6.77E-07 4E-04184 3.65E-06 1E-0417080 1.53E-06 1E-042224 7.55E-04 9E-06375 2.11E-05 1E-0515870 3.03E-03 1E-0716030 8.20E-04 4E-0612560 1.75E-02 1E-078948 5.10E-02 1E-072E-103E-082E-081E-091E-096E-086E-091E-091E-091E-077E-072E-089E-091E-091E-091E-092E-066E-075E-074E-087E-081E-092E-081E-091E-098.17E-15.57E-31.211.741.16E-12.021.643.37 E-16.74E-13.25E-18.60E-46.28E-18.49E-11.081.167.94E-18.01E-31.84E-21.712.22E-13.75E-21.591.601.268.9SE-i1.98E-101.35E-122.94E-104.23E-102.81E-114.90E-103.99E-108.17E-111.64E-107.90E-112.09E-131.52E-102.06E-102.63E-102.81E-101.93E-101.94E-124.48E-124.15E-105.40E-119.09E-123.85E-103.89E-103.05E-102.17E-106.28E-123.09E-161. 11E-131.45E-122.85E-167.06E-144.32E-131.76E-166.24E-165.82E-142.08E-133.19FE-149.63E-142.27E-154.14E-167.55E-179.09E-143.89E-148.59E-122.26E-151.37E-144.03E-151.50E-145.53E-161.35E-167.17E-05 3.14E-021.76E-11 1.03E-088.46E-09 5.56E-063.31E-06 1.45E-036.50E-10 2.85E-078.06E-10 1.18E-061.41E-07 7.19E-054.01E-10 1.76E-071.42E-09 6.24E-076.64E-10 5.82E-074.74E-10 2.97E-071.45E-09 1.59E-061.10E-08 1.07E-055.18E-09 2.27E-069.45E-10 4.14E-071.72E-10 7.55E-085.19E-11 4.55F-088.87E-11 6.48E-081.96E-08 1.72E-055.74E-11 5.66E-083.12E-10 1.95E-079.21E-09 4.03E-068.57E-10 7.51E-071.26E-09 5.53E-073.08E-10 1.35E-07 RAI 27.527.5 For the offsite public dose calculations, in the UT SAR it does not appear consistent with thepotential for ground release of the reactor bay air content, similar to that evaluated in the 1991 SAR(Assumption f on page 11-28 of the 1991 SAR).RESPONSEThere are substantial differences between the current methodology and that used in the 1991 UT SAR,including:(1) The 1991 UT SAR assumes continuous operation at 1.5 MW for 4-years, the current analysisassumes operation until the fuel is depleted to 50%.(2) The 1992 UT SAR in 11.3.2 assumes a 100% release fraction from a TRIGA fuel element for noblegases and halogens, the current analysis assumes a conservative 1X10-4 release fraction basedon NUREG/CR-2387 (PNL-4028).(3) The 1991 UT SAR calculates off-site doses based on atmospheric diffusion models; the currentanalysis calculates worker and off-site doses based on 10CFR20.

RAI 27.627.6 SAR Appendix 13.1, SCALE 6.1 input file, cites an input value 1.6 for the weight fraction of theZrH1.6U fuel. Is this input value for the weight fraction of hydrogen in the fuel? Please confirm andrevise accordingly.RESPONSESCALE input values (mass fractions) are calculated based on assay values. Weight fractions have beenrecalculated in updated analysis.

RAI 28.1it appears that the UT SAR does not provide sufficient information on the peaking factors and otherassumptions used to estimate the maximum fuel temperature rise as listed in UT SAR Tables 13.20 and13.21. Please provide sufficient additional information to allow confirmatory analysis.RESPONSENew analysis was submitted for thermal hydraulic and neutronic analysis, but this was not previouslyidentified as a response to RAI 28.

RAI 32.332. The "Interim Staff Guidance for the Streamlined Research Reactor License Renewal Process," (ISG)identifies ANSI/ANS-15.1-2007 and the corresponding regulatory positions in NUREG-1537, Appendix 14.1are the guidance documents for the review of technical specifications. The guidance in ANSl/ANS-15.1-2007 Section 1.3, "Definitions," recommends definitions commonly used in Research and Test Reactor TS.The TS definitions noted below were either missing, were not consistent with guidance, or were lackingrecommended details. (Note: capitalization for this sequence of RAIs follows the style of the proposed UTTRIGA TS.)32.3 The TS defines the term "immediate" as, "Without delay and not exceeding one hour" andincludes an attached note which states "IMMEDIATE permits activities to restore requiredconditions for up to one hour; this does not permit or imply either deferring or postponing theaction." Please revise to the following: when IMMEDIATELY is used as a COMPLETION TIME, TheREQUIRED ACTION should bepursued without delay and in a controlled manner.RESPONSEThe definition will be changed to:IMMEDIATE Without delay, and not exceeding one hour.NOTE:When IMMEDIATE is used as COMPLETION TIME, the REQURIEDACTION should be pursued without delay and in a controlledmanner RAI 32.4The proposed UT TRIGA TS definition of REACTOR SHUTDOWN only requires the reactor to be subcriticalby $0.29. Please explain the discrepancy in using the value of an abnormal condition (shutdown margin)for a normal condition, i.e., the definition of Reactor Shutdown.RESPONSEIOCFR50 -- (2) Limiting conditions for operation. (i) Limiting conditions for operation are the lowestfunctional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.The definition of reactor shutdown uses a minimum reactivity which is the acceptable minimum allowedsubcritical condition.

RAI 32.532. The "Interim Staff Guidance for the Streamlined Research Reactor License Renewal Process,"(ISG) identifies ANSI/ANS-15.1-2007 and the corresponding regulatory positions in NUREG-1537,Appendix 14.1 are the guidance documents for the review of technical specifications. Theguidance in ANSI/ANS-15.1-2007 Section 1.3, "Definitions," recommends definitions commonlyused in Research and Test Reactor TS. The TS definitions noted below were either missing, werenot consistent with guidance, or were lacking recommended details. (Note: capitalization forthis sequence of RAIs follows the style of the proposed UT TRIGA TS.)32.5 The regulatory guidance of NUREG-1537 Appendix 14.1 states that all controlrods mustbe inserted to achieve REACTOR SECURED MODE. The proposed UT TRIGA TS definitionof REACTOR SECURED MODE requires that 3 of the 4 control rods be fully inserted.Please either provide analYSiS demonstrating the acceptability of the insertion of 3 outof 4 rods or revise the definition to require insertion of all 4 control rods in order tosatisfy the requirements of this mode.RESPONSEANSI/AN5-15.1-2007 defines:reactor secured: A reactor is secured when(1) Either there is insufficient moderator available in the reactor to attain criticality or there is insufficientfissile material present in the reactor to attain criticality under optimum available conditions ofmoderation and reflection:(2) Or the following conditions exist:(a) The minimum number of neutron absorbing control devices is fully inserted or other safetydevices are in shutdown position, as required by Technical Specifications(b) The console key is in the off position and the key is removed from the lock;(c) No work is in progress involving core fuel, core structure, installed control rods, or control roddrives unless they are physically decouple d from the control rods(d) No experiments are being moved or serviced that have, on movement, a reactivity worthexceeding the maximum value allowed for a single experiment, or one dollar, whichever issmaller' The proposed definition as submitted is:REACTOR SECURED MODEThe reactor is secured when the conditions of either item (1) or item (2) are satisfied:

(1) There is insufficient moderator or insufficient fissile material in the reactor to attain criticalityunder optimum available conditions of moderation and reflection(2) All of the following:a. At least three control rods are fully insertedb. The console key is it the OFF position and the key is removed from the lockc. No work is in progress involving core fuel, core structure, installed control rods, orcontrol rod drives (unless the drive is physically decoupled from the control rod)The limiting shutdown margin is designed to "provide confidence that the reactor can be madesubcritical by means of control and safety systems starting from any permissible operating condition andwith the most reactive rod in the most reactive position..." Since the UT reactor has 4 control rods, theshutdown margin provides confidence that the reactor can be made subcritical with three control rods.Therefore, the phrase "The minimum number of neutron absorbing control devices is fully inserted orother safety devices are in shutdown position, as required by Technical Specifications" for the UT TRIGAreactor is explicitly three control rods.With three control rods fully inserted, there is confidence that the reactor can be maintained subcritical.

RA1 33The basis provided in support of the TS 2.1 references Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1 Z which does not exist.Please discuss this error and/or revise accordingly.RESPONSEThe information will added to 4.2.1 (3) and referenced appropriately in the basis statement.

RAI134.1The basis provided in support of the UT TRIGA TS 2.2 references Chapter 4 Section 4.6 B which does notexist. Please provide a basis for the LSSS.RESPONSENew analysis was submitted for thermal hydraulic and neutronic analysis for other RAIs, and the nexusto this RAI not previously identified.

RA1 34.3UT TRIGA TS 2.2, B.2 refers to the statement "verify the measurement value is not correct."Please describe how this is verified.RESPONSEMethods for determining that a temperature channel is not reading correctly include (but is notlimited to) comparison with other instrumentation (temperature and power), observing channeloperation for spurious or erratic operation), testing with installed function, calibration, andtrouble shooting.

RAI 35.3Section 3.1 of the guidance describes that limits be placed on the shutdown margin and states that this value"should be large enough to be readily determined experimentally, for example, >0.5% Ak/k or >0.50 dollar."Please provide an analysis and evaluation that demonstrates the ability to repeatedly measure core reactivity withsufficient accuracy to justify this small value of the shutdown margin.RESPONSEReactivity changes are evaluated using a calibration of reactivity worth and position of control rods. Excessreactivity is evaluated prior to each day of reactor operation as well as following changes in experimentconfiguration. Since UT reactor operations on weekends are extremely rare, the first measurement of each week*is essentially a cold, clean critical position at the current burnup. If no experiments are installed in the core, thefirst measurement of each week reflects the reference core condition less reactivity associated with burnup sincethe last reference core condition measurement (performed concurrently with control rod reactivity worthcalibrations). Reactivity values of sequential first-of-the-week reactivity measurements should be comparable ifburnup since the previous measurement is reasonably small, and a reasonable gage of repeatability.All of the first-of-the-week reactivity measurements with the current core configuration (i.e., since installation of a3-element facility) were reviewed. Measurements of excess reactivity that did not have experiments installedwere tabulated along with core burnup (Table 1, Excess Reactivity Measurement Data, 3k(r¢): Excess, and Total, referenced to the initial reading). The number of days between each measurement and the previousmeasurement was tabulated Day's). A graph of the reactivity data (i.e., excess reactivity at first operation ofthe week, no experiments installed) shows the relationship between excess reactivity and burnup.EXCESS REACTIVITY AND BURNUP0 50 10 10 20 5 0.10NU-(MWOBasd o brnu vaue an xcs rectvty-ifeene bewensqunia. eaigswreclclt. ntauatdinTbl (ifeecebtwe ecssraciit-6k¢: 3Se., unu ve heitevl-M D:SqIneral.Th dfernc i eatiiy etee eqenil eauemnt arssal at i ls tan5.0 wtforexeton.Th ifeecs nreciit eaueensocu t nevasof3 ay n 1.93W,61dyan 413MW,74das nd1.4 8 MWad-1dy n 05 W.Lgraig soitdwt hexetin er xmiebu ecrsdontprvd a biosexlntinfr h esls Changes in sequential cold, clean excess reactivity measurements are expected to be minimal if theburnup between measurements in small, and/or if the time between the measurements is small. The 13measurements with intervals less than 35 days and the 7 measurements for which burnup in the interval is lessthan 2.12 MWD have reactivity differences less than $0.05. All of the differences greater than $0.05 occurred athigher values of burnup and long times between the measurements, although reactivity differences for theremainder of the 22 intervals regardless of time interval or burnup are all small. The agreement of the othermeasurements across a wide range of intervals and burnup values suggests that those specific measurements maybe outliers this comparison.Excess reactivity calculations are routinely conducted to assure experiment reactivity limits are met. If therod position data is captured before the delayed neutron population is stable, excess reactivity calculation leads toan overestimate of experiment reactivity worth. This overestimate is conservative, although the measurement isless precise. A likely explanation for the anomalous (difference in) reactivity values is that excess reactivity worthin these operations, although conservative and acceptable, was not determined with precision comparable to theother efforts.Table 1, Excess Reactivity Measurement DataAMWD AT 6k(¢)Sneq.a Days Excess A(Seq.)06/29/10 0.00 0.00 na 0.0009/27/10 2.22 2.12 90 -2.61 -2.6111/03/10 3.71 1.59 37 -4.86 -2.2601/07/11 5.26 1.54 65 -4.06 0.8001/10/11 5.26 0.00 3 -4.55 -0.4902/21/11 6.54 1.28 42 -7.13 -2.5803/21/11 7.56 1.02 28 -10.95 -3.8205/02/11 9.35 1.79 42 -14.56 -3.6106/29/11 9.59 0.24 Rod Cal 0.00 na08/29/11 13.72 4.13 61 -8.03 -8.0310/03/11 19.89 6.18 35 -11.69 -3.6701/12/12 30.82 10.93 101 -22.26 -10.5703/26/12 45.68 14.85 74 -30.08 -7.8304/02/12 61.37 15.70 7 -34.75 -4.6704/09/12 77.83 16.46 7 -36.68 -1.9305/14/12 97.42 19.59 35 -43.78 -7.1005/29/12 118.16 20.73 15 -44.27 -0.4906/11/12 140.06 21.90 13 -48.98 -4.7106/18/12 162.50 22.43 7 -50.54 -1.5607/09/12 186.08 23.59 21 -51.45 -0.9107/13/12 209.69 23.61 Rod Cal 0.00 na07/23/12 234.20 24.51 10 -4.26 -4.2609/10/12 263.14 28.94 49 -9.23 -4.9709/17/12 292.36 29.21 7 -11.85 -2.63 Table 1, Excess Reactivity Measurement DataAMWD AT 6k(¢)Seq. Das Ees (e.Date Total Interval Das Ees A(q.09/24/12 321.82 29.47 7 -11.59 0.2710/01/12 ....- 7 -13.93 -2.35It is clear that for small burnup intervals and short intervals between measurements, reactivity calculations forsequential measurements are well within a few cents. Reactivity measurements using calibrated control rods atthe UT TRIGA reactor are repeatable well within 5 cents.

RAI 35.4Section 3.2 of the guidance describes that a limit be established for the maximum reactivity control rodreactivity insertion rate for non-pulsed operation. The proposed UT TRIGA TS do not provide such aspecification. This rate, and the control rod scram time, are typically justified through the analysis of anuncontrolled, control rod withdrawal transient.RESPONSE~See response to RAI 11, 7/2015 RAI 36: ANSI/ANS-15.1-2007 Section 3, 'Limiting conditions for operations," requests that the licenseeprovide [COs for constraints and operational characteristics that shall be adhered to duringoperation. The ISG states that the applicable TlSs should explain why the TSs, including theirbases, are acceptable. The following deficiencies and differences are noted with the proposedUT TRIGA LCOs: Please confirm and revise accordingly, or explain why such changes are notnecessary.36.1 The list of measuring channels presented in Table 1 of proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.3"Measuring Channels," does not include the data acquisition and control (DAC) andcontrol system computer (CSC) which are listed as SCRAM channels in UT SAR Table 4.6.RESPONSE:The associated scram occurs when communications are interrupted for greater than 10 seconds as a"health" monitor, not a measuring channel. The 10 second interval is not related to safety, and could bea different interval and serve the same function. A measuring channel is the combination of sensor, line,amplifier, and output devices that are connected for the purpose of measuring the value of a parameter.Neither the data acquisition and control system nor the control system computer are measuringchannels as they do not have sensors, amplifiers, or output devices related to the scram and do notmeasure the value of a parameter. it should be noted that sections of the data acquisition and controlsystem are incorporated into many of the measuring channels enumerated, and failure ofcommunications would interrupt multiple scram channels.

RAI 36.3The basis for propose UT TRIGA TS 3.3 contains a statement "According to General Atomics,detector voltages less than 80% of required operating value do not provide reliable ..." Pleaseexplain how this statement applies to UT TRIGA and how the required conditions for safeoperation are ensured by your TS. Such information should be discussed in the SAR and thenutilized in the TS basis.RESPONSEThe statement will be revised to state that operating experience has demonstrated reliableoperation with the high voltage at least 80% of the nominal operating value.

RAI 36: The guidance in ANSI/ANS-15.1-2007 Section 3, "Limiting conditions for operations," provides guidanceand recommendations for the specifications pertaining to the limiting conditions for operation (LCO). Thisguidance is supplemented by NUREG-1537 Appendix 14.1. Some deficiencies and differences with theproposed UT TRIGA TS are described below. Please discuss these deficiencies and differences and reviseaccordingly.36.4: Proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.4 Table 2 does not provided the scram setpoints for the Reactor PowerLevel, Fuel Temperature, and Pool Water Level SAFETY SYSTEM CHANNELS.RESPONSETable 2 will be revised as:TABLE 2: REQUIRED SAFETY SYSTEM CHANNELSMinimum Function OPERATING ModeSafety System Channel Number Setpoint/Applicabilityor Interlock Operable STEADY STATE PULSEMODE MODEReactor power level 2 Scram 1.1 MW NAManual scram bar 1 Scram YES YESFuel Temperature 1 Scram 550°C 550°CPool water level 1 Scram YES YESCONTROL ROD Prevent withdrawal of(STANDARD) position 1 standard rods in the NA YESinterlock PULSE MODEPrevent inadvertentPulse rod interlock[1] 1 pulsing while in YES NA_________________________STEADY STATE MODE ____________

RAI 36.5/6Proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.5 "Gaseous Effluent Control," Specification A does not establish the conditions thatdetermine HVAC OPERABILITY (e.g., conditions or positions for the fans/louvers/doors); a basis statement is notprovided for the stated value of 10,000 cpm; such information should be discussed in the SAR and then utilized inthe TS basis. Also, there are more COMPLETION TIMEs for Specification A than there are REQUIRED ACTIONs.Please. explain or revise.RESPONS(1) The basis statement in the currently approved Technical Specifications will replicated in the SAR andreferenced in the Technical Specifications.(2) The design section on confinement indicates criteria for the HVAC system. The HVAC control system at UTis a single switch, with no options for configuring fans, dampers or louvers. The purge system is a switchfor the system with capabilities only for securing flow to the pool ventilation, beam ports, or experimentsand a damper for dilution flow, configured based on operational needs. There are no specific criteria fordampers, louvers, or doors to be configured in a specific position.(3) Completion times and labeling of the required actions will be corrected.

RAI 36.7Proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.5, "Gaseous Effiuent Control," Specification D does not provide a basis statement for thestated limit of 100 Ci/yr; such information should be discussed in the SAR and then utilized in the TS basis.RESPONSEThe basis statement is "Analysis shows 100 Ci per year results in a maximum dose to individuals in the effluentplume of 0.142 mrem in a year, well within the 10CFR20 limit of 10 mrem/year for stack effleunts."This will be revised to indicate annual limit of 100 torero.

RAI 36.8The basis for the proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.7 "Fuel Integrity," does not provide an appropriate basis statement tosupport the limits in Specification C. Specification B is missing the word "not" in the REQUIRED ACTION. Thesecond occurrence of CONDITION B should be CONDITION C.RESPONSEAlthough the consequences of the maximum hypothetical accident do not exceed limits, routine operations withfuel that leaks fission products without limits is not considered acceptable by UT.Step labeling will be corrected.

RAI 37.1Proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.2 "Pulsed Mode Operation," the COMPLETION TIME listed for the REQUIRED ACTION is"immediate." Please consider the COMPLETION TIME to be "prior to commencement of pulsing operation."RESPONSEThe request will be incorporated.

RAI 37.2.1CONDITION A.2 the lumping together of COMPLETION TIME(S) under A.2 is confusing as to which REQUIREDACTION must be completed first.RESPONSEThe mode cannot be entered prior to establishing the condition, therefore in practice there is no confusion.

RAI 37.2.2The REQUIRED ACTION(S) A.1.1 and A.1.2 are, "Restore channel to operation OR ENSURE the reactor isSHUTDOWN." The COMPLETION TIME is stated as Immediate for both REQUIRED ACTION(S). Please consider asequence of events (e.g., either restore the channel to operation within an acceptable COMPLETION TIME, ORshutdown).RAI 37.2.3The COMPLETION TIME(S) for the REQUIRED ACTION(S) A.3.1 through A.3.3 are confusing in that no action isidentified to take precedence over another, potentially leaving the operator to make their own assumptions as tothe priority of events within one hour of any specified CONDITION.RESPONSEREQUIRED ACTIONS A.1.1, A.1.2, A.3.1, and A.3.3 as stated do not exist. However, this and other RAIs indicate afundamental error in the intent and method of some action statements in the proposed Technical Specifications.In general, the intent of the specification is for the operator to make choice, shutdown or attempt to restore thechannel. If the channel cannot be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the intent is to require the operator to shut down.For example, should the particulate CAM initiate confinement ventilation and the operator notes that the unitappears to be without power then the operator is required to either shutdown the reactor or restore the channel.If (1)the operator determines the appropriate path is to restore the channel and (2) if adequate technical supportis available, the operator may direct channel restoration. If support personnel discover a blown fuse, then thechannel may be restored without delay if a replacement is in stock. If personnel are unable to identify animmediately available supply, the reactor is required to be shutdown to meet the requirements of TechnicalSpecifications within the same time constraint (without delay and not to exceed 1hour).Therefore, the structure allows the operator to decide the appropriate solution and ensures that if the selectedsolution path cannot be completed then the alternate path is completed within the same time frame.

RAI 37.3Proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.4 "Safety Channel and Control Rod Operability," Specification B has no associatedREQUIRED ACTION(S) or COMPLETION TIME(S).RESPONSEA statement that the reactor will not be used for normal operations until the criteria is met will be developed.

RAI 37.4Proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.5 "Gaseous Effluent Control," logical "AND/OR" connectors are missing betweenREQUIRED ACTION(S) C.2.a-C.2.b and C.2.b-C.2.c. COMPLETION TIME(S) are all listed as IMMEDIATE which iscontradictory. Please revise providing a clear sequence of the expected steps.RESPONSELabeling will be corrected. However, the intent is as written with all actions to be taken without delay, not toexceed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

RAI 37.5Proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.7 "Fuel Integrity," the COMPLETION TIME listed for all REQUIRED ACTION(S) isIMMEDIATE. Please consider revising the REQUIRED ACTION(S) for Specification A and B to state, "Discharge fuelelements prior to reactor operation."RESPONSE'The intent is as written with all actions to be taken without delay, not to exceed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Fuel element elongationand bend is tested out of the core, and "discharge fuel elements" is not apllicable.

RAI 37.6.1REQUIRED ACTION(S) A.1.1 through A.1.3 are in reverse order. The COMPLETION TIME(S) are all IMMEDIATE whichis contradictory.RAI 37.6.2REQUIRED ACTION(S) B.1 and B.2 are in reverse order.RAI 37.6.3REQUIRED ACTION(S) C.1 and C.2 are in reverse order. The COMPLETION TIME(S) are all IMMEDIATE which iscontradictory. Also, and the CONDITION seems to be improperly stated.RAI 37.6.4REQUIRED ACTION(S) D.2 and D.3 are in reverse order. The COMPLETION TIME(S) are all IMMEDIATE which iscontradictory. A basis to support the established limits in Specification D is not provided. Such information shouldbe discussed in the SAR and then utilized in the TS basis.RESPONSE(1) The orders are intentional.(2) All actions are required to be completed without delay, not to exceed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.This and other RAIs indicate a fundamental error in the intent and method of some action statements in theproposed Technical Specifications. In general, the intent of the specification is for the operator to make choice,shutdown or attempt to restore the channel. If the channel cannot be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the intent is torequire the operator to shut down.Actions authorized under a specific path/statement are considered by definition not considered a delay, andcorrective actions not successful in attempting restoration are not considered a delay in completing a reactorshutdown. Given the confusion in review, this will be incorporated in the Action guidance in Definitions.For example, should the particulate CAM initiate confinement ventilation and the operator notes that the unitappears to be without power then the operator is required to either shutdown the reactor or restore the channel.If (1) the operator determines the appropriate path is to restore the channel and (2) if adequate technical supportis available, the operator may direct channel restoration. If support personnel discover a blown fuse, then thechannel may be restored without delay if a replacement is in stock. If personnel are unable to identify animmediately available supply, the reactor is required to be shutdown to meet the requirements of TechnicalSpecifications within the same time constraint (without delay and not to exceed 1hour).Therefore, the structure allows the operator to decide the appropriate solution and ensures that if the selectedsolution path cannot be completed then the alternate path is completed within the same time frame, withoutdelay and not to exceed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.(3) CONDITION C will be ressated as less than 6.5 meters above the bottom of the pool(4) The basis for Specification D is stated.

RAI 38.1There are no SRs for the D)AC or CSC that are listed as SCRAM channels in UT SAR Table 4.6.RESPONSEAn annual functional test for the DAC and CSC watchdog scram will be added as a surveillance requirement.

RAI 38.2There are no SRs for the reactor bay differential pressure for CONDITION A.3 in proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.3"Measuring Channels."RESPONSEAn annual calibration of the reactor bay differential pressure sensor will be added.

RAI138.3Proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.3 "Measuring Channels," contains Surveillance Requirements for the Fuel TemperatureChannel and the Upper Level Radiation Monitor but there are no associated LCO specificationsRESPONSEThe "Upper Level Radiation Monitor" surveillance requirements will be changed to "Pool Area Radiation Monitor."The fuel temperature measuring channel LCO is Specification 3.3.3 A, with Condition, Required Action, andCompletion Time in 3.3.4 B RAI 38.4There are no SRs for the Reactor Power Level scram, the Manual scram, or Fuel Temperature scram to supportproposed UT TRIGA TS 3.4 "Safety Channel and Control Rod Operability."RESPONSEThe power level scram is tested by 4.3.2 channel test. A channel test or channel check will be added for themanual scram and fuel temperature scram.

RAI 38.5There are no SRs to suppor-t proposed UT TRIGA TS 3.7 "Fuel Integrity," CONDITION C.RESPONSEFission product release will be detected by radiation monitoring systems. The particulate CAM and the argon camare specified for operation. The Emergency Plan addresses detection of fuel element failure. The basis for 3.7/4.7will be revised to credit detection systems that are continuous monitors.

RA[ 39.1Proposed UT TRIGA TS 5.1.3(1) allows fuel having a stoichiometry of 1.55 to 1.80 in hydrogen to be used in UTTRIGA.RESPONSEThe stoichiometry reflects data from phase diagram; and is approved for other TRIGA reactors.

RAI 39.21) core parameters; 2) conditions for operation of the reactor with damaged or leaking fuel elements; 3)parameters such as maximum core loading, thermal characteristics, physics parameters, etc; and 4) fuel burn-uplimits. These design features are not stated in the proposed UT TRIGA TS.RESPONSEA section will be added to Design Features,Reactor CoreApplicability:This specification applies to reactor core configurationsObjectiveThe objective is to ensure that reactor core configurations are bounded by the safety analysis.Specification1. The limiting core configuration will be a minimum of 90 (standard and instrumented) fuel elements withthree Fuel Element Follower Control Rods (FFCR) and 1 Transient (control) Rod (TR)2. Control rods will bea. Adequate to maintain reactivity controlsb. Installed in locations designated by design (i.e., full penetrations in the lower grid plateaccommodating fuel follower control rod movement)c. Limited in travel by a safety plate below the grid plate3. Positions with full penetrations in the lower grid plate may contain fuel by installing adapters that supportthe fuel element4. The 120 Core positions may be occupied bya. Standard TRIGA Fuel Elements (SFE)b. Instrumented Fuel Elements (IFE)c. Fuel Element Follower Control Rods (FFCR)d. A central thimble in positon A-ie. A neutron sourcef. Sample transfer systemsg. Three element irradiation facilities

h. Seven element irradiation facilitiesi. Approved experimentsj. Water voidsBasesThermal hydraulic analysis demonstrates the critical heat flux ratio remains greater than 2.0 and the maximum fuelelement temperature remains below the maximum permitted for TRIGA fuel with 90 fuel elements during steadystate operations.Neutronic analysis and operating experienc:e demonstrates that reactivity limits can be met with the currentcomplement of control elements installed.The safety plate installed below the core grid plate prevents control elements from falling below positions wherethey contribute to shutdown reactivity.Full penetrations in the lower gird plate do not support fuel elements in the core, and a physical support isrequired to hold the fuel element in position.The UT TRIGA core was designed to accommodate the equipment as identified.

RAI 39.3Please provide a basis for meeting UT TRIGA TS 5.2 "Reactor Fuel and Fueled Devises in Storage," inrecommended by ANS Standard 15.1, Section 5.4.RESPONSEA statement to the effect that fuel storage will be accomplished by mechanical devices such as racks orstands that hold fuel in position will be made in the Bases section.

RAI 39.4Proposed UT TRIGA TS 5.4 incorporates considerations for experiments into the design features section.These considerations do not meet the regulations of the definition for design features from 10 CFR50.36.RESPONSEFrom 10CFR50.36:(4) Design features. Design features to be included are those features of the facility such as materials ofconstruction and geometric arrangements, which, if altered or modified, would have a significant effecton safety and are not covered in categories described in paragraphs (c) (1), (2), and (3) of this section.(c) Technical specifications will include items in the following categories:(1) Safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings. (i)(A) Safety limits fornuclear reactors are limits upon important process variables that are found to be necessary toreasonably protect the integrity of certain of the physical barriers that guard against the uncontrolledrelease of radioactivity.(ii)(A) Limiting safety system settings for nuclear reactors are settings for automatic protective devicesrelated to those variables having significant safety functions.(2) Limiting conditions for operation. (i) Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functionalcapability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.(ii) A technical specification limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor must be established foreach item meeting one or more of the following criteria:(A) Criterion 1. Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, asignificant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.(B) Criterion 2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of adesign basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge tothe integrity of a fission product barrier.(C) Criterion 3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and whichfunctions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure ofor presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.(D) Criterion 4. A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic riskassessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

(3) Surveillance requirements. Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration,or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facilityoperation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.Specification 5.3.4 identifies design criteria for experiments such as materials of construction andgeometric arrangements, which, if altered or modified, would have a significant effect on safety. Thecriteria are not safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting control settings. The criteria arenot experiment functional capabilities or performance criteria that meet the criterion for a limitingcondition for operation, i.e., not installed instrumentation for the reactor coolant pressure boundary,not an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient that assumes a failure of or challenges theintegrity of a fission product barrier, does not mitigate a design basis accident, and is not a structuresystem or component show to be significant risk to public health and safety. In fact, the experimentdesign criteria specifically prevent an experiment from encroaching on the criterion that would requirean [CO. Placing the criterion into the Design section and requiring experiment reviews to assure thedesign criterion preserves experiment design requirements. Finally, placing the experiment designcriteria in an LCO does not lead to a surveillance requirement except that the design criteria wereimplemented, i.e., the experiment is designed to be acceptable or. not.

RAI 4The guidance in NUREG-2537 Section 4.2.5, "Core Support Structure," requests that the licensee provide designinformation pertaining to the core support structure. UT SAR Section 4.2.5 provides some information, but doesnot address suitability for continued use. Please confirm whether there is any visual evidence of cracking,corrosion, or deformation of the core support structure, and state whether the structure is appropriate forcontinued use for the operating period being requested.RAI 5The guidance in NUREG-2537 Section 4.3, "Reactor Tank or Pool," requests that the licensee provide a descriptionof the reactor tank and associated components including how those components will perform their intendedfunctions to prevent possible leakage associated with chemical interactions, penetration, and weld failures. TheUT SAR does not provide sufficient information. Please confirm whether there is any visual evidence of cracking,corrosion, or deformation of the reactor pool liner, connected pipes or beam ports and provide a discussion ofpreventative measures employed to monitor and maintain the integrity of the connected primary coolant systemover the life of the facility.RESPONSE(1) In 2004 the reactor reflector was replaced, using support by in-pool divers with helmet mounted cameras.Although not specifically acquired to inspect the pool and reflector stand, the extensive video providesevidence that there is no detectable degradation in the reflector stand or the pool. Four snapshots taken fromthe video are provided, strictly as a sample of available graphic information.

(2) There is no current visible evidence of cracking, corrosion or deformation of the core support structure or thereactor pooi, connected pipes or beam ports.(3) Maintenance of conductivity minimizes potential corrosion (RAI 18).(4) Monitoring pool level provides a means to detect pooi and pool cooling system leakage.

RAI 40.2individual or group that shall be assigned responsibility for implementing the radiation protectionprogram using the guidelines of "Radiation Protection at Research Reactor Facilities," ANSI/ANS-15.11-1993 (R2004). This individual or group shall report to Level 1 or Level 2. The proposed UT TRIGA TScontains no such section.RESPONSEAdministrative controls -Functional Responsibility identifies a "Radiation Safety Officer" who "acts asthe delegated authority of the Radiation Safety Committee in the daily implementation of policies andpractices regarding the safe use of radioisotopes and sources of radiation." And, "The Radiation SafetyCommittee is established through the Office of the President of The University of Texas at Austin."

.4RAI 40.4ANSI/ANS-15.1-2007 Section 6.1.4 "Selection and training of personnel," recommends a section forensuring that the selection and training of UT TRIGA staff is consistent with ANSI/ANS-15.4-1988. Nosuch section is provided in the UT TRIGA TS.RESPONSESection 6.1, Organization and Responsibilities of Personnel, part c) Staffing, states "Operation of thereactor an activities associated with the reactor, control system, instrument system, radiationmonitoring system, and engineered safety system will be the function of staff personnel with theappropriate training and certification, with a footnote, "Selection and Training of Personnel for ResearchReactors," ANSI/ANS-15.4 -1970 (N380). The footnote will be changed from 1970 to 1988.