05000382/LER-2014-001, Regarding Room Cooler Breaker Inoperability Causes Past Inoperability of Containment Spray System Train
| ML14045A138 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/2014 |
| From: | Jarrell J Entergy Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| W3FI-2014-0002 LER 14-001-00 | |
| Download: ML14045A138 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3822014001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70057-3093
_I_)
21T Tel 504-739-6685 I I t:E;Iéi)\\l Fax 504-739-6698 jjarrel©entergy corn John P. Jarrell III Manager Regulatory Assurance Waterford 3 10 CFR 50.73 W3FI -2014-0002 February 14, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LER) 2014-001-00 Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)
Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38
Dear Sir or Madam:
Entergy is hereby submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) 2014-001-00 for Waterlord Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3). This report provides details associated with past inoperability of one train of the safety-related Containment Spray system.
Based on plant evaluation, it was determined that this condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
This report contains no new commitments. Please contact John P. Jarrell, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (504) 739-6685 if you have questions regarding this information.
ly,
Attachment:
Licensee Event Report 2014-001-00
W3F1-2014-0002 Page 2 cc:
Mr. Marc L. Dapas, Regional Administrator U.S. NRC, Region IV RidsRgn4MailCenter@nrc.gov U.S. NRC Project Manager for Waterford 3 Alan.Wang@nrc.gov Michael.Orenak@nrc.gov U.S. NRC Senior Resident Inspector for Waterford 3 Marlone.Davis@nrc.gov Chris.Speer@nrc.gov
Attachment to W3F1-2014-0002 Licensee Event Report 2014-001-00 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS To address the apparent cause:
The ECR that replaced the 7 amp breaker with a 15 amp breaker was installed in accordance with the work order process.
Revised drawing notes to account for motors with high full load current.
To address the contributing cause:
The work instruction template was revised to eliminate the practice of substituting factory acceptance testing for pre-installation testing.
To address the extent of condition:
Planned action to adjust the setting for the breaker of the SDC HX Room A AHU.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The calculation that evaluates the Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Rooms heat-up based on postulated LOCA concurrent with loss of offsite power heat loads and complete loss of HVAC cooling was reviewed. The calculation showed that the SDC HX room temperature rises to a maximum value of less than 130 °F in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The SDC heat exchanger room coolers are not considered in the PSA model. Therefore, the loss of room cooling to the SDC heat exchanger rooms does not impact the core damage frequency or large, early release frequency for the PSA. Additionally, inspection of the Environmental Zone Map indicates that there is no instrumentation in the SDC HX room that controls the post-accident SCD HX operation.
During the timeframe in which CS Train B was inoperable, CS Train A was operable and capable of performing the CS function with the exception of 6.65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> on May 2, 2013, and 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> on May 8, 2013. However, based on the above discussion, CS Train B could have met the CS function for a minimum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during the entirety of the period in which it was considered inoperable. Therefore, the failure of the SDC HX Room B AHU is not considered risk significant.
SIMILAR EVENTS
Corrective action program data and Licensee Event Reports for the past five years were reviewed for similar events. None were identified.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Energy industry identification system (EIIS) codes and component function identifiers are identified in the text with brackets
[ ].