Letter Sequence Request |
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CAC:MF8864, Revise Shutdown Margin Definition to Address Advanced Fuel Designs (Approved, Closed) |
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MONTHYEARML16257A4112016-07-31031 July 2016 DUKE-0B21-1104-000(NP), Safety Analysis Report for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus Project stage: Request ML16257A4102016-09-0606 September 2016 Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion Project stage: Request 05000324/LER-2016-004, Regarding Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications2016-09-0606 September 2016 Regarding Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Project stage: Request BSEP 16-0083, Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 And. 2 - Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-535, Revision O, Revise Shutdown Margin Definition to Address Advance Fuel Designs2016-11-18018 November 2016 Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 And. 2 - Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-535, Revision O, Revise Shutdown Margin Definition to Address Advance Fuel Designs Project stage: Request ML16362A0752016-12-23023 December 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Brunswick, Units 1 and 2 - Acceptance of License Amendment Request Regarding Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-535 Project stage: Acceptance Review ML17082A3042017-03-0909 March 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Brunswick Unit 1 and Unit 2 Request for Additional Information Related Containment Accident Pressure in the Mellla+ LAR (CACs MF8864 and MF8865) Project stage: RAI BSEP 17-0029, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion2017-04-0606 April 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion Project stage: Response to RAI ML17088A3962017-06-0707 June 2017 Issuance of Amendments Regarding Revisions of Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-535, Revise Shutdown Margin Definition to Address Advanced Fuel Designs Project stage: Approval ML17275A2772017-10-0202 October 2017 E-mail, Request for Additional Information Related Containment Accident Pressure in the Mellla+ LAR (CAC Nos. MF8864 and MF8865) (Non-Proprietary) Project stage: RAI BSEP 17-0093, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion2017-11-0101 November 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion Project stage: Response to RAI ML18010A0512018-01-0505 January 2018 Unit 2 - Request for Additional Information Related to the Mellla+ LAR (CACs MF8864 and MF8865) (Nonproprietary) Project stage: RAI ML18010A0502018-01-0505 January 2018 E-mail Re. Brunswick Units 1 and Unit 2 - Request for Additional Information Related to the Mellla+ LAR (CACs MF8864 and MF8865) Project stage: RAI BSEP 18-0021, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion (CAC Nos. MF8864 and MF8865). Without Proprietary Enclosure2018-02-0505 February 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion (CAC Nos. MF8864 and MF8865). Without Proprietary Enclosure Project stage: Response to RAI ML18045A8592018-02-14014 February 2018 Withdrawal of Information Relating to the Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion Project stage: Withdrawal BSEP 18-0027, ANP-3655NP, Revision 0, Brunswick Mellla+ CRDA Assessment with Draft Criteria2018-02-28028 February 2018 ANP-3655NP, Revision 0, Brunswick Mellla+ CRDA Assessment with Draft Criteria Project stage: Draft Other ML18075A3302018-03-0101 March 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information SNPB-RAI-2 Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion Project stage: Response to RAI ML18067A1032018-03-0808 March 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Brunswick Unit 1 and Unit 2 Request for Additional Information Related Human Factors in the Mellla+ LAR (CACs MF8864 and MF8865, EPID: L-2016-LLA-0009) Project stage: RAI ML18071A3732018-03-12012 March 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Correction: Brunswick Unit 1 and Unit 2 Request for Additional Information Related Human Factors in the Mellla+ LAR (CACs MF8864 and MF8865, EPID: L-2016-LLA-0009) Project stage: RAI 2017-04-06
[Table View] |
LER-2016-004, Regarding Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
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| 3242016004R00 - NRC Website |
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text
('->DUKE
~ ENERGY SEP 6 2010 Serial: BSEP 16-0071 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 Licensee Event Report 1-2016-004 William R. Gideon Vice President Brunswick Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461 o: 910.457.3698 10 CFR 50.73 In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 1 O, Part 50.73, Duke Energy Progress, Inc., submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER). This report fulfills the requirement of 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a written report within sixty (60) days of a reportable occurrence.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Lee Grzeck, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (910) 457-2487.
SWao William R. Gideon SWR/swr Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 1-2016-004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 2 cc (with enclosure):
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Ms. Catherine Haney, Regional Administrator 245 Peachtree Center Ave, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Michelle P. Catts, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Andrew Hon (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9A) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission (Electronic Copy Only) 432 S Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-4300 swatson@ncuc.net
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06*2016)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
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Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEA)
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA. Privacy and Information Collections
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~*
Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail
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.I (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. NEOB-10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this fonm means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control htto://www.nrc.oov/readino-rm/doc-collections/nureas/staff/sr1022/r3D number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) Unit 1 05000325 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LEA NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I
SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR Brunswick Unit 2 05000324 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 21 2016 2016 - 004
- - 00 09 2016 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201 (bl D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 20.2201 (d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1 l D 20.2203(a)(4)
D so.13(a)(2)(iiil D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(il D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 13.11 (a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D so.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 13.11 (a)(s)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D so.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 13.11(a)(1 l 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 13.77(a)(2)(il D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
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50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 13.77(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in
Event Description
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000-325 YEAR 2016 -
- 3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 004 REV NO.
000 On July 21, 2016, Engineering personnel determined that a conduit associated with Unit 2 NSW pump "B" was vulnerable to a tornado missile. The affected pump was declared to be inoperable. Immediate compensatory actions were implemented in order to satisfy the conditions for enforcement discretion as set forth in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002 and Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)
DSS-ISG-2016-01, Appendix A. With these actions in place, NSW pump 28 was then declared to be operable but nonconforming.
Event Causes The vulnerability of the control cables for Unit 2 NSW pump "B" to a tornado missile has existed since original plant construction.
Safety Assessment
The purpose of the NSW system is to provide cooling water for safety-related plant equipment such as the Emergency Diesel Generators [EK] and Emergency Core Cooling System pump seals and room coolers, and to-serve as the Ultimate Heat Sink for the plant. Two occasions in the past three years were identified in which a-required NSW pump w~s inoperable for greater than seven days, twelve hours. During this time, at least one NSW pump remained operable on each unit,.ensuring the safety function was met.
CSW pumps were also available and can be used to supply NSW headers on both units.
Per EGM 15-002, the NRC has analyzed risk generically for tornado-generated missiles. The analysis supports the characterization of the risk as of low significance.
Based on this analysis, this event had no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public.
Corrective Actions
In accordance with EGM 15-002 and Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2015-06, the following compensatory measures have been implemented:
- Procedures were verified to be in place that address high winds, tornadoes, and the potential loss of equipment found to be vulnerable tq a tornado missile.
J
- Procedures were verified to be in place, and training either received or planned, for responding in the event that a tornado watch or warning is issued.
- Procedures and equipment were verified to be in place supporting Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX).
- The level of awareness by shift personnel was hei~htened by referencing the 2B NSW pump in shift turnover notes and the discussion of non-conforming conditions.
More comprehensive measures will be implemented within the 60-day period specified by EGM 15-002.
These actions will be in place by September 19, 2016.
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 004 REV NO.
000 The above compensatory actions will remain in place until the tornado missile vulnerability is permanently eliminated. This will be completed within the time period specified by EGM 15-002 for plants designated as being in a region of higher tornado missile risk.
Previous Similar Events
No previous events have occurred in which a structure, system, or component has been found to be vulnerable to a tornado missile.
Commitments
This report contains no new regulatory commitments. Page _4_ of _4_
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| 05000324/LER-2016-001, Regarding Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Lnoperability | Regarding Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Lnoperability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | | 05000325/LER-2016-001, Regarding Electrical Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power | Regarding Electrical Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000325/LER-2016-002 | Emergency Diesel Generator 3 Inoperable Due to Failure to Auto-Start | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000324/LER-2016-002-01, For Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1 Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator 3 Inoperable Due to Failure to Auto-Start | For Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1 Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator 3 Inoperable Due to Failure to Auto-Start | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000325/LER-2016-003, Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3 | Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000325/LER-2016-004 | Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000324/LER-2016-004, Regarding Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | Regarding Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000325/LER-2016-005 | Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors Inoperable due to Thermally Induced Current Phenomenon | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000324/LER-2016-005, Regarding Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors Inoperable Due to Thermally Induced Current Phenomenon | Regarding Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors Inoperable Due to Thermally Induced Current Phenomenon | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000325/LER-2016-006 | Control Room Air Conditioning Units Inoperable due to Corroded Supports | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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