05000412/LER-2018-001, Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Loss of 2P 480 Volt Emergency Bus

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Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Loss of 2P 480 Volt Emergency Bus
ML18274A081
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 09/26/2018
From: Bologna R
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-18-229 LER 2018-001-00
Download: ML18274A081 (6)


LER-2018-001, Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Loss of 2P 480 Volt Emergency Bus
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
4122018001R00 - NRC Website

text

FENOC' RrstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Richard D. Bologna Site Vice President September 26, 2018 L-18-229 A TIN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 BV-2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. ~PF-73 LER 2018-001-00 10 CFR 50.73 Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 724-682-5234 Fax: 724-643-8069 Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2018-001-00, "Technical Specification Required Shutdown due to Loss of the 2P 480 Volt Emergency Bus". This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) and 10 CFR

50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B).

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. Any actions discussed in this document that represent intended or planned actions are described for the NRC's information, and are not regulatory commitments.

If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Brian D. Kremer, Manager, Regulatory Compliance, at 724-682-4284.

Sincerely, Richard D. Bologna Site Vice President Enclosure - Unit 2 LER 2018-001-00 cc:

Mr. D. C. Lew, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. J. A. Krafty, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Ms. J. Tobin, NRC Project Manager INPO Records Center (via INPO Consolidated Event System)

Mr. L. Winker (BRP/DEP)

Enclosure L-18-229 Unit 2 LER 2018-001-00 Technical Specification Required Shutdown due to Loss of 2P 480 Volt Emergency Bus

NRC l'ORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3.Page Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 05000 412 1

OF 3

4. Title Technical Specification Required Shutdown due to Loss of 2P 480 Volt Emergency Bus
5. Event Date
6. LER Number
7. Report Date
8. Other Facilities Involved Month Day Year Year I Sequential I Rev Month Day Year Facility Name Docket Number Number No.

NIA 05000 Facility Name Docket Number 8

12 2018 201.8-001.

00 N/A 05000

9. Operating Mode
11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

D 20.2201(b)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 20.2201(d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 1 D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)

D

50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. Power Level D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71(a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(5)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

~ 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73.77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

~ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(C)

D Other (Specify in Abstract below or in

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

r:::-:1 NUMBER I

~

- I 001 1-1 REV NO.

00 The plant risk associated with the BVPS Unit 2 loss of 2P 480 Volt Emergency Bus is considered to be very low. This is based on the change in core damage frequency derived using the conditional core damage probability, and the change in large early release frequency derived using conditional large early release probability for the observed condition and exposure time.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specification.

Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources-Operating, Condition D requires a shutdown to Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> if one or two batteries on one train are not restored to Operable in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

This event is also being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B), Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification. A NOED was requested and granted by the NRC on August 13, 2018 to allow Unit 2 to stay in Mode 4 an additional 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> beyond the required completion time.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1) Relay BV-50-VF211 C, series 238, was replaced with a new series 468 relay.
2) We will assess the series 238 relay Preventative Maintenance strategy and evaluate its design to mitigate failure vulnerability.
3) Operating Procedure 1/20M-48.1.I will be revised to clarify wording regarding a "Loss of Safety Function" as it applies to the operability of the Unit 2 atmospheric steam dump valves and their corresponding power supplies.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

A review of the previous three years identified no similar events have occurred. CR 2018-07138 CR 2018-07251 Page 3

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