05000458/LER-2019-001, Initiation of Standby Service Water Due to Inadequate Monitoring of System Parameters During Maintenance Activities
| ML19154A071 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 06/03/2019 |
| From: | Vercelli S Entergy Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RBG-47957 LER 2019-001-00 | |
| Download: ML19154A071 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4582019001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Entergy.
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station 5485 U.S. Highway 61 N St. Francisville, LA 70775 Tel 225-635-5000 RBG-47957 June 3, 2019 Steven P. Vercelli Site Vice President River Bend Station 10 CFR 50.73 Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 50-458 I 2019-001-00, "Initiation of Standby Service Water due to Inadequate Monitoring of System Parameters During Maintenance Activities".
River Bend Station, Unit 1 NRC Docket No. 50-458 Renewed License No. NPF-47 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report. This document contains no commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Tim Schenk at 225-381-4177.
Sincerely, SPV/twf
Enclosure:
cc:
Licensee Event Report 50-458 I 2019-001-00, "Initiation of Standby Service Water due to Inadequate Monitoring of System Parameters During Maintenance Activities".
NRC Region IV Regional Administrator, w/o Enclosure NRC Senior Resident Inspector - River Bend Station, Unit 1 Ji Young Wiley, Department of Environmental Quality, Office of Environmental Compliance, Radiological Emergency Planning and Response Section Public Utility Commission of Texas, Attn: PUC Filing Clerk NRC Project Manager
NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to
,.p'RREou, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch
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(T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail
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(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not
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3.Page River Bend Station -
Unit 1 05000 458 1
OF 3
- 4. Title Initiation of Standby Service Water due to Inadequate Monitoring of System Parameters During Maintenance Activities
- 5. Event Date
- 6. LER Number
- 7. Report Date
- 8. Other Facilities Involved I
Sequential I Rev Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year Number No.
Month Day Year NA 05000 NA Facility Name Docket Number 04 04 2019 2019 -
001 -
00 06 03 2019 NA 05000 NA
- 9. Operating Mode
- 11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 1 O CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 20.2201(d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50. 73( a)(2)(viii)(B) 5 D
D D
D 20.2203(a)( 1) 20.2203(a)(4)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. Power Level D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71(a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1) 0 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
D D Other (Specify in Abstract below or in prepare the operator for the task of NSW surge tank monitoring. Specifically, they did not properly set direction or mitigate proficiency challenges. In this case, the operator was relatively inexperienced and did not have the proficiency to understand the importance of the parameter he was controlling or how the parameter could be expected to change.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The following actions have been completed to prevent recurrence.
- - A Night Order was created that requires the Assistant Operations Manager and OSM to approve all additional monitoring to ensure supervisor engagement.
- - Operators are now required to report to the Main Control Room at the beginning of each shift to brief additional monitoring items with the Control Room Supervisor for the remainder of Refueling Outage 20.
The following actions have been assigned to prevent a recurrence of this event and are documented in the station's corrective action program.
- - Create an Additional Monitoring Log in Narrative Logs.
- - Develop a pilot process for determining the level of effort required for additional monitoring based off of system, risk, and significance.
- - Present the pilot process for additional monitoring to the fleet for potential fleet incorporation.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE EVALUATION There was one unplanned SSW initiation event at River Bend Station in the last ten years of operation and was reported as a System Actuation by Licensee Event Report 11-001-00. There is no common cause associated with the past event and the event described in this report.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The SSW system responded to a valid low pressure NSW signal as designed. At no time during this event was cooling lost to the RHR Heat Exchangers, thus shut down cooling capability was sustained. Therefore this event was of minimal significance with regard to the health and safety of the public.
(NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System component function identifier and system name of each component or system referred to in the LER are annotated as (**XX**) and [XX]. respectively.) Page 3
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