05000333/LER-1978-097-01, /01X-1 on 781215:during Instrument Surveillance Procedure F-ISP 10,the 8 Temp Switches Associated W/ Isolation of HPCI Sys Steam Line Were Set Above Tech Spec Limits.Caused by Use of Wrong Conversion Table

/01X-1 on 781215:during Instrument Surveillance Procedure F-ISP 10,the 8 Temp Switches Associated W/ Isolation of HPCI Sys Steam Line Were Set Above Tech Spec Limits.Caused by Use of Wrong Conversion Table

ML19263A858
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	12/27/1978
From:	W. Verne Childs POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19263A849	List: 05000333/LER-1978-097, Forwards LER 78-097/01X-1 05000333/LER-1978-097-01, /01X-1 on 781215:during Instrument Surveillance Procedure F-ISP 10,the 8 Temp Switches Associated W/ Isolation of HPCI Sys Steam Line Were Set Above Tech Spec Limits.Caused by Use of Wrong Conversion Table
References
LER-78-097-01X, LER-78-97-1X, NUDOCS 7901030162
Download: ML19263A858 (2)

LER-1978-097, /01X-1 on 781215:during Instrument Surveillance Procedure F-ISP 10,the 8 Temp Switches Associated W/ Isolation of HPCI Sys Steam Line Were Set Above Tech Spec Limits.Caused by Use of Wrong Conversion Table

Event date:
Report date:
3331978097R01 - NRC Website

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During normal operation, while performing Instrument Surveillance Procedure, F-ISP-10, titled HPCI/RCIC Steam Line High Temperature, the eight (8) temperature switches associated with isolation of the HPCI system steam line due to line rupture were found set at approximately 1780 This is contrary to Technical Specification Appendi:: A, Table 3.2-2 which requires the switches to be set < 40 above maximum a:Sient temperature. Maximum ambient temperature is assumed to be 100 thus the maximum allowed setting is 140.

Improper setting of the temperature switches at 178 could have prevented isolation of the HPCI Steam Line due to a large steam leak or rupture or have caused some delay in the isolation until the area temperature reached 178. Two (2) other isolation subsystems (low HPCI steam line pressure and high HPCI steam line flow) were fully operable. Since the outboard containment isolation valve for the HPCI system (23-MOV-16) is normally closed (HPCI in standby) and the line is maintained warm and pressurred by a small (one inch) bypass valve (23-MOV-60) and line around 23-50V-60, large leaks in the HPCI steam line would quickly cause isointion (close signals to the inboard, outboard and outboard bypass valves) due to low steam line pressure when the system is in the standby mode.

If the system was in operation (23-MOV-16 open) when a large leak occurred, the high steam ficw subsystem would quickly isolate the steam line.

This surveillance (F-ISP-10), which is performed monthly, utilizes a milli-volt potentiometer to check thermecouple output voltages. The test instrument OF.

During the (millivolt potentiometer) normally used is direct reading in November 1978 Surveillance a backup instrument whic!. read out in millivolts was used because the other instrument was off site for calibration. When the backup 0

instrument is used conversion tables (millivolts to F) must also be used. Through error, the wrong conversion table was used which resulted in adjustment of the eight(8) temperature switches (13-TS-102C,13-TS-102D,13-TS-107C,13-TS-107D, 23-TS-94A, 23-TS-94B, 23-TS-117a and 23-TS-117B) 38 higher than they should have been. During the December 1978 Surveillance, the direct reading instrument was used and as each of the eight (8) temperature switches was found out of specifi-cation, it was readjusted to within specification (135 ). To preclude recurrence the procedure (F-ISP-10) was revised on December 18, 1978 by adding reference to the actual millivolt reading required rather than simply the equivalent temperature.

NOTE:

Revision 1 of this LER is submitted to provide the required 14-day follow-up of a prompt reportable event and provide additional details relating to event description, probable consequences, cause description, and corrective cction.

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