05000333/LER-1980-083-01, /01X-1:on 801118,average Power Range Monitor Channel D Was Inoperable & Channels B or F Bypassed Against Tech Spec.Caused by Crosswiring Low Power Range Monitor Detectors 44-37B & 44-37C.Wiring Corrected

/01X-1:on 801118,average Power Range Monitor Channel D Was Inoperable & Channels B or F Bypassed Against Tech Spec.Caused by Crosswiring Low Power Range Monitor Detectors44-37B & 44-37C.Wiring Corrected

ML19350A733
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	03/09/1981
From:	W. Verne Childs POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19350A731	List: 05000333/LER-1980-083, Forwards LER 80-083/01X-1 05000333/LER-1980-083-01, /01X-1:on 801118,average Power Range Monitor Channel D Was Inoperable & Channels B or F Bypassed Against Tech Spec.Caused by Crosswiring Low Power Range Monitor Detectors 44-37B & 44-37C.Wiring Corrected
References
LER-80-083-01X, LER-80-83-1X, NUDOCS 8103160729
Download: ML19350A733 (4)

LER-1980-083, /01X-1:on 801118,average Power Range Monitor Channel D Was Inoperable & Channels B or F Bypassed Against Tech Spec.Caused by Crosswiring Low Power Range Monitor Detectors 44-37B & 44-37C.Wiring Corrected

Event date:
Report date:
3331980083R01 - NRC Website

text

U. S. NUCLE AR R EGULATORY COMMISSiCM I

NRC FCRM 064 W711 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT l@

aptgA$s ect NT 0A rvpt att ascuiasc iNrcavAriem

,f CONT =0t stecc: l l

I 1

I I

i 6

la l t l lN l Y I J I A lF l 1 IQ O 10 l-10 10 10 l0 I -l 01 01 0 @ L l il i l il t !@! a@

I l

7 4 e ucENsas :::

a s

a:ENsaN.vsta

s

s v:a%st :.sE.

5:.:

ccN T 11 11 18 18 10 l@l0 13 1019 18I1!@

IoI2I s5'a*] l L l@l 0 15 10 10 10 13 13 13 l@l1 i

8 61

a,gg g; %gyg g a 64 Si E.ENT O ATE 74

?s 8580RT OATE 1:

EVENT CESOAt* TION ANO 8mc5 ABLE CONSEcVENCES h lo i:1 i Durino norr.a1 coeration. APRM System was ocerated with lece than -ini-e-1 I

3! I allowed channels operable due to LPRM Svstem wi rine error.

APQM D wac i-ceerable 1 10 I A l I and APRM B or F was bvoassed when not allmed hv TM Table 1.1-1 fnr - -inAc I

f to'5!I totaline accrexi-atelv ni-e (o) hee r, nvor an

.;-he..n Ilmi aav -,,; a

--t--

i

?n st-at--

.L. toma mi-i 7

- r-Lt p.

g. g -m

. fnr asdi in-21 de+atic.

l ic is i l I

l 017 l !

I l

seI 1 S:

?

8 7 00Va.

va ;s t s't tu OAust CA.st C;;E 000E s.8 O;E

0950%ENT 00E

$43:0 E sLS : f Z@ l

@ &I l019l lt Ia l@

@ & l @ lZ ! ZI ZI ZI ZI I

l d

9 I:

si 12 i

ti is s E L E N?! A.,

000.a EN t age n?

• EVis e0 N E%ENTvtaa a gsca? %0, 00 g rv eg g g, h,'gg a ayy,d l-l 10 10 11 l I/I In 11 I id I-I Id E

7

__2i

s v

s

a a

si 00vs0%gNT sq.v,g ::ve.

va v 2:r.=Em s ?;aE E88E7 s-UT00v N A* AO-st%T

%s a c.A AC*:0 %

v su + sa A4 r.

A::ic.

0%s;A%:

ur-c0

- x=s..

saavmEO

.:= v a.s.

,O O O Y

N I

O O

I u

4 ss

.6

• i 42 42 u

.1 cAtSE :EscairricN aNo c0mmEcrivE AcTicNS h Inadvertent wiring error inside prinary containrent when replacing LPRM strings.

I g,63, j ii,,, i during 1980 refuel outage, is believed to be the cause. During next crimarv I

containment entry problem will be corrected. See attach-ent for additional j

j

,,,7 3 )

(,,3, I details.

I ii iai l iO 7

8 9 ST A s

% *0r.E m CTafas;Args s

av cis00vtav Es n p* 0 ;

NA I

IA (@lManace-ent Review I

ii te!IEl@ l1IOi0lhl a:

u as a >

i:

i:

o Q

i E I lj h,0%?!N?ljQl A0*1v?*v 0

6: car 0%Os=r. as! c ae.iast-af. ast AucuNr Os AC mtv --

l I

I' u

lt v.

6J u

45 7

g 3 ta e,

stasc w p,gxp;sgats l

Nuygga

' vet EsOenar0% A I

l li l 7 6101 c l O l@l z i@l NA 1:

4 3 11 32 i3 st.as w g, s;usits C'

Ngvgga ts:mpe:N lt 94 )lO1OIC l

NA se 3

ii Loss 07 Om :,Ava:t TO FA 2u*v v

?vst Ois:4 s? ION l1 l}l I!

l M

i:

i.m c n = c.s E c8 L <

e.w0n a

i

'sscE0 m :E10* M N U I,I I I I I I I I I I 3'160Uh]

,1. s.,.

l j 21 ? l l ?J f 44 NO f

81 3 :,0

.,,, y,,,,cs;,,,

,, c N,..

[

,,,.,,c.

.Es

.E.

s

/

, /'

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 ATTACHMENT TO LER 81- 083/0l x-1 Page 1

of 3 During normal operation, while conducting Local Power Range Monitor 8

(LPRM) response tests, it was discovered that LPRM detectors44-37B and 44-37C were cross-wired. As a result of this cross-wiring, Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Cnannel "D" was determined inoperable because I

only one "B Level" LPRM input was present which is contrary to the requirements of Technical Specifications Table 3.1-1, Note 10.

APRM "D" i

was bypassed and tagged until the instrument was made operable. This i

action was accomplished by restoring LPRM 12-37B (which had been bypassed at an earlier time) to the operating mode.

)

)

As a result of these findings and discussions in a Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting held on November 18, 1980, additional j

investigation into the event was initiated. This investigation revealed that on a number of occassions during the time period between 1058 on October 8,1980 and 0228 on October 25, 1980 the minimum requirements of Technical Specification Table 3 1-1 were not met for a total of approxi-mately nine hours. Shown below is a summary of the occassions in which APRM "B" or "F" was bypassed while APRM "D" was inoperable (but not known to the plant staff) due to an inadequate number of "B Level" inputs:

i DATE TIME REMARKS 1.

10/8/80 1058 LPRM 12-37B bypassed due to drif t.

This action made APRM "D" Inoperable because the 44-37B LPRM input was actually an input from LPRM 44-37C.

Periods of time during which the requirements of Technical Specification Table 3.1-1 were not met began at this point.

2.

10/ 8 -

Various APRM "B" or "F" was bypassed on a number of 10/13 occasions for the routine conduct of surveillance.

Each time APRM "B" or "F" was bypassed the minimum requirements of Tecnnical Specification Table 3.1-1 was not met due to the inoperable condi tion of APRM "D".

The total time of these events was approximately 127 minutes.

3 10/13/80 1321 Reactor scram due to Reactor Protection System (RPS) MG problem. No change in APRM status.

l

i POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 ATTACHMENT TO LER 81-083/OlX-1 Page 2

of 3

DATE TIME REMARKS 4.

10/13 -

Various APRM "B" or "F" bypassed on a number of occasions 10/16 totaling approximately 359 minutes while the plant was shutdown following reactor scram on October 13, 1980.

5 10/16/80 1904 Commenced plant startup.

6.

10/17 -

Various APRM "B" or "F" bypassed for a total of approximately 10/25 42 minutes for routine APRM surveillance.

7 10/25/80 0228 LPRM 44-378 and 44-37C cross-wiring problem found. APRM "D" bypassed and tagged. This action ended those periods of time when the requirements of Technical Specifications Table 3.1-1 were not met.

8.

10/25/80 1700 LPRM 12-37B was removed f rom bypass and placed in " operate" restoring APRM "D" to a fully operable conditton.

9.

11/18/80 N/A PORC reviewed the event described in item 7, above and initiated the investigation described in this LER resulting in the determination that the plant had been operating for varying periods of time between October 8,1980 and October 25, 1980 in a condition less conservative than the least conservative aspect of LCO permitted by Table 3.1-1.

The total time during which Technical Specification Table 3 1-1 limits were not met was approximately nine (9) hours or approximately 2.3% of the time.

Placing APRM "D" In bypass until it was restored to a fully operable condition by placing LPRM 12-37B in operate brought the plant in full compliance with the requirements of Technical Specification Table 3.1-1.

In addition, ~ LPRM response tests results and other data which might provide an Indication of other LPRM wiring errors has been evaluated to provide assurance that the remaining LPRM detectors are properly wired.

The cross-wiring of the detectors is believed to have occurred within primary containment when LPRM detectors were replaced during the 1980 refueling outage.

Following a plant shutdown on January 17, 1981 a primary containment entry was made and the existance of a wiring error at the connection between plant wiring and LPRM string connectors was conf i rmed.

The wiring error was corrected and a review of administrative controls associated with the installation and testing of LPRM strings was conducted. As a result of this review the following actions will be l

l taken to prevent recurrence:

t

r i

9 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK i

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 ATTACHMENT TO LER 81- 083/0lx-1 Page 3

of 3

1.

Permanent labels will be affixed to the plant wiring that connects to the LPRM string connectors. These labels will allow rapid and positive verification that each detector is connected to the proper signal cable.

2.

Procurement and installation of the labels and revision of the administrative controls associated with installation of LPRM strings is expected to be complete prior to the next LPRM replacement.

14 review of the possible effect on core performance calculations indicates that since the cross wiring was associated with a LPRM string near the core periphery (not in a high power region) other higher power fuel bundles were at all times more limiting with respect to Minimum Critical Power Ratio, Limiting Heat Generation Rate and Maximum Fraction of Limiting Power Density parameters. As a result, the FitzPatrick plant does not consider a significant hazard to have existed.

NOTE:

Vertical lines in right-hand margin indicate those portions of the attachment changed by Revision 1.

e 4