05000362/LER-1983-005-01, Observed Loose Snubbers & Hangers Associated W/Two Sampling Valves (3HV508 & 3HV517) of Rcs.Caused by Removal for Maint Performed on Associated Components.Snubbers Reconnected

Observed Loose Snubbers & Hangers Associated W/Two Sampling Valves (3HV508 & 3HV517) of Rcs.Caused by Removal for Maint Performed on Associated Components.Snubbers Reconnected

ML20023B852
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	03/31/1983
From:	Ray H SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20023B850	List:
References
LER-83-005-01X, LER-83-5-1X, NUDOCS 8305060450
Download: ML20023B852 (3)

LER-1983-005, Observed Loose Snubbers & Hangers Associated W/Two Sampling Valves (3HV508 & 3HV517) of Rcs.Caused by Removal for Maint Performed on Associated Components.Snubbers Reconnected

Event date:
Report date:
3621983005R01 - NRC Website

text

U. S NUCLE AR REGULATOR Y COMMISSION N GC FORM 366 T. m LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l l

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h I o 121 10n February 22, 1983 while Unit 3 was in Mode 5, loose snubbers and hangers associated l lwith two sampling valves (3HV508 and 3HV517) of RCS were observed.

Since the componentp [o 13; 1o 141 Imay have been loosened after the last surveillance performed in October 1982, prior to l l o i si lentry into Mode 4 on January 5,1983 and since LC0 3.7.6 " Snubbers" is applicable in -

g l o !s j l Modes 1 through 4, this event was promptly reported on February 25, 1983.

Public healtp lo l 7 ) land safety were not affected as a result of this event.

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i g o, l The inoperability of these snubbers was a result of, removal for maintenance performed l

,,;ij i on associated components. The snubbers were connected and declared operable.

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Extensive investigation and plant inspection have led to the conclusion that this was gn isolated occurrence.

See attachment for additional information.

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-005, Rev. 1 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3 DOCKET NO 50-362 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR EVENT DESCRIPTION The specific valves involved were hot leg sample line containment isolation valves 3HV508 and 3HV517.

Corrective maintenance had been performed on the valve operators which necessitated removal of interferences such as supports and snubbers.

The Work Orders for removal and restoration of these interferences were not properly processed or tracked.

As a result, the supports and snubbers were not restored / reassembled before plant Mode changes and also no Mode restraint documentation to prevent Mode changes was in effect.

Someuof the work on these valves had been commenced before turnover of the RCS sampling system from Project to Station jurisdiction as part of the Startup Program.

The disassembled supports and snubbers were noted as exceptions in the turnover documentation at the time of turnover, but this information was not provided to Equipment Control.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY TAKEN Upon discovery of these unassembled supports and snubbers, immediate steps were taken to correct this condition and assure all other supports and snubbers were properly assembled and installed except where properly documented.

a)

The supports and snubbers were reassembled, adjusted and inspected on Valves 3HV508 and 3HV517.

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b)

A walk-through of Unit 3 was conducted by Maintenance on February 25, 1983 to examine snubbers which'were visually accessible.

This walk-through included the observation of over 700 snubbers.

In addition, i

Technical Specification surveillance of Unit ~2 snubbers was in progress.

Over 500 snubbers had been verified through this Unit 2 Surveillance which was 60% complete at that time.

No Technical Specifications required snubbers were found removed or disassembled on Unit 2 or Unit 3.

One non-safety related snubber was found to be disassembled.

This was corrected.

c)

Quality Assurance conducted a detailed examination of over 100 turnover packages and verified that all exceptions listed therin were being properly tracked.

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• Attachment LER 83-005 Page of 2 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE To' assure that the Operations Equipment Control organization is fully apprised of all work affecting equipment status and that resulting Mode change restraints required by Technical Specifications are properly communicated to the Control' Room operators, the following actions are being taken:

a)

The Work Order process has been revised.

When a Work Order is written and the work' planned by the Maintenance planners, interferences such as snubbers that need to be removed are identified,.

Following this planning activity, the Work Orders are returned to Operations Equipment Control and with this additional information Equipment Control determines interference removal effects on plant system operability.

b)

" Structure Equipment and System Turnover" acceptance procedure SO123-V-4.15 has been modified to provide for exceptions.to be properly identified and the information transmitted to Operations Equipment Control N

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