05000334/LER-2020-001, Intake Structure Interconnecting Flood Door Found Open Resulting in a Loss of Train Separation for the Reactor Plant River Water System

Intake Structure Interconnecting Flood Door Found Open Resulting in a Loss of Train Separation for the Reactor Plant River Water System

ML20325A147
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	11/13/2020
From:	Penfield R Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-20-296 LER 2020-001-00
Download: ML20325A147 (7)

LER-2020-001, Intake Structure Interconnecting Flood Door Found Open Resulting in a Loss of Train Separation for the Reactor Plant River Water System

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)
3342020001R00 - NRC Website

text

• 111'&1 en~rgy

~

harbor Ro<t* L Penfield

• Site V',ce President November 13, 2020 L-20-296 ATTN: -ocliment Control Desk

• U.S. Nuc!ear Regulatory Cornmission

• Washingtc;m, pc 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Beaver Vall~y Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DP.R.:.66 LER 2020-001-00 10 CFR 50.73 Beaver Valley Power station

. P.O. Box4

• Shlpplf1f!POrl, PA 1 son 724-682-5234 Fax*,724-643-8069 Enclosed. is* Licensee Event Report (LER) 2020-001-00, ulntake Structure Interconnecting Flood-Door Found Open Resulting in a LoS:S*of Train S~paration for the River Water Systemu. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(~)(8), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), and

10. CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viQ parts (A) and (8).

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. Any _actions

• described in this document represent intenc;led or planneq actions and are described for information only.

Jf there are.any questions or if additional information ls required, ple.ase contact.

Mr. Steve Sawtschenko, Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Emergency Response, at 724:682-4284. * * *

• od L Penfield M,..-c:~ ~

... ~R ~ ~~~

Site Vice President

.eoe...-~~~ ~

• M~A'."-d.,.7-

~ncl~sure: B~ver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 LER 2020-001-00

• Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 L-20-296 Page*2.

cc:

Mr. D. C. L~w, NRC Regio_n I Adminis~tor NRC Senior Resident lnspectqr Ms. J. Tobin, NRC Project Manager

- *1NPO Records Center (via INPO Industry Reporting.and Information System)

Mr:* L. Wink~r (BRP/DEP)

Enclosure L-20-296 1?eaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1. LER 2020-001-00

,(

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3160-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2023 (08-2020)

Esbmaled ln.rden par response to ~

lfth 8-.s maidakxy colJoc)loo l'8qlJ8St 80 houri Reported

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_ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 1etsoos 1eamao are llC(JJ)OOlled m the IIC8llSITO process 51d fad ba::I: kl ndustry. Send COI0018f1l8 regar~ burden ec1Jmat8 kl hi FOIA, Ltirny, and lnlormmn ~Brench (T-6 A10M), US

{ ¥}

(Sae Page 3 for required ~umber of dlglta/charactera for each block)

Nudear - Regulat!xy Corrrn,smn, Waaiw'gk)n, DC 20555-00)1, or by

&-maJI kl

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_ - (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for lnslructJon and guidance for completlng tills fom, lnbcoll9ctl Resource@nrc gov, and 1111 0MB -

at 0MB Office rl lnlormalloo 111d Regulat!xy http Ltwww oce,gov/read1ng-rm/doc-conections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/@ -

Alla!!, (3150-0104). Attn Desi: 1U QK8 !ilfllOIIUIOOQo pop goy The NRC mllf not cordlcl or sponsor, 111d a pariOO Ill not reqtnd kl respood kl, a colectllll of rtormatm u-nie docuT]enl

- req~ or~ the coladJor1 dl8pbP/s a currant,, valid OL!ll corool 11Umber

3. Page Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 06000 00334 1 OF 4

4. Title Intake Structure Interconnecting flood Door Foun*d Open Resulting in a Loss of Trairi Separation for the Reactor Plant Rwer

• Water System

5. Event Date 6.- I.ER Number 7.. Report Date

• e. Other FacDltlea Involved I

Month Day Year Year

~

Revision Uonth Day Year Facl!ly Name Dockat Number Nunber No.

05000 09 16 2020 2020. -* - 001 -

00 11*

13 2020 Facllty Na,:ne Docket Number 06000

9. Operating Mode 110. P~Level 1

100 1 ~. This* Report Is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all th'!i apply) -

~U1l~~ij-j -

20.2203(a)(2Xvl) _

• ~.36(~)(2) 60.7~a)(2){IvXA) 50,:?'3(a)(2)(x) 20.2201{b) 20.2203(a)(3XI) 60.46(a)(3)(11)

[Z] _

60. 73(a)(2~{v)(A)

- 1[01:EiRlB~U:J 20.2201(d}

20.2203(a)(3){11) 50.69(g) 0 so. 73(a)(2)(vXB)

73. 71 (a)(4) 20.2203{8)(1) 20.2203(e)(4)

50. 73(a)(,2)(l)(A)

50. 73(a)(2)(vXC)

73. 71 (a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(I) 11~.,~..

m l:ZJ. 50.~3(a)(2)(1)(B)

60. 73(a)(2)(vXD)

73. 77(a)(1 )(I) 20.2203(a)(2XII) 21.2(c)

50. 73(a)(2)(1}{C)

[Z] 50. 73(a)(2)(vlij.

73. 77(a){2)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(111) ~**~~~rJJ

60. 73(a)(2){I1}(A)

50. 73(a)(2)(vlll)(A)

73. 77(a)(2)(11)..

20.2203(a)(2)(Jv)

~0.36(c)(1)(1}(A)

50. 73(al(2)(1l)(B)

50. 73(a)(2)(vlll)(B) 20.2203{a)(2Xv) 60.36{c)(1 )(ll}(A)

• 50.73(a){2)(llij 50.73(a)(2)(1x)(A)

OTHER (Specify here, in abstract, or NRC 366A)

12. Licensee Contact for this LER l.Jcen oe Contact Phone Number (Include area code)

Steve Sawtschenko, Manager, Regulatory Col'!lpliance and Emergency Response 724-682-4284 Cause Systam

'Compooent

. Manufacturer Reportable to IRIS

~

Cauae System Component Manufacturer Reportable to IRIS

_ 14. SupJ>!emental Report Expected Month Day Year ll]* No ID. Yes (If yes."C?mplete 15. Expected Subrrnsslon Date)

16. Expected Submlsalon Date

16. ~batract (Lmrt lo 1580 spaces, 1 e, approxunately 15 smgle-spaced !Y~ Imes)

On September 16, 2020, with the Bea~er Valley P~er Station operating at 100% power, the interconnecting flood door separating_the two redunaant trains of River Water was_foundto be open.-The control room was notified and the interconnecting flood doqr was closed. A past operability review detennined that wrth this door. open, both trains of River Water were inoperable 9ue to a loss of train separation fyom a postulated internal flood in-one of the cubicles. The amount of time that the interconnecting flood doqr was left open prior to discovery could not be detel')11ined but was bounded to 218 days.

The apparent cause 1s an organizational latent acceptance of weak configuration controls applied to a risk significant flooding boundary door. A contributing cause was limrted sensitivity to the ~bnonna_l _condrt1on of this door. Corrective Actions include installing a locking mechanism on ~e interconnecting flood doors and updating procedures and placards to clarify the importance of the position (?f th~ interconnecting flood doors This is being reported under 10 CFR 5O.7~(a)(2)(i}(B); 10 CFR 5O.73(a}(2)(v)(A} and 10 CFR 5O.73(c;i)(2)(v)(B}, and _

10 CFR 5O.73(a)(2)(v1i) parts (A) and (8).

I I.

I*

I I

I 1-l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED.BY*OMB: NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 08/31/2023 1

. ~¥\\' L_ICEN~EE' ~YENT RE~ORT (LER)

~ /

CONTINUATION-SHEET 1

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for in~ctlon and guidance for completing ttus fomi bttp*ftwww.nrc.s1ov/readlng-rm/doc-<x>UectJorisliluregs1stafflsr10221f3l) fstmaEd. burdeii per re!p0fl88 lo coll)l)ly With itus mandal9fY collecoon request 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reponed lessons iea'oed n 1nco~ llio the )censilg procesa 81"f:I fa? back lo Industry Send comments regining tx.deo 8i!iriate il the FOtA, l..rllra,>, im lnfomlallon Collecfloos Branch (T-6A10M), U.S.

Nuclear Reg~ Commlsalon, Walh1ngbl, DC

• 20555-0001, or by. e-mail to lrfOC0!1ects.Reso\\J'ceOii"c.gov, lnl the 0MB raviewer at 0MB Ofl'al of lnfonns!lon ~

Regulatoly Affrus, (3150-0104), Attn. Desk Offl::er for the Nuclear Reg wloly Commlswn, 7'lfJ 171h Slreet NW, Waslwlgton,. DC 20503; &-matl.. iura.sulr]}ISS!OO@omb.ooo goy,. The NRC may not cooouct or S!)OlllOf, and a*person IS rd r8<1J11'Eld ti;> mspc;,r,d lo, a colecoon of ITTfooi)atbn unless 1he document I

recpJeSmg or ~wnng ~

CXJ!lectioo displays a currenttywid OMB_ control oo~

1.- FACll:ITY NAME

- - 2.-DOCKET NUMBER a..LER NUMRO:I>

.ieaver Valley f'ower Station_,_ Unit 1

....._OSOOO-* I* -~ :-.

00~34 _.

NARRATIVE

Energy Industry lgentification System (EIIS) cod~ are.identified in the text *as [XX].

BAGKGROUND Beaver.Valley Unit 1 has a safety-related Reactor Plant River Water (RPRW).system [Bl] consisting of two-redun~ant

- trains* arid three pumps availabfe to sup.ply. the* two trains. Nonnally, the A pump supplies the A train, the B pump *s*upplies the B frain,.and the C pump is a spare-not nonnally.allgned to either train. One train Is in service while the other fs:aligned in standby:.The pumps are located at the Intake.Structure [MK] within separate pump *cubicles. Th*e Intake Structure has.

four pump cubicles,.A,*B;.c;. and D: The three RPRW pumps ar-e located eacii.in tt,eir respectiv.e cubicles (A pump in the A cubicle, B pump.in ftte B. cubicle, *and C pump in the C cubicle).. The A and B cubicles (as well as the C.and D cubicles) are *intE)rconnected with a.sliding flood door and_a fire door which are both*nonnally closed.

Maintaining-the inte~~~nnecb~g flood doors.closed was implemented follow'ing completion of_a-1998 10 CFR 50.59

.evaluation that identified an unreviewed safety question (USQ)*related to a previously uripostulated Beaver Valley Unit 1

• River.W.ater line rubber expansion jo,nt (REJ) rupture in 1;1n intake* structure cubicle. A License Amendment R~quest (LAR) was submitted to.the Nuclear-Regulatory Commission (NRC) to revise the Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR) to maintain the interconn"¢cting flood doo~ normal_ly closed. A_ Saf~ty Evaluation (License Amendment Nos. 218 for Unit 1 and 96 for Unit 2) dated December 16; 1998, was issued and the*licensihg basis was revised to maintain the fnterconnectif)g flood doors.b~tween the_c!Jbicles *containing redundant RPRW/Service \\ivater.pum*ps m the closed position to protect the interconnecting cubicles from the consequen"ces of a major pipe REJ failure.

~

The applicable Technibt.specif1cation (TS) is "3.7.8 ServiCs) Water System (SWS). LCO 3.7.8 Two SWS.trains shall be OP.ERABl_E in.MODES 1-4. SWS is commpnly referred to as the Reactor: Plant River Water System for'Unit 1. SWS Is the*

fennil'!ology used for* l.Jnit 2.

DESCRIPTION*OF EVENT I

The Unit was in Mode l1 at 100% power. No-equipment was lnoperab.le which contributed to this event. The A tram of.

RPRW was in service with the A RPRW pump._running,.B train was in standby.

I

.On September 16, 2020 *durihg *a Design Bases Assurance Inspection (DBAl)'walkdown *of the B cubicle for an unrelated component, the NRC inspector questioned why. ttie interconnecting flood door was open.At.1129 the.Centrol.Rooni was notified-that the interconnecting.flood door was open. The door was closed approximately 18 minutes after the control*

roo*m-was notified:ln ~eeping with procedural guidance, ohe tra\\n (Train 8) of RPRVVwas declared inoperable. Train A.

was* considered operable and *therefore it was detenniried that a* loss of safety fiindiori did not exist A past operability review was *requested:

While review1ng for paFi opeJ"l\\lbility, it was detennmed-that a loss of safety function existed with the interconnecting flood door operi and no compensatory measures in place:. This evaluation* was finaHied*.ori October 21, 2020.. This is the.

discovery date for the loss "of s~ety function..

• _The _amount of_tmie that.tbe*.mterconnecting flood-door. was Jeft open p(iodo discovery 9ould not be detemii119d..The flood..

door seals. were last tested on February 11,'2020. Upcin test completior:i the door was*verified a*nd documented to b~

closed. It is* unknowr:i when after this test that the interconnecting flood door was r:eopeneo. As such, *both train~ are conside~ to have b~n Inoperable for 218 days.

• CAUSE OF EVENT

.f l

The apparent cause is; an organizational latent acceptanGe of weak configuration y0ntrols applied to a risk significant*

flooding boundary door: Thefconaitioh report i_liyest1gation identified inadequat_e controls including phy~ical, administrative, and knowledge type controls.,.

Additionally, *a*coi,tributing cause was the 'B' intake ~ay cubicle P.hysical layout limited personnel sensrtivrty to the abnomial condition* of the Interconnecting Flood Door. Limited sensitivity was compoun*ded by inconsistent knowledge of dopr function and required pos~ion, infrequent interaction with interconnecting flood doors, and related operator round re_adi~gs not highligtiting.door importance..

The *available procedural _gu1danc.e for opening the interconnecting flood doors does not discuss the loss of safety function

-~hat would occur dunng the P.Ostulat~d REJ rupture when the int~rconnecting flood door is open, which contributed to th~

delayed 1dentificatiori 6~ the loss of safety function.

A_NAL YSIS OF. EVENT 1

This everit r.esulted in ~perat1on prohibit~ by TS, rep_ortable und-e~ 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)-(B). Additionally, this was a-lo~

- of safety-function, reportable under 1 O' CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A) and 10 CFR.50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), due to both trains of RPRW being inoperable: Fma'lly;due.to the postulated REJ'.failure requiring the mt~rconnecting flqod door to be closed for_train separation, this event resulteid _in _common cause *inoperability of both independent trains, reportable under jQ_CFR.50.7~(a)(2)(vil) parts (A) and (B).

As. the discovery of the. loss 9f :safety function occurred dunng the* past operability r:eview; the condition that could have prevented the.fulfillment of. the. safety function had *already been cotrected. Tlierefor:e; an event notrfJGSt1on _per

.10 CFR 50:72(~)(3)(v)~was notrequked:.. --*

1 Considenng tJ,e initiating ~vent frequencies.of all internal flooding scenario~_defmed.for the affected pump cubi(?I~ A an*d B', both those include<( in the firial PRA models arid those which quantitatively.screened out, *and using the bound mg -

• conditional Core Damage Probab1lrty (CCDP). for*sir'nuJtaueously failing all cre.dited equipment tn both pump cubicles, the'

• _

risk of having interconrrecting flood door BV-1SI05-1.1 [A TO B'INTAKE CUBICLE CROSS-TIE FLOOD DOOR]'open _

beginning 9n February 11, 2020 and ehcting* on September 16, 2020 for a bounding time.period of 218 days Is determined -.

to be ~f very low safety significance for both B\\fPS-1 and BVPS-2.

NRC FqRM 366A (l)B-2020)° -

of 4

j 1-.

~.

NRC FORM.386A

, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AP_PROVEP BY 0MB: *NO. 3160-0104 E}(P_l~S_:.08/31(2023

.. * (~) _

- _ - _ -. -r * :

_.. -Estimated_ Mle!1 ~ ~

to ~

WIil this mandato!y co!actoo mqueat 80 ~

- Reporled

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~-

le880ns le!rned a-e ll1COIJ)OOied ln(o ffle JK:enslng process aoo fed bacU:i Jrxutry. Sand commenlB I

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,*. {W\\_. l~C-EtJ~E~_ EVE~T_ RE~ORT"(LER)... ~ =*c:~~ [J=~ =-~ ~A~~-! -

~/.. *..9QNTINUATl9N SH_El;T - _..

• WocoUacts,Resoosce@rrc.gov, and the ow __ at Ol,!B O!fke ot1mo~n and Reg\\llaklly *

• 1

• A/faJra, (31S0:0104), Attrr Desk Oflcer br the Nuclear Begulato!y Comm ISStOO, 725. 1711 street NW, (Se:e NURE0.:1022, R.3.fci rnstructi~ and_guldance 'for.completing this for;m Washingt)n, ~: 20503, ~- ou:a S1JbmllllOD@om!l,1:3,QOY The NRC may net ~uct or :

http* /lwww.nr:c.:gov/read(ng-rmldcic-cottectkms/m,:egsistafflsr1022/r3l)..

-$pOOSOr, mid a person-ls not regcted kl f8$llOod to, a eoliecoon al_ lllfomiat1:m unlesl the documeot

~

or req~ the ~

t>>p!ays _a ctJITliflly ~

0MB control number *

• 1.- FACILITY NAME**

2. DOCKET NUMBER -

3_ I >-R NIIUHI-

~eaver Valley Power S~~on, Un~ 1*

1

• NARRATIVE ANP,.L YSIS OF EVl;NT (continued}. *

. {

Alth6ugli the open _intercqnne<;:t;ing flood door imp-~c;t is.to13VP.S-1; the ~ee;ts c;,n BVPS-2 were corjsid~red s_in~ the.

• svPS-2 s*pare Seryi~ Water Punip _is located jn.the B Intake Structu_re_pump cubicle. :J:he other two SWS P\\.ll_llPS are..

located iri th*e_ C p_nd_o;.cubic)es whic),,do_not interconnect to those where._the River Water. REJ break:is postulated (A ar:id..

- Bf The PRA frilpact was cons1dered in tlie PRA model as noted,. taking into aCG()unt the probability tha.tJh~ spare SWS pump ~~Id h~~e _b~? in service* ?ver-the identified period...

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

j I.,

Completed Aptions* * *:

t, The* mter?Onnaj~g fldo~(door. w.;*s*clo~ed to rts ~rrect. position* on Septen'lber-16, 2020:

. The outside. tour lqgs were revised *on Septe_mber 17, 2020.to include* readiogs to* verify the*two interconnecting flood doors are SHUT.-

T~ining analysis.fqrm~ for lni!i~ Training Courses *qn Unit 1 *RPRW and Uri1t 2 SWS were updated on Septel1)ber 17.,

2020 to include e_xplicit infor:mat1o_n reg~rdin*g the two int~~conn~ting flood doors.

~

2 T~p0rary stanchions; and signag~ were placed in front of th~ interconnecting flood do~-rs on November 6, 2020 as ~n *_

• interim measure until the_ loc!<i,ng mechanism is 117stallea.

Planned Actions:.

I.

w An i:IPPf9Priate locking-mech_anism will be designed and installed at both int~rconnecting flood* d9ors to ~ecure theril _in t_h~.

closed position.

• -~

1 l-The OpeJatio.ns proce~ures _containing guidance relating to the Intake S.truct\\Jre flood_ dobrs will be. updateg to *contain_ a

.d[scussion.ofthe impa,ct:o_fthEi1nterconn~ing*ftooct doors_beirig open when in the incorrec_t pump conf1guratjon resulting in a loss ~f safetffun~ion.

• 1 I*

. The placards on the. in_tercor:mectirig flood dQOrs will be changed. to provide ~lear guidance regardini;fth~ impact.of the.

int~rconneciing flood door on RPRW/S\\('IS syster:ns *in order to improve th_e effecliyeness* of the barrier.

PREVIOUS slMiLAR ~NTs:

Beaver Valley Licens~ Event Report.{LERY 2017-001-00, Inadequate Tornado Missile Prqtectiqn *1d~ntified Due tci Non-Conformirig ~sign Conditions;.describes_ an eyent where tWo tolT)~do *miss.ii~ ban:,e~ doors were f9u1Jd to p~ open for'an

. unspecified. perio<:l'of tjme_. The di~covery was mc;1de _during* an ev~lu~tion. of ti:,rna_qo missile vujnerabilrties_ in response to. *

- NRC Regulatory lssu8rSummary 2015-06 "To_tnado Missile.Protection~ per CR i017-01963. The appareht_ca\\_ls~ was.the importance_ of the function of to_rnadq missile barriers was not identified in plant-precesses such *th.at site personnel could i'!lplement the.reguirem~rits !or missile barrier protection...

• ~

_. Condiji9n Repqrt 2020.:.07218 4.