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{{#Wiki_filter:SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 70
9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES
9.3.1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS
9.3.1.1 Instrument Air System
9.3.1.1.1 Design Bases
The instrument air system has no safety-related function. The instrument air system is designed to provide a continuous supply of filtered, dry, and oil free air for all pneumatic instruments and controls in the plant except those described in Subsections 9.3.1.4 and 9.3.1.5.
Each compressor unit is powered from a separate electrical bus.
Codes and standards applicable to the compressed air system are listed in Table 3.2-1. The compressed air system is designed and constructed in accordance with quality group D specifications.
9.3.1.1.2 System Description
General Description
Units 1 and 2 instrument air systems are similar. The following discussion is for the Unit 1 system. The system includes two similar 100 percent capacity compressor trains consisting of an air intake filter silencer, a compressor unit, an aftercooler, a moisture separator and an air receiver. The system continues w ith three parallel dryer trains consisting of parallel prefilters (two trains have three in parallel and one has two in parallel), a dryer unit (two drying towers per unit) and two parallel afterfilters. The trains are connected by a common header that branches into the instrument air subsystems. All of the above components and a common alarm and control panel for each unit are located in the turbine building. The system is shown schematically in Dwg. M-125, Sh. 1.
The major components and the design da ta of the compressed air system are presented in Table 9.3-1.
System Operation
During normal unit operation, one of the two instrument air compressors will be selected as the lead compressor for continuous operation, automatically loaded or unloaded in r esponse to the instrument air system demand. The other instrument air compressor will serve as a standby. The standby compressor will start automatically if the lead compressor fails or if its continuous operation cannot meet the instrument air system de mand.
The service air compressors serve as backup to the instrument air compressors. There are two normally open manual valves with a pressure control valve controlling pressure between the two systems. The Unit 2 instrument air system also serves as b ackup to the entire Unit 1 system and vice versa. The interconnecting valves must be operated manually.
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The Unit 1 system supplies instrument air to common areas such as the control structure, radwaste building, service and administration building, diesel generator building, circulating water pump house, and chlorination building.
A backup to the 90 PSIG non-safety portion of the containment instrument gas system is provided by an intertie to the instrument air system via two normally closed manually operated valves. A check valve is also in the cross connecting piping to prevent contamination to the instrument air system.
9.3.1.1.3 Safety Evaluation
Most instruments required for the operation of engineered safety features are operated electrically. Instrument air operated components, which are essential for the safe shutdown of the plant, are designed to assume the safe position upon loss of air pressure. Their energy source for safety operation is not the non-safety-related instrument air. The list of such components is shown in Table 9.3-2. The operation of the containment isolation valves is described in Subsection 6.2.4. For a failure mode and effect analysis, see Table 9.3-3.
The compressed air system is switched automatically to the standby ac power supply during a loss of offsite power. Both Unit 1 and 2 compressors are tripped off the standby ac power source upon receiving a "LOCA signal" from either operating unit coincident with loss of offsite power. One or more compressors may be manually restarted 10 minutes after a LOCA/LOOP by turning HS12500C1 to Comp A(B).
9.3.1.1.4 Tests and Inspections
The compressors, aftercoolers, moisture separator, receivers, prefilters, dryer units, afterfilters, and the control panel are shop inspected and tested. Air compressors and associated components on standby are checked and operated periodically. Air filters are periodically inspected for cleanliness, and the air filters are changed out based on differential pressure and the desiccant in the dryer units is evaluated for replacement on a timed basis and through the use of data from continuous dewpoint monitoring.
The system was pre-operationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.3.1.1.5 Instrumentation Application
Instrumentation is provided for each instrument air compressor train to monitor and automatically control each compressor's operation.
Switches monitoring the following parameters alarm and trip their respective compressor: oil low pressure, oil high temperature, discharge air high temperature, cooling water high temperature, cooling water low pressure, and intercooler separator liquid high level. Instrumentation temperature is indicated locally on the compressor discharge and the moisture separator. Local instrument air pressure is indicated on the air receiver. Malfunction of the operating compressor and pressure loss in the main header will be annunciated in the control room. All of the compressor controls, including start-stop and load-unload are furnished in the local panel. Handswitches for starting or stopping the units are provided in the control room panel. The instrument air dryer trains have the following controls and instrumentation. The prefilters and afterfilters each have pressure differential indicators. Each of the A, B, C and D dryer
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towers has a pressure indicator, temperature indicator, and high and low temperature switches for heating element control and low temperature alarm. The E and F dryer towers have pressure indicators and a dedicated diagnostic system. All towers have moisture sensors to monitor dewpoint and initiate tower swaps to maintain acceptable dewpoints. All towers can be operated in a moisture sensing or time dryed mode.
9.3.1.2 Service Air System
9.3.1.2.1 Design Bases
The service air system has no safety-related functions. It is designed to provide compressed air for service air outlets located throughout the plant and as a backup system for instrument air. Service air is also used to pressurize the condensate filter vessels to facilitate the filter element backwash process. The Unit 1 service air system provides purge air to the common offgas recombiner system when in standby to dilute and move hydrogen.
Codes and standards applicable to the service air system are listed in Table 3.2-1. The compressed air system is designed and constructed in accordance with quality group D specifications.
9.3.1.2.2 System Description
9.3.1.2.2.1 General Description
The Unit 1 and Unit 2 service air systems are gene rally identical with the exception of common plant areas served. The Unit 1 service air system is described below. The Service Air system includes two identical 100 percent capacity air compressing trains, each consisting of an air intake filter/silencer, a compressor unit, an aftercooler, a moisture separator, and an air receiver. The two trains are connected in parallel by a common header that branches into the service air subsystems. The service air used for CFS filter backwash is filtered using one of two (2), 100% coalescing type air filters rated at 1200 SCFM each. These filters prevent particulate from entering the condensate system. Service air provides up to 5 scfm air flow to the common offgas recombiner system when the common recombiner is i n standby. All of the above components with their common alarm and control panels are in the turbine building. Service air provides air to the mobile radwaste processing system to support solid waste processing. This portion of the system is located in the Radwaste Building. The system is shown schematically on Dwgs. M-125, Sh. 2, M-125, Sh. 6, and M-125, Sh. 30.
The Unit 2 service air system operation is identical to those of Unit 1, with the exception of the connection to the common offgas recombiner system. The common offgas recombiner connection exists only on Unit 1 service air. The Unit 2 service air system is schematically shown on Dwg. M-2125, Sh. 16. The Unit 2 system serves as backup to the Unit 1 system and vice versa. The interconnecting valve must be operated manually. The major components of the service air system and their design data are presented in Table 9.3-4.
System Operation
During normal plant operation one of the two compressors will be selected as the lead compressor and will operate, automatically, being loaded or unloaded in response to the service
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air system pressure. The other service air compressor will serve as a standby. The standby compressor will start automatically if the lead compressor fails, or if its continuous operation cannot meet the service air system demand.
The plant service air systems also supply service air to common areas of the plant which include the diesel generator buildings, circulating water pump house and water treatment building, control structure labs, service and administration building, radwaste building and the chlorine evaporator and sulfuric acid storage building. The service air system serves as a backup to the instrument air compressors.
9.3.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation
As the service air system has no safety design basis, no safety evaluation is provided.
9.3.1.2.4 Tests and Inspections
The compressors, aftercoolers, moisture separator, receivers, and the control panels are shop inspected and tested prior to installation. Air compressors and associated components on standby are checked and operated periodically. Air filters are periodically inspected for cleanliness.
The system will be pre-operationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.3.1.2.5 Instrumentation Application
Instrumentation is provided for each service air compressor train to monitor and automatically control each compressor's operation.
Switches monitoring the following parameters alarm and trip their respective compressor: oil low pressure, oil high temperature, discharge air high temperature, cooling water high temperature, cooling water low pressure, and intercooler separator liquid high level. Local temperature indicators are provided in the compressor discharge. Local pressure indication is located on the service air receiver. Low pressure of the service air header is indicated and annunciated in the control room. All of the compressor controls, including start-stop and load-unload, are furnished in the local panel.
Hand switches for starting or stopping the units are provided in the control room panel. There is also a common trouble alarm in the control room panel.
The flow meter on the Unit 1 service air line to the common offgas recombiner is installed on a local panel.
9.3.1.3 Radwaste Building Low Pressure Air System
9.3.1.3.1 Design Bases
The radwaste building low pressure air system has no safety-related function.
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The radwaste building low pressure air system is designed to provide filtered oil free low pressure compressed air for the liquid radwaste filters and the liquid radwaste demineralizer as these processes require.
Codes and standards applicable to the low pressure air system are listed in Table 3.2-1. The low pressure air system is designed and constructed in accordance with quality group D requirements.
9.3.1.3.2 System Description
General Description
The system includes two intake filter silencers, one compressor, one aftercooler with moisture separator, and one air receiver. The system is shown schematically on Dwg. M-125, Sh. 5.
The major components and their design data are presented in Table 9.3-5.
System Operation
The system operates intermittently based on air demand from the liquid radwaste processing system equipment. The demand on the s ystem will be as follows:
a) Demineralizer - 20 min duration, periodically demand 325 scfm
Generally, not more than one of the above demands will occur at a time.
The compressor has an auto dual capacity control system. During periods when air is being used, the compressor runs and is loaded or unloaded automatically in response to the system pressure. When the demand for air ceases, the compressor stops automatically after a set time interval, restarts, and loads and unloads again if the demand resumes. The compressor can be started manually from the radwaste building control room or from the local panel mounted on the compressor skid.
The system is common to both Units 1 and 2.
There is no standby provision because of the intermittent operation of the system.
Any abnormal operating condition of the low pressure air system will be annunciated in the radwaste control room on panel OC-301.
9.3.1.3.3 Safety Evaluation
The low pressure compressed air system has no safety-related function and no safety evaluation is provided.
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9.3.1.3.4 Tests and Inspections
The compressor, aftercooler, receiver, and the control panel are shop inspected and tested prior to installation.
The system will be pre-operationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.3.1.3.5 Instrumentation Applications
Instrumentation is provided for the low pressure air compressor train to monitor and automatically control the compressor's operation.
Switches monitoring the following parameters alarm and trip the compressor: oil low pressure, oil high temperature, discharge air high temperature, cooling water high temperature, and cooling water low pressure. Local temperature indication is on the compressor discharge and the moisture separator. Local pressure indication is on the low pressure air receiver. All of the compressor controls, i.e., start-stop and load-unload, are furnished in the compressor package.
9.3.1.4 River Intake Structure Compressed Air System
9.3.1.4.1 Design Bases
The river intake structure compressed air system has no safety-related function. The river intake structure compressed air system provides a continuous supply of dry, filtered, oil free air for pneumatic instruments and controls and for limited service air use inside the river intake structure building.
Codes and standards applicable to the compressed air system are shown in Table 3.2-1. The compressed air system is designed and constructed in accordance with quality group D specifications.
9.3.1.4.2 System Description
General Description
The river intake structure compressed air system is common to both Units 1 and 2. The system includes two identical compressing units, a moisture separator, prefilters, dryers, afterfilters and a system air receiver. Each compressing unit consists of a compressor and motor mounted on an integral air receiver. The compressing units are connected in parallel by a common discharge header. Compressor discharge flow is routed through the moisture separator, prefilters, dryers and afterfilters prior to reaching a common distribution header from which the individual instrument air connections are taken and service air can be drawn for limited maintenance use. All of the above components are located in the river intake structure. The system is shown schematically on Dwg. M-125, Sh. 5.
The major components and their design data are presented in Table 9.3-6.
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System Operation
During normal plant operation, one of the compressing units will be selected as the lead unit and will operate automatically being cycled on and off in response to system pressure. The other compressing unit will serve as a standby. The compressing unit selected as the standby unit will start automatically if the lead unit fails or if its continuous operation cannot meet the air system demand.
9.3.1.4.3 Safety Evaluation
The river intake structure compressed air system has no safety function.
For plant availability purposes, there is a redundancy on the compressor train. Failure of this system will not endanger the operation of any safety-related instruments and controls.
9.3.1.4.4 Tests and Inspections
The system will be pre-operationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.3.1.4.5 Instrumentation Application
System instrumentation is provided to monitor and automatically control operation of the compressing units. Local pressure indication is provided on each compressor air receiver. The desiccant type dryer unit has temperature and pressure indicators and controls to support automatic operation of the unit when it is used.
The air header low pressure switch alarms locally and starts the standby compressor. A low-low pressure switch annunciates locally if the standby compressor cannot maintain system pressure. Any trouble alarm in the local panel is transmitted to the control room as a common alarm.
9.3.1.5 Containment Instrument Gas System
9.3.1.5.1 Design Basis
Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment instrument gas systems are generally identical. The Unit 1 system is described in this Subsection.
The containment instrument gas system is designed to provide filtered, dry, oil-free instrument gas to the pneumatic devices located inside the drywell and suppression chamber.
Portions of the containment instrument gas system are safety-related as shown in Dwgs. M-126, Sh. 1 and M-126, Sh. 2.
The safety-related portions included are containment penetrations, the emergency backup nitrogen storage system and the gas distribution piping to the six main steam relief valves that are part of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS).
The system provides instrument gas at nominal value of 150 psig (140 psig minimal) for the safety-related main steam relief valves with ADS function and at 90 psig for all other pneumatic
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devices inside the containment. The safety-related backup nitrogen storage system is maintained at 2200 psig.
The safety-related nitrogen storage system contains adequate gas in storage for long term operation of the ADS after a postulated DBA. The nitrogen bottles have a 3 day storage capacity based on the system design leakage rate. After 3 days, the storage bottles can be recharged indefinitely since the charging connections for the bottles are located in areas of the plant that are accessible under post-accident conditions. The normal supply of compressed gas is not safety-related; however, it has 100 percent redundancy on its major components. Each compressor unit is powered from a separate electrical bus.
Codes and standards applicable to the instrument gas systems are listed in Table 3.2-1. All of the instrument gas systems except the safety-related portions are designed and constructed in accordance with quality group D specifications. The instrument gas system containment penetrations are designed and constructed in accordance with quality Group B requirements. The remaining safety -related portions are designed and constructed to quality group C specifications except the storage bottles, and connection fittings. These storage bottles conform to Department of Tran sportation (DOT) Standards, Title 49, Section 178.37, Specification 3AA. The connection fittings are standard stainless steel tubing connection assemblies.
Although these bottles provide the gas supply for the safety-related function, such bottles complete with shut off valves and connection fittings are not readily available as Q listed and N stamped. However, the manufacturing and testing of these tanks conform to DOT standards, which are in excess of those required by ASME Section III, Class 3.
9.3.1.5.2 System Description
General Description
Containment instrument gas is a recycling system that, for normal operation, takes suction from the drywell atmosphere.
For normal operation the system includes one intake screen filter, one inlet moisture separator, two inlet gas filters, two full capacity gas compressors, two gas aftercoolers with moisture separators, two gas receivers, two gas dryer systems, two outlet gas filters, one pressure reducing station, one instrument gas accumulator, associated piping, valves, controls and instruments.
For emergency operation, the system includes two loops of high pressure bottled nitrogen. Each loop consists of nitrogen storage bottles, pigtails, station valves, manifold, shut off valve, two stage regulator, and other instruments and controls as shown on Dwg. M-126, Sh. 1.
The system is shown schematically on Dwgs. M-126, Sh. 1 and M-126, Sh. 2. Table 9.3-7 is a list of pneumatically operated devices in the Containment Instrument Gas System. Some of these valves are required for safe shutdown, and they assume the safe position in the event of a loss of instrument gas pressure. Some of these valves have individual safety-related accumulators with redundant normal compressed gas supply. Valves designated for ADS function have safety-related individual accumulators with redundant normal compressed gas supply and emergency backup supply.
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The major components of the instrument gas system and their design data are presented in Table 9.3-8.
System Operation
During normal unit operation, the compressor controls are designed to permit automatic start and stop operation of one or two compressors in response to system demand. One compressor normally provides the instrument gas needs. The second compressor serves as a standby for abnormal instrument gas demands.
When the normal gas pressure in the piping headers leading to the ADS function relief valves falls below 142.0 psig because of the failure of both of the compressors or because of containment isolation, the high pressure (2200 psig) nitrogen storage bottles automatically provide instrument gas at 142.5 psig to the ADS function main steam relief valves. Instrument gas pressure from the storage bottles is reduced to 142.5 psig for transmission to the ADS function relief valve accumulators.
A backup to the 90 PSIG non-safety portion of the containment instrument gas system is provided by an intertie to the instrument air system via two normally closed manually operated valves. A check valve is also in the cross connecting piping to prevent contamination to the I.A. (Instrument Air) system.
9.3.1.5.3 Safety Evaluation
Failure of the non-safety-related portions of the compressed gas system does not impair the operation of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems or the integrity of containment isolation during the accidents described in Chapter 15. For a failure mode and effect analysis, see Table 9.3-9.
Pneumatically operated devices, which are essential for the safe shutdown of the plant, are designed to opera te in the safe position upon loss of gas pressure or they are provided with individual accumulators and/or a backup source of safety -related high pressure nitrogen gas.
The compressed gas system's non -safety-related compressors are switched automatically to standby electrical power. These compressors are tripped off the standby ac power source upon receiving a LOCA signal from either operating unit coincident with loss of offsite power. The compressors may be started manually when the LOCA signal is no l onger present.
The system is housed within the reactor building. Wind and tornado protection is discussed in Section 3.3. Flood design is discussed in Section 3.4. Missile protection is discussed in Section 3.5. Protection against dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping is discussed in Section 3.6. Environmental design considerations are discussed in Section 3.11.
The compressed gas penetrations of the containment are designed, fabricated, and installed in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section III, Class 2 and Seismic Category I to prevent release of radioactive materials in the event of an accident. These penetrations will function as part of the Containment Isolation System, discussed in Subsection 6.2.4.
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Because of the provisions of redundant system components for the safety-related portions of the compressed gas system, the failure of a component or an electric power supply will not interrupt the safety-related function of the Containment Instrument Gas System.
9.3.1.5.4 Tests and Inspections
The compressors, aftercoolers, receivers, prefilters, desiccant chambers, afterfilters, and the control panel are shop inspected or tested prior to installation.
During normal plant operation, gas compressors and associated components on standby are checked and operated periodically. Gas filters are inspected for cleanliness, and the desiccant is inspected for its useful life.
The system will be pre-operationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.3.1.5.5 Instrumentation Applications
Instrumentation is provided for each compressor train to monitor and automatically control each compressor's operation.
A compressor suction line pressure switch shuts down the compressors if the suction line pressure drops, as following a containment isolation. A suction line temperature switch shuts down the compressors if high temperature gas, such as steam from a ruptured pipe inside the containment, is drawn into the suction line.
In the compressor packages, compressor lube oil pressure, gas discharge temperature, and cooling water temperatures and pressure are monitored and will alarm locally and shut down their respective compressor if abnormal conditions are measured. A control room alarm, actuated by low-low pressure, monitors the instrument gas receiver of each compressor. Pressure switches on the header start their respective compressor if the compressor is in standby mode.
A pressure transmitter on each header transmits to a pressure indicator in the main control room. Two local pressure gauges (Unit 1) and one local pressure gauge (Unit 2) indicate the pressure in the manifold of each safety-related instrument gas supply bottle header. A pressure switch on each header annunciates safety-related header low pressure in the main control room. The pressure indicators and pressure switches for each division of the nitrogen bottles are dynamically qualified for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the instrument gas header pressure boundary.
Reduced pressure instrument gas during normal system operation is provided via a pressure reducing valve. Local and control room indication of this pressure is provided, as well as local pressure indication on the instrument gas accumulator.
9.3.2 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM
The process sampling system is provided to monitor the operation of plant equipment and to provide information needed to make operational decisions.
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The process sampling system provides remote sampling facilities and the capability for sampling fluids of various process systems during normal plant power operation and shutdown conditions.
The monitoring of gaseous and liquid process streams for nuclear radiation is covered separately in Section 11.5.
The Water Chemistry Data Acquisition System is provided to collect, process, store, and analyze real time Water Chemistry Analyzer Data from the Water Chemistry Sampling Stations. The information collected is used to monitor and trend the water chemistry in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor and Turbine Water Systems. The long term analysis of this data provides for a longer plant operating life through better preventive maintenance, tighter control of water chemistry and reduced exposure of plant personnel to radiation at the Water Chemistry Sampling Stations.
9.3.2.1 Design Bases
9.3.2.1.1 Process Sampling System
The portion of the process sampling system that is connected to the reactor coolant system (Reactor Recirculation sample line) is constructed in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 1 requirements between the process pipe connection and the outboard containment isolation valve. Other sample piping, from the point where it connects to the process system and including the first and second (where installed) process shutoff (or isolation) valves will be the same classification as the system piping to which it connects. Instrument line classification downstream of the root valve will be in accordance with Figure 3.2-2 "Minimum Instrument Line Classifications."
All safety-related ASME Section III sample piping and valves are designed to Seismic Category I requirements.
Lines connected to reactor water systems are of sufficient length to permit decay of short lived nuclides so that sampling personnel will not be unnecessarily exposed to radiation. Additionally, shielding is installed at points on sampling piping to further curtail personnel exposures (as described in Chapter 12) and ensure that they be kept below the limits of 10CFR20. The process sampling system is designed to ensure that representative samples of all appropriate process fluids will be obtained.
Process sampling system piping is large enough to avoid being clogged by anticipated solids. Piping size is minimized to permit effective line purging with a minimum loss of fluid volume.
The process sampling system is designed so that the sample stations will not affect plant safety.
The process sampling system is designed to provide the capability to conduct continuous analysis as well as analysis of discrete samples (grab samples).
The process sampling system is designed to prevent hazards to operating personnel from high pressure, temperature, or radiation levels of the process fluid during all modes of operation.
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The process sampling system for each unit is designed to be functionally similar but operationally independent.
9.3.2.1.2 Water Chemistry Data Acquisition System
The following design bases are incorporated into the Water Chemistry Data Acquisition System (WCDAS):
- 1. The WCDAS is designed to provide an availability of 99% through good modular design, adequate spare parts inventory and trained maintenance personnel.
- 2. The WCDAS was designed to operate in a unattended and continuous mode 24 hours per day seven days a week in between scheduled plant outages.
9.3.2.2 System Description
9.3.2.2.1 Process Sampling System
The process sampling system is illustrated schematically by Dwgs. M-123, Sh. 1, M-123, Sh. 2, M-123, Sh. 3, M-123, Sh. 4, M-123, Sh. 5, M-123, Sh. 6, M-123, Sh. 7, M-123, Sh. 8, M-123, Sh. 9, M-123, Sh. 10, M-123, Sh. 11, M-123, Sh. 12, and M-123, Sh. 13. Locations of sample points are shown on the appropriate system piping and instrumentation diagrams for the systems to be sampled. The process sampling system consists of sampling lines, heat exchangers, sample vessels, sample sinks, and analysis equipment and instrumentation.
Sampling stations are located in the reactor, turbine, and radwaste buildings. The liquid radwaste collection sample station and the auxiliary boiler sample station are common for Units 1 and 2. The reactor and turbine building sample stations are operationally independent systems with the exception of the fuel pool filter demineralizer outlet-common sample which is located in the Unit 1 Reactor Building station.
Local grab samples rather than permanently installed sample lines to a control sampling station are provided for process points that require only periodic sampling and are located in radiologically accessible areas of the plant.
Samples of reactor feedwater, reactor recirculation water, RHR heat exchangers outlet, reactor water cleanup inlet and outlets, control rod drive water and fuel pool filter demineralizers inlet and outlet water including common fuel pool are routed to the reactor building sampling station. Samples of condensate are brought to the turbine building sample station of each unit.
The reactor and turbine building stations are equipped with automatic monitors that continuously determine the critical parameters in the samples drawn from process lines. Grab samples can also be taken periodically from each point at each station to determine chlorides and other components. Portable instruments are also used for periodic calibration of the automatic monitors.
When working with sample station grab samples, the operator is protected by a continuous air flow through the sample station hood and exhausted through the ventilation ductwork.
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Sample flow rates to the monitors can be read and adjusted with a valve to provide the following conditions:
a) Ensure turbulence in the sample line to prevent plate-out of radioactive materials
b) Minimize lag time to monitors
c) Slow the sample flow rate as required for the decay of radioactive nitrogen prior to entering the stations
d) Minimize the waste of high purity water as well as input to the radwaste system.
Representative samples are drawn from process lines by sample nozzles extending into or from the process pipe. Where practicable, a sample probe is located after a run of straight process pipe. On horizontal process pipes, the connection is made on the side rather than on the bottom of the pipe. Sample lines are as short as possible, avoiding traps and dead legs upstream of the sample stations. The connecting tubing is sized for optimal flow rates to the stations.
At each station, samples are automatically conditioned for pressure and temperature to the needs of the monitoring instruments and as required for the operators' safety. For the Turbine and Reactor Building Sample Stations a refrigeration chiller and individual shell and tube rough and trim coolers are provided to condition the samples. High temperature samples are cooled with rough coolers that are supplied by the building closed cooling water system. Critical high purity water samples are cooled to a reference temperature of 25ºC by trim coolers, that are supplied by the sample station chiller. Condensate sample waste is returned to the condenser hotwell via a vacuum drag/pump system. Failure or bypass of the vacuum drag/pump system diverts the sample wastes to the Liquid Radioactive Waste System. All other sample wastes are returned to the radwaste collection system.
Prior to taking discrete samples, the sample line is purged (to the sample sink) with the fluid to be sampled so that a representative sample may be obtained. Sampling lines used for continuous samples do not require an additional purging prior to taking a sample.
Tubing loops in the sample stations can be purged with demineralized water. The flushing water drains into the piped drain system and is routed to the radwaste processing system.
The Turbine and Reactor Buildings sample stations have sample sinks and analytical equipment. The sample station design provides for quick connect and release during sample module removal and replacement in order to minimize personnel exposure. The radioactive waste sample panel is open in the back with tubing and components visible and accessible, so that leaks are easily detected and repaired.
9.3.2.2.2 Water Chemistry Data Acquisition System
The Water Chemistry Data Acquisition System (WCDAS) consists of four Local Acquisition Modules (LAM) which collect information from Water Chemistry Sample Stations to monitor and trend the water chemistry in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor and Turbine Water Systems. The LAMs provide data to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Plant Process Computer (PPC) Systems which collect, process, analyze, store, alarm and display Water Chemistry Data.
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The LAMs are located in the reactor and turbine building areas adjacent to the sample stations and the Plant Process Computer (PPC) Servers are located in the Plant Computer Room.
The LAMS collect inputs via individual hardwired signals from analyzers located at Water Chemistry Sample Stations. Each LAM includes an operator interface workstation. A two way data link exists between the operator interface workstation in each LAM and the PPC System for transmitting Water Chemistry data to the PPC and plant data to the LAM operator interface workstation.
The PPC system receives and processes approximately 100 data points from each of the LAMS. WCDAS software running on the PPC provides scan, logic, and alarm functions and allows on-line changes to system operation through an interactive data base management system. The PPC system monitors communications between the LAMs and the PPC and sends an alarm to the Chemistry Alarm Console in the Chemistry Lab upon any failure.
The LAMs also provide a communications pathway to the Plant Process Computer S ystems for the Hydrogen Water Chemistry and Condensate Filtration System (see Subsection 10.4.7.5) digital controllers via Ethernet connections.
9.3.2.3 Safety Evaluation
9.3.2.3.1 Process Sampling System
The process sampling lines connected to the reactor coolant system (Reactor Recirculation System sample lines) are designed in accordance with seismic Category I requirements as specified in Section 3.2 through the first isolation valve outside containment. Process sample lines connected to other seismic Category I process piping are seismic Category I from the connection to the process piping through the second fail closed valve. The ductwork and hangers for the Unit 1 RBSS are Seismic Category I. The ductwork is connected directly to the non-seismic sample station. An evaluation showed that any seismic induced failures of the ductwork resulting from the response at the top of the non-seismic sample station would be restricted to the ductwork immediately above the sample station, with no impact on the safety-related functions of the Reactor Building Ventilation systems and no potential for damage to any other safety-related equipment in the area. The Unit 2 RBSS ductwork and hangers are Seismic Category I to the wall of the sample station room. Inside the wall is non-seismic installation. The wall is the transition between the seismic and non-seismic installation. The sample stations are designed non-seismic.
Sample lines that penetrate the containment are provided with isolation valves in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 55.
The sampling system is designed to limit the sample line discharge flows, under normal operation and during postulated malfunctions or failures, to preclude any fission-product release leading to exposures that exceed the site boundary limits stipulated in 10CFR20. Adequate safety features are provided to protect personnel and prevent the spread of contamination from the sampling station. The sample station is composed of closed systems; grab samples are taken under a controlled exhaust hood to preclude radiological hazard. The hood maintains a constant air velocity through the hood working face to ensure that airborne contamination does not enter the room under operating conditions. The Radwaste Building, Turbine Building and
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Reactor Building sample station hood exhaust air is routed to the associated buildings filtered exhaust system.
Instrumentation is provided to alarm on high or low air flow for the Reactor Building sample station and low air flow for the Turbine Building sample station.
The ventilation systems in the area of the Turbine and Reactor Building sample stations are balanced for a specific airflow through the sample stations. To maintain a constant airflow with varying degrees of hood sash opening, dampers have been installed in the hood ductwork. Manual pressure operated backdraft dampers are used for the Turbine Building damper and modulating electrically operated bypass dampers are used for the Reactor Building damper. The exhaust air from the two sample stations pass through particulate, charcoal and HEPA filters.
The sampling sinks are provided with demineralized water for washdown. The Reactor Building sample station enables high velocity flushing of the cup sink waste header with demineralized water. Sample line wastes are routed individually at high velocity to the drain to minimize deposition on the sample station. The sinks drain to the liquid radwaste system.
No portion of the Process Sampling System is safety-related. It does interface with safety-related systems such as Reactor Recirculation and RHR, and with ventilation ductwork in the Reactor Building. The piping, valves and ductwork that form the interface between the safety-related system and the Process Sampling System are considered part of the safety-related system.
The process sampling system is not required to function during an accident, nor is it required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
9.3.2.3.2 Water Chemistry Data Acquisition System
The Water Chemistry Data Acquisition System is a non-safety system. This system is neither required to function during an accident nor is it required to either prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
9.3.2.4 Testing and Inspection
9.3.2.4.1 Process Sampling System
The system was pre-operationally tested in accordance with approved plant procedures.
Most components are used regularly during power operation, yielding cumulative data that ensures the performance of the sampling system. Also, grab samples are used to periodically test, calibrate, and check instrument response. Plant procedures at the stations provide for:
a) Adjusting pressure, temperature, and sample flow controls
b) Calibrating the monitors
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c) Inspecting and cleaning conductivity, turbidity, dissolved oxygen, and other sensors.
The Reactor Water Clean Up Inlet pH analyzer has been removed and the pH module (including sensor element) is abandoned in place at the U1 and U2 Reactor Building Sample Stations by EC 2218250.
9.3.2.4.2 Water Chemistry Data Acquisition System
The system was pretested at the factory prior to shipment. After installation a Site Acceptance Test was performed to recheck the integrity of all the communication links. The system also has built in diagnostics to check for failure in both the communication links and the computer systems.
9.3.2.5 Instrumentation Applications
9.3.2.5.1 Process Sampling System
Local pressure, temperature, and flow indicators are used to facilitate manual operation and to verify sample conditions before process samples are drawn.
The monitors used are solid state electronic instruments of standard industrial design. Selected Turbine and Reactor Building sample station analytical variables are recorded in the main control room; and all Turbine and Reactor Building sample station analytical variables are recorded in the WCDAS and PCS.
Monitored variables have alarm trips that signal when preset limits have been exceeded. Equipment trouble alarms are transmitted to the main control room.
9.3.3 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM
The Equipment and Floor Drainage System (EFDS) is provided throughout the plant to collect liquid wastes from their points of origin and transfer them to the Liquid Waste Management System, the plant discharge water treatment facilities, or the Storm Drainage System.
9.3.3.1 Design Bases
The EFDS is capable of handling the maximum expected influent. The turbine, reactor, circulating water pump, and diesel generator A-D building influent is based upon 5 min of Fire Protection System operation. It should be noted that the worst case flood in the reactor building from a postulated pipe crack results in flooding of the reactor building sump pump in the basement of the reactor building. The evaluation takes credit for operator actions to isolate the break within 45 minutes after crack initiation. Refer to section 3.4 for additional information regarding this flood evaluation. For the drywell and radwaste building the maximum expected leakage from equipment provides the design base. The Diesel Generator 'E' Building influent is based upon 30 minutes of fire protection system operation.
The EFDS in the chlorine evaporator and sulfuric acid storage building is designed to drain rainwater from the acid unloading pad and from the open sides of the building.
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The transformer gravel pits are sized to retain the oil contained in the transformers, in addition to the water volume from 10 min. operation of the Deluge Fire Protection System. The water treatment building acid unloading pad drainage system is designed to catch all acid leakage from the delivery trucks.
To prevent back flow into the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) equipment rooms, normally closed manual valves are provided in each drain line from those rooms.
Seismic Category I level switches, which are designed per IEEE 279 and 308 standards, alarm in the control room on ESF room high water level.
The EFDS is designed and arranged so that no inadvertent introduction of radioactive or potentially radioactive fluid to the segregated Sanitary and Storm Drainage Systems will occur.
Sump and drain tank pumps are designed to discharge at a flow rate adequate to keep the sumps and drain tanks from overflowing because of the expected influents outlined above. A backup pump is provided for each sump and drain tank, except for the condenser area transfer sump and the pipe tunnel sump. Backup pumps are started if the water level rises above the first pump start level.
The drywell equipment drain tank drains by gravity. The drain tank's discharge valves automatically open when a predetermined high level in the tank is reached. The discharge valves close at a predetermined low level.
Normally closed equipment and piping drains and vents discharging occasionally into the EFDS do not control the sizing of the system.
The inlet pipes to the sumps are submerged by a minimum of 1 ft at all times to maintain a gas-tight seal except where specific analysis demonstrates that less submergence is acceptable.
Vent lines from sumps containing potentially radioactive wastes are connected to the building filtered exhaust ventilation systems. Oil interceptors with oil sumps precede the low conductivity sumps in the turbine and reactor buildings.
Drainage lines from areas that are required to maintain an air pressure differential but drain to the same header are provided with water seals. Sequenced makeup water is provided to the water seals to maintain the air pressure differential. Where they penetrate the containment, the drywell floor drain sump pump and equipment drain tank discharge lines, including the containment isolation valves, are safety-related.
9.3.3.1.1 Codes and Standards
The Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems are designed, fabricated, and installed in accordance with the requirements of the applicable codes and standards shown in Section 3.2, Table 3.2-1.
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9.3.3.2 System Description
9.3.3.2.1 General Description
The combined Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems provided for collection of various liquid wastes are shown on Dwgs. M-161, Sh. 1, M-161, Sh. 2, M-161, Sh. 3, M-160, Sh. 1, and M-160, Sh. 2. The chemical waste sump of the water treatment building is shown on Dwg. M-118, Sh. 2.
a) For potentially radioactive liquid wastes:
- 1) The Liquid Radwaste (LRW) Collection System collects potentially radioactive liquid wastes at atmospheric pressure from equipment and floor drainage of the drywells, reactor buildings, turbine building and radwaste building.
- 2) The Chemical Radwaste (CRW) Collection System collects corrosive, potentially radioactive liquid wastes at atmospheric pressure from the wash-down areas, sample stations, chemical equipment, and floor drains in the reader, control, turbine and radwaste buildings. Non-radioactive, high conductivity wastes from the auxiliary boiler blowdown lines and the turbine building closed cooling water chemical addition tanks, at atmospheric pressure, are also collected by the CRW System.
- 3) The Detergent Radwaste (DetRW) Collection System collects potentially radioactive liquid wastes at atmospheric pressure from the wash-down areas, personnel decontamination stations, and laundry facilities in the reactor buildings, control building, and radwaste building.
The drainage sources and expected inputs from areas of potential radioactivity are shown in Table 11.2-1.
b) For non-radioactive liquid wastes:
- 1) Oily Waste Drainage Systems collect liquid wastes from the non-radioactive equipment areas in which oil is expected to be present. These areas include the circulating water pumphouse, diesel generator buildings, transformer areas, lube and diesel oil storage tank areas, oil circuit breaker areas, and auxiliary buildings.
- 2) Acid Waste Drainage Systems collect liquid wastes containing non-radioactive chemicals and corrosive substances from equipment and floor drains in the chlorine evaporator and sulfuric acid storage building and the water treatment building.
- 3) Sanitary Drainage Systems collect liquid wastes from all plumbing fixtures of the plant outside the restricted access areas.
- 4) Storm Drainage Systems collect water resulting from precipitation on all building roofs and areaways, paved and unpaved surface areas outside the buildings.
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The radioactive and non-radioactive EFDS consist of collection piping, equipment drains, floor drains, vents, traps, cleanouts, collection sumps, sump pumps, tanks, oil separators, and instrumentation.
The arrangement is such that the non-radioactive drain systems serve only non-restricted areas where no radioactivity potential is present, exclusive of the water closet and urinal wastes in the access control area that are collected by the Sanitary Drainage System. The potentially radioactive wastes from personnel decontamination facilities and floor drains in the access control area are collected by the Detergent Radioactive Waste Collection System.
9.3.3.2.2 Component Description
Components of the Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems are described in the following paragraphs. Major components, such as sumps and sump pumps are shown in Table 9.3-10.
In areas of potential radioactivity, the collection system piping for liquid and detergent waste is made of carbon steel; the Chemical Radwaste Collection System piping is made of stainless steel. The horizontal drain piping is installed with a uniform slope such that the waste flow velocity is not less than 2 fps. Equipment drainage piping normally terminates not less than 3 in. above the finished floor at each location where the discharge from equipment is collected. Surface Drain Units (SDU) in the Oily Waste System are provided with backwater valves to prevent spread of potential fires.
All floor drains are installed with rims flush with the low point elevation of the finished floor, except in certain areas where extensions may be used to prevent small amounts of oil from entering the LRW system. Floor drains in areas of potential radioactivity are welded directly to the collection piping and provided with threaded T-handle plugs of the same material. The T-handle plugs are used in the floor drains for pressure testing the drainage systems.
Inlets to all drainage systems (except those in areas of potential radioactivity, and those in rainwater and clean drainage service) are provided with a vented P-trap water seal to minimize entry of vermin, foul odors, and toxic, corrosive, or inflammable vapors into the building. Vent lines to the outside atmosphere are provided downstream of the P-traps to prevent excessive backpressures that could cause blowout or siphonage of the water seal. Normally, traps are not installed on inlets in areas of potential radioactivity in order to reduce the potential for accumulation of radioactivity in the traps, and because of the difficulty of maintaining a water seal in the trap.
Cleanouts are provided (when practicable) in all collection system piping where the change of direction in horizontal runs is 90 degrees, at offsets where the aggregate change is 135 degrees or greater, and at maximum intervals of 50 ft. Cleanouts for the potentially radioactive collection systems are welded directly to the piping.
Rupture discs are installed in the Turbine Building portion of the Control Structure upper and lower cable spreading room floor drain piping systems.
Sources of the Laundry Radwaste and Chemical Radwaste Systems, which are too low in elevation to drain by gravity to the designated collection tank in the radwaste building, drain to local laundry and chemical drain tanks in the turbine building. From these drain tanks, the wastes are pumped to the main laundry and chemical waste tanks in the radwaste building.
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All sumps are recessed in concrete located at the lowest elevation of the area served. Except for the drywell sumps, pipe tunnel drain sump, turbine building condenser area and chemical sumps, which are provided with removable steel cover sections, all sumps have access manholes.
Equipment and piping drains are separated by an air gap from the drainage piping to prevent pressurization of the drainage piping.
Where necessary for contamination control, splash guards are provided over air gaps.
9.3.3.2.3 System Operation
The various wastes drain to the appropriate sumps or tanks by gravity. From these sumps or tanks, the drainage is pumped out with the exception of drywell equipment drain tank which drains by gravity. Except for the condenser area sump pump, each sump pump starts automatically when a predetermined high level in its sump is reached; the sump pump stops at a predetermined low water level. Potentially radioactive wastes are pumped to waste collection tanks in the radwaste building.
Unidentified leaks inside the drywell drain to the drywell floor drain sumps. Identified leakages drain to the drywell equipment drain tank. This tank level can be maintained for identification of leaking source.
For valves in the drywell with seal leakoffs, a seal leakoff valve is normally closed to make use of the double seals on the valves except during leakage testing of the primary seals. Leakages through the second seals, which are collected in the drywell floor drain sumps, are not identified to their source.
Floor and equipment drains from the condenser area are routed to the condenser area sump, which overflows to the turbine building central area oil separator. The overflow pipe contains an isolation valve that automatically closes when any of the following conditions occurs:
a) Activation of any of the three wet pipe sprinkler systems in the condenser area
b) High water level in the condenser area sump
c) Oil carry-over into the turbine building central area sump.
In case of condenser area fire sprinkler activation, large oil (EHC) leakage, a large circulating water piping leakage, or operations evolution (i.e. high sump water level), the condenser area transfer sump contents will be identified to determine the influent. If the water quality is acceptable for liquid radwaste, the isolation valve is manually throttled open and the water is allowed to drain normally to the central area oil separator. In the event that the water is unacceptable for liquid radwaste the condenser area transfer pump is started manually and the waste is pumped to the condensate storage tank berm area for storage. The water will then be processed by appropriate means, depending on the amount and types of contaminants.
The Oily Waste System collects liquid that enters surface drain units (SDU) located in areas with no sources of potentially radioactive wastes, and where the possibility for oil spillage exists. The oily wastes are conveyed by gravity to oil separators of either the API or baffle type.
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The oily waste in the circulating water pumphouse flows through an API type oil interceptor of 90 percent oil removal efficiency, and the effluent is pumped to a baffle type oil separator. Baffle type oil separators provide an effluent with a total oil concentration of less than 10 ppm, conforming to the requirements of Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Protection. The clarified effluent discharges to the circulating water pump house sump. Water collected in the sump is discharged to the circulating water pump suction line. Oil collected in the oil separator is periodically pumped into a portable drum for disposal.
Floor and equipment drains from diesel generator A-D bays are collected in the diesel generator A-D building sump after passing through a baffle type oil separator. The clarified effluent is pumped to the storm sewer.
Floor and equipment drains located at EL 676' and up in the diesel generator 'E' building are piped to an underground 25,000 gallon oily waste storage tank. From the tank, drainage flows by gravity to the diesel generator 'E' oil/water separator. On elevation 656'-6", drainage is routed directly to the oil/water separator. Waste water from the separator flows to the diesel generator 'E' building sump where it is then pumped to the Service and Administration Building oil/water separator for further processing. Waste oil from the separator is pumped to an underground waste oil storage tank located outside the diesel generator 'E' building.
Equipment drains from the main turbine bearings and the turbine lube oil conditioners are piped directly to the turbine building outer area oil sumps. The turbine lube oil reservoir rooms are recessed from the normal floor level in order to contain all the lube oil in case of a tank rupture. The drainage from the turbine lube oil reservoir rooms is normally conveyed through the oil interceptor to the oil sump. In the event of an oil tank rupture, the valve position may be reversed to route the oil flow directly to the oil sump.
The Acid Waste System collects liquid waste containing chemicals and corrosive substances discharged by laboratory fixtures and equipment. The Acid Waste System also collects liquid waste through floor drains, which are located in the water treatment building (circ. water pumphouse), and conveys the liquid waste directly or by means of the chemical waste sump pumps to a pair of neutralization basins. Floor drains from the acid storage and chlorine evaporator building (acid and chlorine building) containing acid contamination are collected in a sump and either transferred to a cooling tower basin or pumped to the neutralization basins.
The Sanitary Drainage System collects liquid wastes and some entrained solids discharged by all plumbing fixtures located in areas with no sources of potentially radioactive, oily, or acid wastes and conveys them to a sewage treatment facility described in Subsection 9.2.4.
The drain lines were designed to accommodate fire protection system design flow when actuated.
9.3.3.3 Safety Evaluation
With the exception of the drywell equipment drain and drywell floor drain sump discharge pipe penetrations through the primary containment and the associated isolation valves, the failure of the EFDS cannot affect plant safety. Although the reactor building FRW system is non -seismic category 1, credit is taken for floor drains in the SSES internal flood evalutions. A single failure of a floor drain due to blockage is assumed in these evaluations. Refer to section 3.4 for additional information regarding internal flood evaluations. The drywell floor drain sumps are
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designed to Seismic Category I requirements and the associated leak detection instrumentation is designed to OBE requirements. Pump operability is not required for the functioning of the differential level Drywell Floor Drain Leak Detection System.
Each of the six pump rooms (ECCS and RCIC) is provided with a separate drain line to the reactor building sump inlet header. A normally closed manual valve is provided in each drain line outside the pump room to prevent backflow. Seismic Category I level instrumentation provides for main control room alarms if the water level in the pump rooms rises above a preset value.
9.3.3.4 Tests and Inspections
All waste collection piping was hydrostatically tested prior to its embedment in concrete. Potentially radioactive drainage piping was tested to 75 psig, in accordance with ANSI B31.1.0. Non-radioactive oily, acid, sanitary, and storm drainage piping was tested to the equivalent of a 10 ft head of water for at least 15 min. The operability of Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems can be checked by normal use and through t he instrumentation provided in the sumps and the main control room.
9.3.3.5 Instrumentation Application
High and low level switches are provided in each sump. For sumps having two pumps, the level switch will actuate the second pump at a higher level. The first pump to start is alternated on each pumping cycle to equalize run times. Table 9.3-10 shows the usage factors resulting from this provision.
The drywell equipment drain tank drains by gravity. The drain tank's discharge valves automatically open when a predetermined high level in the tank is reached. The discharge valves close at a predetermined low level.
Oil sumps are equipped with level switches and high level alarms in the main control room. The Diesel Generator 'E' waste oil storage tank is equipped with level switches and will annunciate a general trouble alarm in the control room on high level.
To detect leaks, a level alarm will be provided in the main control room for each ECCS equipment room.
The drywell floor drain sump and the drywell equipment drain tank temperatures are indicated, and a high alarm is annunciated on a local panel in the reactor building of each unit.
The levels in the drywell floor drain sumps and drywell equipment drain tanks are recorded, and a high-high level alarm is annunciated in the main control room. Refer to Subsection 5.2.5 and Section 7.6 for further details of the Leak Detection System.
9.3.4 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM
Not applicable to BWR's.
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9.3.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM
9.3.5.1 Design Bases
The standby liquid control (SLC) system is sized to deliver enough enriched sodium pentaborate solution (Na2O*5B2O3) into the reactor to assure reactor shutdown. The SLC Systems additional design function is to prevent re-evolution of iodine from the suppression pool in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA -LOCA) (see (g) below).
The standby liquid control system is a special safety system and engineered safety feature system and is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I re quirements. It shall meet the following safety design bases:
(a) Backup capability for reactivity control shall be provided, independent of normal reactivity control provisions in the nuclear reactor, to be able to shut down the reactor if the normal control ever becomes inoperative.
(b) The backup system shall have the capacity for controlling the reactivity difference between the steady-state rated operating condition of the reactor with voids and the cold shutdown condition, including shutdown margin, to assure complete shutdown from the most reactive condition at any time in core life.
(c) The time required for actuation and effectiveness of the backup control shall be consistent with the nuclear reactivity rate of change predicted between rated operating and cold shutdown conditions. A fast scram of the reactor or operational control of fast reactivity transients is not specified to be accomplished by this system.
(d) Means shall be provided by which the functional performance capability of the ba ckup control system components can be verified periodically under conditions approaching actual use requirements. Demineralized water, rather than the actual neutron absorber solution, can be injected into the reactor to test the operation of all components of the redundant control system.
(e) The neutron absorber shall be dispersed within the reactor core in sufficient quantity to provide a reasonable margin for leakage or imperfect mixing.
(f) The system shall be reliable to a degree consistent with its role as a special safety system; the possibility of unintentional or accidental shutdown of the reactor by this system shall be minimized.
(g) The SLCS system fails to meet all the requirements of a safety-related system in that it is not designed for the single active component failure criteria. Therefore, a failure of a critical component would prevent the system from injecting boron to the suppression pool. Using NRC approved guidelines for the implementation of AST methodology, the SLCS single-failure criteria has been redefined to include component availability in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DAB-LOCA) to assure SLCS flow to maintain the pool pH greater than 7.0. See Section 7.4.1.2.3 for more details of this requirement.
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9.3.5.2 System Description
The standby liquid control (SLC) system (see Dwg. M-148, Sh. 1) is manually initiated through a single keylock switch in the main control room to pump a boron neutron absorber solution into the reactor if the operator determines the reactor cannot be shut down or kept shut down with the control rods. The keylocked control room switch is provided to assure positive action from the main control room should the need arise. Procedural controls are applied to the operation of the keylocked control room switch.
The boron solution tank, the test water tank, the two positive displacement pumps, the two explosive valves, the two pump suction valves, and associated local valves and controls are located in the reactor building. The liquid is piped into the reactor vessel and discharged near the bottom of the core shroud so it mixes with the cooling water rising through the core. A SLCS flow transmitter and flow meter indicate that the borated liquid is flowing.
The specified neutron absorber solution is enriched sodium pentaborate ( Na2O*5B2O3*10H2O) with a minimum enrichment of 88% B-10. Natural boron is 19.8% B-10, which is the neutron absorbing boron isotope. Solutions enriched with B-10 have a directly proportional greater neutron absorbing capacity that a natural boron solution. The solution is prepared by mixing the required quantities of enriched sodium pentaborate in demineralized water. An air sparger is provided in the tank for mixing. To prevent system plugging, the tank outlet is raised above the bottom of the tank.
The amount of enriched sodium pentaborate solution which must be stored in the system in order to assure reactor shutdown or maintain post - LOCA suppression pool pH above 7.0 depends on the concentration, and is defined by Technical Specification Figure 3.1.7-1, similar to FSAR Figure 9.3-14.
The enriched sodium pentaborate solution must be maintained above the saturation temperature in order to prevent precipitation or crystallization during storage, which could plug lines or reduce the boron available for injection into the reactor. Figure 9.3-15 is the saturation temperature curve for sodium pentaborate. The required temperature above this saturation curve is defined by a minimum temperature-concentration line on Technical Specifications Figure 3.1.7-2. The equipment containing the solution is installed in a room in which the air temperature is to be maintained within the range of 60o to 100oF. In addition, a heater system maintains the solution temperature at 65, to 75, F. High or low temperature, or high or low liquid level, causes an alarm in the control room.
The pump and system design pressure between the explosive valves and the pump discharge is 1500 psig. The two relief valves are set at approximately 1500 psig. These pressures allow SLC to perform its function in its most limiting event, ATWS/LOOP (Section 15.8.4). To prevent bypass flow from one pump in case of relief valve failure in the line from the other pump, a check valve is installed downstream of each relief valve line in the pump discharge pipe.
The two explosive-actuated injection valves provide assurance of opening when needed and ensure that boron will not leak into the reactor even when the pumps are being tested.
Each explosive valve is closed by a plug in the inlet chamber. The plug is circumscribed with a deep groove so the end will readily shear off when pushed with the valve plunger. This opens
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the inlet hole through the plug. The sheared end is pushed out of the way in the chamber; it is shaped so it will not block the ports after release.
The shearing plunger is actuated by an explosive charge with dual ignition primers inserted in the side chamber of the valve. Ignition circuit continuity is monitored by a trickle current, and an alarm occurs in the control room if either circuit opens. Indicator lights show which primary circuit opened.
The SLC system is actuated by a three-position keylocked switch on the control room console. This assures that switching from the "off" position is a deliberate act. Switching to initiate SLC system starts the selected injection pump actuates both of the explosive valves, and closes the reactor cleanup system outboard isolation valve to prevent loss or dilution of the boron.
A light in the control room indicates that power is available to the pump motor contactor and that the contactor is de-energized (pump not running). Another light indicates that the contactor is energized (pump running). There is also a SLCS flow transmitter and flow meter to indicate that the borated liquid is flowing.
Storage tank liquid level, pump discharge pressure, and loss of continuity on the explosive valves indicate that the system is functioning. The local switch will not have a "stop" position. This prevents the isolation of the pumps from the control room. Pump discharge pressure and valve status are indicated in the control room.
Equipment drains and tank overflow are not piped to the radwaste system but to separate containers (such as 55-gal. drums) that can be removed and disposed of independently to prevent any trace of boron from inadvertently reaching the reactor.
Instrumentation consisting of solution temperature indication and control, solution level, and heater system status is provided locally at the storage tank. Table 9.3-11 contains the process data for the various modes of operation of the SLC. 9.3.5.3 Safety Evaluation
The standby liquid control system is a reactivity control system and is maintained in an operable status whenever the reactor is critical or in Mode 3. An additional SLC system design function is to prevent re-evolution of iodine from the suppression pool in the event of a DBA-LOCA. Controlling suppression pool pH is achieved by using the buffering action of the boron injected to the suppression pool from the SLC system (via the reactor vessel). For this function the SLC system is required to be operable in Mode 3. The system is expected never to be needed for its reactivity control functions because of the large number of independent control rods available to shut down the reactor.
To assure the availability of the SLC system, and to facilitate maintenance and testing, two sets of the components required to actuate the system - pumps and explosive valves - are provided in parallel.
The system is designed to bring the reactor from rated power to a cold shutdown at any time in core life. The reactivity compensation provided will reduce reactor power from rated to zero level and allow cooling the nuclear system to room temperature, with the control rods remaining withdrawn in the rated power pattern. It includes the reactivity gains that result from complete decay of the rated power xenon inventory. It also includes the positive reactivity effects from
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eliminating steam voids, changing water density from hot to cold, reduced Doppler effect in uranium, reducing neutron leakage from boiling to cold, and decreasing control rod worth as the moderator cools.
The minimum average concentration of natural boron in the reactor to provide adequate shutdown margin, after operation of the SLC system, is 660 ppm natural boron. Calculation of the minimum quantity of enriched sodium pentaborate to be injected into the reactor is based on the required 660 ppm natural boron average concentration in the reactor coolant including recirculation loops, at 70oF and reactor normal water level. The result is increased by 25% to allow for imperfect mixing and leakage. Additional sodium pentaborate is provided to accommodate dilution by the RHR system in the shutdown cooling mode. This concentration will be achieved if the solution is prepared, stored, and maintained above saturation temperature as defined in Subsection 9.3.5.2, and injected into the reactor coolant system as described below.
Cooldown of the nuclear system will require a minimum of several hours to remove the thermal energy stored in the reactor, cooling water, and associated equipment. The controlled limit for the reactor vessel cooldown is 100oF per hour, and normal operating temperature is approximately 550oF. Use of the main condenser and various shutdown cooling systems requires 10 to 24 hours to lower the reactor vessel to room temperature (70oF). At some temperature during the cool down from 550F to 70F the condition of maximum reactivity will occur, however, by assuring that a minimum boron concentration equivalent to 660 ppm at 70F is maintained during the cool down operation adequate shutdown margin will be achieved.
The SLC system is required to be operable in the eve nt of a station power failure, therefore the pumps, heaters, valves, and controls are powered from or connectable to the standby a -c power supply. The pumps and valves are powered from separate buses so that a single electrical failure of either pump or explosive valve will not prevent injection of sodium pentaborate on demand.
The SLC system and pumps have sufficient pressure margin, up to the system relief valve setting of approximately 1500 psig, to assure solution injection into the reactor above the normal pressure in the bottom of the reactor. The nuclear system relief and safety valves begin to relieve pressure above approximately 1100 psig. Therefore, the SLC system positive displacement pumps cannot overpressurize the nuclear system.
One pump capable of performing its intended function independent of the second pump and capable of adding enriched sodium pentaborate solution to the reactor vessel in sufficient quantity to bring reactor power to zero, is required for system operation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62. If a component (e.g., one pump) is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to shutdown capability, and reactor operation can continue during repairs. The time during which one component upstream of the explosive valves may be out of operation should be consistent with the following: the probability of failure of both the control rod shutdown capability and the alternate component in the SLC system; and the fact that nuclear system cooldown takes several hours while liquid control solution injection takes less than one hour. Since this probability is small, considerable time is available for repairing and restoring the SLC system to an operable condition while reactor operation continues. Assurance that the system will still fulfill its function during repairs is ensured by the operable status of the remaining pump.
FSAR Rev. 70 9.3-26 SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 70
In the event of a malfunction of the thermostatically-controlled storage tank heater "A" and a drop in the room temperature to less than its specified minimum of 60oF, a temperature alarm would eventually be annunciated in the control room and would alert the operator to control storage tank temperature manually from the local panel by means of the mixing heater "B". A temperature alarm will also annunciate in the control room if there is a malfunction of the suction piping heat tracing. The alarm low setpoint is sufficiently above saturation temperature of the sodium pentaborate solution such that, even in the unlikely event that ambient te mperature is below 50F, sufficient time will be available to enable the operating personnel to take appropriate temporary measures to heat the suction piping before precipitation occurs.
The SLC system is evaluated against the applicable General Design C riteria as follows:
Criterion 2: The SLCS is located in the area outside of the primary containment (drywell) and below the refueling floor. In this location it is protected by the containment and compartment walls from external natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes and floods and internally from effects of such events and internal postulated events.
Criterion 4: The SLCS is designed for the expected environment in the reactor building and specifically for the compartment in which it is located. In this compartment, it is not subject to the more violent conditions postulated in this criterion such as missiles, whipping pipes, and discharging fluids. This system is called upon to perform a special safety function of providing backup capability for reactivity control under normal operation. A new additional safety function of the system is to prevent re-evolution of iodine from the suppression pool in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA-0LOCA) by maintaining the pool pH at greater than 7.0 through sodium pentaborate injection.
Criterion 21: Criterion 21 is applicable to protection systems only. The SLC system is a reactivity control system and should be evaluated against Criterion 29.
Criterion 26: The requirements of this criterion do not apply within the SLCS itself.
Criterion 27: This criterion applies no specific requirements onto the SLCS and, therefore, is not applicable. See the General Design Criteria Section (Section 3.1) for discussion of combined capability.
Criterion 29: The SLCS squib valves are redundant. Two pumps, and two injection valves are arranged and cross-tied such that operation of any one of each results in sodium pentaborate solution being added to the reactor vessel in sufficient quantity to bring reactor power to zero. One pump is required for system operation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62. The SLCS also has test capability. A special test tank is supplied for providing test fluid for the periodic injection test. Pumping capability may be tested at any time. A trickle current continuously monitors continuity of the firing mechanisms of the injection squib valves.
The SLC system is evaluated against the applicable regulatory guides as follows:
Regulatory Guide 1.26 Revision 2: Because the SLCS is a reactivity control system, all mechanical components required for injection are at least Quality Group B. Those portions which are part of the Reactor Cooling Pressure Boundary are Quality Group A. This is shown in Table 3.2-1.
FSAR Rev. 70 9.3-27 SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 70
Regulatory Guide 1.29 Revision 1: All GE supplied components of the SLCS which are necessary for injection of neutron absorber into the reactor are Seismic Category I. This is shown in Table 3.2-1.
The SLC system is located within a compartm ent within the reactor building, such that it is adequately protected from flooding, tornadoes, and internally and externally generated missiles. SLC system equipment is protected from pipe break by providing adequate distance between the seismic and non-seismic SLC system equipment where such protection is necessary. In addition, appropriate distance is provided between the SLC system and other piping systems. Where adequate protection cannot be assured, barriers have been considered to assure SLC system protection from pipe break (see Section 3.6).
It should be noted that the SLC system is not required to provide a safety function during any postulated pipe break events. This system is only required under an extremely low probability event when a sufficient number of control rods can not be inserted to bring the reactor to cold shutdown. Therefore, the protection provided is considered over and above that required to meet the intent of APCSB 3 -1 and MEB 3-1.
This system is used in a couple of special plant capability demonstration events cited in Appendix A of Chapter 15. Specifically Events 51 and 53 which are extremely low probability non-design basis postulated incidents. The analyses given there are to demonstrate additional plant safety consideration far beyond reasonable and conservative assumptions.
A system-level, qualitative-type failure mode and effects analysis is presented in Subsection 15A.6.6.
9.3.5.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements
Operational testing of the SLC system is performed in at least two parts to avoid inadvertently injecting boron into the reactor.
With the valves from the storage tank closed and the valves to and from the test tank opened, demineralized water in the test tank can be recirculated by locally starting either pump.
During a refueling or maintenance outage, the injection portion of the system can be functionally tested by valving the suction lines to the demineralized water supply and actuating the system from the control room. System operation is indicated in the control room.
After functional tests, the injection valve shear plugs and explosive charges must be replaced and all the valves returned to their normal positions as indicated.
After closing the SLC injection line maintenance valve, leakage through the outboard containment isolation valve can be detected by pressurizing the test volume between the maintenance valve and the outboard containment isolation valve and opening the test connection located outboard of the containment isolation valve. Position indicator lights in the control room indicate that the injection line maintenance valve is closed for testing or open and ready for operation. Leakage through the inboard containment isolation valve can be detected by pressurizing the test volume between the maintenance valve and the inboard containment isolation valve and opening the test connection located outside containment.
FSAR Rev. 70 9.3-28 SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 70
The test tank contains demineralized water for approximately 3 minutes of single pump operation. Demineralized water from the makeup system or the condensate storage system is available for refilling, flushing or testing the system.
Should the boron solution ever be injected into the reactor, either intentionally or inadvertently, then after making certain that the normal reactivity controls will keep the reactor subcritical, the boron is removed from the reactor coolant system by flushing for gross dilution and/or operating various plant systems available to condition reactor water.
The concentration of the sodium pentaborate in the solution tank is determined periodically by chemical analysis. Electrical supplies and relief valves are also subjected to periodic testing.
The SLC system is pre-operationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.3.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements
The instrumentation and control system for the SLC is designed to allow the injection of liquid poison into the reactor and the maintenance of the liquid poison solution well above the saturation temperature. A further discussion of the SLC instrumenta tion may be found in Chapter 7.
FSAR Rev. 70 9.3-29 SSES-FSAR
TABLE 9.3-1
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS (Typical for Unit 1 & 2)
Quantity (per unit) 2 Capacity. each, scfm 440 Discharge pressure, psig 100 Cooling water : flow rate. gpm 13.0 temperature in/out°F 105/125
Quantity (per unit) 2 Capacity, each, scfm 440 Operating pressure, psig 100 Cooling water : flow rate, gpm 9.5 temperature in/out°F 105/125 . ReceiverS::.
2 223 125 450
A.B,C and D E and F Quantity (per unit) 2 2 Capac ity, each. scfm 440 750 Design pressure. psig 150 150
Dryer Units
A.B,C and 0 E and F Quantity (per unit) 2 Capacity, each, scfm 440 750 Design pressure, psig 125 150 Leaving dew point, °F -40 -40
A. B.C and D E and F Quantity (per unit) 2 2 Capacity. each, scfm 440 750 Design pressure, psig 150 150 Efficiency 100% retention of particle size, 1 micron
Rev. 54, 10/99 Page 1 of 1 SSES-FSAR
**-.~
TABLE 9.3-2
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM
PNEUMATICALLY OPERA TED VALVES WHICH HAVE A SAFETY FUNCTION( 1 )
Sy'stem-and Figure **- * -..... **-~*......... **-- *--- 1 Normal 1 Fail 1 Sate~ Number Design Function Location Position Position Position Service Water Turbine building closed cooling water Heat removal from turbine building closed Closed I Closed I Closed Figure 9.2-1a and 9.2-1b heat exchanger outlets cooling water heat exchangers HV-10943A2 HV-1094382 *- -. Turbine building.dosed cooling water Heat rein.ovaffrom turbine building closed Closed Close*d-.. Closed
----+-::T=-u-rb..,....,...in_e_bullding heat exchanger outlets cooling closed cooling water Heat removal from water heat exchangers turbine b-u-;;il-:d-;-in_g_c...,.lo_s_e_d-:-t-~O:o-p-e-n--t~---:::0:-p-e_n __.-'..
~V: 1 d943A3 oJ)en _____,_heat ~x;~an9er outlets __.coo_li~g water heat exchangers ____ --*. HV10943B3 Turbine building closed cooling water Heat removal from turbine building closed I Open Open I Open heat exchanger outlets cooling water heat exchangers Emergency Service Water Turbine building dosed cooling water-- Heatremoval from turbine building closed... Closed cf6sedl closed Figures 9.2-Sa and 9.2-5b heat exchanger inlet cooling water heat exchangers HV-11143A HV-111438 -*... Turbine b'uilding closed cooling water Heat removal from turbine building closed Closed Closed--*
- Closecr-heat exchanger inlet cooling water heat exchangers Reactor Core 1 solation Steam -supply *-.. -Bypass r- -Ciosed c1cised Closed Cooling Figure 9.2-6 HV-1F088 -
HV-1 F025 -Stea*m drain line Isolation Open* I Closed Closed Hv:fF02.6 Steam drain line** *---*-* Isolation... *-***~~-.*-~~.--~I. *- c~~:;d*--+~.~:~::_~_ *---*-ciosed LV-1F054.... *-- --
- Steam drain line... _ ** **-Bypass Closed....
RCIC Turbine-Pump*- drain line on the RCIC vacuum tank--**.. Draln-:-is-o-:-la-:t-=-io-n-----------+-_....,_~.=------=--- Llosed I Closed Closed Figure 9.2-6 condensate pump HV-1F004 HV-1F005......... _ Drain lin-e on the RCIC vacuum tan*k.- Drain isolation Open cioseCI Closed... condensate pump HPCI Turbine Pump.... * *-- Drain line.on the H.PCI turbine pump Drain fsolation.. Closed Close~cr-** c1o~ Figure 9.2-6 HV-1F026 tHV-1F025....... -*-- Drain lin.~*qn.the HPCI turbine pume_._ *or*aiii isolation 1 Open Containmen1 Almos. Control Nitrogen supply line to primary Supp.ly s'hut-off (isolation) Closed.. -~~6-i:~ '"1-g-:~:=~*... FV-05719 containment _..___ _________ _
------~'---. ----...
Rev. 54, 10/99 Page 1 of 3
*~-- *-- ------
SSES-FSAR
TABLE 9.3.. 2
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM
PNEUMAT,CALL Y OPERA TED VALVES WHICH HAVE A SAFETY FUNCTION( 1)
r--*.. *- -. --* *-**.. -*. ___..,. System and F.igure Normal Faif. Safe Number Location Design Function Position Position Position Control Rod Drive Scram Discharge Volume Vent Valve Isolation Open Closed Closed XV-1F011, 1F181...... *--**.. xv~*1 F010, 1F1BO. *-- ***- Scram -s~~m dischar~ _e :v-olume-.. Drain -*... Scrarn inlet line* isolation Open Closed Closed.. XV-126.. inlet valve........... Closed (!pen * * -* Open X.v-121 -**.... ' Man/auto Scram exhaust valve -*. - Scram ex.haust closed* Open Open -.... Closed Closed FV-1 F002A '- station drive water pump. Flow control -.. Open .. FV-1 F002B... Man/auto station -*.. ~ disch~rg.~ ---* * *-----... driv-e water pump -Flow control -Open Closed Closed - . discha~ge - ---- -- Closed"- Reactor Building HVAC system "!'solation *open __ _ Closed Figure 9.4-6, 9.4~7. and 9.4-8 -::::--- -- ".... *- -*** -.. --* ** *... * *-*- HD-17564A&i3.... -- Zone Ill supply fan (V212A&B) discharge...... **- - HD*11S86A&B -- Zone 1 suppiy fan discharge Isolation Open Closed Closed .. --- * (1V202A&B) --- -....... H0-17S76A&B - Zone I exhaust fan inlet (1V205A&B)... Isolation Open Closed
- Closed. --- * **-Open Closed
- Closed HO-f7sOZA&B Zone Ill exhaust system inlet -- Isolation
.. -* (1V213A&B) -'. --** --..... **- H0-1751.4A&B Zorie Ill filtered' exhaust system Isolation Open Closed Closed ..... (1V217A&B).... ---.... ~- -**-....... *-* ~7S24A&B Zone I equipment comp. exhaust syste 'in Isolation Open Closed Closed
-HD-17508A&B _____. ~~~t *--- (1V206A&8) - -from dryweil. p~rge _ to _S.Q..'!§____ Isolation *. -*-* -*Closed -- Closed *ciosea--
... ~ --;-- -*.... -. Closed.. -- - Closed Closed-Tv-07550A&B Fire protection isolation Isolation valve for SGTS.. ** - -. - H'V:67ss*1 A 1,2.3&4 - SGTS drai"n v*alves -- Drain o1ffire protection water.. ' cfosed Closed
- Closed HV-0755181,2,3&4... ___...... --
Ho~ f7534A thru H R. 8. air locks Isolation Open Closed *
- Closed.... Closed
~ --. -Ho:-oi543A&B -. R.B. recl"rculation syste-m outlet lnteroonnectiO-ri between SGTS &
- Open *open *-
-* ; Recirculation System -Rb.17661A&8 R.B. recircUlation-system inlet - * ~rconnectioo betWeen Recircul:iiioil Closed T..
- Closed Closed-**
HD-17602A&B. System RB Duct ! L I HD-17657A&B --... -- ~ ~---. -- --- *** ----- **,.. _ _I_.. -~ - -- _*
Rev. 54, 10/99 Page 2 of 3 SSES-FSAR
,---..... --. -*~---- n -r oo ** -* '.. _.... -- ~ ----
' TABLE 9.3-2
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM
PNEUMATICALLY OPERA TED VALVES WHICH HAVE A SAFElY FUNCTION( 1)
... System and *Figure * **- *--.. *- ** ~--.. *- -..., ----~ ' ~- -* -... - ~ *- *-- Nonnal Fail Safe Number Location Design Function Position Position Position PDD-07554A&B R.B. SGTS inlet from R.B. Recirculation R.B. negative pressure (No Dilution) Open Asls As Is HD-07543A&B - **. ---
- R.B. SGTS inlet from R.B. Recircuiaii.on Control Structure HVAC.. System
- R.'B. -~~~~~e.. P!~s -~u~e. ~~ ~~~]~t~~r:') Closed ___ _2t::~!l Open Fire protection -
.f!9U!~- 9.4-2 --- * -.. spray to the activated charcoal Water spray isolation --* ---*.. closed Closed * --Closed - TV-07813A Water TV-078138 filters -... -
*-- 0 * --........... -........... --..... *-* *-*-~---
~-07824~ 1,81. Retumai *r to units OV13A&B Isolation Open Closed-* *....... closed ~-- *.. ** ***- Outside air to._unlfs. Q\\/103A&B Isolation... HD-07802A&B -- Controi Open Closed clasecf-HD-07833A&B...... room floor relief fan.inlet' ___ Isolation Open --'" ~-****--...... __ _.. _ - *-...... Closed Closed HD..Q7873A&B Control room kitchen exhaust fan inlet Isolation - --** *---- Open **-ciosei:f * ~C?E.~.--
- Clo.sed..... *ciOsed--Closed
---
- HD~07872A&B ***--* Control... -----*... - **-- -.. room toilet ran inter Isolation.... -
(l) A complete list of pneumatically operated valves required for containment isolation is found in Table 6.2-12
...... ~* * * '.......... -. *-*-- **--------* * -----
Rev. 54. 10/99 Page 3 of 3 SSES-FSAR
TABLE 9.3-3
JNSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSORS FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
PLANT COMPONENT EFFECT OF FAILURE EFFECT OF OPERATING SYSTEM FAILURE FAILURE ON THE MODE FAiLURE ON MODE COMPONENT MODE SYSTEM DETECTION OPERATION PLANT
Emergency Compressor Failure of one None. Standby Alarm in the No loss of safety (loss of normal compressor compressor.. will start control room functions power} automatically
Emergency Compressors Failure of two None. The pressure Alarm in the No loss of safety (DBA or LOOP + compressors controt valve control room functions LOCA) between service air and instrument air will open to control pressure.
Rev. 54, 10/99 Page 1 of 1 SSES-PSAR
SERVICE (TYPICAL FOR UNITS AIR SYSTEM DESIGN 1 PARAMETEP.S & 2)
ouanti.tv 2 Capacity, each, scfm 440 Discharqe pressure, psiq 125 Coolinq water: flow rate, qpm 13 temp. in Of 105 tPmp. out Of 125
ouantitv 2 Capacity, each, scfm 440 Operatinq pressure, psiq 125 Coolinq water: flow rate, qpm temp. in op 10.8 105 temp. out or 125
ouantitv 2 Capacity, each ftJ 223 Desiqn pressure, psiq 139 Desiqn temperature, or 450
Rev. 35, 07/~4
- SSES-FSAR
IAJ21E_2.~.J=~-- tow PRESSURE AIR SYSTEM DESIGN PARA~ETERS (COM~ON TO UNITS 1 & 2}
~~-----------~~-------------------~-----------~--~~~--~~------
oua nti t. v 1 capacity, scfm 700 oischarqe pressure, psiq 35 Coolinq water: flow rate, qpm 4.8 temp. inlet oF 105 temp. outlet oF 125
Quantity. 1 capacity, scfm 700 Operatinq pressurP., psiq 35 17. 2 Coolinq water: flow rate, qpm temp. inlet °F 105 temp. outlet oF 125
ouantitv 1 Capacity, ft3 151 Desiqn pressure, psiq 125 Desiqn temPP.rature, op 650
-~-----------------------------------~~~----------------------
Rev. 3 5, 0 7 I 8 4 SSES-FSAR
TABLE 9.3-6
RIVER INTAKE STRUCTURE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS (COMMON FOR UNITS 1 & 2)
COMPRESSOR UNITS
Quantity 2 ' Capacity, each, scfm 15.0 Discharge pressure, psig 100 Receiver capacity, each, gal 80
DRYER PACKAGE UNITS (NOTE)
Quantity 1 Capacity, scfm 5.5 Air outlet dew point -40°F
SYSTEM AIR RECEIVER Quantity 1 Capacity, FT~ 63 Design Pressure, psig 175 Design Temperature, oF 450
NOTE: Desiccant dryer unit is used as a backup to the membrane dryers.
Rev. 53t 04/99 Page 1 of 1 SSES-FSAR
LIST OF INSTRUMENT GAS OPERATED DEVICES
- 1. Four main steam isolation valves.
- 2. Sixteen main steam relief valves, includlnq six valves vith auto depressurizinq function (AOF).
- 3. One rP.circulation sample line valve.
- 4. Tvo RHR check valves.
- 5. Tvo equalizinq valves for RRR check valves.
- 6. Tvo core spray check valves.
- 7. Tvo equalizinq valves for core spray check valves.
- 8. Five tip indexinq mechanisms.
- 9. Ten vacuum relief valves.
- 10. Eiqht reactor buildinq chilled vater valves.
- 11. One Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) steam line equalizinq valve.
- 12. One Riqh Pressure equalizinq valve. Coolant Iniection (HPCI) steam line
Rev. 35, 07/84 SSES-FSAR
TABLE 9.3-8
CONTAINMENT INSTRUMENT GAS SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS (TYPICAL FOR UNITS 1 & 2}
COMPRESSOR UNITS
Quantity 2 Capacity each, scfm 40 Discharge pressure, psig 160 Cooling water: flow rate, gpm 3 temperature in/out°F 105/110
AFTER COOLERS
Quantity 2 Capacity, each, scfm - 40 Operating pressure, psig 160 Cooling water: flow rate, gpm 1.15 temperature in/out°F 105/125
RECEIVERS I
Quantity 2 Capacity, each, ft 3 20 Design pressure, psig 250 Design temperature, oF 200
INLET MOISTURE SEPARATOR Quantity 1 Capacity, each, scfm (max) 80
GAS INLET FILTERS
Quantity 2.. Capacity, each, scfm 80
DRYER UNITS Quantity 2 Capacity, each, scfm 40 Operating pressure, psig 160 Leaving dew point, °F -40
Rev. 54, 10/99 Page 1 of 2 SSES-FSAR
TABLE 9.3-8 (Cont.d)
CONTAINMENT INSTRUMENT GAS SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS (TYPICAL FOR UNITS 1 & 2)
AFTER FILTERS
Quanti!}~_ 2 Capaci~ each. scfm 80 Efficiency Oil removal-99.999% Particle size- 0.01 microns Operating pressure, psig 160
NITROGEN BOTTLES Quantity 26 (13 in one bank
& 13 in another)
Capacity, each (Minimum) 224 scf Nominal Charge Pressure 2200 psig
TWO STAGE REGULATOR
Quanti!}~_ 2 Operating pressure 2200 psrg/150 psig
Rev. 54, 10/99 Page 2 of 2 SSES-I"SAR
!!l!!...!L~.:.1::2
COMTA!M~EMT IMSTRU~EMT GAS SYSTE~ FAILURE ~ODE AND EI"YfCT ANALYSIS PLANT CO!'IPO!E~T !'AlLURE !PP!CT OP OPERATING SYSTEl'l FAILURE ItO DE F.ULUB! Oll
~ODE COI'IPOifENT I'! ODE EPPECT UP FA~LURE ON THE SYSTE!'I D !'I' !C'riON PLlMT OPERATION EaE"rqencv ComPressors Pai.lul:"e of both None. The safety Alan in tbe Mo loss of safety (LOCA
- LOOP) co* pressors related de'fices control roo* function served by the instru11ent qas systea have their ovn accumulators bi\\cked up by nitroqen hottles.
!lletq~ncv Cos pressor Ho failure of !'lone "one !tone (L!'OP, coapressors !aerqPncv 'fi troqen bottl~s Loss of one bank 'fonf". Redundant control &lara in the coo11 ~o loss of safetr of bottles Dank of bottles function is available to pressurJ.Zf'> its group of ADS relief valves. ADS relief valves olSSOCidteif Vith lo;;t bottle bank have accuNulators for storage of sot:lve qa!i foe a short period.
Rev. 35, 07/84 SSES-FSAR
TABLE 9.3-10
EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION
Usage Design Capacity, Factor, Pressure/ I Material Each. TDH, Normal Temperature Pumps Equipment Numbers Type Quantity Casing/Imp gpm ft (1) Driver Hp Psig/°F I Drywell Floor C2rai11.!_ _____. ___ 1 P-402A: 8/1 P-403A, 8 Vert. Centr. Sump 4 SS/SS 30 12 0.013 1 150/180 Drywell Floor Drains 2P-402A. B/2P-403A, 8 Vert. Centr. Sump 4 SS/SS 30 12 0.013 1 150/180 Reactor Building Drains 1P-225A. B Vert. Centr. Sump 2 CI/N1 Hard 250 50 0.012 10 150/150 I Reactor Building Drains 2P-225A, 8 Vert. Centr. Sump 2 CI/N1 Hard 250 50 0.012 10 150/150 I Turbine Bldg. Outer Area Drains 1 P-127A. B Vert. Centr. Sump 2 CI/N1 Hard 250 50 0.016 10 150/150 '** Turbine Bldg. Outer Area Drains 2P-127A, B _Vert. Centr. Sump 2 CI/N1 Hard 250 50 0.016 10 150/150 Turbine Bldg. Central Area Drains 1P-129A, B Vert. Centr. Sump 2 CI/N1 Hard 250 50 0.007 10 150/150 Turbine Bldg. Central Area Drains 2P-129A, 8 Vert. Centr. Sump 2 CI/N1 Hard 250 50 0.007 10 150/150 _Turbine Bldg: Co~d. Area Drains 1 P-126 ----- Vert. Centr. Sump 1 CIIN1 Hard 1000 55 0.000 25 150/150 Turbine Bldg. Cond. Area Drains 2P-126 Vert. Centr. Sum~-- 1 CI/N1 Hard 1000 55 0.000 25 150/150 Turbine Bldg. Chemical Drains 1P~126A. 8 Vert. Centr. Sump 2 SS/SS 50 30 0.002 2 150/150
">n -tl")~/\\ n \\1-.A r"'-.-.a- (.",.--..-.., ~C'IC'C' Turbine Bldg. Chemical Drains..:.r-ILUM, o Vt:H. 'vt!llll. ;:)UIII "' ;:);:)(.;:);:) 50 30 0.002 2 150/150 Chemical Radwaste Drain Tank OP-132A, 8 Horiz. Centr. 2 SSISS 50 30 0.002 2 --- 150/155 Laundry Radwaste Drain Tank OP-131A, B Horiz. Centr. 2 CIICI 50 30 0.001 2 150/155 Radwaste Building Drains OP-338A, 8 _Vert. Centr. Sump 2 CliNt Hard 100 35 0.007 3 150/150 J Radwaste Building Chemical Drains OP~337A, B Vert. Centr. Suf!!E_ __ 2 ss 50 30 0.002 2 150/150 I Pipe Tunnel Drains 1 P-120 Vert. Subm. Centr. 1 Cl 35 15 0.000 1 1251150
- ---*~--~--------*--* I Circ. Water Pump House Drains OP-549A, B yert. Centr. Sump 2 CIINI Hard 100 90 -(~) 10 150/150 Diesel Gen. 'A-D' Bldg. Drains OP-553A, B Vert. Centr. Sull!e__ 2 CIINI Hard 100 35 -{2) 3 150/150 Cl and Acid Storage Building Drains OP-534A, 8 Vert. Centr. Sump 2 A20/A20 50 20 _l2) 2 150/150.I Water Treatment Bldg. Ch~m. Drains OP-522A, 8 Vert. Centr. Sump 2 SS/SS 50 30 -C2} 2 150/150 I (2) 5 35/105 -
Diesel Gen. 'E' Bldg. Drains OP-553C, Q_ __ ~~-***-- Vert. Centr. Sump 2 CI/NI Hard *'- 100 48 -
!llusage factors represent the fraction oflime an individual pump is operating at the expected average waste inpul shown in Table 11.2-1 !2lNon-radioactive waste-usage factor not required per Reg. Guide 1.70 Rev. 2 Section 9.3.3.
Rev. 54, 10/99 Page 1 of 2 SSES-FSAR
TABLE 9.3-10 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION SUMPS AND DRAIN TANKS
-- Sump (Tank)
- Live/
Nominal Oil Oil Sump Material Capacity Interceptor Capacity i Equipment Numbers Type Quantity LinetCover I Each, gal. Manhole Type Each, gal. I Drywell Floor Drains 1SP400A&B Lined Sump 2 SS/- 901 150 No -- Drywe11 Floor Drains 2SP400A&B Lined Sump
- 2 SS/- 90/150 -* -*---- f---* No. -
Drywell Equipment Drains 1T-218 Vert. Tank 1 cs *-. 610/1060 Yes --
I Drywell Equipment Drains 2T-218 Vert. Tank 1 cs 610/1060 Yes -- Reactor Building Drains 1SP200 ~~ed Sump ___.. 1 SS/18~ Cone. 2510/4050 Yes API-500 gpm 670 Reactor Building Drains - 2SP200 Lined Sump 1 SS/18ft Cone. 2510/4050 Yes _ API-500 ~pm 670 Turbine Bldg. Outer Area Drains 1SP104 Lined Sump 1 SS/9" Cone. 2570/4130 Yes APl-500 gpm 670 Turbine Bld9. Outer Area Drains 2SP104 lined Sump 1 SS/9" Cone. 2570/4130 Yes API-500 gpm 670 Turbine Bldg. Central Area Drains 1 SP102 Lined Sump 1 SS/9~ Cone. 2570/4130 Yes API-500 gpm 670 Turbine Bldg. Central Area Drains 2SP102.* ~ined Sump 1 SS/9" Cone. 2570/4130 Yes API-500 gpm 670 Turbine Bldg. Condenser Area Drains 1SP100 lined Sump 1 SS/1" CS --* - /692 ____ No -.. _ - *- *-----.. - Turbine Bldg. Conde~_ser Area Drains 2SP100 -- Lined Sump 1 SS/1" CS - /692 No -- Turbine Bldg. Chemical Drains 1 SP101 Lined Sump 1 SS/1" CS..... _______... ___ !-**--* 486/935 No --
---~*** ~*-.. *----
Turbine Bldg. Che~~~al Drains 2SP101 ___... Lined Sump 1 SS/1" CS 486/935 No -. Chemical Radwaste Drains OT-114 Vert Tank 1 ss 280/378 No -- Laundry Radwaste Drains OT-115.. ~ *--*.......... Vert. Tank 1 ss _, __, _.,. __ 2801378 No - - Radwaste Buildin~. Drains OSP300 Lined Sump 1 SS/12" Cone. 970/1940 Yes. -
Radwaste Building Chern. Drains -.. OSP301 lined Sump 1 -SS/12" Cone. -* 630/1215 Yes - -* - Pipe Tunnel Drains 1SP106 lined Sump - 1 SS/1" CS 150/360 No - - Circ. Water Pump Ho'::se Drains OSP504 - ** Unlined Sump 1 -/15" Cone. 920/1550 Yes AP & B<~ffle 250 - Diesel Gene!.~~r Building Dr<~ins OSP502 Unlined Sump 1 ~1/4" cs 92011390 Yes Baffle 135 C1 and Acid Stora~e B!dg. OSP503 *- Unlined Sump 1 ~/12~ Cone. 790/4110 Yes - - Water Treat. Bldg.. Chern _ Drains Common Unlined Sump l -/15" Cone. 600/1190 Yes - - DG-E Oily Waste Storage Tank OT598 ----- Horiz. Tank 1 cs 25000/ Yes Oil Sep. 550 (OT -599)
Rev. 54, 10/99 Page 2 of 2
FIGURE 9.3-1 REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 1
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FIGURE 9.3-1 REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 1
FIGURE 9.3-1 Rev. 56 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_1.doc FIGURE 9.3.2 REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 2
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FIGURE 9.3.2 REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 2
FIGURE 9.3-2, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_2.doc FIGURE 9.3-2A REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 6
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FIGURE 9.3-2A REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 6
FIGURE 9.3-2A, Rev. 50 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_2A.doc FIGURE 9.3-3 REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 30
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FIGURE 9.3-3 REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 30
FIGURE 9.3-3, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_3.doc FIGURE 9.3-3-4 REPLACED BY DWG. M-2125, SH. 16
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FIGURE 9.3-3-4 REPLACED BY DWG. M-2125, SH. 16
FIGURE 9.3-3-4, Rev. 2 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_3_4.doc FIGURE 9.3-4 REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 5
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FIGURE 9.3-4 REPLACED BY DWG. M-125, SH. 5
FIGURE 9.3-4, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_4.doc FIGURE 9.3-5-1 REPLACED BY DWG. M-126, SH. 1
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FIGURE 9.3-5-1 REPLACED BY DWG. M-126, SH. 1
FIGURE 9.3-5-1, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_5_1.doc FIGURE 9.3-5-2 REPLACED BY DWG. M-126, SH. 2
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FIGURE 9.3-5-2 REPLACED BY DWG. M-126, SH. 2
FIGURE 9.3-5-2, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_5_2.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-1 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 1
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FIGURE 9.3-6-1 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 1
FIGURE 9.3-6-1, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_1.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-2 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 2
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FIGURE 9.3-6-2 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 2
FIGURE 9.3-6-2, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_2.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-3 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 3
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FIGURE 9.3-6-3 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 3
FIGURE 9.3-6-3, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_3.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-4 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 4
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FIGURE 9.3-6-4 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 4
FIGURE 9.3-6-4, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_4.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-5 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 5
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FIGURE 9.3-6-5 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 5
FIGURE 9.3-6-5, Rev. 56 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_5.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-6 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 6
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FIGURE 9.3-6-6 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 6
FIGURE 9.3-6-6, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_6.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-7 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 7
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FIGURE 9.3-6-7 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 7
FIGURE 9.3-6-7, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_7.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-8 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 8
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FIGURE 9.3-6-8 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 8
FIGURE 9.3-6-8, Rev. 57 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_8.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-9 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 9
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FIGURE 9.3-6-9 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 9
FIGURE 9.3-6-9, Rev. 56 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_9.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-9A REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 12
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FIGURE 9.3-6-9A REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 12
FIGURE 9.3-6-9A, Rev. 56 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_9A.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-10 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 10
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FIGURE 9.3-6-10 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 10
FIGURE 9.3-6-10, Rev. 56 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_10.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-11 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 11
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FIGURE 9.3-6-11 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 11
FIGURE 9.3-6-11, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_11.doc FIGURE 9.3-6-12 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 13
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FIGURE 9.3-6-12 REPLACED BY DWG. M-123, SH. 13
FIGURE 9.3-6-12, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_6_12.doc FIGURE 9.3-10-1 REPLACED BY DWG. M-161, SH. 1
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FIGURE 9.3-10-1 REPLACED BY DWG. M-161, SH. 1
FIGURE 9.3-10-1, Rev. 56 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_10-1.doc FIGURE 9.3-10-2 REPLACED BY DWG. M-161, SH. 2
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FIGURE 9.3-10-2 REPLACED BY DWG. M-161, SH. 2
FIGURE 9.3-10-2, Rev. 57 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_10_2.doc FIGURE 9.3-10-3 REPLACED BY DWG. M-161, SH. 3
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FIGURE 9.3-10-3 REPLACED BY DWG. M-161, SH. 3
FIGURE 9.3-10-3, Rev. 56 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_10_3.doc FIGURE 9.3-12 REPLACED BY DWG. M-160, SH. 1
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FIGURE 9.3-12 REPLACED BY DWG. M-160, SH. 1
FIGURE 9.3-12, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_12.doc FIGURE 9.3-12A REPLACED BY DWG. M-160, SH. 2
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FIGURE 9.3-12A REPLACED BY DWG. M-160, SH. 2
FIGURE 9.3-12A, Rev. 55 AutoCAD Figure 9_3_12A.doc FSAR REV.65
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SODIUM PENTABORATE (Na O 5B O 10H O)2 2 3 2 VOLUME-CONCENTRATION REQUIREMENTS
FIGURE 9.3-14, Rev 52
AutoCAD: Figure Fsar 9_3_14.dwg Ref. Tech. Spec. Figure 3.1.7-1 FSAR REV.65
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 & 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
SATURATION TEMPERATURE OF SODIUM PENTABORATE SOLUTION
FIGURE 9.3-15, Rev 47
AutoCAD: Figure Fsar 9_3_15.dwg}}