ML20197C486
| ML20197C486 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/22/1986 |
| From: | Jennifer Davis NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Sniezek J Committee To Review Generic Requirements |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197C372 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-49FR30726, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-73 AA36-2-012, AA36-2-12, NUDOCS 8611060197 | |
| Download: ML20197C486 (1) | |
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!G10RArintf! FOR: Janes 11. Sniezek, Chaiman WBrown Comittee to Review Generic Requirements SG T $!
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FPm: John G. Davis, Director RErickson Office of f!uclear !!aterial Safety ausshardt
,y and Safeguards
SUBJECT:
C m!!ITTEE TO PEVIElf CErlERIC REQUIRDIENTS (CRCR) i REVIEll 0F INSIDER SAFEGIIARDS RULES SUPPORTIllG CUIDANCE In meeting No. 82 on October 23, 1985, the CRG*4 approved the proposed final version of the Insider Safeguards Rules pending recomended modifications.
Supporting guidance for this package, Regulatory Guide 5.64, " Standard Fomat i and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants" , i and Regulatory Guide 5.XX, " Vital Area Access Controls, Protection of Physical l Security Equipnent, and Key and Lock Controls," were handled separately from j the rulenaking package by the Office of fluclear Regulatory Research. -
These regulatory guides were previously reviewed and approved by the CRGR in proposed fom at meeting flo. 40 on June 1,1983. The Insider Rules Package is currently being voted on by the Comission. Regardless of the outcome of the vote on the Access Authorization Rule we feel that the iliscellaneous Amendments portion of the rule will proceed as is; therefore, Regulatory Guide 5.XX is being forwarded to the CRGR for consideration at this time.
He believe that this regulatory guide does not require additional CRGR review based on the fact that there were no significant changes due to public coment and any revisions made are reflective of revisions to the draft final regulation which has been approved by the CRGR. In this regard the primary impact on power l reactor licensees stens from the rule whereas the guide is merely supportive of I the rule. We would appreciate jour response within 15 days so that we may proceed in a timely nanner with this action.
(Sianed) John e. aevep h97e61104 John G. Davis, Director 50 49FR307E6 PDR Office of fluclear 11aterial Safety and Safeguards .
Enclosure:
R.G. 5.XX,flisc. Amend.
19A *See previous concurrence uA o,,,ce > SG*
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$%,db UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W'.y ,E 3 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%,, "~/,f NOV 121985 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: ,
Victor Stello, Jr. , Chairman Comittee to Review Generic Requirements
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF CRGR MEETING NUMBER 82 The Comittee to Review Generic Requirements-(CRGR) met on Wednesday, October 23, 1985 from 1:00-5:00 p.m. A list of attendees for this meeting is enclosed (Enclosure 1).
- 1. R. Burnett (NMSS) presented for CRGR review the proposed final " Insider Safeguards Rules. Enclosure 2 sumarizes this matter (Category 2 item).
- 2. E. Rossi (IE) presented for CRGR review the proposed IE Bulletin entitled Motor-0perated Valve Comon Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings. Enclosure 3 sumarizes this matter (Category 2 item).
- 3. E. Podolak (IE) presented for CRGR review responses to CRGR coments concerning the proposed Comission paper regarding Offsite Medical Services. Enclosure 4 sumarizes this matter (Category 2 item).
Enclosures 2, 3, and 4 contain predecisional information and therefore will not be released to the Pub'ic Document Room until the NRC has considered (in a public forum) or decided the matters addressed by the information.
In accordance with the ED0's July 18, 1983 directive concerning " Feedback and Closure on CRGR Reviews," items 1, 2 and 3 above require written responses from cognizant offices to report agreemer.t or disagreement with CRGR recomendations in these minutes. The responses, which are required within 5 working days after receipt of these meeting minutes, are to be forwarded to the CRGR Chairman and if there is disagreement with the CRGR recomendations, to the EDO for decision-making.
Questions concerning these meeting minutes should be referred to Walt Schwink (492-8639). ,
,f \ f W ' :
ictor Stello, Jr., Chaiman Comittee to Review Generic Requirements
Enclosures:
As Stated 4 cc: See next page T
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NOV 121985 cc: Comission (5) -
SECY Office Directors Regional Administrators CRGR Members G. Cunningham R. Burnett
. E. Rossi D. Matthews a
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? 2 Enclosure 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES CRGR MEETING N0. 82 October 23, 1985 CRGR MEMBERS V. Stello R. Bern'ero E. Jordan J. Scinto ,
T. Ippolito (for J. Heltemes)
R. Cunningham G. Arlotto (for D. Ross)
OTHERS J. Sniezek R. Baer H. VanderMolen D. Allison A. Dromerick W. Fisher M. Jamgochian R. Wessman E. Rossi D. Burke H. Bailey G. Smith R. Meck N. Thomasson J. Aron A. Kenecke L. Chandler B. Richter L. Soffer W. Schwink J. Conran R. Burnett E. TenEyck P. Dwyer J. Yardwmian F. Miraglia P. Ting L. Cunningham L. Bush R. Fonner K. Jamgochian S. Wigginton C. Ong R. Hernan D. Mausshardt R.,Capra B. Brach R. Kiessel J. Knight , R. Bosnak W. Minners
,. ,1 Enclosure 2 to the Minutee of CRGR Meeting No. 82 CRGR Review of the Proposed Final Version of the " Insider Rules" R. Burnett and G. McCorkle (NMSS) presented for CRGR review, the proposed final version of the " Insider Safeguards Rules." The attachment (briefing slides) was given to the CRGR during the meeting.
The staff proposal is for rulemaking in three areas (rules) to provide 1ncreased assurance that nuclear power plants (NPPs) are adequately protected against the malevolent insider threat to NPP safety. In addition to the rulemaking, the proposal acknowledges and discusses an industry (NUMARC) proposed alternative to the staff preferred rule concerning access authorization. Guidance (a Regulatory Guide) for the performance oriented rules is under development. The " Insider Rules" concern the following three areas:
- 1. Access Authorization Program requirements (final rule): Establish unifonn minimum criteria for granting individuals unescorted access to protected areas and vital areas at NPPs. The emphasis is on trustworthiness of persons having access to NPP controlled areas.
- 2. Search Requirements (final rule): Clarify requirements for searches of individuals entering NPP controlled areas. The emphasis is on deference and detection of those persons who might attempt a malevolent act to degrade NPP safety by the introduction of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices.
- 3. Miscellaneous Amendments (final rule): Provide a more operational safety-conscious safeguards (NPP protection) system while maintaining adequate levels of protection against the malevolent insider threat to NPP safety. The emphasis is on balancing NPP protection and operational safety ccnsiderations to optimize net NPP safety.
The rule concerning access authorization requires that NPP licensees conduct a background investigation, psychological assessment, and a continual behavioral observation program for persons who need unescorted access to protected areas and vital areas of a NPP. (" Protected areas" are areas that have controlled access and are enclosed by physical barriers such as fences or walls. " Vital areas" are areas containing equipment or systems whose degradation / failure could endanger NPP safety.) The background investigation inquires into a person's employment, credit, educational, military, character, and criminal history for the past 5 years. The psychological assessment consists of written personality tests and clinical interviews for persons whose personality tests
' are invalid or indicate abnormal personality traits. (The clinical interviews must be conducted by qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologists or psychiatrists.) Continual behavioral observation is to detect changes in l behavior that could threaten NPP safety. Any person who is employed at a NPP l on the effective date of the rule concerning access authorization and who has j
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been screened in accordance with an industry standard will not be required to have a background investigation or psychological assessment. However, the person will be subject to behavioral observation requirements. Licensees are required to submit for Commission approval an access authorization plan describing how they will meet the new regulations.
The rule concerning search, clarifies requirements for searches of individuals seeking entry to protected areas at a NPP. The rule requires equipment search (for contraband - explosives and firearms) of all individuals seeking protected area access, except on-duty police officers. This differs from the NRC existing search requirement by allowing visitors to be subject to equipment search rather than " pat-down" search. However, " pat-down" searches will be required of all personnel when detection equipment fails or any person is suspected of carrying contraband.
The miscellaneous amendments concern:
- 1. Refinement of NRG existing requirements for access to vital areas to ensure adequate access for operational safety purposes as well as necessary physical security protection. For example, the amendments to NRC existing requirements for vital area access controls during emergency conditions include a requirement that licensees periodically review NPP physical protection and contingency plans to ensure that they do not conflict with safe operation of the NPP bothduring nonnal and other than normal operations. The amendments also allows licensees to suspend safeguards (protection) measures if necessary to facilitate responses to a NPP emergency condition.
- 2. Protection of specified physical security equipment that could impact significantly the protection of the plant if such equipment were degraded or inoperative.
- 3. A requirement that keys, locks and combinations be changed or rotated once each year and whenever a person's access authorization is revoked for cause or compromise of the locks is suspected. This relaxes NRC existing requirements which require such change when any employee with access to a key, lock or combination changes employment.
The CRGR reviewed an earlier version of the proposed " Insider Rules" at CRGR Meeting NO. 40 (June 1, 1983). As reported in the meeting minutes, the CRGR supported the purpose of the proposed " Insider Rules" and recommended that the proposal go forward after CRGR comments were addressed. A significant CRGR recommendation concerned including in the proposed " Insider Rules," a clearance program. After CRGR recommendations were addressed, the then current version of the proposed " Insider Rules" was considered and approved by the EDO and then the Commission for public comment. Except for elimination of the clearance program from the proposal, the Commission decided to publish the proposed
" Insider Rules" for public comment after relatively minor modification. The current final version of the " Insider Rules" reflects changes made as a result of public and staff comments. The changes concern:
- 1. Elimination of the Vital Island concept / requirements from the rules, and
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- 2. Acknowledgement and discussion of the industry (NUMARC) proposed alternative to the access authorization program requirement in the staff preferred " Insider Rules "
The staff anticipates the following benefits from implementation and compliance with the " Insider Rules":
- 1. Improved human trustworthiness to reduce the malevolent insider threat to NPP safety;
- 2. Reduced (if not eliminated) conflict (balancing of competing risks) between NPP operation and NPP protection during both normal and other than nonnal NPP operation; and
- 3. Reduced burden associated with adequately safeguarding (protecting) a NPP.
The benefits along with the rulemaking need/ background are discussed in the staff's proposal. The nature of the discussion is deterministic rather than probabilistic since the malevolent insider threat is not amenable to quantitative risk analysis due to the unpredictability of a malevolent insider's intent, ability, means, opportunity and target system (s)/ equipment which may perform preventive or mitigative functions.
Improved human reliability (trustworthiness) is the focus of the " Insider Rules." The staff believes that the increased emphasis on human reliability (trustworthiness) rather than access restrictions will result in substantial additional protection against the insider threat to NPP safety. Experience indicates that while access restrictions do not eliminate " insider" malevolent acts, they do conflict with normal and other than normal plant operations to the extent that NPP and personnel safety could be adversely affected. In this regard, overall NPP and personnel safet on human reliability (trustworthiness) yrather couldthan be improved on accesswith more emphasis restrictions.
The most important benefit expected by the staff from implementation and continuing compliance with the " Insider Rules" is associated with the access authorization rule which requires that NPP licensees establish an access authorization program. The staff believes that such a program will materially assist in assuring that a satisfactory, uniform approach meeting minimum criteria will be applied in determining an individual's eligibility for unescorted access to NPP protected and vital areas. The rule increases the ability of licensees, within the framework of NRC's regulations, to detect an individual at a NPP whose current behavior, behavioral history or emotional makeup could be a precursor to th'e commission of acts detrimental to NPP safety and, potentially to public health and safety. The program would permit reciprocity in granting an access authorization to a contractor,__ manufacturer.
o_r vendor based upon screening conducted by another licensee, and provides a metnoa of accommodating temporary workers during major outages for refueling.
Each element of the proposed program (background investigation, psychological assessment and continual observation) is intended to provide increased assurance of trustworthiriss. The background investigation elements and their associated benefits are:
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- 1. True identity - Assures that the individual seeking unescorted access is not assuming the identity of another.
- 2. Employment history - Verifies the individual's claimed expcrience and qualifications and identifies possible past behavioral actions which might be predictive of future actions that could be detrimental to NPP safety.
- 3. Educational history - Verifies the individual's training, credentials, and true identity.
- 4. Credit history - Establishes financial responsibility and relates to the possibility that the individual may be subject to coercion, influence, or pressure to act in a manner contrary to NPP safety.
- 5. Criminal history - Determines if the individual:
- a. Has been involved in any malevolent act;
- b. Has been convicted of any felony or a series of lesser offenses indicating a pattern of criminal behavior; or
- c. Is a habitual abuser of a controlled substance or alcohol.
Both the psychological tests and clinical interview are for the purpose of detecting behavior attributes which indicate a high potential for comitting acts detrimental to NPP safety or, personality attributes which, when combined with the expected work environment, could develop into a potential for wuiniU.ing acts detrimental to NPP safety. The continual observation program is to detect changes in an individual's behavior or emotional condition which might be precursors to the commission of acts detrimental to NPP safety. The program requires that individuals exhibiting such behavioral changes be referred to the person responsible for administration of the licensee's access authorization program. This person would determine if further referral of the individual to competent medical authorities and/or suspension or revocation of the individual's access authorization is appropriate. The rule provides a licensee with a previously unavailable opportunity to provide unescorted access to unscreened temporary workers under certain plant conditions, waives the background investigation and psychological assessment requirements for persors employed prior to the effectiveJate of thedule, ,and provides for licensee acceptance'of an access autfiorization granted unfer an approved plan by another NPP licensee. It should be noted that much of the NPP industry currently utilizes such a three component program in varying degrees. Furthermore, i background investigations have long been recognized as a valid screening tool in both civil and government sectors. Psychological assessment and behavioral )
observation programs have been used extensively as adjuncts to background investigations in screening out individuals showing tendencies toward aberrant behavior. As an example, psychological assessment tests have long been in use by the FAA in identification of individuals unsuitable for high stress positions such as air traffic controllers. The utility of psychological assessment has withstood scrutiny by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. The increased assurance (against malevolent insider acts) derived from these l
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! programs is considered by the staff to far outweigh the regulatory burden i imposed by this action. The need for rulemaking has been confimed by both the General Accounting Office and Congressional Comittee; the NRC has comitted to
! both parties that progress in this area is forthcoming. In this regard, in 1977, the Comission directed the staff to undertake rulemaking to address this matter.
The cost for NRC/ industry to implement and have continuing compliance with the
" Insider Rules" is estimated by the staff to be as follows:
" Insider Rules"
. Implementation Compliance Total l
O NRC $822.7K $ 0 $822.7K Industry $18M $134M $152M The average site cost (assuming 76 sites) is estimated to be about $2 million.
The staff noted that most of the cost is attributable to implementation and continuing compliance with the access authorization program rule.
The CRGR agreed with the staff's conclusion that the proposed final version of
. the " Insider Rules" will contribute to resolution of the malevolent " Insider l Threat" to NPP safety in a manner that promises easier, more efficient and safer NPP operation. The Comittee recomended that the following I
modifications be made to the proposal:
- 1. In the context of the NRC's recently enacted backfit rule, the proposal should include a thorough discussion of how implementation of the." Insider i Rules" at a cost of roughly $2 million/ plant ($152 million backfit) will
- provide substantial increased protection of NPPs against the malevolent insider threat to NPP safety.
- 2. The proposal should include a legal discussion of whether or not there is i
a need and precedent for an appeal process concerning denial of access to -
NPP protected and vital areas. The discussion should address past, current and proposed appeal process practices and requirements in the context of both the industry and staff proposed access authorization programs. This matter should be highlighted for the Comission.
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- 3. The proposal discussion of whether the industry supports the staff f preferred access authorization program rule or an alternative industry
';' access authorization program without a rule needs clarification.
Specifically, it was not clear who was speaking for the industry. The staff should attempt to clarify this matter and appropriately modify the discussion. If the matter cannot be resolved, it should be highlighted -
for the Comission.
4 4. The proposal should both highlight and discuss thoroughly the OMB view
"...that the psychological assessment and behavioral observation aspects
.- s of this proposed system do not meet criteria for approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act." (Extracted from OMB letter dated September 27, 1984, Goad to Norry.) The word system refers to the access authorization rule requirements concerning psychological assessment and behavioral observation. The OMB letter enclosed U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) letters which include comments that~do not endorse the proposed psychological assessment and behavioral observation aspects of the " Insider Rules."
The CRGR recommends that the proposed final version of the " Insider Rules" be approved after the aforementioned recommendations have been addressed.
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CRGR BRIEFING INSIDERSAFEGUARDSRUL$S OCTOBER 23, 1985
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TE INSIDER RJLL-o ACESS AITHORIZATION ( 3 C0ff0HENTS) o PAT-ljoWN SEARCH ISSUE o lilSCELLANE00S M1EFENENTS
, (VA ACESS, KEY AND LOCK CONTROL, ETC.)
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't PUBLIC COMMEi!T i
i 0 180 DAY PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOo - 142 COMMENTERS 0 CHARACTERIZATION OF COMMENTS
- MOST PERTAINED TO ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM -
REVISIONS CLARIFYING IN NATURE .
- SEARCH RULE - NO CHANGE
- MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS - VITAL ISLAND CONCEPT DELETED e
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fiAJOR COMMENTS ON A2ESS AUTHORIZATION RULE O PHOTO IDENTIFICATION FOR AUTHORIZATION IRANSFER (mg rqs*M) 0 APPEAL PROCEDURES ( * *N 9"I'***&)
O BACKGROUND INV ESTIGATIONS
- EDUCATIONAL / EMPLOYMENT DATA -- INTERVIEW Y1 CORRESPONDENCE
- ASSURANCE n OBJECTIVE Y*
O GRANDFATHERING - SCREENING UNDER INDUSTRY STANDARD 0 NON-LICENSEE EMPLOYEES: CONTRACTOR / SUPPLIER PROGRAMS AND AUDITS t
0 BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
- INDUSTRY STANDARD
- ONE M IWO TESTS -- CLINICAL INTERVIEWS -
0 TEMPORARY WORKER ACCESS DURING COLD SHUTDOWN O INTERIM CLEARANCE PENDING COMPLETION OF FULL SCREENING e 6 MONTHS 0 INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION - THE NUMARC INITIATIVE
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IHE NUMARC INITIATIVE e
O GUIDELINES FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM, TO BE ENDORSED BY NRC POLICY STATEMENT 0 THREE COMPONENT SCREENING BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION O NUMARC SPONSORED 6UIDELINES O CONSIDERED AS ALTERNATE APPROACii TO RULEMAKING
.. -- -=_-_- - -_-. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - __ .__ -. - . . -_ . _ . - .-_
MAJOR DIFFERENCES: GUIDELINES VS RULE w nu. u ne.
- j. ISSUES GUIDELINES RULE APPEAL PROCEDURES NO YES TEMPORARY /lNTERIM PSYCH ASSESS 8 FULL SCREENING PENDING CLEARANCES FOR CREDIT CHECK & 1 RECEIPT OF CRIMINAL & '
l PA/VA ACCESS REFERENCE (180 DAYS) MILITARY HISTORY (180 DAYS) i "GRANDFATHERING" INDIVIDUALS GRANTED INDIVIDUALS WHO'HAVE BEEN UNESCORTED ACCESS SCREENED UNDER A PUBLISHED AUTHORIZATION ON OR INDUSTRY STANDARD COMMITTED BEFORE EFFECTIVE DATE TO IN AN NRC-LICENSED
- , OF GUIDELINES SECURITY PLAN.
INSPECTION / ENFORCEMENT NO DATA' AVAILABLE NRC REGIONAL INSPECTION TO ASSESS PROGRAM AND ENFORCEMENT.
. EFFECTIVENESS PERMANENT EMPLOYEE -APPLIES TO ALL GRANTED APPLIES TO ALL GRANTED i RECIPROCITY UNESCORTED ACCESS UNESCORTED ACCESS TRANSIENT EMPLOYEE NONE UNDER IEMPORARY YES FOR ALL' CLEARED RECIPROClTY CLEARANCE INDIVIDUALS
i .
J WHY NUMARC GUIDELINES 0 SELF IMPOSED BURDEN - NOT REGULATORY l 0 MOST UTILITIES ALREADY CONDUCT SCREENING UNDER ANSI STANDARDS TO VARYING DEGREES O PRECEDENT (nhecs & %)
0 OPTION OF RULEMAKING ALWAYS EXISTS 4
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ - - - - - _-- __ __ - I
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WHY A RULE 2 0 BASIS FOR CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF STANDARDIZED P.ROGRA.M !
O REGULATION BY FEDERAL AGENCY PROVIDES IMPARTIAL PROTECTION OF PRIVACY RIGHTS FOR BOTH INDIVIDUALS AND LICENSEE MANAGEMENT O PROVIDES FOR APPEAL PROCEDURES 0 NRCOVERSIGHTPROVIDESMECHANISMFORPROMPT,EFFECTIVEREMEhlALACTION AS NECESSARY 0 CONSISTENCY: ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF NRC SECURITY PROGRAMS REGULATED BY RULEMAKING 0 SUPPORTED BY GA0 (auty 1933 REPORT) 0 RULE CONSISTENT WITH COMMISSSION RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES 0 CAPTURES SENSE OF UNIONS' VIEWS (12/1/83) COMMISSION MEETING) 0 INSPECTABLE DATA TO JUDGE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAM t
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f C0f1 MISSION PAPER RECOMMENDATIONS ,
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l, O Two OPTIONS FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM l
- NUMARC PROGRAM
- RULE, SUPPORTED BY STAFF O PUBLISH FINAL RULES
- SEARCH REQUIREMEf4TS
- MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS e
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]h-d' "20 UNITED STATES l
., 2% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMiss!ON
[ ja , j WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 pg., ,
%, N '%.. / MAR 2 6 ISc5 MEMORANDUM FOR: Ralph M. Wilde, Program Assistant to the Director Division of Fuel Cycle and Ma'terial Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards FROM: Edwin G. Triner, Director Division of Budget and Analysis Office of Resource Managemen:
SU5 JECT: THE COST ANALYSIS GROUP'S REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED It: SIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES Please find attached the Cost Analysis Group's (CAG) comments on the cost analysis pcrtions of the regulatory impact analyses of the Proposed Insider Sefeguards Rules. There are three proposed rules within this action: 1)
Ac:Ess Authorizaticn Rule (Screening Requirements), 2) Search Requirements F.ule (Pat-Dcwn Search Issue), and 3) Miscellanecus Safeguerds-Related Amend-rents (Access Centrols, Vital Area Designation, etc). Each centains its cwn
' ti:.e impcct analysis, but sc e of cur c: rents held for all cf the analy:es.
-cr example, sc e cf the ca a used is cutda:ed and therefore the recelting
- s: =stica es are r.ot as current E.s tht;. shculd bc. Arctner prc51em is th t "ciure ::::s are r.:: discounted. Lastly, V-ile -he c:s: bure;en resultinc fr:r.
N :-r..crL is considered in the cost esticates, a s:'ccial secticn under Ste:urcry Corsideratiens addressing that issue should be included. ,,
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COST ANALYSIS ' GROUP'S REVIEW 0F THE REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES OF THE' PROPOSED INSIDEP, RULEMAKING
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e COST ANALYSIS GROUP'S REVIEW 0F THE REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED INSIDER RULEMAKING This report is a review of the cost analysis portions of NMSS's value impact analyses of the Proposed Insider Safeguards Rules and is provided under the direction of the Cost Analysis Group's (CAG) Charter.
There are three proposed rules within this action: 1) Access Authorization Rule (Screening Requirements), 2) Search Requirements Rule (Pat-Down Search Issue), and 3) Miscellaneous Safeguards-Related Amendments (Access Controls, Vital Area Designation, etc.). Each contains its own value impact analysis, .
but some of our comments hold for all of the analyses. For example, some of the data used is outdated and therefore the resulting cost estimates are not as current at they should be. Another problem is that future costs are not discounted. Lastly, while the cost burden resulting from paper work is considered in the cost estimates, a special section under Statutory Considerations addressing that issue should be included.
The specific comments follow:
I. Access Authorization Rule .
Page 2 - Under 1.3.1 NRC Ocerations, cost estimates are nade for initial and subsequent annual costs. Folic.:ing the format establis.hed in "A Handbeck for Value-Impac: Assessnent," NUREG/CR-3569, the ces:s could more accurately be identified as NRC Inplementation and NRC Operation costs respectively.-
Page 3 - The NRC implementation cost could be expressed as a function of the total number of sites expected to be in existence based on current expectations. Future sites are very near-term and stali in runber. (There are ;resen ly 5E cperating sites.)
Tne "RC cceratine cost could te a function of the ernual cain-
- er.arce effcr ar.d a recurrir.; in
- pection effort, if any. The Enrxal value could then be presen: valued over the assumed life ex;sctancy of th.e plants.
Footnote 2. refers to an Operating cost, not an implementation cos: as indica ed.
Fage 4 - The ccsts to NRC in subsecuent years are said to exclude ccst increases due to inflation. If you icenti'y costs as being expressed in constant dollars, inf'.t: ion will be irplicity j
1 acccunted for. ~u ture year cc:ts should be discounted.
The cperating (ennual) costs should only include ma4r.tenance and recurring inspections. Future plants are very near-term and limited in number. They shculd be included in implenentation costs for ccr.putational purposes. Also, assuming that six new plants will be licensed each year is not consistent with present infermation and icplicitly assures each of the plants will be en a new site.
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Section 1.3.2 contains estimates as to the incremental impact the proposed action would have on other government agencies in percentage and qualitative terms. Presenting the impacts in dollar values would be more useful.
Page 6 ~ Estimated industry savings are' underestimated because of using the 48 site figure. -
Assuming the same number of people per site is questionable, especially for multiplant sites.
Page 7 - This particular analysis assumes that half-time duties of a professional cost $42,000/ year i.e., an $84,000 per staff year cost is used. An estimate of $124,800 per staff year is used on Page 4.
The industry's initial costs'and annual maintenance costs are
'better denoted as their implementation and operation costs as defined in NUREG/CR-3568. Also, the costs occurring in future years should be discounted.
Page 10 - The estimated cost is again ur.derstated because only 48 sites are assumed.
1.3.4 The Public, The third paragraph should inciuce the revisec ca:a anc read: " Eased cr. generation of 292.100 mil. lien r.st ::ilcwatt hcurs of elec ricity by nuclear reac:crs and a gencr_ ting cost of abcut 3.3 cents per kiicwatt hour (DOE's Annual Enercy Review, Aprii 1984 and DOE's Update - Muclear Pet.er Procrat. Secte=cer 1984), the industry spends ancut 9.6 t' i en to ccver nuclear generating ccsts." Underlined scr: ions ir.cicate cnar.ges. The ne::t sentence in that paragraph ex;resses irrie en ation and naintenance ces:s as percer.ttge ir. creases of the total nuclear electrical generatir;. costs.
Inis ccuid ccr. fuse sc:e readers as the percentages are rather srali, but do represent scre ncntrivial ccsts.
Page IE - :ndustrv (savings per site) are incorrect. The existing plants
. 'l nave ne ccs: savincs associated with licensees establish-ir; a reciprocity program, not savings of $190K as indicated.
his is because the prcptsed rule vaives the backgrcund investigatien recuiretent for pers;ns empicred prior to the effective date af the rule. As for new plants, the estimated savings per site per year should be reported as net savings of 5150.0K (page 6), not the S190K indicated here. ,
II. Search ?.equirements P.ule Page 1 - Tne analysis uses 48 sites, understating the costs. 1 l
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Page 2 - NRC's future annual operating costs should be discounted.
While paperwork cost burdens do not appear to be a significant cost component, statutory consideration requires that they be addressed. A statement to the effect that none or only a
. minimal paperwork cost burden is associated with this proposed change should suffice.
The assumption of six plants per year is not valid. See our comment concerning Page 4 of the first analysis. The costs described under Industry Ooerations are actually implementation costs.
III. Miscellaneous Safeguards - Related Amendments 1
This action has five objectives listed in 1.1 Description. However, under 1.3 Value/ Impact of Procosed Actions, no mention is made of objectives (iii) " Permit the supervision of safeguards measures during
! . safety emergencies."
l Page 5 - The estimated cost is again understated because only '8 tites are assumed. .
Page 7 - Under 1.4 Decision on the Frecosed Acticn, a benefit of the amend ents is saic to be " letter cests to fully implement NP.C regulations regarding reactor safeguards." However, the cos:s and savings presented in Section 1.3 sum to over 5200K per unit, therefore it is not clear uhere the " lower costs" are occurring.
It appears that paperwork cer.sideratier.s are not a large ccst burden for the miscellaneous tmendments but a statement under 2.5 5:atutorv Considerati:rs indicating such. would be beneficial.
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