ML20198G623
| ML20198G623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/29/1985 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197C372 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-49FR30726, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-73, TASK-RIA, TASK-SE AA36-2-003, AA36-2-3, AB17-2-04, AB17-2-4, SECY-85-381, NUDOCS 8512120121 | |
| Download: ML20198G623 (8) | |
Text
. .
l- .
[( ). g ,
8,,
Nevernber 29, 1985 RULEMAKING ISSUE n a_,S_ m (Affirmation)
For: The Commissioners From: itilliam J. Dircks i Executive Director for Operations l
Subject:
INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES
Purpose:
Obtain Commission approval of notice of final rulemaking.
Issue: Establishnt of Muclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations for screening of personnel at nuclear power plants to include background investigations, psychological assessments, and continual behavioral observations; modification of MRC regula-tions for entry searches at power reactor facilities; modtfi-cations to clarify and refine requirements for the protection of vital locations containing safety-related equipment at nuclear power plants.
Discussion: This paper covers three related safeguards rules for power reactors. They are:
l Access Authorization Rule (Screening Requirements) Enclosure A.
l o o Search Requirements Rule (Pat-Down Search Issue), Enclosure 8.
o Miscellaneous Safeguards-Related Amendments (Access Controls, Suspension of Safeguards Measures tring Emergencies, etc.),
Enclosure C.
A rule for an access authorization program at nuclear power reactors has been under development since 1978. Since that time the other two components of the Insider Safeguards Rules were developed and, because all three rules relate to protection against the " insider" threat, they have been grouped under the general title of Insider Safeguards Rules. Full details were provided to the Commission concerning the history and development of these rules in SECY 83-311 CONTACTS:
P. A. Dwyer, NMSS 42-74773 R. L. Fonner, ELD '
49-28692 ,
gl } L )N U Y L
. The Commissioners .
(dated July 29,1983) and SECY 83 311A (dated September 15,1983) dich presented the rules for publication in preposed form.
The proposed rules were issued for pelic conuent en August 1, 1984 (4g FR 30738). The original go dsy public comment period uns extended en additional 90-days at sammenters' request and expired on March 7,1985. A total of 142 letters of comment utre received on the proposed rules and regulatory guidance l from utilities, utility groups, ettlity contractors, behavioral scientists, members of the academic casamity, state and federal agencies, medical doctors, laryers and private citizens.
Following is a summary of actions taken in response to public coment on each rule.
Access Authorization Rule The Access Authorization Rule consists of three major components:
background investigations, psychological assessments and a behav-toral observation progree. The proposed final rule includes all three components with some' refinements made as a result of public comment. All of these changes can best be characterized as provid.
ing clarification of certain issues ad not as being substantive 1 in nature.
Two industry greeps, the lhelear Utility Management and haan
, l Resource tcmaittee (NLMARC) and the Edison Electric Institute I t
(EE!), recommended that the proposed rule be withdrawn and l
replaced by the issuaxe of aa MC policy statement with program guidelines develes'ed by in1ustry. Bis alternative is identified as the IRMARC proposal because IRMARC served as the principal I spokesman on this s@ ject, having followed their March 7,1985 4
letter of comment with an oral presentation of their views to !
the Commission on March 20, 1985. (At that time. IRMARC indicated l that its members represent 55 utilities with nuclear electric i generating stations either under construction or operating and i
that the Committee does not take a position on an issue with less than 80 percent membership agreement.) At Commission direction, the staff has been working with IRMARC personnel to develop and refine the industry guidelines for use if the Commission approves its alternative to replace the proposed Access Authorization Rule.
On August 16, 1985, during a telephone conference, the staff l and IRMARC working group personnel agreed to see final changes l
to a draft guideline working document which was to be presented to the IRMARC Executive Committee during the week of August 19, 1985. A copy of this document which is entitled, " Guidelines for Industry thclear power Plant Access Authorization Program" (Rev. 7, 8/26/85), as furnished by the IRMARC marking group is 1
attached as Enclosure D.
I e
i
-- . . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ - - - _ - _ _ - _ - - . _ - - . - - . ~ . _ _ . _ . . - . - . - - -
" i
~
- i
, o.
1 I
The Comissioners .
Contrary to the staff's previous understanding, EMARC ocelly informed the staff en August 16, IM5 of their intent that lutC umuld provide oversight of the progre through inspection and enforement.* MMARC suggested this could be accomplished 4
through the issuance of an MC policy statment through which IBMARC usuld affirm that all member et111 ties seuld commit to the guidelines by amending their lutC approved security plans.
Comitments made in such plans are, to fact, inspecseble and enforceable by the IRC. Momever, stase such a commitment would entail adherence to much stricter evalsation criteria than presently included in industry screening standards, potential for a higher degru of intrusiveness muld esist than under present programs. For this reason, if 15tC is to inspect and i
enforce the program an appeals procedure for a dented or l revoked clearance is considered a necessary element of the program. An appeals process is an integral part of the staff proposed rule (Enclosure A) but is not cantained in the mMARC guidelines; it is reportedly a feature which IRMARC does not endorse, mile the RMARC proposal is consisteet with precedent con-carning industry self-regulation already established or under consideration by the Commission, (i.e., " Fitness for Duty" and
" personnel Training and Qualification"), the staff favors federal regulation of this japortant security program for the same general reasons previcesly given in relation to the personnel training and fitness for duty programs. Specific reasons in support of the staff's position in this instance are the need to assure that 1) the privacy rights of individuals will be protected; 2) a standardized program that will achieve consistent application with appropriate oversight is taplemented throughout the industry; 3) consideration of union views as expressed during a December 1,1983 Commission briefing is taken; 4) for consistency an access authorization program rusains as a regulatory requirement with di~ rect IWtc oversight as is the case with all other phases of the 15tC security program (physical protection, guard training, and contingency plans); 5) a well defined sechanism exists to assure prompt and effective runedial action to correct security program deficien-cies; and 5) an appeal procedure to assure "due process" is assured for individuals that may be the subject of adverse ~
actions as a result of this program. Further, it is also noted that on several occasions responses to Congressional inquiries indicated that the Cannission planned to achieve increased assurance against the insider through the issuance of the Access Authorization Rule.
t i
- Sy letter of Septaber 4,1985, the Chairman of the EMARC Wrking Group on i Security advised that IRMARC leadership will discuss the matter of oversight l and enforcement with senior 10tC management at some future date. IRMARC's ability to enforce its cemitments over dissenting utility ammbers will be discussed at
- this time.
l
__.,-m-----,--n.-.
, --.--,.-e-- - - - , - - - - , --.,,,---n., e-----,-,---w, --,,,-,,c--,,,ne--- ,---m---m,
a I
The Commissioners '
i 1he manner in which the proposed rule is structured considers several important factors. First, analysis of public comments indicated that all three temponents of the proposed screening rule are presently being used, to varying degrees, by nuclear l power utilities. Second industry standards, such as the current l AN5! 3.3, Security for Nuclear power plants, utilize a three component screening program. Inire, une preponderance of professional opinion from individual psychologists / psychiatrists, the acadamic community, and behavioral science firms, as noted in comments en the proposed rule, recammend the use of all three elements. Finally, a substantial number of individual utilities cammented fsvorably on all three elements of the program as recommended.
Analysis of public comments for this' rule also included public responses to 11 questions in the supporting statement of the Federal Register notice for the F;M rule for which the Commission requested specific causeent. Summaries of responses are included in Enclosure A-1. Detailed responses are found in Enclosure A-2. dich will be 'available for inspection and copying in the NRC public Document Room.
Search Requirement Rule J
No significant comments relating to this proposed rule were-received and its publication in final form without change is recommended.
Miscellaneous Safeguards-Related Amenements The majority of comments received on this rule related to the vital island concept and areas to be designated as independent vital islands. These causnonts indicated same confusion over the optional nature of the concept and huu it is to interface with on-going vital area designation studies. Since the basic assumptions for these vital area designation studies are under review at this time by an interoffice task force and results of this review may impact upon precisely what areas are designated as vital er need be protected independently, the staff helieves it is appropriate to postpone the introduction of this concept within the regulations at this time.
heendments and supporting Regulatory Guide have been revised i accordingly.
I Recommendation: That the Comunission:
l
- 1. Approve publication of the amendments set forth in Enclosure A-1, 5-1, and C-1, as final rules.
l i
- 2. Certify that these rules will not have a significant econanic l !
l tapact on a substantial number of small antities in order to satisfy requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 5 U.S.C.
, l 405(b).
]
The Commissioners .
l 3. Note:
a) That the amendments to 10 CFR parts 50 and 73 will be l published in the Federal Register and ' licensees will be !
required to submit within 120 days planned actions in :
response to the final rules.
b) That this rule is the type of action described in I categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3). Therefore, ;
neither an environmental impact statement nor en
' environmental assessment has been prepared for this rule, c) The supporting statement for tan recordkeeping and
+ reporting requirements contained in this package uns previously submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (98) during proposed rule stage. WS's response indicated the need for receipt of additional detailed justification before WEB could approve the information collection and recordkeeping requirements needed to f
implement these requirements. The supporting state-j ment has been revised by the BC staff to respond to We request and is being resesitted to WS for approval.
d) A public announcement has been prepared for the rule.
. asking. See Enclosure A-3.
e) The IWtc staff will inform the Subcammittee on Energy and Environment of the House Counittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the Subconsittee on Energy and power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the Subcommittee on Environmem, Energy, and Natural Resources of the House Cmunittaa on Government Operations ,
and the Subcommittee on Nucler Regulation of the Senate Committee on Environment and Riblic Works of this action by letters such as Enclosures A-4, 8-3, and C-3.
' f) The Federal Register Notice of rulemaking will be dis-
! tributed by ADM to power reactor licensees / permit holders, applicants for a construction permit for a power reactor, public interest groups, and affected nuclear utility contractors.
I g) That the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration will be informed of the certification and i
1 l
l l
J __
The Capumissioners .
the revisten for it as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
I
~
scheduling: The staff requests scheduling at an rly policy session.
/)
AL i
Wt111 . rcks -
Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
A. Final Rule Package, Access Authorization Program S. Final Rule Package, Search j Requ1raments C. Final Rule Package, Riscellaneous Asenements
! 0. Guidelines for Industry Access Authorization Program 1
Comunissioners' consrents should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, December 20, 1985.
Comunission Staff office comuments, if any, should be submitted i to the Comunissioners NLT Thursday, December 12, 1985, with an i information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper i is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comument, the Coemissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
. Affirmation will be scheduled when we have received Comissioner votes on this paper.
DISTRIBUTION:
Constissioners OGC OPE OI OCA OIA I OPA REGIONAL OFFICES EDO ELD ACRS ASLBP ASLAP SECY
! 1 l
i
y,cgd k bkbb 0M# > i U~~
,' 'A t l
i INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES: JUSTIFICATION IN RESPONSE ID 10 CFR 5W.109 The objective of the proposed Insider Safeguards Rules is to provide increased assurance against the " insider" threat at power reactor facilities through -
such measures as employee screening and refined search and access control procedures. Based upon Comunission research and analysis, both the need for and ,
l difficulty in protecting against the malevolent insider threat at power reactors has long been recognized. Hence, in 1977, the Comunission directed 1
the staff to develop the requirement for a screening program of reactor ,
employees based upon investigation of an jndividual's past history along I with current and continuing anotional stability assessment to assist in i
countering this threat. It is fully recognized that additional reporting 4
and recordkeeping burden will be imposed on licensees in meeting these ,
- new requirewnts which include background investigations, psychological assessments and behavioral observation as the major components of the trustworthiness progran. (It is noted, however, that och of the
- industry currently utilizes such a three component prograa to varying i
j degrees) . Background investigations have long been recognized as a valid screening tool in both civil and government sectors. Psychological ,
I s assessnent and behavioral observation programs have been used extensively l
}
as adjuncts to background investigations in screening out individuals l l
- showing tendencies toward aberrant behavior. As an example, psychological 1 assessment tests have long been in use by the FAA in identification of 1 individuals unsuitable for high stress positions such as air traffic l controllers. The utility of psychological assessment has withstood i
scrutiny by the U.S. Civil Service Comunission. The increased assurance l l
- i t
$ t
- _ . - _ ___ .- _ - _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ - . ~ . - - - _
1 i
against insider sabotage derived from these programs is considered to far outweigh the regulatory burden igosed by this action. (Full discussion j 1
of cost impacts may be found in the value impact statements for the package.) i The need for rulemaking has been confirmed by both the General Accounting
! Office and Congressional Consmittee; the NRC has cannitted to both parties that I progress in this area is forthcoming.
- Based upon the above factors, expert opinion, and best available data, it is i
believed that a decreased risk from insider reactor sabotage will result l
from issuance of this rulesaking and, hence, its promulgation will provide a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and -
sa fe ty.
i 1
l 1 I i
disk 9/ file U/ draft jr/PDwyer I
_ . . - - - . - . - . - - . . - - - - - . - . .