ML20197C459

Forwards Pages to Miscellaneous Amends Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants, 10CFR50 & 73 Final Rules.Regulations Amended to Provide for Refined Area Access Controls & Suspension of Safeguards During Emergencies

ML20197C459
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/31/1986
From:	Jennifer Davis NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Simpson A SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS
Shared Package
ML20197C372	List: ML20197C368 ML20197C398 ML20197C417 ML20197C437 ML20197C447 ML20197C459 ML20197C466 ML20197C486 ML20197C542 ML20197C550 ML20197C558 ML20197C584 ML20197C611 ML20197C617 ML20197C623 ML20197C631 ML20197J540 ML20197K002 ML20197K192 ML20198A267 ML20198G623
References
FRN-49FR30726, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-73 AA36-2-010, AA36-2-10, NUDOCS 8611060185
Download: ML20197C459 (14)

Text

..PQ. M301 DISTRIBUTION NMSS r/f SGRT r/f & s/f

& 31196 PDwyer ,

JYardumlan RBurnett WBrown The Honorable Alan Simpson, Chairman RErickson Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation DMausshardt Committee on Environment and Public Works

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JDavis United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations to provide a more safety-conscious safeguards system at nuclear power plants while main-taining current-levels of protection. The requirements are being promulgated

, in light of an NRC review of the impact of safeguards requirements on plant 1 safety objectives. The amendments provide for: (1) refined vital area access controls, (2) authority to suspend safeguards measures during safety emergencies, (3) protection of certain security equipment the destruction of which could significantly impact nuclear plant security, and (4) refined key and lock controls. These amendments are interrelated and designed to provide a balanced safety / safeguards approach while maintaining an appropriate level of protection.

l Licensees are required to submit, within 120-days of the effective date,.

amendments to their security plans which will define how the new requirements will be met. A Regulatory Guide will also be published to provide information 1

to licensees to aid in the implementation of the new requirements. The Guide '

will be transmitted to you Jnder separate cover. The rule and Regulatory Guide have undergone a 210-day public comment period.

Sincerely, I

(SIGNED) John G. Davis John G. Davis, Director 4 + Office of Nuclear Material Safety 2

and Safeguards

Enclosure:

Federal Register Notice I cc: Senator Gary Hart

• Identical letters sent to: Representative Markey, w/cc to Rep. Moorhead Representative Udall, w/cc to Rep. Lujan i d ../ . . .

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86 :7/ 7 /86  : f/ 4 /86 : l/ /86 :7/ *./86

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0FFICIAL' RECORD COPY i

! h1C'g1ES861104 50 49FR30726 PDR il l

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PARTS 50 AND 73 MISCELLANEOUS AMEN 0MENTS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatcry Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations _

to provide a more safety-conscious safeguards system while maintaining current levels of protection. The revised requirements are a result of a Commission review of the impact of safeguards requirements on plant .

safety objectives. The amendments include refined policy on vital area access controls, authority to suspend safeguards measures during safety emergencies, protection of certain items of security equipment which significantly impact nuclear plant security, and key and lock controls.

This amendment supports the Commission's goal of increased assurance that power reactors are adequately protected against sabotage by an insider.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 3, 1986.

I FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Dwyer, Division of Safe-guards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 427-4773.

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publication in proposed form. The original 120-day public comment period was extended an additional 90 days at public request ar.d expired on March 7, 1985. Changes to the proposed rule have been made in response

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to public comment and to provide clarification where necessary. A sum-mary of public comment and, where appropriate, a description of the changes that resulted from them follows. Minor conforming amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, which were subject to public comment as part of the Access Authorization Rule of the Insider Safeguards Rules (49 FR 30726), are included within these amendments because of the Commission's disapproval of final issuance of the Access Authorization Rule. No public comment -

was received on these conforming amendments to 10 CFR Part 50.

RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS .

A total of 34 letters of comment were' received from utilities, util-l ity associations, contractors, private citizens, and State governments.

The comments addressed a number of issues and have been placed in the following categories:

1. VitalIslandConcept/IndependentVitaiIslands

2. Barriers and Intrusion Alarms

3. Access Lists / Logs

4. Suspension of Safeguards Measures

5. Key / Lock / Badge

6. Clarification of Terms

1. Vital Island Concept /Indeoendent Vital Islands. The proposed rule introduced the concept of the " vital island" as one or more vital 3

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revised accordingly. This deletion also impacts the " sunshine door" provi-sion of these amendments. Further discussion of this issue is found in the discussion of the second category of issues, 2. Barriers and Intrusion Alarms. 'The remaining proposed amendments of the Miscellaneous Amendments are not impacted and go forward as a final rule.

2. Barriers and Intrusion Alarms. Commenters expressed concern regarding the intent of proposed S 73.55(d)(7)(1)(D) to lock and protect by an active intrusion alarm system all exterior doors leading to vital islands which are not otherwise controlled. It was felt this could result in protection in excess of the current required double barriers. -

It was also recommended that the term " active" be changed to " activated."

Further, proposed S 73.55(c)(2) requires the physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area to be separated from any other barrier _

designated as a physical barrier for a vital area or island within the protected area. Commenters felt that this requirement may not be pract-ical in areas such as the gate house and the water intake structure which often times are located at the protected area perimeter.

As previously noted, the vital island concept has been deleted from the rule on an interim basis pending finalization of vital area policy.

Because of this fact, the Commission believes the requirement to lock and alarm all exterior doors leading to vital areas (or islands) can also be deleted on an interim basis. The rule has been modified accord-ingly. With regard to,the term " active," the Commission agrees with comment in this area and has changed the term " active" to " activated" within the regulatory text to allow for the use of balanced magnetic switches in accordance with current procedures.

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31 days. Commenters indicated that both of these requirements are un-necessary and over. burdensome. In a related matter, commenters suggested that the term " log" be revised to allow use of a procedure or system. .

The " Commission disagrees that the term " log' needs revision. The intent of this provision is to retain a record of all personnel who entered or exited vital areas at a facility; this may be acccmolished through a written log or computerized system. The Commission believes that requiring data explaining the reason for vital area entry may be overly burdensome and limit the use of computerized systems. Hence this particular portion of the requirement has been deleted. This is consid- -

ered acceptable because the requirement to update access lists at least once every 31 days will remain. This assures that only individuals whose specified duties require access to vital areas are allowed access. .

4. Susoension of Safeguards Measures. Several commenters specifically supported the amendment addressing the suspension of safeguards measures. It was requested that clarification be provided regarding the licensee's responsibility of reporting the suspension of safeguards measures. It was recommended that the suspension of safeguards measures be tested during drills and exercises in order to i

adequately evaluate the system. Additional guidance was requested  ;

I regarding how this provision is to interface with existing regulation l of a similar nature, i.e., S 50.54(e' and (y).

In response to public comment the Commission has revised the provi-sion for the suspension of safeguards measures to directly relate to the provisions of 5 50.54(x) and (y) and to indicate explicitly that the 7

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considered merely prudent action to change or rotate the locks and combina-l tions to which these individuals had access. Additionally, the Commission I

believes the changing or rotating of all access devices at least every i

12 months is a minimum requirement necessary.to reduce the potential for

compromise.

The intent of the requirement to retrieve identification badges prior to termination is to disallow these employees from having unescorted facil-

! ity access after they have received notice of termination but have not been formally terminated from employment. This accommodates licensee

! processing time. No revision has been made to the rule in this respect; s

however, the issue will be clarified in the rule's supporting Regulatory Guide.

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6. Clarification of Terms. Commenters requested clarification ~of -

10 terms or phrases contained in the proposed Miscellaneous Amendments.

These terms have either been dropped because of deletion of the vital island concept and independent vital island provision or have been '

covered previously in this discussion.

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l ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: Categorical Exclusion i

i The NRC has determined this rule is the type of action described l in categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3). Therefore neither an i

environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been 4

prepared for this rule, l

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within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121. ,

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These regulations will affect some nuclear power industry contractors and j vendors most of whom are large concerns who service the industry.

f BACKFIT ANALYSIS 4

As required by 10 CFR 50.109 (50 FR 38097), the Commission has

completed a backfit analysis for this final rule. This analysis, along with a summary regulatory analysis, follows.

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SUMMARY

REGULATORY ANALYSIS

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1. Objective. The objective of this rule is to provide a more .

4 safety-conscious safeguards system while maintaining current levels of safeguards protection at nuclear power plants. Commission experience since the implementation of 9 73.55, ' Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage," indicated a need to clarify policy for the protection of vital

areas containing safety-related equipment. Particular concern has been I

focused on ensuring that security measures do not impede plant safety.

Inspections have indicated that certain physical security equipment is not protected as vital, despite the fact that the equipment safeguards vital areas containing essential safety-related equipment. In addition, 4

experience with key and lock controls indicates that S 73.55 can be i

modified to provide greater flexibility while continuing to maintain i

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4. Potential Imoact on Radiological Excosure of Facility Employees.

Assuring that safeguards measures (particularly in the area of access /

egress controls to vital areas) do not have an adverse impact on plant safety during emergencies reduces the potential impact on radiological i

exposure of facility employees.

Further, protection of specific security equipment as vital which has not previously been protected as vital reduces the risk of the equip-ment being sabotaged and, hence, reduces the risk of a radioactive release.

Thus, this action also reduces the potential impact on radiological exposure of facility employees. -

5. Installation and Continuing Costs.

Implementation Cost Per Site $10.2K l Annual Operational Savings Per Sita $15.0K -

l (due to key and lock control revisions)

6. Potential Safety Impact of Changes in Plant or Ooerational ,

Complexity.

(a) Maintaining current access lists to vital areas will increase plant safety by helping to assure that only authorized individuals are granted access to these areas.

(b) Designing a facility's access authorization system to accom-i modate the need for rapid ingress / egress of individuals during emergen-cies reduces the complexity of plant operation during safety-related emergencies.

(c) Authority to suspend safeguards measures during safety-related emergencies reduces the complexity of plant operations during such

emergencies.

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j by unauthorized individuals intent upon committing radiological sabotage.

Controlling access to.these areas, including the use of access lists updated every 31 days, contributes significantly to the protection of the public health and safety because of the sensitive nature of vital areas.

Authority to suspend safeguards measures during safety-related emergencies will facilitate plant access by emergency response personnel. For this reason certain site emergencies with the potential to result in a radio-active release might be mitigated in a more timely manner by emergency response personnel, thereby preventing a radioactive release. In this situation, the protection of the public health and safety would be -

1 e significantly increased. The specific security equipment that would be ,

l protected as vital under these amendments are onsite secondary power supplies for alarm annunciator equipment and nonportable communications -

equipment. Protection of this equipment as vital will help assure proper operation of the central alarm station during a safeguards emergency, and, further, will help assure communications with local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) in such an emergency. The ability of the site security force to respond to site emergencies in a cohesive, timely manner, and to call upon LLEA, if neeced, significantly increases the assurance that the public health and safety will be adequately assured. Finally, reducing the operational complexity of key and lock controls while assuring that l

these controls remain adequate, will permit safer plant operation. This ,

results in an overall increase in the protection of the public health and j

, safety. In conclusion, these amendments, in toto, will result in a

} significant increase in the protection of the public health and safety.

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For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73.

PART 50--00MESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

1. The authority citation for Part 50 is revised to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186,.189, 68 Stat. 936, .

937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232,'2233, 2236, 2239, 2282);

secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. .

5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat.

2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L.97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152).

Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273), SS 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b));

SS 50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, i

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3. In S 50.54, paragraph (p) is revised to read as follows:

S 50.54 Conditions of licenses.

a = = = n (p) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contingency plan procedures in accordance with Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 for effecting the actions and, decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the safeguards contingency plan. The licensee may make no change which would decrease the effectiveness of a security plan, or guard training and qualification plan prepared pursuant to S 50.34(c),

50.34(f), or Part 73 of this chapter, or of the first four categories of information (Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, Responsibility Matrix) contained in a licensee safeguards contingency plan prepared pursuant to S 50.54(d) or Part 73, as applicable, without -

prior approval of the Commission. A licensee desiring to make such a change shall submit an application for an amendment to the licensee's license pursuant to S 50.90.

The licensee may make changes to plans referenced above without prior Ccmmission approval if the changes do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. The licensee shall maintain records of changes to the plans made without prior Commission approval for a period of two years from the date of the change, and shall furnish to the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (for enrichment and reprocessing facilities) or the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (for nuclear reactors), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter, a report containing a description of each change within two months after the change is made. Ccmmencing on February 9, 1983, Licensees in Regions I and II, and commencing on 19

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. PART 73--PHYSICAL PROT 5CTION OF PLANTS AND MAT 5 RIALS i

4 The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as J  :

l follows:

i AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147,

! 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1212, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841,-5844).

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Section 73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L 96-295, j

i 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). .

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

l 2273); SS 73.21, 73.37(g), and 73.55 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat.

l 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); SS 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, i

j 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. ,

i j 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C.'2201(i)); and SS 73.20(c)(1),

73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f),

73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2), (3)(iii)(B) and j (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(iii)(B), 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued i under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42.U.S.C. 2201(c)).

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c. In S 73.55, the introductory paragraph, paragraph (a),

paragraphs (d)(7) and (d)(9), and paragraph (e)(1) are revised to read as

] follows:

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S 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in 1 nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

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section. Specif#cally, in the special cases cf.l.icensed operating reac-tors with adjacent reactor power plants uncer construction, the licensee shall provide and maintain a level of physical protection of the operat-ing reactor against radiclogical sabotage equivalent to the requirements J

of this section. Ir. &cccrdance wit 5 SS $0 54(x) and (y) of Part 50, the licensee may suspend any safeguards neasures pursuant to S 73.55 in an emergency when this action is innediately needed to protect the public i health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions 3r.d technical specification that can oravide adequate or equivalent protec-tion is immediately apparant. This suspension must be approved as a minimum by a lice 1 sed senior operator prior to taking the action. The I

suspension of safeguards measures must be reported in accordance with the provisions of 9 73.71. Reports made under S 50.72 need not be dupli-cated under S 73 71 a n n n n (d) Access r equirements. ***

(7) The licensee shall: 1 (i) Establish aq access authnrization system to limit unescorted access to vital areas during noremergency conditions to individuals we.o require access in order to perform their duties. To achieve this, the licensee shall:

i (A) Establish current authorization access lists for each vital area. The access lists must be updated and reapproved by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days. The licensee shall include on the access list only individuals whose specific duties require access te vital areas during nonemergency conditions.

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[7590-013 licansee shall issue keys, lo:ks,' combinations, and other accass cor. teel devices to protected areas and sital areas only to oersons cranted unescorted facility access." Whenever an individual's unascorted access -

1-3 revoked due to his cr her lack of trustworthiness, reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combi.1ations, and ralateo access control devices to which that person had access mast ba changed o* ictated.

(e) Detection aids. (1) til alarms required pursuant to this cart must annunciate in a contintously manned central alarm station located 1

within tne protected araa and in at least one other continrously manrad .

station not necessarily onsite, so that a singla act cznnot remove the capability of calling for assistanca or otherwise responding to an alarm.

Tne onsite central alarn station must be located within a builoing in .

such a manner that the interior of the central .11 arm station is not vis-10le from the perimeter of the protected area. This station must not contain any operational activities that wcuid interfere with the execution of the alarm response function. The walls, doors, floor, ceiling. and any windows in the walls and in the doors of the central alarm station shall be bullet-resisting. On site secondary pcwer supply systems for alarm an-nunciator aquipment and non portable communications aquipment as required in paragraph (f) of this section must be located within vital areas.

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6. In S 73.70, paragraph (d) is revised to read at follows:

5 73.70 Records.

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