ML20197C623
| ML20197C623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/09/1985 |
| From: | Gagner S NRC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA) |
| To: | Dwyer P NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197C372 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-49FR30726, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-73 AA36-2-030, AA36-2-30, AB17-2-28, NUDOCS 8611060308 | |
| Download: ML20197C623 (4) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES g g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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- August 9, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Priscilla A. Dwyer, NMSS FROM: Sue Gagner Public Affairs Officer Office of Public Affairs
SUBJECT:
DRAFT PUBLIC ANN 0UNCEMENT Enclosed for your comments and approval is a draft public announcement on the three final rules that make up the insider safeguards package. As we discussed, OPA believes a single announcement ic preferable to one for each rule -- assuming all three rules are published in the Federal Register on the same day.
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Sue F. Gagner Public Affairs Officer Office of Public Affairs Enclosure 8611060308 861104 PDR PR SO 49FR30726 PDR
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DRAFT NRC CHANGES REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AGAINST SAB0TAGE BY INSIDERS The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations for the safeguarding of nuclear power plants against sabotage by employees and other insiders.
4 The revisions fall into three areas: access authorization programs for licensee employees and contractors with access to controlled areas, search requirements for individuals seeking entrance to protected plant areas and miscellaneous amendments on other safeguards issues.
The access authorization regulations require that nuclear power plant licensees conduct a background investigation, psychological assessment and continual behavioral observation program for persons who need unescorted access to protected areas and vital areas of the plant site. " Protected areas" are areas that have controlled access and are enclosed by physical barriers such as fences or walls. " Vital areas" are areas containing equipment or systems whose failure could endanger the public health and safety.
Any person who is employed at a licensee site on the effective date of this rule and who has been screened in accordance with an industry standard will not be required to have a background investigation or psychological assessment. He or she will, however, still be subject to behavioral observation requirements, aimed at detecting changes in behavior that could be 1 hazardous to the public health and safety.
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DRAFT The access authorization program will be run and administered by the industry, with the licensee having responsibiliity for granting, denying, suspending, or revoking an individual's unescorted access authorization.
Licensees are required to submit for Commission approval an access authorization plan describing how they will meet the new regulations.
The background investigation inquires into a person's employment, ;
credit, educational, military, character, and criminal history for the past l five years.
The psychological assessment consists of (1) written personality tests and (2) clinical interviews for persons whose personality tests were invalid or indicated abnormal personality traits. The clinical interviews must be conducted by qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologists or psychiatrists.
Continual behavioral observation--the third part of the access authorization program--is designed to detect behavior changes in a person that might be observable in a person as changes in job performance, competence, or judgment capabilities.
4 The new search requirements require utilities licensed to operate l nuclear power plants to use explosives and firearms detection equipment to search all individuals seeking entry to protected areas. When detection equipment is not in place or is inoperable, all individuals will be subject to physical pat-down searches. In addition, any person suspected of carrying contraband will be subject to a pat-down search.
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DRAFT Finally, the miscellaneous amendments on safeguards issues include:
- a. Refinement of requirements for access to vital areas to ensure adequate access for safety purposes as well as necessary physical security protection. For example, changes to vital area access controls during emergency conditions include a requirement that licensees periodically review physical protection and contingency plans to ensure that they do not conflict with safety objectives. The rules also allow licensees to suspend safeguards 4
measures if necessary to facilitate response to an emergency condition.
- b. Protection of specified physical security equipment that could impact significantly the security of the plant if it were sabotaged. For example, the rule requires that secondary power supplies for intrusion alarms and
! nonportable communications be located within vital areas.
- c. A requirement that keys, locks, and ' combinations be changed or rotated once each year and whenever a person's access authorization is revoked for cause or compromise of the locks is suspected. The present regulations require a change when any employee with access to a key, lock or combination leaves. -
t A set of proposed regulations on access authorization, entry search and l miscellaneous safeguards requirements was published in the Federal Register for public comment on August-1, 1984. Changes made as a result of the comments received and details of the final rules are described in a Federal Register notice published on . By (120 days after publication of the Federal Register-notice) licensees must submit for Commission approval a plan describing how they will. comply with the i l
new requirements.
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'S.,,',;# August 16, 1985 ,J l
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c, e MEMORANDUM FOR: UN-CDWfG Director
'difiEe'If'Ndiflear Material Safety and Safeguards FROM: Harold R.'Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES.- FINAL. RULES The Office of. Nuclear Reactor Regulation has reviewed the Final Insider
- Safeguards Rules and concurs in all the revisicns made in response to public comment.
We 'sould like to commend the NMSS staff for a very comprehensive job on
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this rule.
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Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 4
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